The Hard Problem of Consciousness
A Literature Survey
My notes from reading Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu).
The hard problem of consciousness is figuring out why our thoughts and experiences feel like something to us.
Even though science can explain how the brain works, it’s still a mystery why it gives rise to consciousness. This problem challenges our understanding and raises questions about the limits of science.
Some people have different ideas about it, from denying the problem to believing that everything has some level of consciousness. It’s a big topic in philosophy and research in areas like psychology, neuroscience, and quantum physics.
How the Problem was stated
Chalmers
The hard problem of consciousness, named by David Chalmers, deals with understanding why and how our conscious experiences exist. Unlike other psychological functions that can be explained through their roles, consciousness remains a challenge because it cannot be fully explained in terms of its functions.
Chalmers argues that reductive explanations, which work for many natural phenomena, fail to capture the essence of consciousness. This leads to the question of whether consciousness should be eliminated or considered as a fundamental aspect of reality separate from physical functions.
Nagel
Thomas Nagel’s perspective on the hard problem of consciousness revolves around the subjective nature of conscious experiences.
He argues that these experiences can only be fully understood from specific viewpoints, making them inherently subjective. Scientific explanations, on the other hand, require an objective approach that transcends particular perspectives.
Therefore, the subjective aspects of consciousness remain elusive to scientific understanding, making the mind-body problem difficult to solve. Nagel illustrates this by questioning what it’s like to be a bat and how we can never truly grasp the bat’s subjective experience, even with extensive knowledge of its biology and behavior.
Levine
Joseph Levine highlights the “explanatory gap” between consciousness and the physical, which is the core of the hard problem.
He argues that a good scientific explanation should allow us to deduce the presence of the phenomenon being explained from laws or mechanisms and initial conditions.
However, when it comes to consciousness, even with detailed specifications of brain mechanisms and physical laws, we still face the question of whether consciousness is present. No matter how much additional information we add to our explanation, this gap persists, leading to the hard problem of consciousness.
Responses to the Problem
Eliminativism
Eliminativism is the idea that there is no consciousness, so there is no problem of consciousness to worry about.
Some philosophers argue for this view, saying that what we call experience may not be the same as consciousness or that consciousness is a concept made up by philosophers.
However, this view is not widely accepted because it goes against our common understanding of consciousness, and there are other ways to understand consciousness as being functional and related to other things.
Strong Reductionism
Strong reductionism argues that consciousness can be explained entirely by understanding its functional properties, rejecting the idea that it is a fundamental or basic aspect of experience.
Different reductive theories, such as functionalist, enactive, and representationalist approaches, attempt to explain consciousness by focusing on its functional roles, its connection to bodily processes and behavior, and its ability to represent the world.
However, there are concerns and objections to these reductionist views, as they may overlook certain aspects of consciousness that cannot be fully captured by theoretical knowledge.
As a result, some people prefer a more moderate approach called weak reductionism.
Weak Reductionism
Weak reductionism suggests that consciousness cannot be broken down into simpler nonconscious elements but can be identified with physical properties supported by a parsimonious theory.
Weak reductionism faces challenges regarding the explanation of how phenomenal concepts reveal conscious experience. While it argues for physicalism due to mental causation, questions about the correlation between neural states and conscious experience remain unanswered.
Nonetheless, the current understanding leans towards physicalism as the most parsimonious metaphysical explanation, although it may leave some mysteries unsolved.
Mysterianism
The mysterian response to the hard problem of consciousness says that we can’t solve it with our current scientific methods, and maybe we can’t solve it at all.
There are two versions of this idea: temporary mysterianism and permanent mysterianism.
Temporary mysterianism says that we don’t know why some physical things are conscious, and the gap between consciousness and physics is too big for us to understand right now. But maybe in the future, a big change in science will help us understand.
Permanent mysterianism says that our limited minds might never be able to solve the hard problem because we’re not built for it. It’s like squirrels trying to understand quantum mechanics. Some people worry that we can’t know for sure if the problem is permanently unsolvable, and maybe it’s just a temporary obstacle.
Both versions agree that there is a real gap between consciousness and the physical world, and current science can’t explain it. The permanent version believes we’ll always be stuck, while the temporary version hopes for a breakthrough in the future.
Interactionist Dualism
Dualism is the idea that consciousness is separate from the physical world.
It can be seen as two types: substance dualism, which says consciousness exists independently of the physical body, and property dualism, which says consciousness is a nonphysical property of the brain.
Some dualist views believe consciousness can affect the physical world, while others think it can only be influenced by physical events. Quantum mechanics is sometimes used to support dualism, suggesting that consciousness may play a role in the collapse of quantum events.
However, dualism faces challenges, including different interpretations of quantum mechanics and the question of how quantum properties contribute to our conscious experience.
Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism is a view that says our thoughts and feelings don’t cause our actions.
Instead, it suggests that our actions are only caused by physical things. This idea goes against what we usually think that our feelings can make us do things.
Even though it’s a strange idea, some people believe it because they think it’s more important to follow scientific rules than to go with what we usually think.
Dual Aspect Theory/Neutral Monism/Panpsychism
Some people believe in a dualistic approach where the physical world is separate from our conscious experiences. They think that our feelings and thoughts don’t actually cause our actions and that our knowledge of our own thoughts and feelings isn’t caused by those experiences either.
This view goes against common sense and is hard to accept because it contradicts our everyday understanding of how our minds work. However, some people who support this view think that denying our intuitions is better than going against scientific principles.
Many thanks to Prof. Josh Weisberg, author of the source article!
