Phenomenological relativism

Epistemic relativism is the view that knowledge is relative to a particular point of view or context, and that there is no absolute truth.

Several prominent philosophers and thinkers have dealt with epistemic relativism. Here are some key figures and their views:

The American philosopher Nelson Goodman (1906–1998) advocated a moderate relativism. In his work “Ways of World Production”, he argued that our acceptance of descriptions of the world depends on our purposes and interests. He wrote: “Which description we accept depends on the purposes we pursue.” [1]

The philosopher Thomas Nagel dealt with the subjectivity of our perception. In his famous essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” [2]. he argued that we can only experience the world through the “lens of our own modality”, e.g. as human beings with human senses.

The physicist Werner Heisenberg, one of the founders of quantum mechanics, emphasized the role of the observer: “What we observe is not nature itself, but nature that is exposed to our kind of questioning.” [3]. This points to an epistemological relativism.

The philosopher Paul Feyerabend advocated a radical epistemic relativism and pluralism. In “Against the Necessity of Methods” he criticized the idea of universal methodological rules in science [4].

The American philosopher Richard Rorty was a prominent representative of neo-pragmatic relativism. He rejected the idea of an objective truth independent of the community [5].

Although these thinkers represented different forms of relativism, they shared the view that our knowledge and descriptions of the world are always relative to a particular point of view. Epistemic relativism remains an important and controversial topic in philosophy.

There are some empirical studies that seem to support aspects of epistemic relativism, but it is a complex and controversial topic. Here are some relevant findings:

Cultural differences in perception and cognition

Studies have shown that people from different cultures sometimes perceive and process the world differently. For example:

- In one study, participants from individualistic and collectivist cultures had to describe visual scenes. Participants from individualistic cultures focused more on individual objects, while those from collectivist cultures emphasized context more [6].

- Other studies suggest that people from East Asian cultures are more inclined to think holistically and contextually, while Westerners think more analytically and object-focused [7].

Such findings suggest that our cultural imprints influence our perception and cognition — a core argument of relativism.

Linguistic relativity

- Speakers of languages that do not distinguish between blue and green have difficulty distinguishing these colors [8].

- Speakers of languages with many words for color gradations can distinguish colors better [9].

This suggests that the categories of our language influence our perception of the world.

Limits of sensory perception

Our brain filters and interprets sensory inputs in complex ways. Optical illusions and other perceptual illusions show the limits and “blind spots” of our senses. This suggests that we do not perceive the world objectively, but through a “neural filter”.

However, there are also many arguments and findings that speak against radical epistemic relativism. Most philosophers and scientists today advocate more moderate forms that acknowledge the existence of an external reality, but limit our ability to recognize it, at least in part.

Epistemic relativism plays an important role in modern philosophy. He challenges the idea of an objective, community-independent truth, emphasizing that our knowledge is always relative to a particular point of view or context. Here are some key aspects of the epistemic relativism debate:

Subjectivity of perception

A major argument of relativism is that our perception of the world is shaped by our biological and cognitive limitations. As mentioned in the text, we do not perceive the world objectively, but through a “neural filter”. Our senses and processes of interpretation transform reality into our own modality.

Perspective Relativity

Perspective relativity says that our understanding of the world depends on our position and scale. As mesoscopic beings, we perceive the world in an intermediate size range, while other scales (quanta, cosmology) can only be represented abstractly [1]. There can be no universal description on all levels.

Cultural and linguistic relativity

Many relativists argue that our cultural imprints and languages influence our perception and cognition, as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis suggests. Different cultures and languages lead to different worldviews.

Criticism of objective truth

Epistemic relativism rejects the idea of an objective truth independent of observers. Instead, he emphasizes the subjectivity and contextual dependence of knowledge and descriptions of the world.

Epistemic relativism forces us to critically question our assumptions about knowledge and reality and to adopt different perspectives. He calls for tolerance towards other world views.

Epistemic relativism has far-reaching implications for epistemology and challenges some of its central assumptions. Here are some of the key implications:

Skepticism about ultimate justifications

Relativism forces us to critically question our assumptions about knowledge and reality. It sows doubts about the possibility of ultimately substantiating our knowledge or achieving a final truth.

In epistemology, relativism has led to a reorientation, away from the search for absolute truth towards a contextualist understanding of knowledge. Moderate forms accept an external reality but emphasize the relativity of our access to it.

Overall, epistemic relativism forces epistemology to acknowledge the limitations of our knowledge and to look for new ways to justify knowledge and integrate different perspectives. It calls for humility towards our cognitive abilities and openness to other worldviews.

There are some historical examples and precursors of epistemic relativism in the history of philosophy:

Ancient skeptics

The ancient skeptics such as Pyrrhon of Elis and the new academics fundamentally questioned the possibility of certain knowledge. They argued that we cannot see the true nature of things and must limit ourselves to appearances. This skeptical attitude towards the ultimate justifications of knowledge is a precursor of relativistic ideas.

Michel de Montaigne

The French Renaissance philosopher Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) emphasized in his “Essais” the subjectivity and perspective dependence of human knowledge. He pointed to the diversity of human customs, customs and opinions and drew the conclusion that there can be no universal truths.

Giambattista Vico

The Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) advocated an early cultural relativism. In his “New Science” he argued that human truth and knowledge are shaped by the respective culture and history.

Historicism

The historicists of the 19th century, such as Wilhelm Dilthey and Johann Gustav Droysen, emphasized that all knowledge is historically and culturally determined. They rejected the idea of timeless truths and saw man as a “historical being”.

Sociology of Knowledge

In the early 20th century, sociologists such as Émile Durkheim and Karl Mannheim developed the idea that knowledge and cognition are shaped by social factors such as class, culture and ideology. This is a precursor to social constructivism.

Postmodernism

From the 1960s onwards, postmodern thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Jean-François Lyotard exercised radical criticism of claims to objectivity and advocated linguistic and cultural relativism.

Although the term “epistemic relativism” is relatively new, these historical examples show that relativistic ideas about the subjectivity and contextual dependence of cognition have long been discussed in philosophy. Modern relativism builds on these traditions.

In addition to empirical evidence, one can also make theoretical considerations for relativism. This is based on phenomenology by saying that as neuronal beings, we transform reality into a modality that corresponds to it, thus creating an epistemically subjective reality that represents our relationship to the world. This would then not be arbitrary speculation, but a logical derivation.

I call this epistemic type of relativism phenomenological relativism, because it does not start from fixed epistemic theoretical edifices, but from experience, in order to search for the essence of things and to reconstruct them logically and historically.

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[1] Goodman, Nelson. Ways of World Production. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984, p. 34.

[2] Nagel, Thomas. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974): 435–50.

[3] Heisenberg, Werner. Physics and Philosophy. Stuttgart: Hirzel, 2000, p. 60.

[4] Feyerabend, Paul. Against the compulsion to use methods. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976.

[5] Rorty, Richard. Contingency, irony and solidarity. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989.

[6] Masuda & Nisbett (2001). Attending holistically versus analytically. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.

[7] Nisbett et al. (2001). Culture and systems of thought. Psychological Review.

[8] Roberson et al. (2000). Color categories are not universal. Journal of Experimental Psychology.

[9] Winawer et al. (2007). Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination. PNAS.