The Supreme Court of the United States

In re: Dixie Bill 177 (The Dismemberment Abortion Ban Act)

Case №18–02, 101 M.S. Ct. 106

BSDDC, J., delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court.*

I. Introduction

The Constitution protects a zone of fundamental privacy from government intrusion. Under our constitution, the government is limited by the rights of the people, not the other way around. That promise protects the rights of marriage, raising children, and the freedom from unreasonable searches, ensuring that the government can only invade our homes in the most limited and pressing of circumstances. See U.S. Const. amend. IV.

And yes, that zone of privacy extends to the decision of whether to carry a child to term. The Southern State Supreme Court held that Dixie Bill 177 (“D.B. 177”), which included several abortion regulations, passed constitutional muster, noting that there was “no violation of precedent or the Constitution.” In re: State Law 177: Dismemberment Abortion Ban, №18–9 (S.S.S.C., Dec. 24, 2017).

We disagree entirely. We granted certiorari, and now reverse.

II. History of the Case

This case began when the State of Dixie adopted D.B. 177, the Dismemberment Abortion Ban Act last year. Petitioner brought suit in the Dixie Supreme Court, which ultimately upheld the law. In re: State Law 177: Dismemberment Abortion Ban, №18–9 (S.S.S.C. Dec. 24, 2017). After final judgment, Petitioner timely applied for certiorari, which this Court granted. We enjoined enforcement of this act during this appeal.

The preamble of the act justifies the law, in part, upon the fact that “many Christian beliefs hold abortions to be murder.” D.B. 177. Notably, there are no findings regarding the need for medical regulation. Continuing on, the bill defines an “abortion” as “a voluntary pregnancy ending act.” Id. at § 2. (Technically, then, inducing birth, which voluntarily ends a pregnancy, would be within the reach of this act!) The bill further defines what is a “dismemberment abortion.” Id. Relevantly, the law declares, rather broadly, that “[a]ll abortions shall be considered banned after the 18 week point no matter the circumstances.” Id. at §3(b).

While we do not construct the statutory language for the purpose of this decision, the plain meaning of abortion in this law includes inducing birth. As such, having a cesarean operation or using medicine to initiate birth would seem to fall within the law’s broad prohibition of “voluntary pregnancy ending act[s].” Of course, such a construction would be unreasonable and should be avoided, but the Court below did not construe the acts language at all. Because of the law’s facial invalidation, neither will we; however, all must remember that careful drafting is not only appreciated but in many cases necessary for the validation of the law.

III. Standards

As to first principles, the Constitution limits the power of the government. For example, States cannot engage in arbitrary or discriminatory regulation. In fact, the Congress may not act without an express or necessary grant of authority. Further, the government cannot invade a person’s home without cause. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. So viewed, the Constitution protects certain private and fundamental rights. That protection extends to marriage, consensual adult sexual relationships in private, the right to be free of unreasonable surveillance, and many other intimate rights. Included in this zone of privacy is the right for families to use contraception and for women to choose whether to carry a pregnancy to term.

Our decisions protecting the right of a woman’s choice are nothing new. See In re: State of Sacagawea Public Law B.060, 101 M.S. Ct. 102 (2017); In re: Midwestern Public Law B005.2 Midwest Equal Rights Act,100 M.S. Ct. 122 (2016); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

No argument was made by any party to overrule any of our decisions. As such, these cases and their reasoning apply in full force. We will not revisit settled law without cause; especially when we are not asked to do so. See In re: State of Sacagawea Law B.060, supra.

Our precedents establish various rules regarding the regulation of abortion. First, before viability the state has no interest in prohibiting abortion. In re: State of Sacagawea Public Law B.060, supra; In re: Midwestern Public Law B005.2 Midwest Equal Rights Act, supra. The state may engage in bona fide health regulation before viability, but it cannot be motivated out of the state’s interest in the potentiality of life. Pre-viability regulation relates only to actual medical care for the patient.

Thus, a state law that applies before viability is “unconstitutional if it imposes on the woman’s decision an ‘undue burden,’ described as purposefully placing a substantial obstacle or having an effect creating such for the woman’s right to choose.” In re: State of Sacagawea Public Law B.060, supra.

Even after viability, the state may never prohibit a life saving abortion. See In re: Midwestern Public Law B005.2 Midwest Equal Rights Act, supra,(Notevenalongname, J., concurring in judgment). Moreover, even when the state regulates abortion post viability, the regulations must give due and controlling regard to the life of the mother.

Those are the necessary legal standards that resolve this case.

IV. Discussion

A. The Decision of the Southern State Supreme Court

We begin by reviewing the decision of the Southern State Supreme Court. First, it explains Casey as allowing state regulation “in ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” In re: State Law 177: Dismemberment Abortion Ban, №18–9 (S.S.S.C. Dec. 24, 2017). That is true. Yet, the Court below left out the most important qualifier for that statement; it only applies post viability. Pre-viability regulation cannot be based on the interest in the potentiality of life, but instead we will sustain only honest to goodness medical regulation that do not impose an undue burden upon the mother.

The Southern State Supreme Court then decided that Casey was no longer good law. Id. (finding that Casey represented the “best known scientific data” of its time, and therefore could be overruled by the development of science). Obviously the Court below cannot overrule our precedent, regardless of whether it thinks it is out of date. The Southern State Supreme Court lacks any such authority and its decision in that regard was clearly erroneous. U.S. Const., art. VI., cl. 2. Remember, “ our precedent binds and acts with the force of the Constitution itself.” In re. State of Sacagawea Executive Order 007, 100 M.S. Ct. 123 (2016).

Egregiously, the decision below failed to rely on any of our more recent precedents beyond Casey, where we have held that the state may not prohibit an abortion that will save the life of the mother. In fact, the decision lacked any mention of the mother life rule. That omission was also clearly erroneous.

Finally, the Southern State Supreme Court upheld the dismemberment abortion ban because “the Plaintiff ma[de] no attempt to explain why the state has no legitimate interest in these fetuses.” Our precedent does not place the burden upon the plaintiff’s in these cases, the government must demonstrate its bona fide motivation of regulation was out of medical regulation in the interest of the patient. The government must introduce medical evidence demonstrating that the regulation protects patient health.

For those reasons, we conclude, unanimously, that the Southern State Supreme Court’s decision should be, and is, reversed.

B. The Constitutionality of D.B. 177

As to D.B. 177 itself, we will resolve the case on appeal because the law is facially invalid. First, the law bans abortions even if the procedure is necessary for the life of the mother. Therefore, §3(b) of the law is held void as it is dramatically unconstitutional. The state attempted to eliminate even life-saving procedures, which is prohibited entirely.

Second, we examine the provision banning dismemberment abortions before viability. The state may engage in honest attempts to regulate procedures if they are medically unsafe. What the state claims here, though, is an interest in the protection of that fetus from a “barbaric act.” That interest may be extremely compelling if the fetus is viable. But pre-viability we have consistently held that there is simply no legitimate state interest in the potentiality of life as it relates to the privacy of the woman. The state may punish feticide when a third party violates the rights of the mother, invading the zone of privacy. It may not, however, impose itself into that intimate relationship.

The state presents no medical interest for the banning of the procedure. Further, while the Court appreciates and profoundly respects the sincere beliefs of all faiths, there is no legitimate state interest created by the fact that “many Christian beliefs hold abortions to be murder.” Therefore, this regulation is also held void. As such, all material portions of D.B. 177 violate the Constitution.

We hold, therefore, that the law was not severable, and the entire law is invalidated. Accordingly, we dissolve our injunction, as this law no longer has any effect.

V. Conclusion

Today the Court’s decision touches upon profound questions of humanity and morality. Incredibly intelligent people reach entirely different conclusions on the efficacy of abortion. That decision is one that women face intimately and answer privately. But the morality of abortion is not the question before us.

We must answer whether the Southern State Supreme Court correctly applied our binding precedent to the case before it. We conclude that the Court below did not fulfill its constitutional duty to do so. See U.S. Const., art. VI., cl. 2; In re. State of Sacagawea Executive Order 007, supra.

Next, we must answer the question of whether the law before us was consistent with our precedent. We conclude that it is not. The viability standard has been long upheld by this Court, and without reason to revisit it, we apply it today in finding that D.B. 177 violates the fundamental right to privacy protected by the Constitution.

Our decision’s scope is narrow. We do not, for example, decide when life does or does not begin. We do not answer what is the “correct” decision for women to make. We only hold today that our limited and fallible government may not invade such a private aspect of exceedingly intimate choice.

Thus, the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Southern State is REVERSED and entered in favor of the Petitioner.

It is so ordered.

*Justice Elevic took not part in the decision of this case.