The Supreme Court of the United States

In Re: Subpoenas of the House Committee on Government Oversight, Infrastructure, and the Interior

Case №19–01, 101 M.S. Ct 110

Justice Bsddc delivered the opinion of the Court in which Notevenalongname, WaywardWit, and Wildocra joined. Justice JJEagleHawk concurred in judgment only, in which Justice RestrepoMU joined. Chief Justice Raskolnik concurred in judgment only.*

Politics end where our jurisdiction begins.

Petitioner asks this Court to quash subpoenas issued by Congress for the purpose of investigating executive activities. But that question is purely political and plainly precluded from our review by the speech and debate clause. Therefore, the case must be dismissed as it presents a non-jusiticiable question.

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Our government is divided against itself and that is a good thing. There are both limits on the federal government’s power and limits on the different federal branches as well. For example, the courts of the United States hold no authority outside of the power to resolve cases or controversies. In re: Executive Order “Securing America’s Energy Future,” №18–15 (M. Sup. Ct. 2018). Those checks prevent any one branch from accumulating too much power; including the judiciary. One of the checks on our potential tyranny is the limit of jurisdiction. Some questions and parties are simply beyond our reach.

That means that when the Court lacks jurisdiction, it must dismiss the case without addressing the merits, because to address the merits of a case assumes that jurisdiction exists. For that reason, when jurisdiction is questionable, federal courts must address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction before any other matter. Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007); see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Those principles are black letter law.

As we’ve squarely held: “Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law, and, just as issues of fact, it must be decided after, and not before, the court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). It does not matter if the claims are “frivolous,” for determining the merits necessarily assumes jurisdiction. While we are not presented with any reason to revisit prior decisions, contrary reasoning is dubious, at best.

Our job is to resolve active cases or controversies, with limited exceptions. Thus, if this case raises non-justiciable political questions that are protected by the speech and debate clause, we lack jurisdiction. And it necessarily follows that if we lack subject matter jurisdiction, we must dismiss. Therefore, the question is whether the Petition raises a non-justiciable question. And if it does, then we must dismiss.

We hold that it does, and so we dismiss.

II. The Question Presented Is Non-Justiciable

As part of Congress’ enumerated powers it may undertake investigations into matters within its scope of legislative authority. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975). The functions of the executive fall within that power, and are protected by the speech and debate clause. Id.

The import of Eastland is that generally all Congressional subpoenas are protected from being questioned by the courts. Should an individual raise due process or first amendment concerns, for example, then the Court will engage in whether the subpoena is within Congress’ legislative authority. Today’s case is entirely distinguishable from Eastland as that case involved a private organization, not the executive branch. Nor does today’s case deal with enforcement of a subpoena or contempt proceedings.

The undertakings of the executive branch are typically within the scope of Congress’ investigatory power. Perhaps some case will present a reason for the court to step in and prevent Congressional overreach. But this case does not require the Court to do so today. The subpoenas at issue are protected by the speech and debate clause, and raise non-justiciable political questions.

Examining the Baker v. Carr factors, (Horizon Lines v. President Bigg-boss, Case №s 17–07, 17–08, 101 M.S. Ct 103 (2017)(Bsddc, J. concurring in the judgment only)), the power of investigating the executive branch is one solely within the province of the Congress — our role is limited to, as stated, resolving cases or controversies, not ongoing supervision. That factor counsels that this case raises a political question.

Involving the federal courts in supervising Congressional subpoenas would politicize our judiciary more than it already is. Further, it would subordinate Congress’ will to our own despite the clear applicability of the speech and debate clause. Thus, these two factors also imply that the case is political.

Critically, this is not a case about decision making authority that must be resolved as a constitutional matter, like in Horizon Lines, supra (Bsddc, J. concurring in the judgment only). The authority to investigate the executive is held by Congress, unlike the less-than-clear power to terminate treaties in that case.

On balance, the Baker v. Carr factors indicate that the question before is political, a conclusion confirmed by the protections afforded by the speech and debate clause under Eastland. For these reasons we conclude that the questions raised in the Petition are political, non-justiciable questions.

III. The Case Must be Dismissed

We’ve held that subject matter jurisdiction is necessary in all of our cases, and dismissal is required otherwise. We lack subject matter jurisdiction over non-justiciable questions. And this case presents only non-justiciable questions. Therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that we must dismiss this case.

And we do.

The case is dismissed as we lack jurisdiction.

It is so ordered.

Justice JJEagleHawk and RestrepoMU, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with my brother Justices Bsddc, Notevenalongname, and WaywardWit that this case should be dismissed without addressing the merits because, as a threshold question, we lack subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. However, I write separately because, in my view, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction not because determining the validity of a subpoena issued by Congress is a non-justiciable political question, but because this matter is not yet ripe for review.

There are several contradictory contentions in the majority opinion which deserve resolution. The majority, for example, argues that determining whether a subpoena issued by Congress for the purpose of investigating executive activities is a non-justiciable political question (citing separation of powers and speech/debate rationales). A black line rule, to be sure. But then it concedes that some hypothetical future case may present a reason for the Court to step in. This Court is wise to not shut the door entirely on Congressional subpoena review, because if an “individual raise[s] due process . . . concerns, for example, then the Court will engage in whether the subpoena is within Congress’ legislative authority.” But that position already violates its black letter rule, as apparently Congressional subpoenas are justiciable sometimes, and also fails to recognize the fact that /u/Comped did raise a direct due process concern in arguing against the subpoena.¹ To concede that some Congressional subpoenas will require review despite the political questions or separation of power issues that would inevitably attach seems to eliminate “non-justiciability” as the best vector for this decision.

There are other inconsistencies but all of them can be avoided if we simply dismiss this case as lacking subject matter jurisdiction because the matter is not yet ripe for review. It is undoubtedly true that this Court could properly resolve this case had the subpoenaed executive branch members invoked executive privilege or refused to appear, and the issuing Congressional committee had appealed to this Court in seeking to enforce its subpoena. This approach would be consistent with Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008). Here, though, the Executive Branch sought a preemptive ruling on the validity of the subpoena. I don’t believe that is a request which is ripe for review, so I concur with the majority that this case should be dismissed.

/u/JJEaglehawk, J.

1 — See https://www.reddit.com/r/modelSupCourt/comments/al55sl/in_re_subpoenas_of_the_house_committee_on/efjvp2c/ (“2 days is not long enough to comply. Within the guidelines set by the subpoena as written, it can’t mean 48 hours notice to appear on any possible topic under the committee’s jurisdiction. It is a prime example of an undue burden for cabinet officials, who have a lot of other responsibilities, to appear that quickly on that short of notice.”)

*Chief Justice Raskolnik declined to issue a concurring opinion but would dismiss the case for failure to state a claim.