Supreme Court of the United States

In Re Public Law B.143 (Campaign Finance Reform Act)

Case No. 16–11, 100 M.S.Ct. 117

BSDDC, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the Chief Justice, Taterdatuba, and AdmiralJones42, JJ. joined.

Before us is Public Law B. 143 — The Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2015. Bill 143 was adopted by the Fourth Congress and President /u/therealdrago signed the act making it law. The law stands alone without a voice to defend or define its virtues. But, the act’s vices, the criminal penalties it imposes, violate the Eighth Amendment and are held void. The penalties are not severable from the remainder, and so the entire law must fall. This holding is narrow; we only pass judgement on the statute before us.

I. Discussion and Analysis

Beginning with the Preamble, Congress’s intent is clear. The act aimed to prevent excessive influence by the wealthy and by corporations. This is a laudable goal. Our nation should not belong to an oligarchical ruling wealthy class. But this preamble does not affect our inquiry significantly, for even the most just ambition cannot be carried into effect by unconstitutional means.

A. Excessive Fines and Punishments

Relevantly, the Eight Amendment prevents the imposition of excessive fines and prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. And when we examining excessive fines our inquiry is governed by the principle of proportionality — the penalty imposed should fit the offense. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). In Bajakajian, we announced the test for proportionality: if the punishment is grossly out of sync with the crime it seeks to punish the punishment is unconstitutional. There we held a $357,144 fine grossly disproportionate for the crime which amounted to a “reporting error.” Id. Our standard does not require exacting precision; often times it will be impossible to accurately reflect the gravity of a crime with a dollar figure. We also defer greatly to Congress is these matters; however, a limit exists. Accordingly, our test for the proportionality under the Eighth is as follows: (1) we examine the punishment’s severity; (2) the gravity of the crime; and (3) if the punishment is grossly disproportionate with the crime it is excessive, thus unconstitutional.

Section 1 provides us with a title, which is helpful to gaining support for a law, but the act provides us with no definitions, which is not helpful to this Court. Perhaps we could gather other definitions from the remaining statutory scheme that the law would be placed into. Unfortunately, the law is also devoid of references to any statute or other law of the United States. For example, the act’s primary goal of preventing direct donations by corporations to political campaigns is already illegal. 2 U.S.C. §441b (2000). However, we do not rule on § 441b, as the question is not properly before us.

First, we must examine the severity of the punishment imposed under this law. Notably, the strict liability offenses imposed by this act can result in an immense fine. The penalties imposed by the law are extreme, to say the least. For example, upon the second violation of section 3 of the act the “entity shall face a fine equal to $25,000,000.” These penalties are massive, and to be constitutional the crime they seek to punish must be gravely heinous to be upheld. Unfortunately, the activity this law seeks to punish is not heinous, and it may even be entirely innocuous.

Second, we examine the gravity of the crime that the law seeks to punish. This law covers a broad range of activity within one catch-all punishment scheme. A $10,000,000 offense is punished to the same degree as a $10 donation. Yet, what is remarkable, and extraordinarily unthinkable, is that this penalty is imposed on a strict liability basis. It does not matter if the entity intended to commit the violation! As such, one accidental violation could expose the entity to a $5,000,000 fine. Upon the second violation the fine increases fivefold. An accidental donation — the slightest misstep — is analogous to the Bajakajian “reporting error,” and we can say with unrelenting confidence that this fine is grossly disproportionate with the activity it seeks to punish, even by the most deferential standards.

B. Strict Liability

Strict liability cannot be imposed for criminal penalties which are this serious. A $5,000 strict liability offense is entirely different from a $25,000,000 one. We typically require some form of mens rea to impose such large criminal penalties. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994). Without the requirement of knowledge, intention, or negligence, due process concerns are implicated. This law raises those due process concerns because it does not matter whether an entity acted with any state of mind. Perhaps we could read a mens rea requirement into this law, but doing so would supplant Congress’s lack of judgement with our own; we are not legislators. If the law criminalized a regulatory and minimal offense, we would give this question more pause. However, because this law creates such a punishing system of regulation, it is not possible to say that it is merely a slap on the wrist for a regulatory offense. However, we need not lay the entire groundwork regarding strict liability when examining this law. Suffice it to say that the strict liability nature of a criminal offense informs our proportionality inquiry under the Eighth amendment; a strict liability crime is not as serious as a willful contravention of the law.

Regardless, this law’s most frightening feature is that it could expose a party to unimaginable sanctions even if they do not act at all. In section 4, the act makes it a penalty for a “natural person” to donate in excess of certain amount per year based on who they are donating to. Violation of this provision results in a fine of 300% of the person’s contribution for the donor, and the receiving entity. It is not hard to imagine the possible result; I could donate $500,000 (if only I had the money) to a political campaign I wish to see flounder, only to have myself, and the campaign, exposed to $1,500,000 dollars of liability. The campaign has done nothing, and yet is, for some reason, punished to a much greater degree. In other words, this law can impose unimaginably massive penalties without mens rea or actus reus requirements. This law cannot stand, and we cannot say that this penalty scheme is proportional to the crime it seeks to punish. A $10 offense cannot constitutionally result in a $25,000,000 fine. The penalties imposed by this law are held void.

II. Severability

The law as adopted by Congress is not intact without its penalties. When portions of a law are held void, we ask whether Congress’s intent remains the same without the violating sections. See generally In re: Pub. L.B.074 (The Police Reform Act of 2015), 100 M.S. Ct. 112 (2012). The act’s regulations are not severable from the penalties designed to enforce the remainder of the law. The Congressional intent here was to regulate campaign donations, and Congress sought to enforce the law with hefty — unconstitutional — penalties. The remainder is not the same law Congress adopted. And so, we hold the entire law to be invalid. We cannot stress enough, that the lack of a severability clause does not guide our decision, we meaningfully examine whether the remaining aspects of a law can withstand the invalidation of other sections. We conclude the remaining sections cannot survive the excision of the unconstitutional provisions within this act, and void the law entirely.

III. Conclusion

Again, our holding is narrow: Congress may not impose a massive penalty for a minimal offense. This is consistent with both our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and our conscience. We do not disrupt nor question 2 U.S.C. §441b, which already prohibits campaign donations by corporations. We hold the law to be void completely.

It is so ordered.