The reverse circle of change in the Western Balkans
It is not easy to be an influential policy actor in a region that has been identified with instability. The region is famous for ‘Balkanisation’, the expression coined after the end of the First World War to refer to endless disputes and fragmentation in the region. As polarisation has recently become prevalent globally, Balkanisation has been used to refer to the lack of cohesion within the West or the potential for violence when basic democratic institutions are disputed. In this context, think tanks from the Western Balkans are a good example of how policy impact in times of uncertainty is facilitated not only by relevant research but also active involvement in re-shaping political narratives and building communities.
The emergence of think tanks in the Western Balkans in the 2000s was a sign of the normalisation of politics after a decade of the bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia, international isolation and authoritarian regimes. The think tanks emerged once the transitions to democracy and peace were put in motion in the states that came out of Yugoslavia through armed conflicts (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia) and Albania. There are differences in strategies pursued in different countries and among the organisations, but there are also some common patterns within three generations of think tanks in the region. In interaction with external context, the thinktankers selected different combinations of narratives, relationships, and research to support desired changes.
The pioneers
The first think tanks in the Western Balkans were established by public intellectuals that stood up for democracy during the authoritarian nineties. This generation played an important role in the late stages of authoritarianism by breaking fear and the taboos around sensitive policy issues. They promoted the idea that even the most controversial policies should be discussed publicly and deliver public goods. Examples of this are the Centre for Civil-Military Relations (now called Belgrade Centre for Security Policy) in Serbia, which argued the need for democratic civilian control of the armed forces, or the Institute for Public Finance in Croatia, which examined the social consequences of a rapid transition to a market economy. The pioneers also planted seeds of future policy communities. In the authoritarian period, this meant joining up forces among the like-minded members of civil society, academia, political parties, and independent journalists and taking part in engagement with citizens.
After the fall of undemocratic regimes, the thinktankers broadened the policy community by convening initial dialogues among the new political elite and civil servants, as well as other groups who were previously excluded from policy processes (civil society, young people, the private sector, etc.). The initial research products were intended to educate the public and to introduce new norms into laws and institutions.
The professionals and peace-builders
The second generation of think tanks was initiated after few years of transition by a younger generation that was mostly educated in the West or obtained key professional experience working for international organisations in the region. They were followed up in the 2010s by the mid-career experts who wanted to pursue change in a faster and more flexible way than they could as a part of public administration. The key question during this period was not whether the countries of the region want democracy and to join the Euro-Atlantic community, but how to do it effectively and more quickly. That is why debating was gradually replaced with the provision of policy interventions based on more sophisticated research, diversification of engagement with decision-makers, and professionalisation of communications to serve different audiences. As accession to the EU became ‘a main game in town’, Western Balkan think tanks started developing the ability to play the double-level game — influencing policy both at home and in Brussels and EU capitals.
Some Western Balkan think tanks paved the path for improvement of inter-state relations by the creation of Track Two dialogues on bilateral and regional disputes. The first regional partnerships were initiated to coordinate the production of comparative research so as to inspire positive competition among the elites within the region and to decrease security dilemma by increasing transparency of national policies. The bonds developed within transnational networks also served in the cases of inter-state incidents to promptly collect information ‘from the other side’ and put out potential disinformation fires in their home countries. Last, regional partnerships were used to scale up advocacy with international actors, since the interest and resources of external actors shifted to more troubled regions.
Think tanks as democracy-defenders?
In the last few years, the Western Balkan think tanks were the first to diagnose autocratisation in the region, but they were not able to prevent it. In contrast to the nineties, when the autocratic and repressive practices were more open, this wave has been more gradual and sophisticated. The new autocrats came into power through mostly democratic elections and used legal disguise to re-purpose key policy processes and institutions to serve private interests. An example of state capture practice is tailored-made laws. Such laws are frequently adopted under the excuse of alignment with EU standards, while at the same time, diminishing checks and balances and thus creating space for impunity. Such policy choices are legitimised by polarising populist narratives that divide the public into ‘us’ and ‘them’, either by reviving animosities within the region or targeting those that criticise the government’s reforms. As a result, frail peace and political competition are additionally weakened, although to a different extent within the region. Kosovo, and more recently North Macedonia and Montenegro, are more pluralistic, while the civic space, media freedoms, and political contest in Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Serbia are shrinking to the extent that democracy is increasingly distrusted by citizens over quick solutions.
Civil society actors, including think tanks, that challenge official accounts are attacked in orchestrated smear campaigns in mainstream media, by government-organised nongovernmental organisations (GONGOs) and trolls in social media, or even hacked. Besides a difficult policy environment at home, a polarised international environment with no clear democracy champions among big powers is also complicating the defence of nascent democracies in the Western Balkans. All these challenges have been deepened and amplified with the COVID-19 pandemic.
Back to the future
The think tanks in the Western Balkans are currently searching for ways to address the new normal. The biggest challenge is getting out of urgency mode of reacting to everyday news and finding mental space for reflection and preparing scenarios to run marathons along the paths previously not walked. The new scenarios need to answer questions on how to remain influential and not feed into legitimisation of state captors, who to engage with, how to bridge over populist narratives and polarisation, how to produce and place credible research when public access to information and media is shrinking and fragmenting, and last but not the least how to secure organisational resilience in the context of pressures and threats to civil society.
Some are shifting from direct engagement with national policymakers and engaging with other civil society actors to re-build national constituency in favour of democracy. This may include assisting with research and advocacy or partnering with other national democracy defenders and grass-root movements. In most countries, civil society is avoiding partnering with political parties. The other strategy is to connect with the citizens whose interests they claim to represent through participatory research or public education. Such approaches assume spending more time in direct contact with citizens listening to their fears and frustrations and providing ways to address them. Another strategy is to keep doing what think tanks do best, and that it is to put into the wider context the evidence collected through research of state capture and advocacy against it, through leveraging the influence and support of international stakeholders. Whichever strategy is taken, the defence of fragile peace and democracy in the Western Balkans and globally will require that think tanks deploy their research and other capabilities to engage in the battles of narratives and fostering a sense of community within the nation and the region.
Sonja Stojanovic Gajic
Founder | Public Engagement
Former director | Belgrade Center for Security Policy (BCSP)
