Democracy at Disneyworld, How Residents Could Affect Disney’s Control Over the Reedy Creek Improvement District
The local government that administers the area encompassing Walt Disney World may be the most interesting, complex, and powerful privately controlled government in the United States. Comprised of a large special-purpose district known as the Reedy Creek Improvement District, and two municipalities known as Bay Lake and Lake Buena Vista, this government provides the Walt Disney Company with powers comparable to (or greater than) a county (Foglesong, 2003, 6). The State of Florida furnished these powers to the Company to create a tourist mecca, but these powers were also intended to enable the creation of an experimental city (Foglesong, 2003, 69; Koenig, 2007, 35–8). While Disney has assuredly built a tourist destination, the experimental city has yet to materialize. However, Disney recently began selling residential properties within its improvement district for the first time, and this development has the potential to change how Disney governs its world (Sisson, 2016). The level of control Disney possesses has been maintained by restricting residential tenancy, and through total ownership of land within the District’s boundaries. On one hand, the sale of land to residents fulfills part of the original purpose behind the creation of a Disney controlled government. On the other hand, future residents may oppose Disney’s authority. In short, the establishment of residents within Walt Disney World creates added legitimacy, and potential challenges to the Company’s control over its government.
The Creation of the Reedy Creek Improvement District
Shortly before his death, Walt Disney recorded a film presenting plans for an experimental city to be built on land that would become the Reedy Creek Improvement District. Disney called his city EPCOT, the Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow, and intended for it to be experimental in every way (Koenig, 2007, 35–7). EPCOT would host firms at the cutting edge of their industry. Ever-evolving transportation and utility systems would be tested at EPCOT, and it would be home to 20,000 people willing to participate in research focused on improving American cities (Atencio, 1966; Koenig, 2007). EPCOT was Walt Disney’s vision for an ideal city — a place that changed with the times, and that developed answers for the problems other cities face.
To build this city alongside an East Coast Disneyland, the Company sought a large parcel of inexpensive land. Starting in 1964, the Disney Company created a series of dummy corporations to purchase land in Central Florida in secret (Koenig, 2007, 27–8). These corporations had generic names shielding the Company’s intentions from the general public, and very few people within the Company were aware of Disney’s activities in Florida. If the Company’s plans became widely known, then land prices would certainly balloon. By the autumn of 1965, when Disney’s actions became public knowledge, the company had acquired over 27,000 acres of land — the equivalent of 43 square miles — for only $5 million (Koenig, 2007, 29). This was far more land than Disney needed, and it gave them the ability to build their experimental city, and much more.
With the land purchased, the Disney Company proceeded to push for total control over their property. These efforts began in earnest when Walt’s EPCOT film was shown for the first time. David Koenig, a writer specializing in the Disney company, points out that the debut audience made up of common Floridians and state officials sat mesmerized as they watched Walt (who had died 7 weeks prior) describe his city (Koenig, 2007, 13–4). They were in awe. Once the film concluded, Walt’s older brother Roy explained that the Company would need help from the state to build EPCOT, and the rest of Walt Disney World. He then requested special legal status to exercise control over the recently acquired land. As Koenig (2007) writes, in that theater, Roy Disney began lobbying for, “… [M]ore control than any company had ever been granted. Disney was asking for its own government, one devoted to high standards yet open to experimentation (15).” With a government under their control, the Company could use the land as they saw fit.
The primary mechanism the Company found that would allow for the formation of a Disney controlled government was a special-purpose district. Florida is filled with wetlands. To encourage the development of wetland areas, the state had created numerous special drainage districts prior to Disney’s interest in Central Florida (Foglesong, 2003, 61). These districts gave private corporations special powers and immunities with regards to wetland areas, and most of the land Disney purchased could be classified as wetlands because it needed to be drained to be useable (Koenig, 2007, 31–2). Over the weeks following the unveiling of the Company’s plans for the Florida property, Disney would push for state legislation creating their own special-purpose district, but this district could not provide all the powers Disney thought they would need.
To further bolster their control, the Company called for the state to create two cities within the proposed special-purpose district. Chad Emerson (2009) of the Florida State University Law Review states that Disney needed these municipalities to utilize police powers (197). In effect, the creation of these cities, would provide Disney with the ability to zone their property without county interference. Furthermore, these cities would prevent future residents from incorporating without Disney’s approval (Foglesong, 2003, 63). The Company knew that the end result of the creation of these municipalities would be a set of general-purpose governments that they could control.
On May 12th, 1967, the Florida House of Representatives passed three pieces of legislation creating a special-purpose district, the Reedy Creek Improvement District (RCID), and both the cities of Bay Lake and Lake Buena Vista (“An Act Related to…,” 1967; “An Act Establishing the City of Bay Lake,” 1967; “An Act Establishing the City of Reedy Creek,” 1967). Governor Claude Kirk signed these acts into law later that day, and with a few strokes of his pen, Disney became arguably the most powerful private entity in the entirety of Florida (Koenig, 2007, 41–2).
Unsurprisingly, the creation of the RCID and the two cities was not controversial. Special-purpose districts are common, and Disney was (and is) a popular American company that was promising to invest in the region (Emerson, 2009, 180–1). The counties in which the RCID sat, Orange and Osceola Counties, saw the District as a way for Disney to assume the costs for infrastructure improvements, and Disney believed that the District would exempt their property from county regulations (Emerson, 2009, 191). In most Floridian’s eyes, the RCID was a boon.
With the RCID, and control over the two municipalities within the District, Disney amassed a collection of powers on par with a county government. Noted Disney expert and critic Richard Foglesong (2003) sums up this political system as a, “…[T]win-tier government, with two general-purpose local governments on the bottom and a special-purpose district, [the RCID], on top (6).” This multi-level government has provided Disney with the ability to issue bonds and leans, to tax, to operate emergency services and an airport, to collect and dispose of waste, to build both conventional and experimental power plants, to exercise extraterritorial eminent domain, to set building regulations, to zone, to build roads and transportation infrastructure, and more (“An Act Related to…,” 1967; “An Act Establishing the City of Bay Lake,” 1967; “An Act Establishing the City of Reedy Creek,” 1967; Emerson, 2009, 195–6). This amount of power is unique for a privately controlled government. Company controlled governments are typically limited in scope, but Disney’s government is endowed with broad powers that are usually held by traditional local governments (Emerson, 2009. 179). These powers have served the Company (and arguably the region) well, and the company has protected their powers in many ways.
The Company recognized early in the development of Walt Disney World that the biggest potential challenge to Disney’s control would be the influence of residents within the RCID. Even before Disney’s death, company officials worried over the potential impact of residents on Company control. Emerson (2009) writes that in the summer of 1964, while the Company was still purchasing land in Florida, “…[A]t least one Disney official suggested that, if established… cities [on Company land] should exclude residential properties as this could dilute the company’s influence (187, 189).” At the time, this proposal was not accepted because EPCOT was meant to be home to 20,000, and there were more workable solutions to the problems posed by residents.
To protect the Company’s control over their land, voting within the RCID would be limited to property owners. During the planning phase of Walt Disney World, attorney Paul Helliwell suggested that Disney request for their special-purpose district to have voting rights assigned by acreage owned within the District. He also provided three examples in Florida of districts with such a voting scheme (Emerson, 2009, 189–90). Since Disney would always be the majority owner of land within the District, and since most (if not all) residents would be renters, Disney would maintain control in perpetuity. However, during the construction of the first Disney theme park in Florida, questions arose concerning the long-term viability of the RCID’s voting scheme.
In 1968, the Supreme Court released a decision that would change how Disney viewed residents living within the District. Emerson (2009) discusses how the Avery v. Midland County (1968) ruling affected Disney’s plans (192–4). In Avery, the Supreme Court ruled that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to how local governments allocate voting powers among residents, and this holding could affect how voting was administered within the RCID. Emerson (2009) writes:
“…[I]n light of the Avery decision, if Disney chose to allow individuals to reside within the [RCID] or its municipalities, doing so could require that the company extend to them voting powers in order to comply with the Equal Protection Clause. While the Court would ultimately limit the application of the Avery holding in the context of certain special districts, Disney had no way of knowing that this would occur — and, even so, whether the unique structure of the District could avoid judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment (193).”
The Avery decision caused the Company to rethink how they would maintain control. The only way to test if their special-purpose district had to comply with Avery was if a resident challenged the RCID’s voting scheme. If taken to court, Disney’s powers were so broad, and so similar to a public municipal corporation, that the voting system could be ruled unconstitutional. Disney was not willing to take this risk, and a new solution to maintain Disney’s control was needed.
To ensure that the Company would maintain control over the RCID, Disney redesigned EPCOT as a theme park without inhabitants, and decided to restrict residency on property to solely a handful of trusted employees. Since the opening of Walt Disney World in 1971, to until recently, the only residents within the RCID were employees selected by the Company (Pedicini, 2015). Simply put, the way Disney would avoid ceding any control to residents, was to not have residents.
Furthermore, the arrangements Disney has with their resident-employees are purposefully designed to protect the Company’s control. Disney rents out small plots of land to selected Florida-based supervisors who purchase mobile homes to live on each site (Pedicini, 2015). Residents do not sign long term leases for the land, and one employee confides that the company could kick any renter out within a moment’s notice (Hill, 1987). Residents pay a fair rent, and serve their municipalities in official ways. Some residents sit on municipal boards, and one resident of each of the two cities within the RCID will serve as a mayor. Due to Florida law, city councils must vote on planning issues, but council members avoid challenging Disney’s wishes (Pedicini, 2015). While residents claim that they do not just approve what Disney wants, Koenig states that, “If they didn’t vote Disney’s way regularly, you can be sure they wouldn’t be Disney employees or living on Disney property much longer… (Pedicini, 2015).” In total, approximately 44 people (including employees’ family members) live within the RCID (Pedicini, 2015). The employees that live in the District do not pose a risk to the Company’s control, but now new residents are moving in, and this development could potentially change how Disney operates the government it controls.
Ongoing Residential Development, and How It Could Affect Disney’s Control
In 2010, the Disney Company broke ground on a luxury residential development in the City of Bay Lake (Sisson, 2016). For the first time, Disney began selling property within the RCID to would-be residents. Since then, this community, known as Golden Oak, has been constructed in stages, and is made up of estate home plots ranging in price from $2 million to over $10 million (Pedicini, 2016). The development of Golden Oak marks a turning point in the history of the RCID. The District was originally meant to have non-employee residents, and now, it finally does.
Ironically, the Company thought that the properties in Golden Oak would be mostly used as vacation homes for the very wealthy, but more and more homes are being occupied as primary residences. When Disney began the Golden Oak project, they thought that only 20% of the 300 planned homes would become the main residences of the property owners (Pedicini, 2016). However, as of 2016, approximately 40% of the 100 completed homes are being used as primary residences, and Disney officials now believe more than half of the development will be occupied by full-time residents in the near future (Pedicini, 2016). Permanent residents are more likely than seasonal residents to develop an interest over the administration of their local governments, and Golden Oak may not be the only place where permanent residents will eventually live in the RCID.
Even though Golden Oak is the sole development that is currently planned for non-employee residents to live in the RCID, Disney has signaled an increased interest in residential construction. Later this year, Disney will begin construction of 2,600 apartments in an area known as Flamingo Crossings in the western extremes of Bay Lake (Storey, 2018). As of now, these units are intended to be occupied by only Disney employees and college interns, but this construction project shows an increased willingness to build residential units within the RCID. The Flamingo Crossings development — in conjunction with Golden Oak — indicates that the Company has changed its stance on a large population of people living in the RCID. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that Disney may allow more residential construction within the District in the future.
The growth of permanent residents within the RCID will assuredly alter how Disney exerts control over the District and the cities of Bay Lake and Lake Buena Vista. While residents could limit how Disney administers these local governments, it is important to first recognize how residents legitimize the existence of the RCID, and the cities it contains.
By building residential communities within the District, Disney is validating the rationale behind the creation of the RCID. Foglesong (2003) argues that the sole reason why the state created the District and the two municipalities was to allow for Disney to build EPCOT as originally presented — as a residential city (69). Moreover, the fact that Disney limited residential construction within the RCID shortly after the creation of the District has led to criticism. Foglesong (2003) claims that presenting EPCOT as a city filled with residents was a calculated ruse to dupe state authorities into authorizing governmental bodies for the Company to control (55–78). While the merits of Foglesong’s argument are debatable, Disney’s failure to construct any residential properties with the RCID until recently is apparent. In light of the original plans for EPCOT and Walt Disney World, the ongoing residential development within the RCID helps to justify the creation of the District. The state authorities who supported its creation were clearly presented with plans to build a residential city, and Disney is now building residential communities within the RCID. Disney taking nearly five decades to build residential areas is plainly suspicious, but the ongoing formation of Golden Oak partially legitimizes the District nonetheless.
The expectation for Disney to build residential communities within the RCID is evident in state Supreme and Appeals Court rulings as well. Since creation of the RCID, numerous decisions have referenced how the District will benefit residents living within the District. In State v. Reedy Creek Improvement District (1968), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the RCID could issue municipal bonds to complete the wholly private projects associated with the construction of Walt Disney World (Foglesong, 2003, 75). However, the case was truly a test to determine if the broad powers of the RCID were legal under Florida law (Emerson, 2009, 199–201). The court ruled that the District’s powers were legal because they were intended to be used for a publicly beneficial purpose. The holding of the court was in part based on the potential benefits for residents living in the District. Writing for the majority, Justice Richard Ervin states, “…[I]t is obvious that to a lesser degree the contemplated benefits of the District will inure to numerous inhabitants of the District in addition to persons in the Disney complex (State v. RCID, 1968).” The court expected people to live within the RCID, and declared that the broad powers issued to the District were partially intended to benefit these residents. Emerson (2009) points out that the court acknowledged that the RCID was a, “…[U]nique vehicle for governing… (201),” due to the District’s size, breadth of powers, and private control. Yet the court ruled that the District conformed to Florida law because its powers would serve a publically beneficial end.
Sipkema v. Reedy Creek Improvement District (1997) also references people living within the RCID, but in this case, the ruling was not based on potential benefits to District residents. In Sipkema (1997), the state’s Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court’s ruling that the RCID’s security personnel are not a police department. The court agreed that the RCID cannot form a police force, and that police activities within the District stem from the powers granted to Bay Lake and Lake Buena Vista. Neither city has a police force. Law enforcement within the district is handled by Orange and Osceola county sheriff departments under agreements with the municipalities, but the District still operates a security force to aid with minor security concerns (Emerson, 2009, 198; Koenig, 2007, 303). The lower court ruled that the RCID’s security team was not a police force because it did not engage in law enforcement activities, and the Appeals Court agreed. In his concurrence to the unelaborated per curium decision, Judge Richard Harris references the potential for residents living within the District by discussing how the RCID itself cannot supply police protection to RCID inhabitants (Sipkema v. RCID, 1997). He specifically mentions the concept of District residents, and goes on to discuss how the current voting scheme of the RCID gives the Disney Company outright control of the District. While the Sipkema court’s decision does not consider potential benefits for District inhabitants, it does show that state judges still expect a significant number of people to live within the RCID.
Residents living in Golden Oak help to legitimize the establishment and operation of the RCID. The state created the District believing thousands of people will live at EPCOT, and Florida courts have ruled in Disney’s favor expecting that inhabitants will be well served by the RCID’s powers. These beliefs and expectations are now partially validated because of Golden Oak’s ongoing development. Whether or not the Company continues to build residential areas is yet to be seen, but by taking this first step, Disney has begun to fulfill expectations made decades ago.
While the governmental structures set up for Disney are legitimized by the inclusion of residents within the RCID, these residents also pose a significant risk to the Company’s control. As discussed above, voting in the District is based on land ownership (Emerson, 2009, 189–90). However, some of the homes within Golden Oak could potentially house more than one person eligible to vote (such as a married couple). If this voting scheme is ever challenged in court with regards to Avery v. Midland County (1968), the Company may be forced to allow every eligible resident to vote on certain referendums within the District, as well as elections for RCID administrative positions, and for the city council members and mayors of Bay Lake and Lake Buena Vista (Emerson, 2009, 192). The likelihood of such a challenge increases with each new resident. While allocating a single vote to every eligible resident will not eliminate Disney’s control within the District, it will affect it. The Company would probably have to consider resident’s concerns before making decision that impact the RCID. If Disney ignore their concerns, residents could vote against the Company’s wishes, or resist Disney’s control in other ways.
Company plans have been thwarted by votes and other democratic actions before, and the development of residential areas with the District could lead to new challenges for Disney’s control over the RCID. During the planning phase of Walt Disney World, Florida voters blocked the sale of bonds to fund road improvements around Company property (Foglesong, 2003, 56). Disney had supported the sale, and the results of the referendum caused the Company to alter how they approached the management of Disney land in Florida (Foglesong, 2003, 56). The Company’s relationship with Anaheim, California (the location of Disneyland), has also changed overtime as the city’s voting population became more and more cynical of Disney (Niles, 2017). In both of these cases, Disney altered their plans, or scaled back their desires because of opposition from a local electorate. Residents of the RCID represent the potential for local voters to block Disney’s plans within a District that the Company has enjoyed total control over since its creation. Without exaggeration, if every future resident of the RCID were allowed to vote on District matters, then the way Disney administers the RCID would profoundly change.
Residents also pose a democratic challenge to the Company’s control even if they do not become a powerful voting contingent because resident could organize to disrupt the operation of Disney’s parks and other ventures within the RCID. When Disney was planning a second park in California, they originally intended for the park to be woven into the streets surrounding Disneyland (Warren, 2005, 245–6). Residents of Anaheim were opposed to this plan, but city officials were supportive. Without the ability to block the plans by a vote, those opposed to Disney’s wishes organized a group of 1,600 Anaheim residents. This group picketed Disneyland, generated media attention, and eventually forced Disney to rethink the design of the second theme park (Warren, 2005, 245–6). Residents saw Disney’s proposal as an attempt to take over the planning of their community, and since they could not vote on the matter, they took other democratic actions to take back control of their city (Warren, 2005, 245–6). If residents of the RCID ever feel as though Disney is administering the District to the detriment of inhabitants, it is possible that they could take similar actions against the Company’s control.
Disney’s ability to control the RCID as they see fit will probably change regardless of if every resident is afforded the ability to vote on District matters or not. This change is noteworthy because it counters extensive actions taken by Disney to protect their control. The Company lobbied for the creation of the RCID to protect from the influence of elected county and state governments (Foglesong, 2003, 58; Emerson, 2009, 189–91). The Company requested that the state allocate voting rights within the District by property ownership to insure Disney could maintain control in perpetuity (Emerson, 2009, 189–90). The Company even blocked all non-employee residents within the RCID for nearly fifty years to guarantee Disney’s control over the RCID (Emerson 2009, 192–4). All of these actions raise a serious question: Is Disney’s control over the RCID even compatible with residents living within the District? Disney’s plans have been compromised by democratic actions before, and the residents who will live in the RCID will rightly expect a government that takes their concerns into account. Whether or not Disney will readily support their residents’ interests is unknown, but Disney will need to consider them nonetheless.
Some experts on Disney’s planning practices believe that the Company’s corporate interests struggle to coexist with a local democracy. Stacy Warren (2005), former chairwoman of the Geography and Anthropology department at Eastern Washington University, has extensively studied Disney’s relationship with urban environments, and she is wholeheartedly critical of the Company’s actions and policies. In an essay examining the Company’s planning efforts, she states:
“…[I]t is almost taken for granted that anything [Disney] does will result in a blandly homogenized sugary-sweet façade masking the ruthless and fundamentally undemocratic corporate activities and policies that are its underpinning, all willingly swallowed by a politically gullible public. … Disneyfied urban space offers perhaps the quintessential example of the replacement of public space with private simulations of it. But what often escapes attention are the many times that Disneyfied plans flounder, unbuilt or grudgingly transformed, under the weight of organized protest, impulsive acts of resistance, and the unwieldy and inefficient mechanism known as democracy. (Warren, 2005, 231–232)”
She goes on to provide examples of how democratic actions have stifled Disney’s plans. She also discusses how the Company resisted the public’s wishes during the planning of public spaces in the past (Warren, 2005, 232–260). Her criticisms illuminate the struggle created by the private control over the planning and administration of public areas, and a similar struggle could precipitate over residents’ dissatisfaction with the RCID. The residents who live in the District will expect Disney to manage the RCID in ways that serve residents, and similar expectations have been ignored by Disney when planning public areas in Seattle, Long Beach, and Anaheim (Warren, 2005, 232–260). In these cities, Disney lost control of public areas due to actions of a disgruntled public. Moreover, these cases demonstrate that if Disney wants to maintain control over the RCID, they will likely have to balance corporate interests with residents’ concerns and desires.
While Warren (2005) would probably oppose Disney’s control of the RCID since there are now residential areas within the District, others have discussed how private control over residential areas can benefit both current and future residents living within these communities. Nadav Shoked (2013) of Northwestern University’s Pritzker School of Law states that privately controlled municipalities are quite common, and people often prefer living in them. Privately controlled cities tend to be less bottled down by bureaucratic inefficiencies, and very often limit negative externalities created within their jurisdiction (Shoked, 2013; Stringham, Miller, & Clark, 2010). Furthermore, privately controlled municipalities often protect the interest of future residents better than publically controlled cities. A team led by economist Edward Stringham writes that, “…[Traditional] government often has little incentive to care about future residents because only current residents vote (Stringham, Miller, & Clark, 2010, 101).” Conversely, privately controlled cities often need to address the interest of future residents in order to ensure their tax and consumer bases remain intact. Stringham and his team (2010) argue that private entities who control cities are concerned with both current residents who drive economic activity, and future residents who represent the municipality’s continued economic viability. Disney’s control over the RCID could potentially benefit both current and future residents. Yet this rosy outcome is only possible if the Company controls the District with residents’ interests in mind.
The Golden Oak development will change how Disney administers the RCID. For decades, Disney has only needed to worry about Company’s interests when managing the District, but the growth of residents within the RCID will require the District, and the cities of Bay Lake and Lake Buena Vista to serve them well. If Disney fails to address residents’ concerns, they could challenge Disney’s authority through litigation, lobbying to the state, or by organizing opposition to the Company’s control. If challenged in court, Disney’s control over the District could be partially relinquished to residents. No matter how residents’ concerns arise, the fact that residents now live in the RCID will require Disney to make decisions in both its residents’, and the Company’s behalf.
Conclusions, and the City of Tomorrow
In the EPCOT film Walt Disney recorded weeks before he died, he refers to EPCOT as the “City of Tomorrow (Atencio, 1966).” There is no better phrase to sum up both the ideals and pitfalls of planning. While planners often look for ways to create a city that thrives in the future, they often forget about how cities currently exist. The Disney Company believed that the only way they could craft a “City of Tomorrow” would be through the private control of local government. While there are certainly some advantages to privately controlled governments, there are serious doubts whether such an administration would ever construct Walt’s ideal city. There are far more profitable ventures than city building (such as the operation of theme parks and hotels), and there are few if any privately controlled governments that do not primarily serve a private interest. In the end, Disney never built EPCOT as a city, and the ongoing residential developments are hardly a substitute for the goals set forth by Walt in the EPCOT film.
Still, regardless of how the plans for EPCOT changed, the existence of Walt Disney World eventually resulted in the birth of a metropolitan city, but that city was not EPCOT. Since the opening of Walt Disney World, the Orlando metropolitan area has tripled in population, and has become a global capital for the tourism industry (Foglesong, 2003, 3–4). Despite his criticisms, Foglesong (2003) acknowledges that, “By the unveiling of Epcot [as a theme park] in 1982, Orlando had become the most popular tourist destination in the world (3).” It is hard to believe that the Central Florida region would be as prosperous as it is today without the opening of Walt Disney World, and Orlando would have surely remained a minor city if not for the EPCOT plans.
The ongoing residential development within the RCID provides new legitimacy, and potential challenges to Disney’s control over the District. Planners should view the effects of these developments as a unique case study of privately controlled governments. Local governance is a major element of planning, and the governments set up for Disney have unquestionably facilitated the Company’s planning efforts. Yet the planning Disney has engaged in within the RCID has been dedicated to Company interests so far. This dedication will change as residents move into the District. Planners should keep a keen eye on how Disney’s plans, and how their control over the RCID changes over the upcoming decades. They should analyze how well Disney’s privately controlled government addresses residential concerns, and must scrutinize experimental planning practices employed by the Company. EPCOT was supposed to be an experimental community, and if EPCOT was built as intended, some of its most important experiments would have been at the nexus of planning, government, and law. The potential to engage in similar studies exists today, and planners should be more than willing to perform such research.
Michael A. N. Montilla, November, 2019 (Originally written in May, 2018)
Citations
An Act Relating to the Establishment, Powers and Functions of the Reedy Creek Improvement District (May 12, 1967). General Acts Adopted by the Legislature of Florida, Volume 1, Part 2, 256–358, House Bill №486, Chapter 67–764. Retrieved March 28, 2018 from http://edocs.dlis.state.fl.us/fldocs/leg/actsflorida/1967/LOF1967V1Pt2Ch0614-1068.pdf
An Act Establishing the City of Bay Lake (May 12, 1967). Special Acts Adopted by the Legislature of Florida, Volume 2, Part 1, House Bill №485, 200–301 Chapter 67–1104. Retrieved March 28, 2018 from http://edocs.dlis.state.fl.us/fldocs/leg/actsflorida/1967/LOF1967V2Pt1Ch1069–1223.pdf
An Act Establishing the City of Reedy Creek [N.K.A. Lake Buena Vista] (May 12, 1967). General Acts Adopted by the Legislature of Florida, Volume 2, Part 3, House Bill №487, 3769–3869 Chapter 67–1965. Retrieved March 28, 2018 from http://edocs.dlis.state.fl.us/fldocs/leg/actsflorida/1967/LOF1967V2Pt3Ch1844-2197.pdf
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