Evolution of Qualia

The question of the origin and nature of consciousness has occupied philosophers and scientists for centuries. In this theory, I try to take a new look at this complex topic by linking the evolution of consciousness with the need for orientation in the environment.

The core idea is that, unlike plants, animals have to orient themselves in their environment. This orientation requires the processing of various stimuli that enable safe navigation. However, these stimuli would be meaningless if they were not “felt”. The increasing differentiation of this “sensing” ultimately leads to highly complex experiences that we call qualia.

A central aspect is the idea that there must be an evaluative entity — a subject — to interpret these stimuli. This subject is the living individual himself. In contrast to a machine, in which humans are the controlling and evaluating authority, an organism must be able to react autonomously to its environment.

I further argue that unconscious processes alone are not enough to produce goal-directed behavior, which is necessary for survival. Consciousness is understood as a kind of fine-tuning required for complex behavior. Simple organisms such as bacteria do not need this fine-tuning, but as the complexity of the organism and its environment increases, it becomes increasingly important.

The threshold above which conscious processing becomes evolutionarily advantageous is fluid. It moves where the radius of movement and the decision-making space become larger. This implies a gradual development of consciousness in the course of evolution, which goes hand in hand with the increasing mobility and complexity of organisms.

To illustrate this gradual development, we can look at different stages in the animal world. Simple organisms such as jellyfish already show primitive forms of environmental perception and reaction. Insects have more complex behavioral patterns and possibly rudimentary forms of consciousness. In reptiles and amphibians, we are already seeing clearer signs of conscious experience. Mammals, and primates in particular, exhibit highly developed forms of consciousness, including self-awareness and complex emotional experiences.

This perspective is supported by neuroscientific findings. Studies of neuroplasticity and brain development in different species show how the increasing complexity of the nervous system is associated with the development of higher cognitive abilities and presumably also with the development of consciousness.

Another important aspect is Qualia’s role in decision-making. Qualia’s subjective experience allows organisms to make quick and intuitive decisions that can be essential for survival in complex environments. For example, the direct experience of pain or fear can lead to immediate reactions that ensure survival.

In addition, awareness plays a crucial role in social interactions. The ability to perceive oneself and others as conscious beings is fundamental to the development of empathy and cooperation in social groups. This, in turn, offers evolutionary advantages, as it allows for more complex forms of collaboration and mutual support.

Logically, this perspective leads to the conclusion that qualia would not only be unnecessary for plants, but potentially harmful. Since plants do not move and do not have to make decisions, the constant experience of qualia would not be able to cause them to do anything and would thus be a waste of resources.

The theory offers a functional approach to understanding consciousness that shifts the focus from the metaphysical question “How do qualia arise from matter?” to the more practical question “What are qualia for in an evolutionary context?” This avoids the classic body-soul problem and instead focuses on the pragmatic role of consciousness in the interaction of an organism with its environment.

Another important aspect of this perspective is the realization that the often discussed “hard problem of consciousness” is based on a category error. The attempts to establish a causal connection between philosophical-psychological and physiological-biological objects transcend fundamental conceptual boundaries.

The theory presented here shows parallels to existing concepts in consciousness research, but also introduces its own innovative aspects.

Daniel Dennett’s work “Consciousness Explained” (1991) and his more recent book “From Bacteria to Bach and Back” (2017) also discuss the evolutionary function of consciousness and argue for a gradual development of cognitive abilities. Dennett’s approach supports the idea of a fluid threshold of consciousness as proposed in the present theory.

The emphasis on the connection between mobility, decision-making space and consciousness resonates in Euan Macphail’s “The Evolution of Consciousness” (1998). Macphail explores the role of movement and complexity in the development of consciousness, which complements the perspective presented here.

Todd Feinberg and Jon Mallatt argue in “The Ancient Origins of Consciousness” (2016) for a gradual evolution of consciousness, starting with simple organisms. This supports the idea of a gradual development of consciousness depending on the complexity of the organism and its environment.

The functional consideration of qualia, as proposed in this theory, has similarities with the approach of Christof Koch in “The Feeling of Life Itself” (2019). Koch discusses the spread of consciousness in nature and offers interesting perspectives on the question of the consciousness threshold.

The category error aspect of the hard problem of consciousness is reminiscent of Gilbert Ryle’s critique of Cartesian dualism in “The Concept of Mind” (1949). Ryle argued that the idea of mind and body as separate entities is based on a category error.

However, the theory presented here goes beyond these existing approaches in some respects. The specific link between radius of movement, decision-making space and the necessity of qualia offers a new perspective. In particular, the idea that qualia could be potentially harmful to plants represents an interesting and less discussed perspective.

A novel comparison emerges when we look at this theory in the context of the development of artificial intelligence. While AI systems can handle increasingly complex tasks, their “orientation” is fundamentally different from the conscious orientation of biological organisms. The question arises as to whether sophisticated AI systems could also develop a kind of “qualia” to act effectively in complex, dynamic environments.

The approach presented here considers consciousness under an evolutionary, functional approach as an adaptive trait that has evolved from the need for orientation and decision-making in complex environments.