KISSATA: ‘Concerned Citizens’, recon, and internet conspiracy theories
This is a story not of an active militia group, but of an interesting phenomenon in American militia history that didn’t make much of a narrative dent in terms of current patriot/Constitutionalist militia analysis. Many writers currently talking about American militias specifically and American extremist tendencies more broadly may, of course, know about this group and have their ideas informed by it, but few mention it .
This is the story of KISSATA, or the ‘Concerned Citizens’ organization “Keep It Simple and don’t be Stupid Anti-Terrorist Alliance.
KISSATA was a loose-knit group of people across several states that primarily tried to discover the newest potential terror plots from the early 2000’s to early 2010’s. Most members knew each other through online spaces, with a few cases of family members or close friends introduced to the group’s work.
KISSATA did have its own unique webspace for a time. There they hosted information about the group and its priorities, including this mission statement page:
There are a multiple things that can be examined from this mission statement and tied to some of KISSATA operations. These will be detailed below.
“[training] others, so they can go out and train others, and so on”.
The model upon which KISSATA based its training module is their own perception of the US Special Forces’ Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG). CIDG policy is largely comprised of Green Beret ‘counterinsurgency’ efforts in Vietnam, where paramilitary units were recruited from minority populations that liked neither the North or South Vietnamese forces. An awkward irony in understanding here is that KISSATA ‘CIDGs’ were primarily from white populations and they weren’t operating in a war environment.
Many American militias do engage in community training exercises, seeking to educate people in survival skills or Constitutional knowledge. Most KISSATA operations originated from online spaces or semi-online spaces to this end. However, when compared to many other militias, community training was no major priority for KISSATA, eclipsed by some of their other activities.
“We wish to bring skills … that could be crucial to survival should a disaster or terrorist attack cause a situation where the police and military could not come to our aid …
“…[We] wish to establish an environment where no terrorist group…would be stupid enough to attack the American public with small arms, or in small armed groups.”
KISSATA operated within a particular media environment, with TEA Party activism and ‘Infidel’ stickers on pick-up trucks in full American swing. The impact of this cultural moment for some people in the US is easily noted, from its inclusion in KISSATA’s mission statement to their “anti-terrorist” name.
A lot of KISSATA organizing against “terrorist group[s]” involved looking up suspicious-sounding names in Google Maps/Google Earth, driving to nearby locations they found, and reporting back to forums. Much in the same way that Reddit investigations go, many of these ‘operations’ resulted in jumping to conclusions.
For example, an oft-cited ‘terrorist’ compound was in “Aliville, GA”. The site was the location of an alleged Muslims of America / Jamaat al-Fuqra free territory.
Numerous “investigators” went to Aliville, passing along directions and assorted photos of street signs and “DEAD END” posts. One KISSATA individual even flew a plane over the compound to surveil it, though they could not provide images from the sky aside from the same few screenshots of Google Maps.
Many accounts of visiting the supposed compounds included witnesses expressing their fear at seeing certain signs, detailing how quickly they fled the area, or describing how justified they were to be stalking particular rural roads.
There is no real record of any organized attack on such compounds, though KISSATA folks documented how often they showed up in these communities to snoop around or harass residents. Several conservative news outlets wrote about these alleged “terrorist training camps”, both before KISSATA folks started talking about the areas and well after KISSATA people mostly lost interest. No terror attacks were claimed by these monitored communities.
“KISSATA sincerely hopes to be of value in networking and bringing [like-minded] individuals and organizations together on a national level … and break away from the current situation of fragmented and secretive localized groups…
Like many contemporary American militias, KISSATA saw a fragmented armed militia movement as a major hurdle to affecting change in the US. To combat this, they aimed to use online networking as well as meetings known as “gatherings of tribes” to build connections nationally. KISSATA members frequented online forums and a set of shared websites. Members of the Illinois KISSATA were of great prominence in organzing online spaces and physical meet-ups, though members hailed from as far from Illinois as Florida.
From the beginning, the head of KISSATA used the name “Commander Klicks” — or “Klick” for forum posts — and wrote and distributed a central KISSATA text, known as the Handbook. Klick also printed and bound the KISSATA Handbook before shipping it to people who had ordered the text. By 2016, no more handbooks were being printed by the KISSATA commander. Alongside the handbooks, “Death to Terrorists” stickers were a popular buy for online members.
Most members of KISSATA forums used usernames with military and firearm references included, from “Flintlock Jack” to “M203TANGO” to “Garand69”.
Their forum use was expansive, offering a place for members to discuss the news, order the KISSATA handbook, and share information with new members.
Like some other militia organizations (including the Watchmen), KISSATA also had a chatroom with a set meeting time for members to hang out and talk online.
In June 2007, the first time that KISSATA met for training with representatives from multiple states, it had just under half a dozen ‘CIDGs’, or militia units (technically, a unit would only be a CIDG per Green Beret operations if it was comprised of locals and without any central authority beyond the CIA). They spent this weekend of meeting time to camp in the woods with their rifles and even brought along a dog.
In addition to providing a platform for organization or investigating theorized terror threats, KISSATA online forums allowed for significant social sharing between members. Whether it was to talk about their families or to share a photo album of a motorcycle trip through Georgia, the most active KISSATA forum members were particularly interested in interacting as often as possible through cyberspace. This personal sharing was often met with enthusiasm and encouragement. In many cases, those who often posted social posts were some of the last remaining KISSATA online members, writing into the void wondering where everyone else had gone or answering questions of the same.
”…and distance ourselves from the politically motivated, racists, egomaniacs, and those who engage in illegal activities”
Many American militias declare themselves as not tolerant of racists or criminals within their ranks. In this sense, KISSATA was no different from the III%, making similar statements about undesirable politics in their militia space.
However, a lot of KISSATA operations or the operations of KISSATA members were in direct odds with this phrase from their mission statement. From harassing Arab and Black folk in rural areas to confronting individuals based upon their names, KISSATA operatives constantly profiled people they didn’t know and reported back their aggressively-toned information about the encounters.
For these actions, it is surprising that there were not a lot of reported murders or attempted murders of people living in the communities that KISSATA folks were stalking. Perhaps the online-to-action causal chains had not been solidified among KISSATA ranks or maybe the ‘compounds’ KISSATA encountered disbanded instead of dealing with constant tresspassing.
KISSATA did fall apart a few years ago and a lot of their archival materials are now dead links. Its Facebook pages have been silent since 2011 or completely cleared of content and members. One awkward remaining footprint of the group is in a LifeHacker article about making a poncho into a tent, sourced directly from (and with knowledge of) the KISSATA forums.
KISSATA was a largely unimpactful organization, but they provide an interesting case study for the analysis of the connection between online militia networking and real world action.
