From Apple to Adidas: Brands Use Ethnic Minority Slave Labor in China
Between 2017 and 2019, more than 80,000 Uyghurs were transferred to work in 27 manufacturing facilities that supply 83 global brands
Since 2017, China has drawn the attention of international human rights activists about the massive and forced transfer of Uyghurs to so-called “re-education” camps. Uyghurs are a Turkic speaking Muslim minority who mainly live in Central Asia, in the Xinjiang region, a province in northwestern China home to several ethnic minorities. After “graduating” from the camps, they are sent to work in factories in different regions of the country in slavery-like conditions. Away from their families, with controlled mobility and without the right to practice their religion, the policy reinforces state control in the region and guarantees Chinese factories access to cheap labor.
From 2017 to 2019, the Australian Institute of Strategic Policies (ASPI) exposed the forced transfer of more than 80,000 Uyghurs to 27 manufacturing facilities that supply 83 global brands, including Adidas, Apple, Amazon, Gap, H&M, Microsoft, Nike, Sony, Victoria’s Secret and Zara. The institute’s report gathers information from the past three years collected from Chinese State media, official government notifications, analysis of satellite images, and academic research. It points to clear pieces of evidence of slave-like labor in such factories. The practices stipulated by the “re-education camps” violate international human rights, the Chinese constitution — which prohibits discrimination based on ethnicity and religious belief — and are called a “government-led cultural genocide” by experts.
The forced Uyghur migration has been taking place in China for at least twenty years. But the country only recognized the existence of such a system, and the camps, in 2018, as a response to international pressure. Still, the tone used by Chinese spokesmen to address the issue is positive. In essence, officials deny the use of Xinjiang’s workforce, and the Chinese media declares that participation in the programs is voluntary. However, Uyghurs who manage to escape this system report scenes of constant vigilance, fear, political indoctrination, torture, and privation.
They come at night
In 2019, journalist Isobel Yeung traveled to Ürümqi, Xinjiang, to report on the daily lives of the Uyghur population in the region. With a hidden camera, she filmed the countless surveillance cameras on the streets, the approaches she suffered by the police — especially because of her appearance, which, according to locals, resembles the Uyghurs — and the low and frightened voices of those who were willing to tell about police repression.
In Turkey, she met with former prisoners who managed to escape. The reports are similar to the way the Uyghurs described being taken to camps: “they arrest people at night. They want people to disappear and not to be traceable,” says Omir Bekali, an Uyghur who was forced to confess to crimes such as coordinating with and sheltering terrorists. An anonymous woman said she was arrested because she studied the Koran and learned Arabic. “They told me I tried to corrupt people’s ideology and divide the country,” she says.
According to the ASPI report, if a Quran is found in Uyghur’s belongings or cell phone, they can be sent to the re-education camp for 3 to 5 years. For the government, such a policy is necessary because the Uyghurs are “a terrorist and separatist threat” and classified as “people infected with extremist thinking.” In an interview for BBC, Xinjiang’s foreign affairs office representative, Zhisheng Zhang, questioned: “Some people, before committing murder, already show that they are capable of killing. Should we wait for them to commit the crime?”
Journalist John Sudworth visited one of the camps and captured, behind staged scenes and forged happiness, the pain, and repression suffered by the Muslim minority. Uyghurs report that they are forced to eat pork, memorize nationalist songs, learn Mandarin, do self-criticism sessions — all to distance themselves from their culture, mother tongue, and resemble the image of the ethnic Han majority.
The government carefully records information not only from captured people but also from their family and friends through a central database developed by the Human Resources and Social Affairs Department of Xinjiang. It was through such documents that journalist Isobel was able to locate an Uyghur’s sister, captured by the Chinese government. Although Rozinisa Tohti migrated to Turkey 17 years ago, both her information and her sister’s behavior in the re-education camp have been thoroughly compiled. When an Uyghur is considered fit to “graduate,” they are sent to factories in Xinjiang and other provinces, which maintain the isolation and the same repressive character.
From the re-education camp to the factory
In 2017, 20,859 “surplus rural workers,” as the State calls many Uyghurs, were transferred to work in other provinces. In 2018 and 2019, there were 28,000 and 32,000 people, respectively. In those facilities, they live in separate dormitories, continue Mandarin and ideology classes after working hours, and are under surveillance all the time. The International Labour Organization (ILO) lists 11 indicators of forced labor. Relevant indicators in the case of Uyghur workers include: being subjected to intimidation and threats, being in a position of dependency and vulnerability — such as having family members threatened in Xinjiang — and excessive workload.
One of the cases studied by ASPI is the Qingdao Taekwang Shoes Co. Ltd factory. In January 2020, it employed around 600 workers, mostly women, from Xinjiang ethnic minorities. The company’s main customer is Nike — more than seven million pairs are produced at the factory annually. The Washington Post reported that Uyghur workers were not allowed to go home on vacation. Photos published by the newspaper show that the site is equipped with watchtowers, barbed wire, and facial recognition cameras. Inside the complex, Uyghurs are also isolated: they barely speak Mandarin and eat at a restaurant across the street from the factory. They even live in buildings close to work, in separate rooms from Han workers.
Chinese companies and government officials pride themselves on being capable of changing the “extremist minds” of these workers. They describe these processes as a transformation into “modern citizens” who are “more attractive physically, as they learn to take daily baths”.
The geopolitical importance of Xinjiang
You may ask yourself at some point: why does China invest so much in the region’s control, to the point of making these its major public policies in recent years? The answer lies in the importance Xinjiang’s geographic space has for the domestic and foreign markets. The region is rich in energy sources: it represents almost 40% of the coal reserve, more than 20% of the total oil and natural gas, and 20% of the country’s wind potential, in addition to being responsible for 84% of the national cotton production.
Political instability in Xinjiang has been going on for almost a century. Uyghurs are culturally and linguistically distant from China, being closer to the way of life of other Turkic populations. In the past few decades, not only the region but China as a whole has developed economically. Despite that, ethnic minorities have again suffered from social disparity — Uyghurs have been left to work on low wages, while Hans has scaled to leadership positions. Consequently, in 2009, the group rebelled against the discrimination they suffered, and the action ended in one of the worst riots ever in the provincial capital.
Chinese repression intensified as Xinjiang became even more economically relevant to the country. In 2013, with the launch of the “Belt and Road” initiative [note] Known as “One Belt One Route,” the Chinese government strategy aims at developing infrastructure and investments in countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa. “Belt” refers to land routes, while “Road” refers to sea routes. [/note], China invested US$ 1 trillion in fiber optic cables, train lines, and pipelines to boost the economy, facilitating trade with the rest of the world. Many of these projects pass through the Xinjiang region, making the province an important corridor for the country.
Even if Uyghurs do not claim territorial independence, they have a strong presence in the province. The coercive project is a way for China to ensure that the region remains in its hands. In the infographic below, we examine the main points of tension between the Uyghur — Chinese Government relationship over the last century.
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The seemed importance of the region is reinforced when we take a look at the incentives that the government offers to politicians and business people. “Xinjiang Aid,” created in 2010, provides financial and political subsidies to mobilize richer cities and provinces to promote the region’s development and stability. In 2018, for each Uyghur hired to work in a factory for a year, the owner of the company would receive US$ 144.16 from the government and US$ 720.80 in three-year contracts. Advertisements selling Uyghurs by “lots” are also in place. According to the ASPI report, an internet advertisement offered 1,000 Uyghur workers between 16 and 18 years old with the words: “the advantages of Xinjiang workers are: semi-military style management, they can withstand difficulties”.
How to end the cycle of violence
There’s a big chance that your cell phone, electronics, cars, and clothes have passed through the hands of an Uyghur working in modern slavery conditions. To divert from this cycle of hyperconnected markets is not easy, especially when the production network is so extensive, and even brands have difficulty tracking their suppliers. In response to the ASPI report, companies like Adidas, Bosch, and Panasonic said they had no contractual relationship with the suppliers involved. Still, the report points out that such brands have been unable to inform about their entire supply chain.
The harsh reality is that China, other governments, and international companies, prefer to put capital above human life. The ASPI report makes it clear that such retention and isolation measures go against Chinese and other legislations, such as the United States’. The country prohibits the entry of products manufactured by labor analogous to slavery. It has, since 2012, the Global Magnitsky Act, which imposes sanctions on government entities and foreign government officials who are compliant with human rights violations.
This means that the legislation is up to date. It also means that the American government is being complacent with this reality in order to preserve its political and, mainly, commercial influence, in negotiations that add up to billions. Besides, International pressure is still weak: in July 2019, 22 ambassadors sent a letter to the UN condemning Chinese persecution with the Uyghurs, but no action was taken.
While we as consumers do not have much individual power to change this scenario, we, as citizens, can begin by demanding that Brazilian authorities create stricter laws, requiring brands to assume accountability for its suppliers. This is what the American Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act promises, which considers that all products from Xinjiang, in specific categories, are made in slavery-like conditions. In that case, the importing company is responsible for proving that its suppliers do not retain Uyghur workers in such circumstances.
ASPI lists three to four recommendations for each actor mentioned throughout the report. Some of which are: the Chinese government, to grant unrestricted access to multinational companies to investigate abusive labor practices in factories in China and ratify ILO International Labor Standards; the 83 brands, to carry out robust audits and social inspections in Chinese factories, ensuring the safety of vulnerable workers; the foreign governments, to press the Chinese government to ratify the 1930 Forced Labor Convention, the 1957 Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, and the 2014 Protocol on Forced Labor Convention; the consumers and civil society groups, to advocate for the recognition of surveillance and monitoring of workers during and outside working hours as an underreported indicator of work analogous to slavery and to force brands to be more transparent about their supply network.
The 83 brands listed in the ASPI report are Abercrombie & Fitch, Acer, Adidas, Alstom, Amazon, Apple, ASUS, BAIC Motor, BMW, Bombardier, Bosch, BYD, Calvin Klein, Candy, Carter’s, Cerruti 1881, Changan Automobile, Cisco, CRRC, Dell, Electrolux, Fila, Founder Group, GAC Group (automobiles), Gap, Geely Auto, General Motors, Google, Goertek, H&M, Haier, Hart Schaffner Marx, Hisense, Hitachi, HP, HTC, Huawei, iFlyTek, Jack & Jones, Jaguar, Japan Display Inc., LLBean, Lacoste, Land Rover, Lenovo, LG, Li-Ning, Mayor, Meizu, Mercedes-Benz, MG, Microsoft, Mitsubishi, Mitsumi, Nike, Nintendo, Nokia, The North Face, Oculus, Oppo, Panasonic, Polo Ralph Lauren, Puma, Roewe, SAIC Motor, Samsung, SGMW, Sharp, Siemens, Skechers, Sony, TDK, Tommy Hilfiger, Toshiba, Tsinghua Tongfang, Uniqlo, Victoria’s Secret, Vivo, Volkswagen, Xiaomi, Zara, Zegna, ZTE.
Written by Juliana Aguilera
Translated by Carol Bardi
Originally published at modefica.com.br on April 02, 2020.
