The Challenge of Theory Formation in Contemporary Philosophy
1. Introduction
In the landscape of contemporary philosophy and philosophy of science, a remarkable tendency is emerging: many approaches tend to translate observable phenomena directly into ontological or metaphysical concepts, rather than looking for deeper, abstract principles. This problem, which we could call “phenomenontologization”, can be observed in various areas of philosophy and raises fundamental questions about the nature of theory formation.
In this essay, we will examine this tendency through different philosophical approaches, analyze its strengths and weaknesses, and discuss the challenges it poses for philosophical methodology. We will also look at alternative approaches and try to show ways to achieve a more balanced relationship between empirical observation and abstract theory formation.
2. The tendency towards phenomenontologization
2.1 Multivalued logic
Multivalued logic, whose origins go back to Jan Łukasiewicz and his three-valued logic introduced in 1920, represents an extension of classical two-valued logic. It was developed to better capture phenomena such as vagueness, indeterminacy or future contingency.
While multivalued logic has undoubtedly made important contributions to logic and philosophy, it can be argued that in a certain sense it ontologizes the phenomenon of indeterminacy. Instead of questioning the nature of indeterminacy itself, or looking for more fundamental principles that might explain such phenomena, it simply introduces additional truth values.
In her book “Philosophy of Logics” (1978), Susan Haack discusses the advantages and disadvantages of multivalued logics and points out that the introduction of additional truth values can have intuitive appeals, but also raises new conceptual problems.
2.2 Structural realism
Structural realism, which in its modern form was largely developed by John Worrall (1989), is an attempt to explain the “miracle” of scientific success without relying on the problematic assumption of a direct correspondence between scientific theories and reality.
Structural realism asserts that what is “real” in science and persists through changes in theory is the mathematical or relational structure of theories. While this approach attempts to solve some problems of scientific realism, it could be argued that it ultimately ontologizes the phenomenon of scientific success by elevating the mathematical structure itself to a metaphysical entity.
James Ladyman, in his book “Every Thing Must Go” (2007), defended a radical version of structural realism known as “Ontical Structural Realism.” This approach goes even further in the ontologization of structures by claiming that structures are the only thing that fundamentally exists.
2.3 Expanded mind
The theory of the extended mind, first presented by Andy Clark and David Chalmers in their influential article “The Extended Mind” (1998), argues that cognitive processes are not limited to the brain or body, but can extend into the environment.
While this theory undoubtedly provides important insights into the nature of cognition, it could be argued that it ontologizes the phenomenon of tool use and cognitive expansion into the environment. Instead of looking for more fundamental principles that explain why and how we involve external resources in our cognitive processes, extension itself is elevated to a metaphysical principle.
Richard Menary, in his book “Cognitive Integration” (2007), has tried to develop a more nuanced version of this theory, focusing less on the ontologization of the expanded mind and more on the integration of different cognitive resources.
2.4 Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of the Body
Maurice Merleau-Ponty developed a philosophy in his main work “Phenomenology of Perception” (1945) that focuses on embodied experience and the fusion of subject and world. Although Merleau-Ponty does not directly follow the tendency towards phenomenontologization, it could be argued that his approach also tends to place observable aspects of the human experience directly at the center of the theory.
2.5 The Philosophy of Situated Cognition
The philosophy of situated cognition, developed by authors such as Lucy Suchman (“Plans and Situated Actions”, 1987) and Jean Lave (“Cognition in Practice”, 1988), emphasizes the embedding of cognitive processes in the environment and context. While this approach provides important insights into the nature of cognition, it could be argued that it also tends to translate observable aspects of cognition directly into theoretical principles.
3. Countercurrents and alternative approaches
3.1 Husserl’s Eidetic Reduction
Edmund Husserl’s method of eidetic reduction, which he developed in works such as “Ideas on a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy” (1913), stands in a certain sense in contrast to the tendency of phenomenontologization. Husserl tried to penetrate to the essence of things through a process of abstraction and variation, rather than directly ontologizing observed phenomena.
Nevertheless, Husserl’s approach has also been criticized. For example, Jocelyn Benoist argues in “Éléments de philosophie réaliste” (2011) that Husserl’s method may be too abstract and loses touch with concrete reality.
3.2 Analytic philosophy
Analytic philosophy, which has its roots in the works of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, often strives for clear definitions of terms and logical analysis. It tries to reduce complex ideas to their basic components.
Willard Van Orman Quine, in his influential work “Word and Object” (1960), proposed a naturalistic approach to philosophical problems that attempts to deal with philosophical questions in the context of the natural sciences without falling into a direct ontologization of phenomena.
4. The challenge of theory formation
The approaches discussed above raise important questions about the nature of philosophical and scientific theory formation:
4.1 The tension between realism and abstraction
Philosophical theories often face the challenge of both doing justice to the complexity of the observable world and searching for more abstract, fundamental principles. This tension is discussed by Nicholas Rescher in his book “The Strife of Systems” (1985), where he argues that philosophers often have to navigate between different, seemingly irreconcilable demands on their theories.
4.2 The danger of overemphasising individual phenomena
By emphasizing certain observable aspects, theories run the risk of neglecting or underestimating other potentially important factors. This problem is discussed by Helen Longino in her book “Science as Social Knowledge” (1990), where she argues that scientific and philosophical theories are often shaped by certain values and perspectives that emphasize certain aspects of reality and neglect others.
4.3 The need for revision
Theories that are too closely tied to specific phenomena may be more susceptible to fundamental revisions as new discoveries are made. Thomas Kuhn argued in his influential work “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (1962) that scientific theories are often replaced by radical paradigm shifts when faced with too many anomalies.
5. Possible solutions
5.1 Integration of empiricism and abstraction
One possible way forward could be to develop approaches that both take empirical observations seriously and look for more abstract principles. Critical realism, as developed by Roy Bhaskar in “A Realist Theory of Science” (1975), seeks to achieve such integration by distinguishing between the transitive dimension of our knowledge and the intransitive dimension of reality.
5.2 Multi-level declarations
Another approach could be to develop multi-level explanations that take into account both specific phenomena and more abstract principles. Daniel Dennett proposed such a multi-level model for the explanation of mental phenomena in his book “The Intentional Stance” (1987).
Dennett argues that to explain complex phenomena such as consciousness and human intelligence, different levels of analysis are necessary. These levels can include, for example, biological, psychological and social aspects. Each of these levels offers a different perspective and contributes to the overall explanation of the phenomenon.
In terms of consciousness, Dennett suggests that it’s not enough to just look at the neural processes in the brain. Instead, higher cognitive functions and their evolutionary development must also be taken into account. This means that explanations at the level of neurobiology must be supplemented by psychological theories, which in turn can be extended by evolutionary and sociocultural theories.
5.3 Pragmatism and experimental metaphysics
A pragmatic approach, such as that advocated by William James and John Dewey, could offer a way to mediate between considering concrete phenomena and searching for more abstract principles. More recently, in “Naturalism Without Mirrors” (2011), Huw Price has argued for a form of pragmatism that he calls “experimental metaphysics” that attempts to address metaphysical questions in the context of scientific practice.
It combines elements from physics, philosophy and other sciences to gain a deeper understanding of the foundations of our reality.
6. The role of science
The discussion about phenomenontologization in philosophy also raises questions about the relationship between philosophy and science. While some philosophers, such as Wilfrid Sellars in “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man” (1962), have argued for a clear separation between the “manifest” and the “scientific” image of the world, others, such as Patricia Churchland in “Neurophilosophy” (1986), argue for a closer integration of philosophy and the natural sciences.
7. Conclusion
The tendency towards phenomenontologization in contemporary philosophy poses a significant challenge. While on the one hand it has the advantage of taking into account the complexity and richness of the observable world, on the other hand there is a risk of missing important steps towards abstraction and the search for more fundamental explanations.
The search for a balanced approach that does justice to both empirical reality and the pursuit of abstract principles remains one of the central tasks of philosophy. It is necessary to find a way to preserve the richness of experience without falling into a superficial ontologization of phenomena.
Possible ways forward could lie in the development of multi-level explanations, in the integration of empirical and abstract approaches or in pragmatic approaches. In doing so, it will be crucial to rethink the relationship between philosophy and science and possibly to forge closer links between the two disciplines.
Implications could be:
Mesoscopic nature of humans:
We exist and operate in an in-between world — neither on the quantum level nor on the cosmic scale. This has an impact on our perception and understanding of reality.
Limits of direct perception:
We cannot directly perceive quantum fields, ultraviolet radiation or gravity. Our access to these phenomena is indirect and takes place through instruments and theoretical constructs.
Epistemic relativism:
Our ability to cognition is limited and shaped by our biological and cognitive structure. It is therefore epistemically relativistic.
Starting point of human reality:
My suggestion is to start from our reality instead of striving for a transcendent perspective. This corresponds to philosophical approaches such as phenomenalism or certain forms of pragmatism.
This view has several important implications:
a) Modesty in epistemology:
It asks us to be more modest in our epistemological claims. We should recognize that our knowledge is always filtered by our specific position in the world.
b) Focus on the human experience:
Instead of looking for an absolute reality independent of our experience, we should focus on understanding and explaining our immediate world of experience.
c) Re-evaluation of scientific theories:
Scientific theories that deal with areas beyond our direct perception (such as quantum mechanics or cosmology) should perhaps be understood as useful models rather than direct representations of reality.
d) Interdisciplinary approach:
The approach suggests that we could potentially benefit more from the collaboration between philosophy, cognitive science, and biology to understand how our specific position in the world affects our cognitive capacity.
