Russia-Ukraine Conflict from A Neorealist Perspective
This article conceptualizes the conflict of Ukraine and Russia within realist framework. It studies the background of the clash, its political economic aspects and its impacts on security of energy in Europe. The main idea is that whether or not the interventions of Russia in the post-Soviet countries can be perceived legitimized form realist perspective or not
When the demise of the Soviet Union was near, western states asked Mikhail Gorbachev for the reunion of West and East Germany. The reunification went ahead peacefully and the European leaders promised Gorbachev that from that time on, even one inch of the Communist orbit will not be incorporated in the West orbit. Western Leaders did not keep their words and year by year they grabbed the former states of the Warsaw pact into the NATO. This trend continued and this time was the turn for the farmer Soviet Unions states to be gulped down by the incorporated into NATO. Countries of East Baltic Sea including Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania were warmly accepted as the new members of NATO. But this time Russia`s reaction became totally different, First Moscow warned seriously to the European states about the acceptance of Baltic sea countries in the NATO and while realized that these peaceful and nonviolent requests will never change the insatiable greed of eastward NATO desires, resorted to military measures and sent troops to convert the the war’s scene, but this time in Georgia toward the pro-Russian groups. Now Ukraine is the latest battlefield of confrontation among Russia and NATO (on the behalf of the United Stated and its European states).
In November 2013 Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych who won the presidential poll in 2010, abandoned a proposed EU trade agreement. He sought a closer cooperation with Russia that triggered demonstrations in Ukrainian capital city Kyiv. In December of the same year, Russian president Vladimir Putin thrown Yanukovych an economic lifeline offering to buy Ukrainian debt of gas and reduce the price of energy. In February after the bloody and huge scale demonstrations in Kyiv, the government of the Yanukovych collapsed and the pro-Western government of Poroshenko took over the power and his government gained acclaim of the Europe and the United States, widely. Russia was not the passive spectator of the game and hauled Ukraine into the state instability by logistic and military support of discontented Russian ethnicity of Ukraine, mostly in the eastern parts. In March of 2014 Russia formally annexed Crimea and United States and EU are posing sanctions day by day on Russia. Hundreds of people have been killed form beginning of the war up until now and the perspective of the peace is ambiguous.
A Neorealist perspective
K. N. Waltz the founder of neorealism is one of the leading light humanitiies scientisrs scientists which had been writing on this theory. From the time of the publishing his book namely “Theory of international politics” in 1979 till now his ideas considered as the original concepts of the neorealism. Nevertheless, there are some critiques of his theory most importantly its wrong prediction about the longevity of bipolar system of international-politics. despite this defect of Waltz`s theory of neorealism, it is a elaborated and sophisticated theory which can give us a regulated and practical instruments to evaluate and analyze international issues. So I will use his viewpoints and theories as guideline in this article.
After contextualizing the aspects of conflict into neorealism, i will go more specifically through one of the prominent (and probably most important) aspects of the hostility among Russia and Ukraine, which is their struggle on the energy and transferring of it. I will show how does the presence of the Europe at the heart of the tension, exacerbate the situation? And how does the neorealism analyze this battle?
Backgrounds
Different Scholars have embedded realism into Ukraine and Russia conflict. Bock, Henneberg, and Plank has used the theory of “threat balance” and argue that the in the ongoing conflict, we must look at the Moscow’s perception of the threats to its interests more carefully (Bock, Henneberg, and Plank, 2014: 1). They argue that annexation of Crimea, which violated international laws, cannot absolutely be interpreted as a neo-imperialist passion of Moscow. They accuse the dominant narrative of Western media as politically motivated narrative (ibid.). Their main claim is that behaviors of each sate aredetermined by the threat they perceive from other states or alliances (ibid. 2). States will not balance against other states that are increasing in power but rather against those that are perceived as a threat. Until the time that the United States and Europe are using NATO as the political instrument to resolve the crisis, Moscow steadily understands their behavior as a threat and struggles to generate threat toward the United States and Europe to keep the balance of threat. This Russian struggle appears in the real world in its pragmatic actions like annexation of Crimea (ibid. 7).
Mearsheimer is another willingly supporters of realism theory. He contends that crisis of the Ukraine is the West’s fault (Mearsheimer, 2014a). He contends that the taproot of the current crisis is NATO expansion alongside the Washington’s commitment to move Ukraine out of Moscow’s orbit in order to integrate it into the West (Mearsheimer, 2014b: 1). So, the agitated militaristic backlash of Moscow in Ukraine is not surprising; because the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core strategic interests (Mearsheimer, 2014a: 1).
Mearsheimer names three features that has generated and exacerbated the conflict among Russia and Ukraine: NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and democracy promotion (Mearsheimer, 2014b: 3). His latest arguments about role of the West in Ukraine-Russia conflict has thrown debates within in academia in a global scale.
Through neorelist lenses
Neorealism believes that the belt which serves the security of the Russia is going to be thinner and thinner over the time by enlargement of NATO eastward. The effort of Russia to keep a shield around itself against the penetration of NATO is a rational act.
Neorealism observe the International-politics as a structure (Waltz, 1979: 79) and leaves aside questions about cultural, economic, political, and military interactions of the states (ibid. 80) and do not ask whether states are revolutionary or legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic. Waltz in his way of thinking, ‘abstracts every attributes of states and do not emphasize on the intentions of states in terms of friendship or hostility (ibid. 99). If we omit all these irrational elements of analysis (friendship or hostility), we will be capable to realize that Russia is not a contender state which is setting the fire of war to satisfies passions of land expansion. Moscow only wants to retain the very pivotal interests which are essential to survive.
Waltz contends that the ‘units of international structure are like and equal in diverse situations’ (ibid. 94); subsequently they render same reactions according to their positions in the arrangement of international system in line with maximizing their rudimental benefits. Therefore the Russian`s reaction to push back the penetration of NATO is not the matter of autocratic and imperialistic desires of Putin. Considering that ‘the respective system of International-politics necessarily affects its units and their behaviors’ (ibid. 100) the unipolar structure of the international-politics obliges Russia to intervene militarily in Ukraine. Russia erects its national security in line with its economic and geopolitical urgencies in Ukraine. here the term of security is a broad term which can comprise of not only the very basic matters of security, but might be expanded and embrace diverse economic vital aspect and benefits of country which are necessary for reproduction the economy of the state and nation. ‘In the interaction among states, the state which feels insecure, is compelled to ask who will gain more? Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit them because each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities’ (ibid. 106). Russia considers that in the process of incorporation of Ukraine into the NATO, the United States and Europe are gaining more that Russia and Russia is losing hordes of its potential instruments of power in this region which can be used by the West in future against Russia; the gains that Russia can guarantee their devotion for itself in the frame of the preventive measure. Waltz claims that ‘the system of international-politics is formed and maintained on principle of self-help that applies to the units’ (ibid. 91). In this system the only way for Russia to overcome this logical feeling of insecurity is to hold Ukraine in its orbit by any possible means, whether militarily or peacefully. ‘Among states, anarchy, or the absence of central strength government as the manager of the international system, is associated with occurrence of violence’ (ibid. 103) and Russia can logically resort to violence if the rationality of war (benefits of war) afford Russia’s security and its economic interests in Ukraine, more than rationality of peace (benefits of peace). In the status of anarchy, the occurrence of war is probable and the structural strains of the system entails Russia to fulfill its supposed duty; the duty of prolonging the national security benefits as whole term for its other fundamental benefits. The pressure of unipolar system can paint the military operation of Russia in Ukraine by brush of legitimacy. Waltz concludes that ‘states may seek reasonable and worth ends, but they cannot figure out how to reach them. The problem is not their stupidity or ill-will but intelligence and goodwill cannot discover and act on adequate programs, instead, it is the structure that determines their behavior’ (ibid. 111). The western leaders consider the operation of Russia in Ukraine as an irrational behavior of an autocrat leader who wants to put the destination and fate democracy in Ukraine under his own will. But neorealism does not look at this ongoing conflict as the question of democracy or ideology. The rationality of neorealism depicts us that structure of international-politics entails Russia to attempts to convert this system and guarantee its national interests in Ukraine. Russia in the conflict of Ukraine uses the bare power as explicit as possible but it is not weird and an awkward path (as European leaders claim), because as Waltz supposes, ‘in the international-politics, force serves as first and constant ratio, and units use it not as their aim but as means of affording interests’ (ibid.).
In the international-political order with more than one pole, the necessities that the structure poses to the units determine to the some extent the behavior of them and the balance between poles prolongs the longevity of the system. This balance makes the international-politics constant, but in the unipolar situation the national pressures and interest entail specific action to the states in the international sphere. As Waltz holds, ‘the policies of the United States in the unipolar structure of international-politics is generated not by external security interests but by internal political pressure and national ambitions.’ (Waltz, 2000: 25) He supports his point of view by the example of negligence and ill-timed intervention of the United States in ex-Yugoslavia. ‘When Yugoslavia’s collapse was followed by genocidal war in successor states, the United states failed to respond until Senator Robert Dole moved to make Bosnia’s peril an issue in the forthcoming presidential election; and it acted not the sake of its own security but to maintain its leadership position in Europe’ (ibid. 24).
The unipolar order of the international-politics is suffering from fluctuation and lack of instability within the system. The superpower wants to drive the train of international-politics on its own will and show the least consideration to necessities of the system. The United States is turning a blind eye on the determining importance of Ukraine for Russia economically and geopolitically, and insists to drag Ukraine out of the satellite of Russia. Realists think that this kind of short-sighted initiatives will culminate in weakening and eroding the power of super-power in the long run (ibid. 23). Also these despotic measures of the only superpower of our era leads to the profound dissatisfaction of other states like Russia. Broadly speaking, it will sprawl and latterly amplify the forces of centrifugal inside the system and encourage the discontented states to erupt the system through their available capacities and toolkits. Considering the state of anarchy as ever-present property of the international-politics, Russia needs permission of no other state to stand up against the system which considers it unequal and harmful for its national security. Fickle innate of unipolar structure of international-politics displays an ambiguous future for the Ukraine and Russia conflict. At the beginning of the adventure, some economic and political ambitions grappled the United States and NATO with the Ukraine’s issue and as the repercussion, Russia is compelled to get involve in Ukraine, militarily. Nonetheless, the United States and its allies in NATO, have a huge amount interrelated economic benefits in Russia and cannot jump into a completely militaristic confrontation against this powerful country. Consequently, the most utter action of the United States and the European countries is a cluster of sanctions which hardly can alternate the determinant intention of Russia to give up its national interest in Ukraine. Through a glance at the foregone history of bipolar system, we apparently witness that for ‘almost half a century, the constancy of Soviet threat produced the constancy of American policy… however with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the united states no longer faces a major threat of its security; absence of threat permits policy to become capricious. It culminates in sporadic and self-willed policies by the United States’ (ibid. 24). This unipolar system has brought turmoil and instability to system and makes the spectrum of peace gloomy as time goes by.
If we put ourselves in the shoes of Russia, we can touch the tangible factors of logical scare from unleashed strength of the United States in the international-political arena and this uncertain situation, it would not be insane whether one feel abandoned lonely, with the military choice as the first, ultimate, and solely solution. Russia has to self itself and conduct measures which are not necessarily peaceful. Russia inevitably conducts militaristic actions, while its rival is NATO. Waltz holds that ‘in the unipolar system, unbalanced power leaves the weaker states feeling uneasy and gives them reasons to strengthen their positions. The United States has a long history of intervening in weak states often with the intention of bringing democracy to them (ibid. 25) and Russia by no means is an exception for expansion of Western values (including democracy and human rights) through NATO; the theater that directed by the United States to gather as much as possible states under its umbrella. If Russia loses its last shield against cultural, economic and military influx of the United States and NATO, someday in future will certainly face increasing demands for Western values and democratic desires within the country. It would be the time that the United States and Europe to show up as patrons of democratic activists of Russia and destabilizes the country. Government of the Russia now is trying its best to nip this nightmarish scenario in the bud. Waltz with no hesitation expresses his skeptical ideas about the main purpose of the NATO and the United States in their invasive eastward expansion and believes that the ‘United States thinks of itself as acting for the sake of peace, justice and well-being in the world. However, these terms, are defined to linking the powerful, which may conflict with the preferences and interests of the others’ (ibid. 24). In the case of conflict with Ukraine, Russia is transparently undermining the position of pro-democratic forces inside the Ukraine, still it would be understandable in the neorealism way of thinking while we see ‘no world government to protect states from one another and states are acutely sensitive to threats — especially near their borders — therefore they sometimes act ruthlessly to address potential dangers. International law and human rights concerns take a back seat when vital security issues are at stake’ (Mearsheimer 2014b: 2). It is the actual meaning of anarchy in the in the neorealism theory; the state of being no states as the central authority which be able to align the interactions among states. You must help yourself when nobody affords your gains and security. The democratic values might possibly be sacrificed for the sake of security and it is the reality of the world-politics; whether fair or unfair.
4 — Gas and interrelated geopolitics of Russia and Ukraine
Ukraine is geopolitically important for Russia. It has located between Russia and Europe and plays the role of intermediary for gas flow from Russia to the Europe. Its large population (more than 44 million) serves a considerable market for Russian products. Expanded flat premises with high quality soil deserve the title of “Breadbasket of the Europe” to Ukraine. The prominent role of Ukraine`s farms to help the food security for Russia cannot be neglected. Additionally, there are remarkable weapon factories in Ukraine and a variety of Russian made weapons are finishing in the factories of Ukraine.
Since the issue of energy and its relation with geopolitics of Russia and Ukraine accounts for the most determinant variable in the ongoing conflict of these two countries, we focus profoundly on this aspect in the realm of neoliberalism and set aside the other important associated variables of geopolitical and economic interactions among Russia and Ukraine.
Russia and Ukraine in the case of gas and oil are interdependent. Ukraine without the gas of Russia cannot survive. The consumption of gas in Ukraine is inefficient and if Russia closes the valves of the its gas for Ukraine, a remarkable parts of Ukrainian old and backward industries will be paralyzed. Also winters of Ukraine without Russian gas might be mortal. It is not whole the story and Ukraine earns constantly from the transportation of Russian`s gas to the Europe. But on the other side of the coin, Russia is the biggest supplier of gas for the Europe and most of this gas is exporting via pipes which are laid in the vast expanses of Ukraine. Russia is sending about four-fifth its export heading to the EU through Ukraine’s gas transit system (Diakun, 2012: 50). So Ukraine and Russia need each other, bilaterally. Russia guarantees the supply of gas to the Ukraine and Ukraine guarantees the deliverance of gas to the Europe.
But why the issue of import and export of gas among Russia and Ukraine deserves to be highlighted in this article? Waltz contends that like other organizations, states seek to control what they depend on (Waltz, 1979: 107). Russia as the country that fossil energy exports has accounted for 50% of its revenue in 2013 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014), vastly depends on this resource of earning. A slight change in the price of exported fossil energy causes great earthquakes in the national economy of this country. The problem appears when a pro-Western government is in the power in the Ukraine and it commences to drive bargain with Russia about the price of fossil energy and its paying service to transport to Europe. The European states support the Ukrainian part because it is beneficial for them if they would enjoy reduction in fossil energy prices. Russia feels alone against a unified foe comprised of Europe and Ukraine.
With establishment of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine, not only Russia might debilitate (whether not eliminate) Ukraine as a troublesome mediator in the trajectory of bargaining on fossil energy toward Europe, but deprives Europe from a practical means of bargaining, namely Ukraine. On the contrary, with the establishment of a pro-European government in Kyiv, Moscow might lose a precious ace in the game of making influence on the system of International-politics. In the Rationale of neorealism ‘states are alike in the task they face, though not in their abilities to perform them. Differences are of capability, not of function’ (Waltz, 1979: 94) and state can respond the constraints of the system through their capabilities. Ukraine can simply be presumed as one of the geopolitical and economic capabilities of Moscow, through which Moscow can be an effective rather than a static player in the field of international-politics. Rationality can explain the reason behind the invasive manner of Russia to retain Ukraine in its orbit. Russia needs the control over the pipelines of petro transportation of Ukraine as a bargaining chip against Europe. Moreover, in the domestic sphere the constant flow of petro-revenue brings economic and political stability which in broad sense might absorb more FDI and lubricate the wheels of domestic economy.
The tension among Russia and Ukraine on the price of the gas has reached two boiling point from 2006 (Diakun, 2012: 50) and the involvement of European states in these hostilities is cleared. In January 2006 Yushchenko the pro-Western president of Ukraine, took the power and during his time of presidency Russia increased to price of exporting gas to Ukraine and Europe in order to express its sense of discontent (ibid.). Diakun describes how did the second gas war occur and how did Russia try to use its exporting gas as a means of influence Europe:
The second tension took place in 2009 while the gas debt of the Ukraine Soared to more than billions of dollars, Russia halted the transport of Ukraine`s would-be gas supply. When Ukraine responded by syphoning off gas that was meant for the EU to cover its own needs, Russia turned tap off completely on January 7th so that Ukraine and many in the EU alike, went for another week without the necessary gas supply. The crisis was finally resolved when then-Prime Minister Tymoshenko and Putin negotiated and finalized a ten-year deal, on that was ultimately extremely unfavorable for Ukraine. Whereas had been a 180 dollar per 1000 cubic meter just months before, the deal set the price at a level double this amount. (Diakun, 2012: 51)
To put strain on Ukraine pro-West government, Russia posed a lower price for service of transit of gas to Ukraine. Reciprocally, the Ukraine president Yushchenko in 2010 stood up against Russia and announced that the agreement of rent of Sevastopol for settlement of Russian Black Sea fleet will not be extended after its finishing in 2017. During the tension the both sides came to compromise and yushchenko shifted his politics totally toward Russia. Ukraine extended the lease agreement for rent of Sevastopol to Russian Naval in Black Sea until 2042 and instead, Russia fixed 30% discount for exportation of gas to Ukraine. Some believe that Kyiv sold some of its sovereignty for a stronger economy (Varettoni, quoted by Diakun, 2012: 52). In this time as well other foregone times, the necessities of neorealism explain and clarify the situation; countries cannot do and act as they wish. When Ukraine has such a superpower neighbor like Russia, it has to subordinate the imposed directives of Moscow. In line with neorealism terms, the stand and capabilities of the units actuate their behavior. Kyiv cannot escape from its location in the World map. Ukraine has two major capabilities; first, its huge expanse of pipelines through which it can transfer gas of Russia to the Europe. Europe needs this, inevitably, and Russia needs the revenue of this gas, inevitably. Second, Ukraine possesses some vital strategic points in the Black sea like Crimea. These strategic points in Black Sea deliver an irreplaceable contribution to Russia for build and preserve its territorial security. In line with these privileges, Ukraine can participate successfully in the game security with Russia. Ukraine can overlook its sovereignty to some extent and keep a peaceful interaction with Moscow. By making Russians leaders confident about their use of Black sea strategic ports and conducting a responsible coordination with them over transport of gas to Europe, the Ukrainian governments are able to fulfill the duties which they feel them on their shoulder; the duties of administration and governing the country.
Issue of gas in Ukraine in its root is the matter of security and the government cannot underestimate or postpone the gas-corporation with Moscow. Position of Ukraine in international-politics entails this country to adopt a modest and wise policy toward Russia. Though, Russia is showing as apparent as possible that will never tolerate the policies which jeopardize its national security in its orbit. If the pro-West government of Ukraine does not pave the way for Russia in the Crimea (as a strategic spot for Russian territorial security), Moscow resorts to violence to catch it by any feasible measures. As well as Kyiv, Moscow has to afford its national security and national security of Russia necessitates the military presence of Russian army in the Crimea and other strategic points of Ukrainian harbors in the Black sea.
5 — Counter-productivity for the United States
In line with the logic of neorealism, engagement of the United States with the Russia-Ukraine conflict is counterproductive for the national interests and national security of Washington. In the unipolar system of international-politics, there are no unlimited rooms for the singular existing pole to do whatever it likes. The United States as well as other states of the system is confined to the specifications and mechanisms of system and cannot assume itself as the absolute initiator. Sometime it cans only reaction rather than dictation. One of the most actual hazards which threat the security of the United States is the Islamic extremism. Islamic hardliners are the undeniable reality of current international-politics and has been pinned themselves to the map of scene in the world scale. They endanger the benefits the United States wherever they can. The United States is the in the state of prominence in terms of military capability, but it is not sufficient factor to defeat Muslim hardliners. Some of the centers which export of the Islamic terrorism to the world have located in the regions like Afghanistan and Middle Asia. After rising of the “IS” in Iraq and Syria, a variety of Islamic discontented Islamic groups have scattered in Middle Asia specially in Uzbekistan and mountainous borders of Tajikistan and Afghanistan; The regions that Russia has influence on. Overcoming terrorism in these areas without logistic assistance and intelligence cooperation of Russia is in the state of doubt and question. If the United States blindly agonizes Russia and insists to separate its Strategic depth in Ukraine, will lose the helping hand of Moscow in fighting against terrorism which is of the most rudimental issues of the national security for the United States. The only pole of the international-political system is boosting up its erosion in two seemingly different but virtually interrelated fronts; In the East Europe it has grappled itself with a fruitless and costly hostility against Russia which necessarily culminates in enmity with Moscow and declines the possibility and depth of Russia’s help in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and Middle Asia.
Moreover, if the United States has a strong will to solve the nuclear troubles with North Korea through diplomacy and negotiations, Russia is the irreversible element which can encourage the decisive and strict leaders of North Korea to resume the negotiations over nuclear weapons of Pyongyang. Russia has vast relations with North Korea in fields of energy and trade and is one of the very few ventilations of dialogue with the closed government of North Korea for the United States. If the United States keeps refusing the legitimized interests of Russia in Ukraine, it undoubtedly ruins the bilateral space of its cooperation with Russia and it would be against the long run benefits of the United States in nuclear negotiations, not only with North Korea but also with Iran. In the context of neorealism, the United States by engaging in Ukraine-Russia conflict, is committing self-harming.
6 — Conclusion
The research Question of this article is that how does the conflict of Russia and Ukraine can be contextualized in the realist terms?
With a historical glimpse we see that this conflict is irrigated by eastward expansion of NATO which started after the Cold War. The aftermath of this enlargement, surged the sense of uncertainty in Moscow about the coming and predictable NATO’s enlargement in the territory of ex-Soviet Union.
In the neorealism theory, the actions of the states in the international-political system are evaluated regardless of their ideological specifications. Consequently, the intentions of Russia to take part in the conflict of Ukraine derive directly from its national interests. Whether Russia is a democratic or autocratic state, fending its rudimental interests in Ukraine is defensible and understandable in rationale of neorealism.
System of the international-politics is formed of units; the positions and abilities of these units render an autonomous and effective character to the system. In broad sense it enables the system to affects actions of the units by putting structural strain on them. This systematic constrain, obliges Russia to participate in Ukraine conflict, actively.
In the absence of a sovereign government in the international sphere, Russia finds itself in the state of the anarchy in the international system of politics and has to help itself in the contest against pro-Western government of the Ukraine and its strength patron, NATO.
In the bipolar or multipolar system of international politics, the system poses its rules to the units but in unipolar system, the only superpower of the era might be stumbled into the trap delusion and consider that has absolute free will to dictate all its desires to the system. The only pole of the age maybe turns a blind eye on the valid necessities which are essential for the other units to maintaining their security. Since mentioned in the text, security is general term that encompasses strategic, military, and economic aspects which are vital for the state; every unit across the world, with any kind of ideology must fulfill these interests as its duties. Russian`s benefits of security in the Ukraine are not exceptions and must be fulfilled as well. Expanded presence of United States and its European allies in Ukraine expresses the sensation of insecurity to Russia. It generates a cluster of national concerns and latterly tendencies which compel the government to conduct preventive measures in Ukraine in advance, before losing fundamental gains of the country.
Behaviors of the states are considered rationale in neorealism. Rationality entails Russia to hold the pipe lines of the Ukraine in its hands in order to enjoy stability in the revenue that is earning from exportation of gas to Europe. With controlling over these pipelines, Russian can enhance its power of bargaining and effectiveness in the international-political system; this strength of bargaining is a pivotal capability of Russia in the international-politics. Furthermore, harbors of Ukraine in Black Sea serve strategic purposes and opportunities to Russia. If Moscow loses its heavy militarily strategic presence in these Ukrainian ports, will unquestionably face insecurity and uncertainty in terms of territorial integrity and land security. Now we can interpret the logic of Moscow behind annexation of Crimea.
Neorealism offers us a range of analytical facilities to pondering the intentions of engaged foes of Ukraine-Russia conflict and grasping the points that why do they imply some special measures and get rid of some others. Neorealism depicts us that behavior of which part of the battlefield is more rational and which one`s is less. Also I think the neorealism is a fit theory to analyze the conflicts among countries which fed up with a limited numbers of revenue resources; like Russia which enjoys fossil energy export as it most prominent export.
References
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Diakun, A. (2012). EU Foreign Policy in Ukraine: Policy Shortcomings and Russia’s Countervailing Force (Doctoral dissertation, Central European University).
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014a). Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. Foreign Aff., 93, 77.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014b). Getting Ukraine Wrong. The New York Times, 13.
U.S, Energy Information Administration, 2014, n.d.
Available in this address: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17231#
Waltz, K. N. (2000). NATO expansion: A realist’s view. Contemporary Security Policy, 21(2), 23–38.
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of international politics. Addison-Wesley Publishing company, 1979.
