Right Mesh Smart Contract Audit

New Alchemy
New Alchemy
Published in
10 min readApr 16, 2018


Right Mesh engaged New Alchemy to audit the smart contracts for their “RMESH” token. We focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts and on finding differences between the contracts’ implementation and their behaviour as described in public documentation.

The audit was performed over four days in February and March of 2018. This document describes the issues discovered in the audit. An initial version of this document was provided to RightMesh, who made various changes to their contracts based on New Alchemy’s findings; this document was subsequently updated in March 2018 to reflect the changes.

Files Audited

The code audited by New Alchemy is in the GitHub repository https://github.com/firstcoincom/solidity at commit hash 51b29dbba309acd6acd40931be07c3b857dee506. The revised contracts after the initial report was delivered are in commit 04c6bb594ad5fa0b8757feba030a1341f59e9f85. RightMesh made additional fixes whose commit hash was not shared with New Alchemy.

New Alchemy’s audit was additionally guided by the following documents:

The review identified one critical finding, which allowed the crowd sale owner to issue large quantities of tokens to addresses that it controls by abusing a flaw in the mechanism for minting “predefined tokens”. Three additional minor flaws were identified, all of which are best-practice violations of limited practical exploitability: lack of two-phase ownership transfer and of mitigations for the short-address attack, and token allocation configuration that is less than ideally transparent. An additional minor flaw was documented in some earlier versions of this report but was determined to be a false positive.

After reviewing an initial version of this report, RightMesh made changes to their contracts to prevent predefined tokens from being minted multiple times and to mitigate short-address attacks. No changes were made to ownership transfers or to the configuration of predefined token allocations.

General Discussion

These contracts implement a fairly simple token and crowdsale, drawing heavily on base contracts from the OpenZeppelin project¹. The code is well commented. However, the RightMesh white papers and other documentation provide very little detail about the operation of the crowd sale or token. It was not clear to New Alchemy who receives pre-defined token allocations; from MeshCrowdsale, how large these allocations are, or why they receive them. Likewise, it was not clear how Timelock fits into the token ecosystem. RightMesh later clarified that the pre-defined token allocations are for the "RightMesh GmbH & Community", "Left & team", "Advisors & TGE costs", and "Airdrop to community", as documented in the RightMesh FAQ. Further, the Timelock contract is used to hold these allocations.

Some of the OpenZeppelin base contracts inherited by the RightMesh contracts have changed substantially since the RightMesh contracts were written. Consequently, the RightMesh contracts cannot be built against the head of OpenZeppelin. RightMesh should either copy a fork of the relevant OpenZeppelin contracts into their repository or document the OpenZeppelin release or commit that should be used to build their contracts.

Critical Issues

Fixed: Predefined tokens can be minted multiple times

As its name implies, the function MeshCrowdsale.mintPredefinedTokens mints tokens according to an allocation set during deployment. This function does not check that it has not previously been called, so it can be called multiple times. Despite comments to the contrary, this function is tagged onlyOwner, so this function will only ever be called more than once if an owner makes a mistake or deliberately misbehaves. Further, MeshToken gets deployed in a default state of paused, which prevents any token transfers, and mintPredefinedTokens does check that the balance of each beneficiary is zero, so if mintPredefinedTokens has already been called, subsequent calls should have no effect. However, there are still possible conditions under which a beneficiary could transfer tokens prior to an extra call to mintPredefinedTokens:

  • An owner could call MeshToken.unpause, which would allow all token holders to transfer tokens. MeshToken cannot be re-paused once unpaused, so any call to mintPredefinedTokens after MeshToken has been unpaused may mint additional tokens.
  • An owner could use MeshToken.updateAllowedTransfers to flag a beneficiary as being allowed to make transfers despite MeshToken being paused.

In the worst case, a rogue owner deploys MeshCrowdsale with a beneficiary address that it controls, flags that address to permit transfers despite MeshToken being paused, waits for some tokens to be sold, then alternates calls to MeshCrowdsale.mintPredefinedTokens and MeshToken.transfer to allocate up to the remaining crowdsale cap to itself.

To ensure that predefined tokens are only minted once, a control should be added to MeshCrowdsale.mintPredefinedTokensto ensure that it is called at most once. Some sort of control to ensure that MeshToken remains paused until the crowdsale completes may also be useful. Further, the comment or the declaration of mintPredefinedTokens should be amended so that they agree on what users are allowed to call this function.

Re-test results: RightMesh added logic to prevent mintPredefinedTokens from being called twice and corrected the function comment to indicate that it can only be called by the owner.

Minor Issues

Not Fixed: Lack of two-phase ownership transfer

In contracts that inherit the common Ownable contract from the OpenZeppelin project^2 (including MeshToken, MeshCrowdsale, and Timelock), a contract has a single owner. That owner can unilaterally transfer ownership to a different address. However, if the owner of a contract makes a mistake in entering the address of an intended new owner, then the contract can become irrecoverably unowned.

In order to preclude this, New Alchemy recommends implementing two-phase ownership transfer. In this model, the original owner designates a new owner, but does not actually transfer ownership. The new owner then accepts ownership and completes the transfer. This can be implemented as follows:

contract Ownable {
address public owner;
address public newOwner

event OwnershipTransferred(address indexed previousOwner, address indexed newOwner);

function Ownable() public {
owner = msg.sender;
newOwner = address(0);

modifier onlyOwner() {
require(msg.sender == owner);

function transferOwnership(address _newOwner) public onlyOwner {
require(address(0) != _newOwner);
newOwner = _newOwner;
function acceptOwnership() public {
require(msg.sender == newOwner);
OwnershipTransferred(owner, msg.sender);
owner = msg.sender;
newOwner = address(0);

Re-test results: RightMesh opted to preserve the current ownership transfer mechanism.

Fixed: Lack of short-address attack protections

Some Ethereum clients may create malformed messages if a user is persuaded to call a method on a contract with an address that is not a full 20 bytes long. In such a “short-address attack”, an attacker generates an address whose last byte is 0x00, then sends the first 19 bytes of that address to a victim. When the victim makes a contract method call, it appends the 19-byte address to msg.data followed by a value. Since the high-order byte of the value is almost certainly 0x00, reading 20 bytes from the expected location of the address in msg.data will result in the correct address. However, the value is then left-shifted by one byte, effectively multiplying it by 256 and potentially causing the victim to transfer a much larger number of tokens than intended. msg.data will be one byte shorter than expected, but due to how the EVM works, reads past its end will just return 0x00.

This attack effects methods that transfer tokens to destination addresses, where the method parameters include a destination address followed immediately by a value. In the RightMesh contracts, such methods include MeshToken.mint, MeshToken.transfer, MeshToken.transferFrom, MeshToken.approve, MeshToken.increaseApproval, MeshToken.decreaseApproval, (all inherited from OpenZeppelin base contracts), and Timelock.allocateTokens.

While the root cause of this flaw is buggy serializers and how the EVM works, it can be easily mitigated in contracts. When called externally, an affected method should verify that msg.data.length is at least the minimum length of the method's expected arguments (for instance, msg.data.length for an external call to Timelock.allocateTokens should be at least 68: 4 for the hash, 32 for the address (including 12 bytes of padding), and 32 for the value; some clients may add additional padding to the end). This can be implemented in a modifier. External calls can be detected in the following ways:

  • Compare the first four bytes of msg.data against the method hash. If they don't match, then the call is internal and no short-address check is necessary.
  • Avoid creating public methods that may be subject to short-address attacks; instead create only external methods that check for short addresses as described above. public methods can be simulated by having the external methods call private or internal methods that perform the actual operations and that do not check for short-address attacks.

Whether or not it is appropriate for contracts to mitigate the short-address attack is a contentious issue among smart-contract developers. Many, including those behind the OpenZeppelin project, have explicitly chosen not to do so. While it is New Alchemy’s position that there is value in protecting users by incorporating low-cost mitigations into likely target functions, RightMesh would not stand out from the community if they also choose not to do so.

Re-test results: RightMesh overrode the listed functions to require that msg.data.length is at least 68. All are public, so they may not work properly if called internally from something with a shorter argument list.

Not Fixed: Predefined token allocations are not hard-coded

According to the RightMesh FAQ, tokens are allocated as follows:

  • 30%: Public distribution (crowdsale)
  • 30%: RightMesh GmbH & Community
  • 20%: Left & team
  • 10%: Advisors & TGE costs
  • 10%: Airdrop to community

These last five allocations are controlled at deployment by the beneficiaries and beneficiaryAmounts arrays passed into the constructor for MeshCrowdsale. While this approach does put the allocation data in the blockchain where it can be retrieved by interested parties, the state of the contract is not as easily located or reviewed as its source code.

The current predefined token allocation in config/predefined-minting-config.js appears to try five times to assign 100 tokens to the address 0x5D51E3558757Bfdfc527867d046260fD5137Fc0F (this should only succeed once due to the balance check), though this may be test data.

For optimal transparency, RightMesh should instead hard-code the allocation percentages or token counts so that anyone reviewing the contract source code can easily verify that tokens were issued as documented.

Re-test results: RightMesh opted to preserve the current allocation configuration mechanism.

Line by line comments

This section lists comments on design decisions and code quality made by New Alchemy during the review. They are not known to represent security flaws.


Lines 12, 52–53

OpenZeppelin has radically refactored their crowdsale contracts as of late February 2018. Among other things, CappedCrowdsale has been moved, the functionality for starting and ending times has been moved to TimedCrowdsale, and Crowdsale.validPurchase no longer exists. In order to ensure that a version of OpenZeppelin compatible with these contracts can be easily identified, RightMesh should copy a fork of the relevant contracts into their repository or at least document the commit that should be used.

Re-test results: RightMesh added a comment to their code indicating that the version of OpenZeppelin at commit hash 4d7c3cca7590e554b76f6d91cbaaae87a6a2e2e3 should be used to build their contracts.

Line 42

“og” should be “of”.

Re-test results: This issue has been fixed as recommended.

Lines 96, 116, 132, 149, 159

There is no need for these functions to return bool: they all unconditionally return true and throw on failure. Removing the return values would make code that calls these functions simpler, as it would not need to check return values. It would also make them marginally cheaper in gas to execute.

Re-test results: This issue has been fixed as recommended.

Line 167

This function is declared as returning bool, but never returns anything. As above, there is no need for it to return anything.

Re-test results: This issue has been fixed as recommended.


Lines 60

The function should be tagged public or external rather than relying on the default visibility.

Re-test results: RightMesh reports fixing this issue as recommended.


Line 91

If cliffReleasePercentage and slopeReleasePercentage ever sum to less than 100, then the remaining fraction of tokens will become available all at once once the slope duration expires, essentially creating a second cliff at the bottom of the slope. If this is not intended behaviour, then the check should be amended to require that the sum is 100%.

Re-test results: RightMesh reports that this is intended behaviour.

Lines 117, 128, 138, 147, 176

There is no need for these functions to return bool: they all unconditionally return true and throw on failure. Removing the return values would make code that calls these functions simpler, as it would not need to check return values. It would also make them marginally cheaper in gas to execute.

Re-test results: RightMesh reports fixing this issue as recommended.

Line 157

Consider checking withdrawalPaused in availableForWithdrawal instead of in withdraw. As currently implemented, availableForWithdrawal may report a non-zero quantity available for a paused address, but withdrawal will fail. It would be more intuitive if availableForWithdrawal reported 0 for a paused address.

Re-test results: RightMesh reports that this behaviour is by design: it allows employees to see unlocked tokens even if withdrawal is paused.


The audit makes no statements or warranties about utility of the code, safety of the code, suitability of the business model, regulatory regime for the business model, or any other statements about fitness of the contracts to purpose, or their bugfree status. The audit documentation is for discussion purposes only.

New Alchemy is a strategy and technology advisory group specializing in tokenization. One of the only companies to offer a full spectrum of guidance from tactical technical execution to high-level theoretical modeling, New Alchemy provides blockchain technology, token game theory, smart contracts, security audits, and ICO advisory to the most innovative startups worldwide. Get in touch with us at Hello@NewAlchemy.io



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