India vs China: Reasons for the Past and Complications of the Present
Today, China has emerged as an ambitious, rapidly developing nation that is on track to become a superpower. This cannot be denied irrespective of the tactics adopted to reach this position. The Communist Party of China has always been driven by the urge to reorient the global order and to restore China to its former glory. Therefore it has attempted to expand its borders at any opportunity available and thereby, grow its economic and cultural influence. The Indo-China War of 1962 and the tensions arising thereafter, can be attributed to such attempts by the Chinese.
The July 1958 edition of an official Chinese magazine named China pictorial, can be categorized as a key contributing factor to the war of 1962. It published a map of China that shed light on developments and arguments that led to forming the basis of the conflict that, six decades on, India and China still find themselves in. The map in question depicted large parts of the Himalayan territory of Ladakh and the North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA) as parts of China.
At present, even as Beijing and New Delhi are engaged in negotiations to ease tensions at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), arising from the fatal Galwan valley clashes of June 15–16, the Chinese side has been amassing a large contingent of troops and armaments in violation of the Peace Agreement of 1993. The military-level talks held after the clashes, which concluded with agreements to disengage troops on the disputed border, was in fact followed by satellite images (reviewed by Reuters) showing China adding up new structures and a potential new camp under construction. Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso, Demchok and the Hot Springs are the hotspots of the territory in contention in Ladakh. The People’s Liberation Army has also alarmingly increased troops along the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh.
So, what is it that resulted in these sharp conflictual bilateral relations between India and China? What can be the driving force behind China’s motives? Why has China repeatedly violated the LAC?
This article intends to decode the historical events that have led to China’s volatility along the LAC in Ladakh and the currently-less-talked-about Arunachal Pradesh.
Ladakh and Aksai Chin
Ladakh’s integration into India
After the Sikhs acquired Kashmir in 1819, the Dogra invasion of 1834 led to the integration of Ladakh into Jammu and Kashmir. The British supported the Dogra invasion in the hope of benefiting from a diverted Tibetan trade route towards its holdings. The Anglo-Sikh War of 1845–46 ultimately brought Jammu and Kashmir, including Ladakh, under British rule.
Ladakh was part of the Tibetan Empire before being an independent state, up until the Dogra invasion. Hence, historically, culturally and politically, the state was intrinsically linked to Tibet. Due to this, Tibet under the Qing dynasty of China invaded Ladakh in 1841 but was defeated by the Sikhs. This was the first display of interest for Ladakh by the Chinese. It is important to note that China has always felt a strong nationalistic drive to return China to its ancient far-flung Qing Dynasty borders. That formed the basis of China’s claim over and occupation of Tibet.
The British legacy of the map of the territory of Ladakh became the ground for India’s claim on the area, which the Chinese argued to have never really been delimited. Ramchandra Guha writes in his book India after Gandhi:
“The claims of both governments rested in part on the legacy of imperialism; British imperialism (for India) and Chinese imperialism (over Tibet) for China.”
Post occupation of Tibet by China
The annexation of Tibet by China in 1950 gave rise to newly found motives for China in Ladakh that affirmed after the 1959 Tibetan uprising and India’s political asylum to Dalai Lama. In order to crush the revolt and continue to maintain control over Tibet, the Chinese built a road across Ladakh and significantly increased its presence in the Aksai Chin region, clearly in official Indian Territory. The map above shows Aksai Chin as a part of China.
The Macartney-McDonald Line vs. The Jonathan Line
China claimed ownership of the plateau based on The Macartney–MacDonald Line that was only proposed by the British to China in 1899 but was never approved or acknowledged. In the absence of any response from the then Qing Government to the proposal, the British reverted to its original boundary, the Johnson Line, which became the official boundary of India. Failure of diplomatic negotiations resulted in the war of 1962 with India losing control over 34,000 sq km of the territory of Aksai Chin to China.
Political scientists Margaret W. Fisher and Leo E. Rose commented in their 1962 paper, ‘Ladakh and the Sino-India border crisis’,
“ Indeed, most of the territory currently in dispute between New Delhi and Peking would have been conceded to China under this settlement. The Chinese Communists must indeed find it galling that the Ch’ing Court did not even formally reply to the British offer, thus rejecting it by default.”
The significance of Aksai Chin
China construes India’s emphasis on infrastructure development along the LAC and LoC since 2013, as part of a long term strategy to regain occupied territories and to possibly disrupt the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Not only does China want Aksai Chin for maintaining a direct route between Tibet and Xinjiang and hence connecting China to the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), it also appreciates the territory for its strategic position. Aksai Chin is mostly high ground (an average elevation of 17,000 ft) and will enable taking a commanding high position in the event of a war. China has been successful in forcing Pakistan to cede land to strengthen its presence in the region.
Arunachal Pradesh and the McMahon Line
The psychological wounds of the war have resurfaced repeatedly in the years that followed the Indo-China War of 1962. When India granted statehood to Arunachal Pradesh in 1987, China responded by crossing the LAC along the McMahon line and building permanent structures. A war was averted at the flashpoint of Sumdorong Chu, though the buildup was eerily similar to that of 1962. This time, the focal point of the dispute was the McMahon Line.
The McMahon Line is the legal boundary that separates Arunachal Pradesh from China and the demarcation that China evidently considers baseless and illegal. What is now Arunachal Pradesh, was integrated as North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in 1954 into the Republic of India. Once again taking in reference the China pictorial map of 1958, China believes that NEFA was a part of South Tibet and hence a part of China. Historically, Arunachal Pradesh neither belonged to India nor China but was controlled by various autonomous tribes. In 1912–13, the British government made agreements with these indigenous tribes to form the NEFA.
The Simla Convention
The Simla Convention is an important dimension of this dispute. In 1913–14, the Simla Convention was held by representatives from Great Britain, China and Tibet to decide the borderlines for Tibet (comprising of Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet) and the McMahon line was chosen to separate British India from Outer Tibet. China, however, refused to sign the treaty because it gave autonomy to Tibet. Since China wasn’t a part of the convention, it doesn’t acknowledge the boundaries that were hence defined. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conquered most of the area of Arunachal Pradesh in 1962 but ended up withdrawing.
What Arunachal Pradesh means to China
In recent years, tensions along the McMahon line have risen as China has publicly claimed the region. China has even gone to the extent of destroying old maps and making new ones, having renamed parts of Arunachal Pradesh with Chinese names. Of particular interest is the district of Tawang where the second largest Buddhist monastery is located. China believes that Tawang is historically linked to Lhasa in Tibet and hence a part of China. Control over this territory would also mean Chinese presence on both sides of Bhutan. It is also strongly convinced that there exist large deposits of precious minerals in the disputed territory, based on mining operations of 2018 that China conducted on its side of the border, that led to the discovery of gold, silver and minerals valued at about US 60 billion.
The Present Complication
There has been a significant shift in Chinese foreign policy. This can be witnessed in tensions with the USA, events in the South China Sea and a new security law for Hong Kong. The alarming build-up along the LAC is a part of this shift.
China’s old strategy of “hide your capacity and bide your time” has been replaced by the Chinese Premier’s new policy of “China should not hide its strength”.
The Chinese Dream or China 2049 seeks the great rejuvenation of the nation by the centenary of the People’s Republic. China at mid-century aims to be a strong, prosperous socialist country, in the hope of reinstating it with the lost glory that the Chinese have always craved for. President Xi’s interpretation also includes a military dream for the military, focused on “fighting and winning wars”. This entire ideology becomes more intricate as Xi Jinping links it directly to the concept of the “Middle Kingdom of China”. It is in based on ethnocentricism, whereby China becomes the centre of the world affairs from a historical and cultural viewpoint.
China is fighting for its aspirations through what is known as the “salami tactics” — where a dominant power attempts to establish its hegemony piece by piece. India is one slice in this salami slice strategy. China sees India as a threat to its goals and that became apparent by India’s obstruction to the Belt and Road Initiative. Therefore it has moved forward to change the status quo. China’s ability to change the facts on the ground has been challenged by the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) road. India’s strengthening of border infrastructure and army preparedness all along the LAC have checkmated China’s aggressive designs.
This historical border dispute now faces the new structural reality of a rising China, adamant on redefining its sovereignty and an equally resolved India, ready to safeguard its integrity like never before.
