Supreme Court of The United States

In Re: Public Law B.137 (Gang Activity Prevention Act)

Case No. 16–10, 100 M.S. Ct. 115

BSDDC, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the Chief Justice, Taterdatuba, CincinnatusoftheWest, and AdmiralJones42, JJ.
joined. SancteAmbrosi, J., concurred in judgment.

I. Introduction

It has been said that “[u]ncertainty is the essence of life, and it fuels opportunity.[1]” The law does not share this poetic sentiment.

Petitioner seeks relief from this Court, pleading that Public Law No. B.137, more commonly known as the “Gang Activity Prevention Act,” is unconstitutionally vague. Alternatively, Petitioner advances the argument that the law unconstitutionally coerces the states into a federal scheme.

Respondent denies these assertions, arguing that the language of the statute passes muster, and further, that the law does not contravene the sovereignty of the states. We agree.

First we must note that the vagueness doctrine applies in cases that impose criminal liability; however, when the issue is uncertainty in the language of a statute granting authority to the executive branch, as the law before us does, the applicable standard is whether the law provides an “intelligible principle.” We find that this law does provide an intelligible principle which guides the execution of the law. Second, the regulation on its face does not displace state sovereignty or conscript the states into a federal scheme. Without a clear statement in the law that it intends to impose upon the states we will not read an act of Congress as doing so. Therefore, we uphold the challenged law, with only one small caveat.

II. Judicial Standard

A. Vagueness in Criminal Codes

Due process, under the Fifth Amendment, requires criminal codes to provide clear notice to potential defendants that their conduct is prohibited. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983). The simple principle behind this rule is that it would be unjust to impose criminal liability without affording a would-be offender the opportunity to understand the criminality of their actions. A second and independent concern raised by vagueness in criminal statutes is that they invite arbitrary enforcement. (Id.). Without the ability of the courts to readily apply criminal codes law enforcement officials can abuse their discretion using broad language to their advantage at the expense of the criminal defendant. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52–53 (1999). Importantly, these principles apply in statutes that establishing crimes and those which determine sentencing. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979).

Certainty in the language of the criminal law prevents the abuse of civil liberties by those entrusted to enforce it. Restraining the discretion of law enforcement is a traditional hallmark of our due process jurisprudence. (Id.) Capricious enforcement undermines the faith that our citizens have towards our system of criminal justice and fundamentally degrades the moral authority on which the system is based.

The illustrative case of Desertrain was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2014). There, a Los Angeles city ordinance made it illegal for anyone to “use a vehicle parked . . . upon any City street . . . as living quarters either overnight, day-by-day, or otherwise.” (Id. at 1149). The Ninth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs in that case had no idea what conduct would subject them to liability. (Id.) The statute’s language was ambiguous as to what was now illegal and the broad, almost boundless, authority given to law enforcement officials invited abuse. The court found this was unacceptable, and struck down the ordinance. All of this is to say that due process concerns are implicated when the language of a statute is subject to various and broad interpretations.

When we approach ambiguity in statutory language, we invoke several canons of construction to guide our interpretation of these statutes. A good rule of thumb, which is most often invoked in the exception, is the plain meaning rule. We look to the literal text of the statute, and if we can plainly discern what is, and what is not, criminal, our inquiry ends. The “harmonious reading” canon provides that in the face of ambiguity we should read entire regulatory sections so that the meaning of the words is consistent. A final canon of interpretation that is kept in the judicial toolbox is the idea that Congress generally acts in a manner consistent with the Constitution. While this final canon — and all canons of construction for that matter — has exceptions, it guides us when statutory language can be interpreted in multiple ways. If one interpretation would be unconstitutional, while the other is constitutionally sound, we would assume that Congress intended the laws they pass to be constitutional, and thus that meaning was Congress’s likely intent. Again, while we often invoke this canon it is important to keep in mind that it can be overcome.

B. Ambiguity in Delegated Authority

Even though the previous review of our vagueness doctrine is important for criminal statutes, it is not the governing standard in this case. This Court must note that the standard to be applied here is not the vagueness doctrine, as the law in question does not impose criminal liability. Instead, it seeks to grant executive authority to a new law enforcement division. And so, the doctrine to be applied is our nondelegation doctrine. The question we ask when examining a delegation of authority to the executive branch is whether the law provides an “intelligible principle” to guide the enforcement of the law. Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 473–74 (2001). The basis for the question is simple. Only Congress may make the law, and then the executive enforces the same. A Congressional authorization which provides unfettered discretion usurps Congress’s legislative duties, and cannot be sustained. And so, a law must provide an intelligible principle to guide its enforcement and keep the power of the executive in check.

A quick survey of our precedents reveals that this standard is relatively low. We have only found two laws which lacked an “intelligible principle.” See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (finding that the authority to regulate the entire economy pursuant to protecting “fair competition” provided no guidance to the President’s execution of the law); see also Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (finding that a law which allowed the President to regulate the interstate oil industry whenever he felt it was necessary — without any guidance whatsoever — was entirely devoid of an intelligible principle). Otherwise we have broadly upheld a variety of delegations.

The rule is simple; an intelligible principle can be found when (1) the statutory language provides guidance to the executive in acting under the delegation and (2) from the language it would be clear that the executive has overstepped their bounds. If both of these prongs are satisfied then the law is constitutional. If the language of the delegation provides no guidance in the administration of the law, then it would be our solemn duty to hold the law void. This analysis should not be confused with our separation of powers jurisprudence, which is not a question before this Court.

C. Infringement on State Sovereignty

State sovereignty concerns, the second theory raised by Petitioner, exist where the federal government regulates a traditional area of state authority. On that question we have recently said that “Congress may not directly conscript the law enforcement officers of the several states and regulate their actions directly.” In. re The Police Reform Act of 2015, No. 16–03, 100 M.S. Ct. 112 (2016). The key inquiry we undertook in that case was asking whether the federal statute displaced what has traditionally be reposed in the states. If the area of federal action intrudes upon a traditional area of state concern — the police powers of the state — the law is likely void. Congress may certainly act to protect federal interests; it may not act in a way which displaces the sovereignty of the state.

Second, when terms in statutes may be read to imply an new imposition upon the states which may upset the federal balance, we have declined to read them as such. If Congress wishes to regulate the states it must do so with a clear statement. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463–64 (1991). Absent a clear statement doing so, the federal statute will be limited in application to the federal system. If there is a clear displacement of state sovereignty we then will grapple with the question of whether or not the exercise of power was constitutional under our federalism jurisprudence.

With these principles in mind we now face the language before us.

III. Discussion

A. Vagueness and Ambiguity

First, we cannot accept Petitioner’s claim that the language in the statute is unconstitutionally vague. Turning first to the claims of ambiguity, Petitioner points to the definition of “gang” as an “organized crime group,” as a source of vagueness, and has presented to this Court that under the statute “[i]t is virtually impossible for any reasonable person to say, to any degree of certainty, what exactly an ‘organized crime group’ is.” A plain reading provides significant elucidation into the meaning of the challenged term. “Organized” implies some system of arrangement or structure, while “group” provides guidance as to what is being organized — people. Perhaps “group” is meant to refer to objects other than people, but such a definition would be absurd, and we will not read statutory language in a way that produces absurd results. If this is all the statute provided we may give this language more pause, but in light of the final word, “crime,” it is clear from the language what is being regulated is a system of organizing people in such a way as to accomplish something criminal. More importantly, while we strictly construe statutory language, it must be remembered that we typically construe the ambiguous language in regards to the evil the act was meant to prevent. See Matter of Banks, 244 S.E. 2d 386 (N.C. 1978) (cert. denied). As such, when the statute regulates “gangs” we find that it seeks to regulate criminal organizations.

However, this interpretation is not necessary for the resolution of this case, for the vagueness doctrine it is not the governing standard. Instead we must ask whether the law provides an “intelligible principle” for the enforcement of the law.

Applying our “intelligible principle” test, the law passes muster. The law does not impose criminal liability, thus a vagueness inquiry here would be improper. Section IV of the Gang Activity Prevention Act provides several governing guidelines for the newly minted Division of Gang Activity Prevention. These guidelines provide a clear framework to the division as to what their responsibilities and authority are. Additionally, they provide guidance to the courts as to the limits of the division’s authority. Petitioner claims sections within the law self-contradict. For example, the law provides that the division will have investigatory powers; however, the law also limits the authority of the division to the Department of Justice. And as such, Petitioner avers that it is impossible for the executive to enforce the law.

We are not convinced.

Certainly an investigatory power can be held in this division without other law enforcement capabilities. This division will not be able to act as a police force, but nothing from the statute seems to preclude the authorized investigatory power. For example, Congress does not posses enforcement powers, but maintains the power of investigation. Thus, the investigatory power is not limited by the placement and limitation of the Division within the Department of Justice, and so we cannot agree that there is a contradiction. We therefore must resolve only the question of whether the statutory language was clear enough to be a constitutional delegation. Finding an intelligible principle is, as we said earlier, not a high bar, and, as mentioned above, the majority of this law easily clears this small hurdle.

Yet, the statute has one source of extreme ambiguity — the reporting requirements. The language used provides little to no guidance in terms of execution, and it is therefore unenforceable. Much like our analysis of the disclosure requirements in The Police Reform Act of 2015, supra, this section is utterly devoid of meaning and provides no guidance as to its execution or limits. What must be reported? Who must it be reported by? The guideline — if we can call it that — cannot be interpreted in a way which tells this Court when the Congressional mandate has been disrespected. It is, therefore, void.

However, the remaining language of the statute easily remains intact, and the Justice Department would certainly be free to coordinate with federal prisons to accomplish the likely intent of the stricken section. This holding is limited in scope only to the reporting requirements, and we find that it does not disrupt the remainder of the statute. We now turn our attention to the second issue raised by Petitioner.

B. State Sovereignty

We cannot accept that this law infringes upon the powers traditionally reposed in the states because it limits its enforcement to the federal prison system. Petitioner urges us to read several sections of the law — the law enforcement reporting requirement and the state division system — as sources of infringement upon state sovereignty. Considering that the former is entirely unenforceable, we must only ask whether the state divisions created to administer the Gang Activity Prevention Act impermissibly infringes upon the rights of the states. We cannot agree that it does. The challenged language could be read as a way of administering the federal scheme, not a way of conscripting the states. Surely regulating the federal prison system state by state would be an efficient way to divide up the sprawling federal correctional institutions.

Yet, we need not, nor do we, examine the interpretations of the statutory language exhaustively to reach our conclusion in this case. Because the law can be read in two ways, one of which may disrupt the federal system while the other does not, we will not read an unclear statement as expanding federal power over the states, consistent with Ashcroft, supra. As such, the law is limited in application to the federal system. We believe this is both the intent and aim of the statutory language. This is especially true considering the canon that we generally assume Congress legislates pursuant to the Constitution, not in violation of the same. Therefore, it was unlikely Congress intended to adopt language which would be Constitutionally questionable, making the alternative reading all the more likely, and thus, the reading we adopt.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons we find the law (1) raises questions regarding our “intelligible principle” doctrine, not our vagueness doctrine, (2) provides an intelligible principle for the execution of the law, with one minor caveat, and (3) does not unconstitutionally infringe upon the sovereignty of the several states absent a clear statement doing so. We uphold the law, and hopefully quash any uncertainty as to its fate.

It is so ordered.

[1] Tina Seelig, What I Wish I Knew When I Was 20, (2009).

SancteAmbrosi, J., concurring in judgment.

The vagueness doctrine applied by this Court many times throughout its history has affirmatively worked to protect the substantive and procedural rights of this nation’s many citizens. When a law is so vague that an individual is incapable of understanding what actions would create liability on the part of that individual, such a law is utterly reprehensible to the fabric of a just society.

The doctrine of vagueness does not exist, however, to forego basic education and the ability to open a dictionary. With the advent of the internet, the ability to learn the meanings of words has become easier than ever. As such, while I join completely with the majority opinion in this matter, I vehemently condemn the tendency of petitioners in recent matters to assert the doctrine of vagueness in order to argue unconstitutionality merely because a term is not defined within the law and, thus, petitioner believes that an average citizen is incapable of understanding the term. In the present case, we see the term “gang” and “organized crime group.” These terms have been used actively in the United States for an entire century. There are entire laws built around the concept of organized crime. Yet, somehow, petitioner finds the concept completely novel and incapable of being understood.

The level of indolence necessary to refuse to apply common sense and recognize the existence of words independently within the English language and without a need to be defined in every use is astronomical. The Putsch of such a petitioner is just as reprehensible to society as an unconstitutionally vague law. The low view that such an argument places upon the intelligence and capabilities of the citizenry of America is extremely objectionable.