Icarus Falls: An Approach to Cyber Risk Management in the Aviation Industry
My dad was the one who got me into books and stories. I remember when I was 7; he gave me a book about Greek Mythology instead of the common princess and prince charming stuff (no offense, but I’m not into the idea of waiting for someone else to rescue me when things don’t work out). I’m glad Dad has good taste. I’ve learned a lot from each of the stories in the book, which taught me about wisdom, morality, actions-consequences, and helped me find my way to philosophy.
In order to avoid negative outcomes, stories like the myth of Daedalus and Icarus emphasize the importance of wisdom in decision-making, a lesson that I can apply now as I work in the field of cybersecurity, especially if you’re talking about risk management.
In the story, Daedalus and Icarus were imprisoned on the island of Crete. To escape, Daedalus crafted wings using feathers and wax for himself and his son, Icarus. Daedalus warned Icarus not to fly too close to the sun, as it would melt the wax. However, Icarus, overcome by the thrill of flying, ignored the warning. His wings melted, and he fell to his demise in the sea. The myth symbolizes the consequences of disobedience and the dangers of hubris.
Speaking of the devil, cyber risk management in the aviation industry is no different from the lesson you can learn from the Daedalus and Icarus story. The aviation sector, with its intricate web of interconnected systems, faces an ever-evolving threat landscape. As digitalization and connectivity become integral to aviation operations, the vulnerability to cyberattacks escalates. That’s where effective cyber risk management is crucial.
Words and Terms
Now that you have the context, I’ll introduce you to several terms in cyber risk management. I’ll make it easy to understand, so instead of providing textbook definitions, I’ll let you find the relation with the Daedalus and Icarus story.
Assets and Services
Tackling cyber security starts from asset identification and decomposition. Picture above shows an overview of the key assets to be protected in Smart airports. ACRP Guidebook on Best Practices for Airport Cyber security classified the airport assets and systems that are relevant for cyber security as follows: Landside Operations, Airport Administration, Staff Management, Customer Ancillary Services, Facilities and Maintenance, Passenger Management, Airline/Airside Operations, Safety and Security, and IT and Comms Systems.
Some of these assets belong to and are managed by the airport authority, while others are provided by external service providers. Primary assets are the essential processes and information that support the main airport activities. Usually, primary assets consist of business processes and activities, and information. Secondary assets are those assets that the primary elements depend on. These assets have vulnerabilities that are exploitable by cyber security threats aiming to impair the primary assets — processes and information. They include all types of deployable systems that allow an airport to carry out its primary functions such as hardware, software, network, personnel, and site.
Identifying assets is a fundamental step in cyber risk management. It enables organizations to comprehend their exposure, assess risks, prioritize efforts, allocate resources strategically, and respond effectively to cybersecurity incidents.
Threat
Well, now that you’re familiar with the assets I mentioned earlier, let’s delve into Air Traffic Management (ATM). It’s one of the critical assets in Airline/Airside Operations. ATM plays a vital role in the aviation industry by ensuring the safe and efficient movement of flights. Now, let’s explore how this asset faces vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats.
As you can see, ATM contains several components like Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP), Communication Satellite, Radar Surveillance etc. I’d like to talk about the GNSS. Well, is it important? No. Is it very important? yes, it is (wtf what kind of question is this).
GNSS is a system that gives pilots, as well as aircraft systems, precise information about the position of the aircraft, as well as the reference time. To avoid dependency, several countries operate their independent GNSS systems with varying degrees of coverage and operational capabilities, including GPS by the USA, GLONASS by Russia, Galileo by the European Space Agency, and BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) by China. The four major systems have distinct carrier frequencies, and they also employ different modulation schemes (Maksutov et al., 2019).
All the currently operational GNSS systems including GPS offer no encryption or source authentication for services available for public use (Ioannides, Pany & Gibbons, 2016), making them equally susceptible to attacks. I’ll talk about it in detail over the next section, but first I’ll give you a taxonomy about the common threat we face related to Smart Airport Assets.
Risk Scenarios & Security Measure
Alright, welcome to this section. Now that you’re familiar with GNSS, I’ll jump right to the risk scenario. So, in order to perceive risks and opportunities more broadly, we need a risk scenario. Let’s consider this one: Drone interception as a mobile vehicle for jamming and spoofing aircraft-airport, traffic control, and airline communications.
Below is the picture that will help you understand how crucial the function of GNSS is. The communication between Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) and pilots occurs through VHF (30–300 MHz) radio frequency (RF) channels. This type of communication requires the use of the ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast) wireless communication protocol or GNSS, which are essential components of ADS-B, to allow the broadcasting of status data (aircraft position, speed, call sign, etc.).
The crisp thing about this is that; systems that rely on satellite positioning technology can be targeted by spoofing. Drones, fitted with electronics devices, can be used to spoof, and jam aircraft-airport and traffic control-airline communications. The attacker objective is to insert false positioning information into these systems and by that provide navigation of airplanes or drones for the purpose of hijacking or distracting security/safety in airspace surveillance.
The lack of encryption and authentication features in the ADS-B system together with low technical difficulty required to perform the attack make the likelihood that an attack might occur high. This may lead to different situational awareness pictures for pilots and ATC, provoke false collision warnings and thus generate safety issues, while potentially impacting the airport flight management operations.
The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) has actively contributed to enhancing the security and resilience of air transport in Europe since 2010. One of their notable works is a blueprint titled ‘Securing Smart Airports’. Below, I provide an example of a security measure recommended by ENISA to address spoofing or jamming attacks.
Conclusion
No system is safe. Opting for the best risk management approach doesn’t ensure absolute safety — there will always be risks. Risk is an inherent part of life, and the only certainty in life is uncertainty itself. However, this isn’t a reason to avoid taking risks. As Mark Zuckerberg said, “The biggest risk is not taking any risk… In a world that’s changing really quickly, the only strategy that is guaranteed to fail is not taking risks.”
Reference
[1] Cyber- Threat Assessment for the Air Traffic Management System: A Network Controls Approach. Sandip Roy, Washington State University, and Banavar Sridhar, NASA Ames Research CenterAIAA Aviation 13–17 June 2016, Washington, D.C. 1.
[2]A safety assessment framework for the Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) system. Dejan V. Kožović, Dragan Ž. ĐurđevićBEN AIR, Belgrade, Republic of Serbia, and Megatrend University, Faculty of Civil Aviation, Belgrade, Republic of Serbia 2.
[3] On GPS spoofing of aerial platforms: a review of threats, challenges, methodologies, and future research directions. Shah Zahid Khan, Mujahid Mohsin, Waseem IqbalPeerJ Computer Science, Vol. 7, e507 3.
[4] SPOOFING IN AVIATION: SECURITY THREATS ON GPS AND ADS-B SYSTEMS. Dejan V. Kožović, Dragan Ž. ĐurđevićMicrosoft Word — 10 Kozovic KONACNO SPOOFING IN AVIATION: SECURITY THREATS ON GPS AND ADS-B SYSTEMS 4.
[5] ADS-B vulnerability to low-cost jammers: Risk assessment and possible solutions. Contini, S., Fabbri, L., and Matuzas, V5.
[6] Securing Smart Airports. ENISA .
