The Philosophical Problem of Time

Time is one of the fundamental concepts of our universe, and yet it is also one of the most mysterious. What exactly is time? How does it flow? Is there an arrow of time that leads us from the past to the future?

These questions have occupied philosophers for centuries, and there are no easy answers. The problem of time is one of the most complex and fascinating in philosophy.

Some of the most important issues related to time include:

The nature of time: Is time fundamental or derived? Is it a dimension of the universe like longitude and latitude, or is it something else?

The flow of time: Does time seem to flow in one direction, or is it static? Is there a past, present and future, or are they just illusions?

The Arrow of Time: What Causes the Arrow of Time? Why does time always seem to flow from the past to the future?

Timekeeping: How can we measure time? Is there an absolute time, or is all timekeeping relative?

Free Will vs. Determinism: Is There Free Will, or Are All Our Actions Determined by the Past?

Travel through time: Is it possible to travel through time? If so, what implications does this have for our understanding of time and causal relationships?

Let’s look at different philosophical approaches:

1. Presenteeism: This view assumes that only the present really exists. Past and future are not real. Representatives are, for example, the philosopher Arthur Norman Prior [1] and the so-called “new tensers” movement.

This view holds that only the present really exists, while the past and future are not real. This is justified by the apparent self-evident nature of our experience of the “restless present”. Only the present moment appears to us immediately conscious and real. Differentiation from A-theory, for example: Presenteeism denies not only the reality of the future, but also of the past. Differentiation from possibilism: For presentism, possible worlds of the past and future do not exist in reality, but mere abstractions, not concrete entities.

There are different variants of how presenteeism justifies the non-existence of the past/future: Some argue metaphysically that only the present has a concrete reason for being. Others emphasize the lack of causal effectiveness of past/future. Still others rely on the phenomenological reality of the restless present. Within presentism, there are debates as to whether propositions about the past/future can be true and whether these realms exist at least as abstractions.

2. Theory of eternity: This theory, developed by J.M.E. McTaggart [2], states that time itself is not real, but only an illusion of the way we perceive events. There is only one timeless reality.

McTaggart’s argument is that time itself is an illusion or contradiction, since past, present, and future are only relational concepts that permanently merge into each other. The only reality, therefore, is an immovable, timeless existence. Differentiation e.g. from B-theory: Although this does not assume objective time, it does assume a real temporal arrangement of events. The theory of eternity denies any temporal reality.

McTaggart’s argument for the contradictory nature of the temporal is very technical. It revolves around the alleged impossibility of reconciling the temporal series A (past/present/future) and B (earlier/later). Opposing positions have disputed this incompatibility or questioned the claim to inconsistency in general. It also remains debatable whether McTaggart’s conclusion of a timeless reality is compelling.

3. Possibilism: According to this position of David Lewis [3], not only the present facts, but also possible worlds with past and future exist as abstractions.

Here, in addition to the present world, other “possible worlds” are assumed to exist as real, in which the past and future are actualized. Lewis justifies this with his modal realism theory. Differentiation, for example, from presentism: the latter assumes only the present as real, possibilism, on the other hand, assumes many other branches of time as concrete realities.

Lewis’ modal realism and the associated interpretation of many-worlds are extremely complex and controversial. Critics criticize, among other things, the metaphysical over-determination and lack of empirical anchoring of the theory. Within possibilism, there are debates as to which type of modal is to be regarded as existing (possible, necessary, etc.).

4. A-theory: The A-theory [4] distinguishes between the objective past and future (lack of tenses) and our subjective perception of the past, present and future.

It distinguishes between the objective past/future (lack of tensibility) and our subjective experience of periods of time. The past is therefore real, but has lost its original present and future. Differentiation from presentism, for example: The latter denies the reality of the past, the A-theory assumes it. Differentiation from B-theory: The latter completely negates objective periods of time.

The distinction between objective tenslessness and subjective experiences of time raises many problems, for example with regard to the classification of the present or compatibility with the theory of relativity. This is also where different intuitions collide, e.g. whether the future is “open” or determined. Critics doubt whether the A-theory can ultimately really explain the flow of time.

5. B-Theory: The eternal present-present presence of the B-Theory [5] according to J.J.C. Smart states that there is no objective flow of time, but only a timeless arrangement of events.

Representatives such as Smart argue that there is no objective flow of time, but only a static arrangement of events in a 4-dimensional “space-time”. Past, present and future are mere subjective perspectives, not real properties. Differentiation from presenteeism: The latter considers only the moment as real. The B-theory, on the other hand, has equal rights to all events as existing.

The key question is whether time indexials such as “present” describe only subjective perspectives or objective facts. Defenders of B-theory argue that the “now”, like the “here” point, is a purely subjective orientation without metaphysical privilege. However, opposing positions see the experience of time as too fundamental to devalue it in this way.

6. Circular time: Some philosophers such as John Wheeler [6] advocated the idea of circular, repeating time with no beginning or end.

This idea from antiquity, mythology and modern cosmological speculation states that time repeats itself in large cycles without beginning and end. Wheeler, for example, thought of alternating expansion and contraction phases of the universe.Differentiation from linear time models: These assume a unique beginning and end of time. Cyclic time is unlimited and recurring.

This raises the question of the empirical plausibility of such cycles and whether they must be thought of as endless. Even for circular models, the quality and “direction” of time remains mysterious. Many deny that such cycles can really explain temporality itself and not just shift it.

7. Dynamic theories of time assume that time is something dynamic that constantly arises (e.g. through physical processes, acts of consciousness, etc.). This idea was developed by Aristotle [7] and modern process philosophers.

Here, time is not understood as a rigid continuum, but as a dynamic, emerging process, for example through natural processes or mental acts (Whitehead, Bergson, etc.). Time is therefore not a container, but is continuously recreated. Differentiation from block universe models: These consider time as a finished, unchangeable totality. Process philosophers, on the other hand, as a creative, ever-changing flow.

They contradict the common scientific view, according to which time is a pre-given continuum. It remains unclear what the dynamic origin of time is supposed to be here — a mental act, natural processes or a metaphysical force? Objections concern the alleged mixing of categorically different phenomena.

The great German idealists Kant, Fichte and Hegel have also made important contributions to the philosophical debate of the time:

For Kant, time is an a priori form of perception, a necessary condition of our sensory experience, as he explains in the “Critique of Pure Reason” (1781/1787). However, time itself does not exist independently of human consciousness as a “thing-in-itself”, but is a subjective form of ordering phenomena. Kant distinguishes between the timeless, intelligible world of things in themselves and the phenomenal world, in which we must necessarily arrange events into the forms of space and time. Kant thus denies the objective reality of the time.

In his “Basis der Gesamtwissenschaftlehre” (1794/95), Fichte developed a subjective idealism in which the ego posits the whole of reality through its actions. Time is also seen as a necessary product of the ego. For Fichte, there is no objective time independent of the ego, but only time as an “image of the ego”. Thus, every moment must correspond to an action of the ego. Temporality follows the process of self-awareness.

In Hegel’s philosophy, the dialectical movement of time plays a central role. For him, there is no objectively existing, absolute time in itself, but only the concrete temporal relations of the idea in its dialectical process. The focus is on the present as a synthesis of past and future. In his “Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences” (1817), Hegel shows how time emerges from nature itself. Time is the sphere of finitude and becoming.

What the German idealists have in common is that they deny the objective reality of the time. Rather, time is understood as a product or ordering scheme of human consciousness, the ego or the idea. They thus distinguish themselves from naturalistic conceptions of time, according to which time has a reality independent of consciousness. On the other hand, her conceptions go far beyond simple presenteeism.

The relationship between physical time, philosophical time, and subjective experience of time is complex and highly controversial. There are different points of view on this:

Physical Time:

Modern physics works with an objectified and quantifiable concept of time as the fourth dimension in space-time. Time is understood here as a universal, uniformly running quantity that can be measured by precise measurements (e.g. with atomic clocks). This physical time is closely linked to the laws of nature and the structure of space.

Connection to philosophical times:

Some philosophers see in physical time the actual, objective time realized, from which all other concepts of time are merely derived. The laws of nature and our experience must agree with this fundamental physical time structure.

Others, however, argue that physical time is only a specialized concept of time for specific purposes and does not yet provide a complete explication of the nature of time. Philosophical theories of time would have to integrate physical time coherently, but go far beyond that.

Subjective time:

Our subjective perception of time — our inner “experience of time” — differs significantly from physical time. Experiences of time dilation/gathering, the present point or the flow of time cannot simply be reduced to physical time.

Some positions see subjective time as a mere cognitive illusion that deviates from “true” physical time. Others, however, emphasize that we can only understand physical time on the basis of our original experience of time. Our experience of time is a central point of reference.

Some try to integrate both concepts of time conceptually, for example by showing how subjective perception of time is based on neurophysiological processes that follow physical time.

Overall, it can be seen that physical and subjective/phenomenal time are closely related, but their exact relationship is very complex and controversial. A complete theory of time must presumably encompass both aspects and relate them conclusively to each other.

There are several approaches to how a comprehensive theory could integrate subjective experience of time and physical time:

1. Emergence theory

This position assumes that our subjective perception of time is based on the fundamental physical time structures and brain processes, but itself represents a new, emergent property. Just as consciousness and qualia cannot be completely reduced to the neurobiological basics, our experience of time would be an independent phenomenon arising from the physical level. Philosophers such as David Chalmers advocate such theories.

2. Information theory approach

It is argued here that subjective time is closely related to information processing in our brain. Neurons continuously encode and transmit information, creating an internal, serial sequence of states that we experience as a flow of time. Physical time at the quantum level would be “translated” into an experienced tense, so to speak. Similar theories have already been advocated by physicists such as Smolin.

3. Phenomenological approach

From a phenomenological point of view, our immediate experience of time is the actual basic concept of time, on which all other conceptions of time are based. Physicists like Pauli argued that we must always interpret the formalized physical concepts of time against the background of our previous experience of time. A complete theory of time would have to take up this life-world basis coherently.

4. Naturalistic perspective

This could be the starting point for a position in natural philosophy, according to which physical time and our experience of time are ultimately an indivisible phenomenon — time as it actually exists and unfolds in nature. The supposed gap would then possibly be an illusory problem due to shortened perspectives. Whitehead and Bergson developed variants of such naturalistic process ontologies of the time.

Another aspect comes into play through the system time. Ilya Prigogine (1917–2003), who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1977 for his work on thermodynamics and equilibria and the role of time in dissipative systems, has made very interesting contributions to the philosophy of time.

Prigogine’s critique of the classical, deterministic conception of time as reversible and symmetrical between past and future is central [8]. From the perspective of Newtonian mechanics and classical physics based on it, time appeared as a mere parameter variable with no active role of its own. Prigogine, on the other hand, used irreversible thermodynamics to show that time does indeed have a fundamental, constructive influence in open systems characterized by entropy production.

In such dissipative systems far from equilibrium, continuous fluctuations and instabilities can spontaneously give rise to new structures and patterns of order, so-called dissipative structures. Here, time is not just a passive background, but an active operator who creates something new and builds complexity. The future is fundamentally open and not predetermined by deterministic laws.

My reasoning is based on my approach of epistemic relativism [9], which says that we transform reality into a modality that suits us. Of course, this also applies to Die Zeit. However, if we enter this modal world of ours, we determine a so-called objective time, which corresponds to that of the theory of relativity. Anyway, this is the best theory we currently have.

Subjective time has little to do with this ‘objective’ time. It allows time, or rather our sense of time, to arise through the overlapping oscillations in our organism, which are synchronized with all the rhythms of time that surround us. Depending on how many events of which kind can be inserted into a period of time such as a day, subjective time passes faster or slower.

Since ‘objective’ time as space-time has almost no influence on us on this planet, there is hardly any overlap here. In addition, our sense of time and physical time are two completely different concepts, each of which comes from a different field of science and thus not only has a different perspective, but also has a different object.

This means that we have three different types of time that pursue different concepts, one physical, one system-theoretical, and one subjectively experienceable, all of which have in common that events follow one another, but which are in completely different contexts. A union of these three concepts is not possible because they contain different perspectives that are not compatible.

This idea follows the idea that no theory of everything is possible, because we observe reality from different perspectives and from or on different scales. Reality is therefore not only epistemically relativistic, but also methodologically and operatively. This does not allow a uniform causality to be determined, no common past and future. To want to explain the subjective experience of time physically or to want to establish a connection between the two is like trying to explain qualia physically. It is an explanatory gap that cannot be closed, or better: it is not an explanatory gap at all, because the problem is an illusory problem.

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Sources:

[1] Prior, A. N. (1967). Past, Present and Future. Oxford

[2] McTaggart, J. M. E. (1908). The Unreality of Time. Mind, 17(68), 457–474.

[3] Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford

[4] Broad, C. D. (1938). Examining the mind. Cambridge

[5] Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Philosophy and Scientific Realism. London

[6] Wheeler, J. A. (1968). Einsteins Vision. Berlin: Springer.

[7] Aristoteles (ca. 350 v. Chr.). Physik. (1987). Hamburg

[8] Prigogine, I, (1992). Das Paradox der Zeit. München

[9] Stegemann, W, Epistemology — Anthropic Relativism, https://medium.com/neo-cybernetics/epistemology-anthropic-relativism-2773dc8c77b7