26/11: Intelligence Failures and International Relations
This work was originally done as part of a university assignment for a postgraduate program. Opinions expressed here are of the author’s alone.
The deadly commando-style terrorist attack that wreaked havoc on the financial capital of India has been termed as the ‘9/11’ of the country. A pre-planned and strategically executed plot which originated from the minds of a Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operative on the hills of Kashmir culminated in the death of 166 innocent civilians, including 26 foreigners. The ten heavily armed terrorists had reached the shores of Mumbai by arriving in small boats, hijacked from fishermen, so as to evade the sophisticated radars of the Indian Coast Guard. As the shooting hit news channels on the eve of Thanksgiving, bureaucrats and officials from New Delhi to London to Langley were busy up on their desks wondering how did they not catch them coming (Rotella 2014). After deliberations and much surprising disclosures were the bits of unsolved puzzles-gathered from various sources-pieced together.
Revelations from various captured Lashkar veterans including David Coleman Headley, an American who toured Mumbai to aid in planning the attack (MacDonald 2017) and Ajmal Amir Kasab, one of the attackers who was captured alive (Khetan 2009) as well as documents leaked by Edward Snowden and those released by Indian and American agencies verify that there had been a significant intelligence failure across various levels ranging from effective communication among agencies to systematic failure in passing down information, mainly within the Intelligence Bureau of India and the local police force (A. B. Rabasa 2009).
Thirteen years after the attack, the insights it provides and the lessons that can be learned exhibit the fact that effective working among intelligence agencies is vital to ensure safety and security beyond borders. There is a role played by intelligence in bolstering international relations as well as intelligence failures do have their repercussions in global arenas.
Intelligence Sources
By the fall of 2008, Lashkar intel was already busy organizing their action plan from the remote areas of Pakistan (Glanz, Rotella and Sanger 2014). “Lashkar” is a shortened form of “Lashkar-e-Taiba” which means “Army of the Pure” (Tankel 2014, 1). The organization, rooted in orthodox Islamic values, its promotion and ensuring an end to anything that acts as its friction, grew rapidly in the 1990s mainly with the support of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), the Pakistani spy agency (Barker 2011). Lashkar conducted various proxy battles in Pakistan in exchange for weapons, intelligence, finance and training. The main objective of Lashkar was India and more specifically, the Muslim regions in the Indian-Administered Kashmir (Glanz, Rotella and Sanger 2014).
One of the main plan-makers of the attack include Zarrar Shah, the tech head of the operation and who helped navigate communications from the terrorists and their supervisors in Pakistan during the three-day siege. By September 2008, Mr. Shah would spend most of his time checking the weather forecasts in the Arabian Sea, searching Sun Tsu’s ‘The Art of War’ and browsing through Google Maps and mapsofindia.com, looking at sites in and around Mumbai (Glanz, Rotella and Sanger 2014). Little did he know that his cyber movements were being monitored by the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in the UK. According to classified documents disclosed by Edward J Snowden, the British were spying on many of his online activities, from his internet searches to messages (NSA 2014). This vital piece of intel was already in British hands and they had supervision of enemy computers. The information was on the table, what was needed was a way to unveil what it truly meant. Surveillance was on point but the questions of ‘why’ and ‘why not’ were not answered.
Moreover, in the United States, months prior to his arrests, the emails sent by David Headley to the plotters went unnoticed until 2009. Statements from his unhappy wife, who had previously told American law enforcement officers that her husband was a Pakistani terrorist and that he had plans of violent attacks on civilians were left unpursued (Rotella 2014). “Separate chatter” intercepted by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), relating to Lashkar movements were not effectively analyzed (Rotella 2015, par. 12). Also, by mid-September 2008, Indian intelligence agencies were also exposed to different indications of a future attack on its soil. In fact, Indian authorities had arrested an LeT operative in February 2008 who had with him documents of surveillance of different regions of Mumbai. This also enunciates the fact that a plot can remain dormant, but not non-executable (Collins 2009). By the end of September, Indian security agencies were aware of three major issues. Firstly, an Let sub-branch had been in training for at least three months in and around Karachi for launching sea borne attacks. Besides, Yahya Muzammil-a Lashkar terrorist-was in contact with his counterparts in Bangladesh regarding obtaining international SIM cards and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, chief military commander and chief of operations of the LeT was in contact with the trainees and had designed and conducted several training modules for terror attacks (Datta 2011).
Indian officials, so as to examine the above-mentioned inputs, scrambled the fragments in several directions in pursuit of obtaining a clear picture, which was never in sight, at least till 26th November 2008. By mid-November, Indian sources learnt that an attack on the financial hub of India was imminent but its modus operandi was not known, given in hand the experiences of the Mumbai train bombings that occurred in July 2006 (Rath 2010). Evaluations were aligned towards a bomb attack and security at several places, including the Taj Hotel, which was Ground Zero of 26/11, were increased (Datta 2008). But, security at the hotel was lowered after a few days as they hindered administration and daily ongoings, for example, when people complained that they were “not able to park their cars in the portico because of a security check with metal detectors”[1] (Tata 2008).
All these elucidate the fact that, thanks to modern technology, eye-dropping tactics and proper human intelligence, there were stiff warnings of an impending attack. Intel sources did succeed not just in supervising suspicious behaviour and intercepting improper activity but was able to distinguish the scope of an enemy penetration in Indian borders contrary to traditional thinking. However, intelligence analysis, in this case, was not complete by just shedding spotlight on terrorist movements and inbound attacks. Detection had to be succeeded by collaborative information and action. Often, intelligence strategies tend to fail when effective and immediate remedial measures are not taken.
Spy-craft Failure
There have been various sources that reveal certain failures in spy-craft leading to 26/11. One of them was the negligence to connect and share the intel received between international agencies (Bhatt 2019). Even though Britain reiterates that if they knew anything about an inbound attack, they would have informed India about it, Snowden’s unclassified files reveal of supervision but no actions upon it have been mentioned (Rotella 2014). Moreover, as stated above, an important aspect to understand is the cross-national aspects of how security agents, if heeded to the Moroccan wife of a Pakistani-American, could have in a way prevented an attack on Indian soil (Rotella 2014).
Another important issue was that there was no proper coordination within intelligence agencies in India mainly ‘due to lack of specificity and uncertainness in handling information’ (A. R. Rabasa 2009). There was insufficient careful and coordinated communication between the security agencies-the Research& Analysis Wing (RAW), the Intelligence Bureau (IB)- and the Mumbai Police. The earlier CIA ‘chatter’ obtained by RAW was not passed onto the analysis sector of the agency rather it was hurried among different establishments and scrambled to New Delhi. A similar approach was taken after another warning in mid-November and thus the flawed security at Taj weeks prior to the attack. If that information was handled with clear inspections, a better break-down of substances would have taken place and a ‘higher emphasis’ could have been issued to the warning (Datta 2011). Even though it is not clear whether the Mumbai Police or the Indian Coast Guard received warnings of a terrorist arrival via sea, they definitely failed to act on it (Parikh 2008).
The movements of David Headley while pursuing his reconnaissance mission in Mumbai and sending emails to his LeT counterparts only became known to US and Indian authorities after his arrest in Chicago. David Headley, born Daood Gilani, and later changed in relation to his mother’s American sounding name-to ease his movements across borders (Berger 2011)-did raise certain red flags with his emails and phone calls. But connecting ‘Gilani’ to ‘Headley’ took some time and he simply ‘slipped through the cracks’ (Rotella 2014). Headley, upon further interrogations, accepted to have been assisting the LeT in plotting the attack on Mumbai and even ridiculed the Indian officers present in the room as their intelligence arsenal did not succeed in eliminating his agendas in their country (Berger 2011).
Revelations by Headley also point out a crucial factor in the planning and execution of the 26/11 attacks and which would further deteriorate the relationship between India and Pakistan. He said that one Major Sameer Ali of the ISI was in the LeT control room during the attacks. Another ISI officer, Sajid Mir, was also involved in training the terrorists for the Mumbai siege (Gordon 2014). Headley also testifies that of the $29,500 that he received from his Pakistani superiors, $28,500 came from a serving ISI officer, Major Iqbal-who became the first Pakistani intelligence operative to be blacklisted by the US for terrorist activities[2] -while the rest came from Sajid Mir. This highlights the notion that terrorist training and support did occur from state intelligence in Pakistan. Moreover, the mobile phone of one of the slain terrorists contained the e-mail of Colonel Sadatullah of the Special Communications Office (SCO), a communication agency that staffs army personnel (Tran 2009). Even though it is unclear if the involvement was direct or ‘rogued’ by individuals, it is certain that the LeT was allowed to flourish-right from its inception-under the wings of the ISI. Under the disguise of Markez-Ud-Darwa-LeT’s charity wing-it continues to fund training camps in Pakistan-Administered Kashmir and its leaders press on hate speeches and killing of Jews, Hindus and Christians (Gordon 2014).
Intelligence and International Relations
From all the above instances, it is necessary to pinpoint how various intelligence activities-from supervisions to even failures-can impact the international stage. Protests from New Delhi regarding Islamabad’s slow pace in detailing the investigation was echoed by the US and the UK during the months right after 26/11, which did put Pakistan on the spotlight of terror activities. While Pakistan promised a cooperation in the diplomatic level after the attacks, Islamabad was busy in denying its role as well as destroying the evidences leading to Pakistan in the whole and Lashkar in specific (Mahadevan 2019). Right after Kasab was captured alive during the siege, Pakistan was quick in denying that he was one of their own, only to revert their stance several years later. In 2009, India provided a 69-paged dossier to Pakistan and to those countries whose citizens were killed in the attack. The document included records of LeT communications, including those of Sajid Mir ordering the execution of those foreigners who were in terrorist captivity (Sengupta 2009). Thus, Islamabad was under intense diplomatic pressure and as a consequence of that, the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) raided LeT camps and took into custody Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi, head of military operations of the organization. However, revelations from Zabiuddin Ansari, A Mujahideen terrorist arrested in Saudi Arabia and extradited to India, included that Sajid Mir, among many key plotters, escaped custody “upon the advice of ISI officers” (Mahadevan 2019). While Lakhvi was sentenced to a five-year prison term in 2021 after receiving bail in 2014 and being arrested again seven years later (Bukhari 2021), Sajid Mir still remains on the FBI’s most wanted list (FBI 2011).
The mentioning of the ISI as a beacon of help to the attackers clearly puts the credibility of intelligence analysis into question and whether spy-craft apparatus of the state- used directly or indirectly-has to do anything with assessing the outcomes of the attack. The ISI have had long disputed relationships with various terrorist and insurgent organisations-mostly those that saw India as its prime enemy before and even after 26/11. In 1991, the ISI was involved in agreements with the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), an insurgent group in the Assam state of India, which included training courses in Pakistan (Kiessling 2016). The ISI had an involvement in the orchestration of the Jamat-e-Mubarak led terrorist attack on an Indian Air Base in January 2016 (Filkins 2016). Amrullah Saleh, the Vice-President of Afghanistan until the Taliban take-over, did voice his belief that the ISI provided logistical help for the Al-Qaeda killers who murdered Ahmed Shah Massoud, former leader of the Northern Alliance who had raised concerns over Pakistan’s meddling over his country (MacDonald 2017). While the first images of the terrorists of 26/11 were published on world media, ISI was quick enough to destroy their trail. They went up to Kasab’s village of Faridkot and forced his neighbours into being silent regarding any of his details. Also, they ensured Kasab’s family was removed from the scene. They even invited international journalists to their headquarters to exhibit their innocence and the Pakistani press was commissioned to praise the agency’s role in acting as guardians of national security (Kiessling 2016).
All these point to the inevitable fact that 26/11 worsened an already poor India-Pakistan relationship-a bond closely watched in the international realm. What should have been a paired investigative analysis of the Mumbai attacks dissipated into an argumentative sphere of blaming each other in subsequent cases (Gordon 2014). Thus, this cordial setup between two nuclear powered nations were at its height of uneasiness again after the 1999 Kargil War. New Delhi found itself being “betrayed” after its hope of restoring intelligence talks post the horrors of the Mumbai train attacks (Menon 2016, 65). Even though India presented evidences that were credible enough to arrest the suspects mentioned, Pakistan continued its resistive behaviour, voiced questions, demanded clarifications and only after a politically delayed process did they arrest seven lower members of the LeT from the twelve-membered list given by New Delhi (Menon 2016). The delay in prosecutions and denial of facts made Pakistan in an unfavourable position not just for India but in South Asia. This unease has caused reciprocations even outside the political sphere leading to toils in international disciplines. Post the attacks, India stopped playing bilateral cricket matches with Pakistan (Vishwanathan 2018). The only time Pakistani players participated in the Indian Premier League-the domestic cricket league of India- was in 2008, before 26thNovember. Today, no Pakistani and Indian players can take part in the cricket leagues of the other country. Thus, a three-day terrorist siege overturned the entire geo-political scenario of one of the world’s nuclear hot-spots.
The effect that 26/11 had on intelligence analysis and the effect on international relations can be seen as a requisite for clear introspection. The attack had its ripples on the intelligence community in India. The then RAW Head had offered his resignation, on the second day of the siege, to the then Indian Prime Minister Dr. Singh who politely turned it down (Gupta 2021). Post the attack, a new intelligence wing specially dedicated to counter terrorism-within and outside the country-called the National Investigation Agency (NIA) was established. However, India was able to assert its influence and gather support in the international realm to safeguard and use intelligence capabilities in a much-strengthened manner. Intelligence successes gained after the attacks, were mainly due to the collaborations with other countries that helped in finding those who assisted the perpetrators in technology and other equipments (Menon 2016). Sheikh Abdul Khwaja, chief handler of 26/11-while attempting to travel to Karachi from Colombo under a new name-was arrested by Sri Lankan authorities who had him under surveillance via computer recognition systems and was put on a flight bound to India within hours of his capture (Swami 2010). Israel publicly came to support India by offering to provide technological, logistical and other assistances (Buck 2008). By all these instances, it is clear that not only the international community was willing to take responsibility and prevent another intelligence failure but also were adamant in finding the perpetrators as one united team.
Post 9/11, the US was concentrating on al-Qaeda and gave less importance in pressurizing Pakistan over LeT. This stance changed after six Americans were killed in the Mumbai attacks and warnings on the group’s development in the South Asian region had now already been given out in Washington (Tankel 2014). Cooperation by Pakistan with the Americans had been generally positive in the first decade of this century, for instance, the CIA was allowed to fly their drones over the remote and tribal regions where many militants were suspected to be in hiding and those drone surveillances did prove to be fruitful (Schmidle 2018). But over the years, this relationship have had their frictions. As targets were killed by US drones, new and foreign al-Qaeda personnel were added to that list. In 2010, the identity of a key CIA operative was leaked to the Pakistani press with the US suspecting the help of the ISI as a payback for listing the names of several ISI officers in a legal proceeding in New York brought by the families of those killed in 26/11 (Walsh 2010). Pakistan’s continued reluctance to crack down networks such as al-Haqqani that targets US citizens and America’s hardlined policy towards the country, especially under the Trump Administration increased Pakistan’s pressure and visibilty as a terror-shelter nation (Schmidle 2018). The diplomatic rift and the straining of relationship between the two countries exhibit the American concern of ISI as a ‘hidden launchpad’ for terrorist activities against Western interests.
Conclusion
The failures in analysing, interpreting as well as sharing intel materials among and between agencies played a crucial role, even in the conduct of the siege and the outcomes after that. The involvement of multi-national entities such as Headley raises the complex issues of threats that can easily evade radars. Thus, collection and analysis of intelligence have an important role in international relations which is of mutual cooperation to destroy the common enemy. In this world of rapid digitalisation, agencies often find it hard to evaluate inputs within the given time. This constraint can be avoided by recognising the need to quickly eliminate risks collectively. Even though the intelligence failure opened up ways of showing how things can go wrong, it is important in this progressing world that further cooperation among regional and other parities take place so that we may never have to repeat another ‘9/11’ or ‘26/11’.
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[1] Ratan Tata, the then Tata Group chairman, said those words in an interview with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria which took place right after the end of the siege.
[2] Mentioned in the ‘Indictment against David Headley’ and the document was filed in the US District Court, Northern District of Illinois on July 2010.