Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. O’Connor

Case №18–18, 101 M.S. Ct 109 (2018)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Introduction and Findings of Facts

Let me tell you the story of this case as I see it. And as with all good stories, let’s start at the beginning.

Almost twenty years ago Sandra O’Connor began working of the Department of Defense. She was hired to moderate foreign transactions. While O’Connor came into her position with a clean record, at some point she got dirty. Ms. O’Connor intentionally embezzled roughly seven billion dollars from the Department of Defense by funneling money to fake employee accounts.

The accounts were manipulated by O’Connor herself. She used the accounts to shuffle money to her family through a series of proxy accounts. There were no possible government uses for these funds.

At this point, a whistle-blower enters our story. The “High-Ranking Military Official” has worked for the Department of Defense for about five years. While examining the salary records of the Department, the whistle-blower noticed O’Connor’s dummy accounts. They leaked that information, and Special Prosecutor Shockular’s investigation began.

Not a week later, the Secretary of Defense was shot. An unknown assassin, designated as “Person ZZ,” pulled the trigger. This Court does not know much about Person ZZ. What I do know is this: O’Connor met with the assassin and told ZZ information about the Secretary that she admits “circumstantially [led] to his attempted assassination.” She is adamant that she did not purposefully want the Secretary to die.

Further, ZZ is “known to commit acts in favor of corporations.” Typically, such character evidence used for propensity reasoning is inadmissible in the federal courts. However, ZZ’s actions have achieved the status of a modus operandi. The Court considers this evidence relevant because Ms. O’Connor’s illegal schemes were coordinated through Heraldington Corp., a private military contracting firm.

Emails from Ms. O’Connor to Heraldington reveal how her full scheme came together. She would threaten Heraldington’s contracts with the United States if they showed “disrespect.” As she said, “[i]t has come to my attention that you have ignored the requests of replacing such parts. I’d like to remind you who your primary supplier is: us. If you continue to show disrespect and negligence, then we will cut funds and orders to your company.”

There are two ways to interpret Ms. O’Connor’s relationship with Heraldington. At best, she funneled money through a company that was reliant on her for financial contracts. At worst, and the explanation that the Court finds true given Ms. O’Connor’s demeanor at trial, she used her position of authority over the corporation to force its hand when carrying out her illegal scheme.

And once her scheme was exposed, ZZ, a contract killer who frequently works for corporations (like Heraldington) attempted to kill the Secretary of Defense. After a thorough investigation and various searches and arrests Ms. O’Connor’s was caught and charged with many crimes.

So now our story has reached its end — this trial.

I am sitting as a single Justice presiding over this case. Sandra O’Connor is charged with various crimes by the United States. She waived her right to a jury trial. Thus, I am to examine the evidence and determine whether Ms. O’Connor is guilty of her accused crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. The Events Board has simulated her trial, and dictated what evidence I should consider. All of the legal findings, however, are purely my own. My previous findings of fact are based off of that mandate and reasonable inferences from the evidence.

The Charges

What follows are the crimes (in relevant part) that the United States has charged Ms. O’Connor with and the elements required to prove those crimes.

• 18 U.S.C. § 351(c)-(d)— attempting or conspiring to kill or kidnap a head of an department in the executive branch;
• 18 U.S.C. § 1344 — knowingly executing a scheme to defraud a financial institution;
• 18 U.S.C. § 225 — organizing, managing, or supervising a financial crime enterprise and making more than $5,000,000 in profit over two-years;
• 18 U.S.C. § 641 — embezzling from the United States;
• 18 U.S.C. § 643 — embezzling by an employee of the United States;
• 18 U.S.C. § 653 — when a disbursing officer (someone who sends the United States’ funds to others) converts public money for their own use;
• 18 U.S.C. § 654 — when any employee converts the money of another in their control for their own use;
• 18 U.S.C. § 2073 — when an employee of the United States intentionally falsifies an entry or record with the intent to defraud;
• 18 U.S.C. § 2315 — receipt, possession, or disposition of goods or money of the value of $5,000 or more knowing the property is stolen or unlawfully taken;
• 18 U.S.C. § 1001 — the falsification of a material fact, statement, or entry within the jurisdiction of the executive branch;
• 18 U.S.C. § 1117 — conspiracy to commit murder;
• 18 U.S.C. § 1113 — attempted murder;
• 18 U.S.C. § 3 — being an accessory after the fact to help an offender to escape justice;
• 18 U.S.C. § 4 — not reporting the commission of a felony.

Criminal Findings

In the first part of this opinion I discussed the various findings of fact I have made. I will now examine each charge step by step to see if the United States has proven all elements of that charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

18 U.S.C. § 351(c)-(d) — Guilty of Attempting to Kill a Department Head

Ms. O’Connor and Heraldington Corp. were involved in moving around billions of dollars to fake accounts. Not days after the whistle-blower came forward, the Secretary of Defense was shot by ZZ, an assassin with the modus operandi of carrying out corporate related killings. Were this all the evidence the government had I would find Ms. O’Connor not guilty of the charge. But the video changes everything. Ms. O’Connor met with ZZ, and as she admits, she gave ZZ information that “circumstantially [led] to” the attempt on the Secretary’s life.

She argues, however, that she did not act with the requisite intent to be guilty. I disagree. Intent does not, and in fact cannot be proven through evidence. It can only be inferred. No one knows the inner machinations of Ms. O’Connor’s mind but herself. Given the timing of the meeting with ZZ, the high stakes that Ms. O’Connor had in her criminal enterprise, and her demeanor at trial, I find that Ms. O’Connor relayed the information to ZZ with the purpose of killing the Secretary.

It is of no matter that she herself did not pull the trigger. Either she conspired to kill the Secretary under subsection (d) or was simply using ZZ as a means of accomplishing the same under subsection (c). The result is the same.

I find Ms. O’Connor guilty of attempting to kill the Secretary of Defense.

18 U.S.C. § 1344 — Guilty of Bank Fraud

Ms. O’Connor funneled billions of dollars through proxy accounts established using fake personas. In other words, she made up fake identities to create false accounts with banks. Bank fraud is using false pretenses to obtain “any of the moneys” that are “under the custody or control of” a financial institution. As such, it was not criminal to deposit the embezzled funds with the banks.

And therefore, Ms. O’Connor argues, because her deposits weren’t bank fraud and she didn’t have “administrative access to manipulate said funds,” she cannot be convicted of bank fraud.

Again, Ms. O’Connor is in error. The fraud was not the depositing of funds or any “manipulation.” The fraud was withdrawing funds illegally obtained using false pretenses. Ms. O’Connor did not possess the money at issue. It was deposited in dummy accounts. Those accounts were in “the custody or control” of a financial institution. Thus, any fraudulent representation used to withdraw or move money held by the banks was bank fraud.

I find Ms. O’Connor guilty of bank fraud.

18 U.S.C. § 225 — Guilty of Continuing a Financial Crime Enterprise

Section 225 has various predicate offenses to establish a continuing crimes enterprise. The government must show a “series of violations under section 215, 656, 657, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1014, 1032, or 1344.”

As discussed previously, Ms. O’Connor is guilty of various instances of bank fraud under section 1344. That bank fraud received over $5,000,000 in gross receipts within a 24 month period (any way the money is divided over the past decade this must be true).

I find Ms. O’Connor guilty of continuing a financial crime enterprise.

18 U.S.C. § 641 — Guilty of Embezzling from the United States

Embezzling is essential stealing what someone trusted you to hold. If someone gives you $10 to hold on to in trust, and you spend it for your own use, you are guilty of embezzlement.

Ms. O’Connor supervised various payment accounts which used proxies to funnel money to illicit and fake recipients. If you were to look up embezzlement in the dictionary, Ms. O’Connor’s face would be right next to the definition. As discussed in the findings of fact, she did this with the intent to defraud the United States.

I find Ms. O’Connor guilty of embezzlement from the United States.

18 U.S.C. § 643 — Guilty of Embezzling as a Government Employee

Normally, two charges that are essentially the same crime cannot result in duplicative punishment unless there is a clear intent by the Congress to do so. Thus, on its face, it appears as though Ms. O’Connor cannot be convicted under both sections 641 and 643.

However, 643 adds an additional element to the crime. Not only must the government prove its case under 641, it must also show that the defendant is an employee. While this may seem like spiting hairs, the crimes are different. Only a US employee can be convicted under 643. Perhaps this is because when an employee, a government official, steals from the United States it is especially heinous.

No matter, I find Ms. O’Connor guilty of embezzlement as a government employee.

18 U.S.C. § 653 — Guilty of Misusing Funds as a Disbursing Officer

Ms. O’Connor’s crime here relates to Heraldington Corp. As discussed, Ms. O’Connor leveraged United States contracts with Heraldington to help her embezzle billions of dollars and worked to assassinate the Secretary of Defense. The use of those funds was egregiously unlawful. In essence, Ms. O’Connor put those funds to her own use as power over Heraldington.

Moreover, the money O’Connor actually embezzled from accounts she oversaw were clearly misused.

I find Ms. O’Connor guilty of misusing funds as a an officer in charge of disbursing those funds.

18 U.S.C. § 654 — Innocent of Converting the Property of Another

I have discussed at length how Ms. O’Connor misused US funds. Her crimes, however, do not include embezzling the funds of another. As a matter of statutory interpretation, funds “of another” cannot mean funds of the United States. Otherwise, the separate statutory section punishing embezzlement form the United States would be rendered mere surplussage. As I have discussed before, I will not neuter a statutory section for administrative ease. Horizon Lines v. Bigg-boss, 101 M.S. Ct 103 (2017) (Bsddc, J., concurring).

Thus, to prove this charge the government must show that the “funds of another” were embezzled by O’Connor. That is a finding that I could not make beyond a reasonable doubt. The money stolen was government funds. There is no evidence that a third party trusted Ms. O’Connor with money that she stole.

Therefore, I find Ms. O’Connor innocent of converting the property of another.

18 U.S.C. § 2073 — Guilty of False Entries with Intent to Deceive

Ms. O’Connor argues that the entries she made were not “necessarily false, as all had standing records of where the money was delivered too.” Forget that nonsensical argument. Remember this: O’Connor had the Department of Defense pay salaries out to dummy accounts.

Clearly false entrie (entirely false identities) were created to carry out O’Connor’s scheme. The employees being paid weren’t real. Again, she did this intentionally.

I find Ms. O’Connor guilty of creating false entries with the intent to deceive.

18 U.S.C. § 2315 — Guilty of Receiving Stolen Money

Section 2315 makes it a crime to receive, keep, or possess knowingly stolen property or money over $5,000.

O’Connor argues that the funds disbursed weren’t within the definition of “securities” as used in the section. I agree but it doesn’t matter. The section also criminalizes receipt of stolen money over $5,000. Those funds do not need to be securitized.

Ms. O’Connor knowingly controlled, possessed, and received over $5,000 of stolen funds.

I find Ms. O’Connor guilty of receiving stolen money.

18 U.S.C. § 1001 —Guilty of Falsifying a Material Fact Within the Jurisdiction of the Executive Branch

Ms. O’Connor made up fake employees to embezzle from the Untied States. That is a falsification of a material fact within the jurisdiction of the executive branch. The defense argues that those statements were in “order to secure operational integrity of any ongoing operation under the DoD.”

I am entirely uncertain what DoD operation could be aided by the creation of false employees. The facts are this: Ms. O’Connor made up fake accounts to steal from the United States. That is the falsification of a material fact. Because the dummy accounts were within the jurisdiction of the executive branch, she is guilty.

I find Ms. O’Connor guilty of falsifying a material fact within the jurisdiction of the executive branch.

18 U.S.C. § 1117 — Innocent of Conspiracy to Murder

As I have already found, Ms. O’Connor is guilty of conspiring or attempting to kill the head of a department. Under section 1117, however, she can only be found guilty if the government has proven a conspiracy.

As discussed above, for the purposes of section 351, I found that either she conspired with ZZ to kill the Secretary or gave ZZ information to accomplish the same. Her conduct was either conspiratorial or simply an attempt of the Secretary’s life without the agreement of the actors.

To illustrate my point, imagine a hypothetical. A man wants to kill a banker. He meets another man who wants to do the same, for an unrelated reason. There is evidence that he told the other man where the banker would be and how to accomplish the crime. We have no other evidence. Have they agreed to commit the conspiracy? Maybe. Has our defendant made an attempt on the banker’s life by pointing someone in the banker’s direction? Definitely. Under my findings, certainly one scenario has occurred, but both are possible. Under section 351 either crime results in the same culpability, and I have found that the government has proven the attempt charge at minimum. The government has not, however, proven an explicit conspiracy.

The conviction under section 351 results because the course of conduct will result in culpability regardless of the alternative chosen. I have found that either a conspiracy or attempt occurred. And while I have found that an attempted occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, I have not found definitively that a conspiracy occurred.

In terms of logic, either option 1 or option 2 results in conviction under 351. But only option 1 will result in conviction under 1117. The government has proven that either option 1 or option 2 occurred. Thus, culpability is shown under section 351, but no culpability is proven under sectoin 1117.

In the simplest terms: I find that O’Connor wanted the Secretary dead. I am not sure if she conspired to do that, though I am certain she has at least committed an attempt on the Secretary’s life. Thus, I found her guilty under section 351. But because I am not certain a conspiracy has occurred I cannot convict O’Connor under this section.

I find Ms. O’Connor innocent of conspiracy to commit murder.

18 U.S.C. § 1113 — Guilty of Attempted Murder

As I just discussed, conviction for conspiracy requires the explicit agreement, which I am not sure has been proven. Regardless, attempted murder does not require an agreement. It requires an action that one intends to result in the death of another without justification.

Here, as I have found, O’Connor disclosed information about the Secretary as part of an attempt to have ZZ kill the Secretary. O’Connor, as I have found, intentionally disclosed the information to cause the Secretary’s death in order to cover up her schemes.

I find Ms. O’Connor guilty of attempted murder.

18 U.S.C. § 3 — Innocent of Accessory After the Fact

There is not sufficient evidence that O’Connor gave refuge to ZZ after the crime. As I’ve mentioned, were the circumstantial evidence all the government introduced I would not convict O’Connor of any of the crimes relating to the attempt on the Secretary’s life. But the video changes everything.

There is no corresponding evidence relating to actions by O’Connor to cover the crime up after the fact. At least, not enough to convince me beyond a reasonable doubt.

I find Ms. O’Connor innocent of being an accessory after the fact

18 U.S.C. § 4 — Guilty of Misprision of a Felony

I have found multiple times that Ms. O’Connor knew of ZZ’s actions. Either she did so with the intent to kill the Secretary or it was part of their conspiracy. Either way, she had knowledge of commission of a felony, and did not alert anybody.

I find Ms. O’Connor guilty of misprision of a felony.

Charges Concluded

I have found Ms. O’Connor guilty of of conspiring or attempting to kill the Secretary of Defense, bank fraud, continuing a financial crime enterprise, embezzling from the United States, embezzlement as a public official, misuse of funds as a disbursing officer, creating false entries with the intent to deceive, receiving stolen money, falsifying a material fact within the jurisdiction of the executive branch, attempted murder, and misprision of a felony.

Sentencing

In accordance with the sentencing guidelines, which I will examine but not rely upon, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), I will now sentence Ms. O’Connor for her various crimes. Her offenses in her official capacity are graded more egregiously by this Court because of the breach of trust she has created between the electorate and our government.

Ms. O’Connor, I hereby sentence you to the following terms:

• Attempted Murder of Secretary of Defense: life in prison;
• Bank Fraud: 5 years;
• Financial Crime Enterprise: 10 years;
• Embezzling Public Funds: 5 years;
• Embezzling as a Public Official: 8 years;
• Misuse of Funds by a Disbursing Officer: 8 years;
• False Entries: 8 years;
• Receipt of Stolen Money: 5 years;
• Falsifying a Material Fact: 2 years;
• Attempted Murder: 20 years;
• Misprision of a Felony: 3 years.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3584, Ms. O’Connor’s prison terms can run either consecutively or concurrently, unless it is a conviction for an attempt and for another crime which the sole object was the attempt.

No such crimes are applicable here.

Thus, to determine whether her sentences should run concurrent or consecutively I must consult the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The section 3553 sentencing factors are: (1) the characteristics of the offense and the defendant; (2) whether the sentence reflects the seriousness of the offense, deters other criminal conduct, protects the public, and rehabilitates the defendant; (3) the other available sentences; (4) the sentences and applicable sentencing range for the defendant’s crime; (5) pertinent policy statements provided by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. As always, the sentence imposed must be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to accomplish the goals of sentencing.

The offenses at issue are a vile betrayal of the public’s trust and of our moral code. They are very serious crimes ranging from government corruption of the highest order to attempted murder. My options in sentencing are to let the terms run consecutively or concurrently. I have already sentenced O’Connor within the guideline ranges. I have not departed from the ranges as I have found them all to be reasonable.

Overall, after examining the factors listed, I concluded that in the interest of justice, Ms. O’Connor’s sentences should be divided into those based on her embezzlement and those based on the attempt on the Secretary of Defense’s life. Within each group, the sentences will run concurrently. But the two groups of sentences will run consecutively.

I sentence Ms. O’Connor to life in prison plus ten years. The life sentence is calculated from the attempt on the Secretary’s life. The ten years is based on the continuing crime enterprise crimes.

Conclusion

After reviewing the evidence and the mandate from the events board, the preceding opinion reflects findings I have made beyond a reasonable doubt. Ms. O’Connor has harmed not only the nation’s bank account, but the public’s trust in government. In an attempt to hide her crimes she set in motion an attempt on the Secretary of Defense’s life. I hand down a serious and somber sentence because of the severity of her crimes.

An appropriate order follows.

ORDER

I find that Sandra O’Connor is GUILTY beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes she was charged with. Ms. O’Connor is REMANDED into the custody of the federal government to serve out her sentence of LIFE PLUS TEN YEARS as follows:

• Life in prison for crimes relating to the attempted assassination of the Secretary of Defense;
• 10 years for crimes relating to her embezzlement and continuing financial crimes.

Ms. O’Connor is not to be eligible for parole or early release.

It is so ordered.

-Associate Justice Bsddc