Gen. George B. McClellan Relieved of Command
You know how your history teachers told you about how most northerners thought the U.S. Civil War would only last a few weeks, or a few months at most? Arguably it should have, except Gen. George B. McClellan proved to be an indecisive and ineffective commander, leading to a prolonged war.
Today is November 5, 2017, and on this date, 155 years back, in 1862, Gen. George B. McClellan was relieved of command by President Abraham Lincoln.
The Civil War started slowly. It was a long series of dominoes dropping before any blood was actually shed. In the time between Lincoln’s election and inauguration, seven states seceded and formed the Confederate States of America. In the time between Lincoln’s inauguration and First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas) in July, 1861, Fort Sumter was captured, Robert E. Lee declined command of the Union Army, four more states seceded, and Robert E. Lee accepted a post in the Army of Virginia.
At Bull Run, the first pitched battle of the war, Union forces commanded by Irvin McDowell were defeated by Confederate forces led by Joseph Johnston. Dismayed by the defeat, the Union sought to shake things up in the aftermath of the battle. McDowell became the scapegoat, even though he had made no tactical mistakes. (The defeat stemmed from Johnston getting reinforcements to P.G.T. Beauregard, which could have been prevented by another Union officer.) On July 25, 1861, McDowell was replaced by Gen. George B. McClellan as commander of the Union Army. (He would take on even more responsibility, and the title of General-in-Chief, in October, following Winfield Scott’s retirement from service.)
McClellan set about building a strong and well regimented army. In addition to increased training and drilling, he made every effort to ensure that his troops’ morale was high. McClellan appeared to be well organized and competent in his position. The only problem was that he was averse to ever engaging in battle.
Confederate troops were amassed near Washington D.C., and Lincoln expected McClellan to attack and repel them, but he wouldn’t. McClellan feared that he would be attacked in overwhelming numbers by the Confederates. He consistently called for more troops, and more supplies, gearing up for a defensive stand that he would never actually make. Because he had every advantage, and the Confederate commanders knew it, and refused to attack him.
As it turned out, McClellan was a dithering fool who seemed to enjoy playing at being a General, but hated leading his men into battle. It should be noted, though, that McClellan was not a coward, if anything, he cared too much about his men and didn’t wish to see them harmed. Lincoln and the War Department were exasperated by his behavior, and soon a deep rift formed between the President and his top General.
McClellan devised his plan for the Peninsula Campaign over the winter. The following spring, he would take his army and sail down the Chesapeake Bay with the intention of capturing Richmond (the Confederate capital) via the Virginia Peninsula between the York and James Rivers. At Yorktown, the plan hit its first miscue, as he had no planned for the Confederates to have fortified the peninsula. He would have to perform a siege of the city.
After weeks of meticulous planning, McClellan engage in his siege only to learn that the Confederate forces had retreated up the peninsula and he’d have to give chase. This led to the Battle of Williamsburg, McClellan’s first victory. However, things are rarely so simple, and a large portion of the army he defeated actually retreated to Richmond to fortify the defenses there.
In less than a month, McClellan was within four miles of Richmond. Confederate Gen. Johnston took a calculated risk, and launched attacks at the Union army, which were repelled, but brought even more scrutiny on McClellan. He was sidelined with malarial fever at the time, but was nevertheless roundly criticized anyway for not counterattacking. It was thought that by scattering the Confederate forces, Richmond would be vulnerable to capture.
McClellan, once recovered, wasted more valuable time repositioning his troops, which left him vulnerable to Robert E. Lee’s series of attacks that would become known at the Seven Days Battles. The first battle of the series so unnerved McClellan that he reported to Washington that he was faced with Confederate forces 200,000 strong, despite there only actually being 85,000. McClellan retreated back down the peninsula, and squabbled with Washington about reinforcements and the merits of sailing north versus marching on Richmond again.
Lee judged McClellan based on these battles, and determined it was safe to leave him be. Lee diverted a significant portion of his army north to cut off General Pope who was marching on Richmond from the northeast. They met at the Second Battle of Bull Run, where the Union forces were thrashed.
Following the defeat, it was incumbent on Washington to recall McClellan and his troops to the north to rebuild their tattered army and defend the capital. In September 1862, General Lee embarked on his Maryland campaign, using his assessment of McClellan as overly cautious to fuel his own risk-taking. Amazingly, though, McClellan lucked into a complete copy of Lee’s plans that was found in an abandoned camp. Emboldened by the accidental reconnaissance, McClellan attempted to set a trap.
McClellan scored a victory against Lee at South Mountain, and chased him to Antietam Creek near Sharpsburg. He planned to attack on the 16, but delayed the plan a day due to foggy conditions. This allowed Lee, who was outnumbered by more that 2 to 1, more time to strategize and set his defenses. On September 17, McClellan attacked, and it became the bloodiest single day battle in American history. While the battle proved to be a tactical victory for McClellan — he drove Lee from the field — it cost him 12,000 troops.
Five days after the battle, Abraham Lincoln announced the Emancipation Proclamation, which had major repercussions on the Confederacy’s attempts to gain foreign support. Despite still having a tremendous numerical advantage, though, McClellan stopped to lick his wounds instead of chasing after Lee.
Lincoln visited the Antietam battlefield on October 3, and met with McClellan, who hadn’t moved at all in two weeks. Lincoln considered the battle a disappointment since given his advantages, it should have been a crushing defeat that could have ended the war, not a near-draw. In Lincoln’s estimation, it was McClellan’s tactical decision making that was to blame.
McClellan wouldn’t break camp and move after Lee until October 26, over a month after the battle. This proved to be the final straw.
Lincoln relieved McClellan of command on November 5, leaving the position of General-in-Chief vacant for a few months. During this time, Lincoln himself, aided by his war council, ran the army directly from Washington.
The Union Army would continue to struggle until the Battle of Gettysburg in July of 1863, which, combined with Ulysses Grant’s simultaneous capture of Vicksburg, Mississippi, turned the tide of the war once and for all.
In 1864, George McClellan would challenge Abraham Lincoln as the Democratic Presidential Nominee. Lincoln would win the popular vote 55% to 45%, the Electoral College 212–21, and states 22–3.
Thanks for reading, and be sure to check back tomorrow for a gay rights first.
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