Challenges in implementing measures to prevent COVID-19 in Vietnam
After successfully containing COVID-19 in the first half of 2020, Vietnam is now facing the next wave of the virus, which has forced some parts of the country back to tough restrictions. Like many other countries in the world, Vietnamese central and local governments have been challenged with balancing stringent measures to suppress the spread of the virus against infringing upon civic freedoms. In Vietnam, these measures have included the requirement of social distancing and restriction of movement, engaging in contact tracing, and trying to prevent the spread of misinformation and disinformation.
Vietnam’s Constitution acknowledges, respects, protects, and guarantees human rights and citizens’ rights (Article 14(1)). These include, but are not limited to:
(i) freedom of movement and of residence within the country, and international travel (Article 23);
(ii) personal privacy rights (including on information and data) (Article 21); and
(iii) freedom of opinion and speech, freedom of the press, and of access to information (Article 25).
These rights are also protected under some international conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Vietnam has adopted.
The Vietnamese Constitution also envisions the possibility that these rights might be restricted, only if prescribed by law, for reasons of national defence, national security, social order and security, and social morality and community well-being (Article 14(2)). The Order on the State of National Emergency is one such law. Similarly, the ICCPR considers that proportionate restrictions may be permitted if preceded by an announcement of national emergency. The restriction “must conform to the principle of proportionality”, which must be respected “not only in the law that frames the restrictions, but also by the administrative and judicial authorities in applying the law”.
Regardless of the convention or the intent of government to introduce potentially beneficial public health measures, negative consequences may occur. These consequences may occur as a result of overbroad interpretations of the wording of the law, gaps in pre-existing legislation, or a lack of transparency in enforcement. The lessons learnt from these experiences locally and abroad may help to influence future pandemic resilience of the country.
Broad interpretations of social distancing and movement restrictions
The Vietnamese government declared a national pandemic on 30 March 2020, in accordance with the Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases. Unlike some of the other countries in the region (namely Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar), have not made a formal declaration of emergency. The day after, on 31 March 2020, the national-level government issued Directive 16 which required nationwide “social distancing” for 15 days starting from 1 April 2020. It also required compulsory quarantine of people coming from “hot spots”, and restricted movement outside the home except for “essential circumstances”. This original directive was implemented by provincial and local level governments.
However, not all levels of the administrative governments interpreted this directive in the same way, and in some cases this resulted in implementation that was disproportionate to the on-the-ground scenario. For example, “social distancing” was interpreted as “isolation”, from the village and commune levels to the provinces. In fact, some villages and communes in Quang Ninh province blocked roads to residential areas to control the movement of people and vehicles, which is legally beyond their authority as local-level governments. Similarly, Hai Phong province prohibited all people and vehicles from entering the city, and required all people exiting the city to have a permit.
In addition, the term “hot spots” was not defined in the Directive. Consequently, some provinces — Da Nang and Quang Nam — issued documents considering the whole of Hanoi City and Ho Chi Minh City as hot spots, even though infections were only found in a few spots in each of the cities. All residents of both cities were required to quarantine. Hai Phong province implemented a similarly broad measure, requiring all Hai Phong people returning to the city to quarantine regardless of whether they had visited a COVID-19-infected area or not.
As well, “essential circumstances” were not defined in the Directive. This resulted in a wide range of implementation. Truc Bach quarter in Hanoi defined it by time, fining people going out after 2200h. Ha Long City in Quang Ninh province also defined it in the same way as the quarter in Hanoi, but additionally restricted people from going to the market more than two times a day. These restrictions were not stated by regulation, and were enforced by measures such as naming violators.
After initial implementation of Directive 16, criticisms were raised regarding the breadth of implementation that the wording of this directive permitted. Subsequently, the government issued clearer instructions on the implementation of Directive 16, which resulted in the removal of some measures in provinces where implementation had been disproportionate.
Gaps in existing legislation and contact tracing
Contact tracing is considered by the WHO to be an essential public health tool. Accordingly, it has been adopted by many countries, in some cases very effectively. For instance, South Korea is considered highly successful in containing COVID-19, in part through its intensive and highly detailed work in conducting contract tracing, which in addition to doing patient interviews, also used data from CCTV footage, shopping receipts and health information. Vietnam has conducted quick and widespread contact tracing since the beginning of the pandemic, tracking travel history through a declaration, collection of medicine receipts, and a local neighbourhood cadre monitoring and reporting system. This has contributed substantially to the success of Vietnam in containing the first wave of COVID-19. An additional tool used by the government is a contact tracing app, BlueZone. Since its introduction in April 2020, more than 10 million Vietnamese citizens have downloaded the application. An evaluation of the app’s effectiveness as a digital approach to contact tracing and digital privacy concerns was conducted by AppAssay, an independent organization that has begun surveying COVID-19 smartphone apps and related approaches since the start of the pandemic. The evaluation by AppAssay indicates that while the effectiveness of BlueZone is similar to other apps that perform the same function, there are significant privacy concerns due to the development of the software and existing flaws in how personal data are utilized by the app itself.
Additional complications related to personal privacy arise when there are gaps in relevant law and policy alongside limited enforcement. These concerns have been raised globally and locally in the context of contact tracing. The typical issue is that laws and policies do not yet consider all types of abuse of personal data and breaches of privacy, if at all. In circumstances such as contact tracing, governments have limited legal frameworks to fall back on to determine how to balance personal privacy against public health.
In Vietnam, data privacy rights are protected by the Constitution and other laws. However, some privacy infringements have not yet been prevented, such as trading of private data (especially customers’ data), exposure of celebrities’ information, disclosure of vulnerable people’s information (e.g., children, people with HIV/AIDS), and stealing of private data. This is partly due to gaps in national law: for instance, “personal information” is not yet defined clearly and consistently in legal documents; and there are unclear and specific regulations on protocols and procedures to treat personal information. Lenient and weak enforcement is another issue. At present, Vietnam’s government has recognized some of these gaps and is pushing the finalization of Guidelines on the Implementation of Cybersecurity Law, and has introduced fines for misuse of personal data in Decree No 15/2020/NĐ-CP.
Even though contact tracing is a necessary and useful tool to contain COVID-19, Vietnam’s initial efforts to comprehensively do so highlights the tension between the need for public disclosure in a public health emergency and the importance of personal privacy. The highly personal information collected through contact tracing (including names, ages, addresses, occupations, and travelling history) was originally disclosed to the general public via mass media, as a means of protecting public health. For Patient №17, considered the source of the first wave of the virus outbreak in Vietnam, her personal data has now been widely spread. The impacts of such a breach of privacy are not simply related to data; it includes discrimination, mental and emotional attacks, and being wrongfully blamed. Patient №17 received a lot of negative social media attention, and was reported to be stressed and worried as a result.
The Vietnamese government was quick to acknowledge that public disclosure of personal identifiable indicators (PII) and the subsequent release through mass media was an issue, and no longer makes such disclosures. However, lists of this information continue to be leaked via unofficial means, and are sent around using social media applications such as Zalo and Facebook Messenger.
On the one hand, the government needs to be able to disclose specific information to help control the spread of the coronavirus; on the other hand, if the information is too detailed, it can be abused. The challenge is for government to balance these two sides through transparent enforcement, based on law. Thus, the need for a law on data privacy protection in Vietnam remains high.
Combating misinformation and disinformation
Thanks to the development of technology and internet, data and information, including misinformation and disinformation, or “fake news”, can be transmitted much faster and further than ever before. This is especially true in Vietnam, which is one of the world’s top 10 countries in terms of the number of social media users, with nearly 64 million Facebook users and 35 million YouTube users.
During COVID-19, the spread of information, accurate and otherwise, was so fast and the volume so high that it was termed an “infodemic”. The danger resulting from the spread of false information during a public health emergency is high. Risks include acting on false prevention and treatment methods, as well as negative impacts due to fear and prejudice. The government has worked to provide quick access to correct and transparent information to their citizens, which has been critical to its success in containing the virus so far. However, like many other countries, Vietnam has needed to combat misinformation and disinformation around COVID-19.
Vietnam’s actions against misinformation are rooted in law, in Decree No 15/2020/NĐ-CP dated 03/02/2020. This Decree introduces fines for the dissemination of “fake news” or rumours on social media for public order and the prevention of social confusion. Though the decree is not specific to the pandemic, the rapid spread of online information about the novel coronavirus has been the perfect use for the law. Most of the 21 cases since the introduction of the Decree have been related to COVID-19. However, the decree defines misinformation and fake news ambiguously, and does not explain how to identify instances of them, nor how to distinguish them from expressions of free speech, views or attitudes. This definitional gap has meant that there has already been some controversy in implementation. For example, in one case a tour guide was fined for boasting on Facebook that he had helped a tourist group “escape” from Danang city before the second wave of COVID-19. Some people agreed that using the word “escape” was inaccurate, while others argued that it was not fake news but an account of a personal experience.
Given the potentially harmful effects of misinformation, it is necessary to have measures of control. However, it is similarly important that implementation of these controls be clearly defined, to promote accurate interpretation, transparency and fairness in enforcement to avoid the violation of the freedom of expression.
Summary
While the restriction of civil and personal rights may be necessary in a public health emergency such as the coronavirus pandemic, it comes with challenges. In an ideal scenario, relevant laws and regulations would already exist and clearly define necessary terms to support responsive implementation. The reality is that even in scenarios with a responsive government and some legal protections, gaps remain. A continued balancing between the rights of the individual and the needs of the country is needed.
