Wishful Thinking is a Poor Approach to Address Climate Change

Influential proposals either ignore or assume away the extraordinary challenges of a net zero energy transition by 2050. Such unrealistic reports are misleading the public and policy makers.

Fossil fuels contribute to over 75% of the global greenhouse gas emissions¹. A rapid shift to low carbon energy is highly desirable to minimize the impacts of climate change. Consequently, proposals that target a net zero energy system by 2050 are receiving wide attention²𝄒³. Per the recommendation of climate experts, these proposals are designed to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5ᵒC⁴.

The net zero proposals advocate a complete shift to a low carbon energy system in less than thirty years. Many climate activists believe that such a rapid energy transition is not very difficult. They believe that the main challenge is a lack of political will. We will see below how such beliefs contradict basic facts.

Comparison with the Previous Energy Transition

The previous energy transition involved a shift from traditional biomass to fossil fuels. It is interesting to compare the low carbon transition to the previous energy transition.

An energy transition has three key attributes. They are speed, size, and convenience offered by the new energy system. These attributes define the level of the challenge for the transition. We will see how the low carbon transition compares with the previous transition for each of these attributes.

Speed is a key attribute because it defines the rate at which new resources will be needed to support the transition. Currently, low carbon technologies contribute to about 20% of the global energy⁵. Influential proposals have a target of reaching net zero emissions by the year 2050⁶𝄒⁷. The proposal is to shift almost completely to a low carbon energy system over the next three decades.

How does the proposed speed compare with the transition from traditional biomass to fossil fuels? It took over a hundred years for the shift to fossil fuels⁸. So, the net zero proposals are endorsing a speed that is over three times faster than the previous transition⁹.

The low carbon transition also differs in terms of the size or the amount of global energy use. This key attribute defines the quantity of resources required for the transition. The energy requirements for the current transition are substantially higher than that of the previous transition⁹𝄒¹⁰.

The low carbon transition also differs from the prior energy transition in terms of the convenience offered to society. A superior convenience helps with a more easy consumer acceptance. Fossil fuels provide energy in a manner that is easy to use. The shift from biomass to fossil fuels markedly increased the convenience of energy use. Such an advantage does not exist for a low carbon energy system. The best-case scenario for low carbon energy will be to provide comparable convenience to a fossil fuel-based energy system.

A direct comparison with the previous transition is revealing. The speed proposed for the low carbon transition is over three times faster, the size is larger, and there is no advantage from a convenience viewpoint.

Note: The above comparsion cannot be used to make any conclusions. But it is always a good idea to understand the past.

The Low Carbon Transition Will Require Many Extraordinary Changes

A recent report by the International Energy Agency (IEA) has detailed the major changes in the energy sector that will be required to target net zero by 2050¹¹𝄒¹²𝄒¹³. We will review the highlights of the required changes and discuss why these changes are extraordinary.

The share of low carbon energy is currently about 20%. The net zero proposal by IEA requires an almost complete shift to low carbon energy by 2050. This is extraordinary because the share of low carbon energy has only increased from 13% to 18% over the last three decades¹⁴𝄒¹⁵.

The global electricity networks will need to more than double over the next thirty years. This an extraordinary challenge because the existing global networks were built over a hundred years¹⁶. For reference, the total length of transmission circuits and distribution grids is over 80 million kilometers¹⁷𝄒¹⁸.

The annual electricity produced from solar and wind power will need to grow from the current 3500 TWh to 55,000 TWh by 2050. Why is this extraordinary? Because the global annual electricity from all sources combined only increased by 6000 TWh in the last ten years and 17,000 TWh over the last thirty years¹⁹.

Battery storage will need to increase to 4200 GW by 2050. This is extraordinary considering that the existing capacity is currently less than 100 GW.

The current levels of low carbon energy use are very low²⁰. An extraordinary growth will be required in all the energy areas by 2050²¹. The annual production of hydrogen from low carbon sources will need to increase from the current trivial amounts to over 400 million tons²². The share of low carbon emissions steel and cement will need to increase from 0% to over 90%. The share in the sales of low carbon buses will need to increase from 4% to 100%. The share in the sales of low carbon freight trucks will need to increase from 1% to 100%. The public EV chargers will need to increase from 3 million to over 30 million units. The share of low carbon ships will need to increase from 0% to 85%. The share of low carbon air travel will need to increase from 0% to 70%. The share of buildings that can support zero carbon will need to increase from the current trivial levels to over 80%. The total CO₂­ captured will need to increase from 45 million tons to 6000 million tons.

Extraordinary Changes at Rapid Pace = Extraordinary Challenges

Energy drives our world. We use more energy annually than plastics, steel and cement combined. An overhaul of our energy system is an overhaul of how we produce, travel, and live. As discussed in the previous section, a transition to low carbon energy by 2050 will require many extraordinary changes.

This is indicative of many extraordinary challenges because such changes will require extraordinary amounts of resources at a rapid pace. Resources include critical minerals, materials, land, energy, water, and skilled workers.

We will examine the challenges associated with some of the resources next.

The Critical Minerals Challenge

Low carbon technologies require several times more critical minerals than fossil fuel technologies. Solar power requires sixteen times more critical minerals compared to fossil fuel power to produce the same amount of lifetime electricity²³𝄒²⁴. Onshore wind power requires twelve times more critical minerals while offshore wind requires fourteen times more. An electric car requires six times more critical minerals than a conventional car. A heat pump requires seven times more critical minerals than a conventional gas boiler.

The proposed increase in low carbon energy will lead to a massive increase in the demand for critical minerals (Figure 1). The situation will be extreme for certain critical minerals such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, and neodymium. By the year 2030, low carbon technologies alone will need these minerals in quantities that are equivalent or more to the current total global production²⁵𝄒²⁶𝄒²⁷. Such requirements are unprecedented.

Figure 1. The increase in demand for critical minerals from 2021 to 2030 for the IEA net zero by 2050 pathway. Data Source²⁸: IEA

Many new mining projects will be required to provide the critical minerals required for a net zero world. Recent global data for relevant critical minerals shows an average of twenty years of lead time for a new mining project²⁹. Exploration takes about twelve years. Construction of the mine and ramping up production requires another eight years. Such projects carry a high financial risk.

Although the activity in this area has increased, there is no evidence to suggest that the supply will keep up with the demand consistent with a net zero by 2050 scenario. A recent analysis by IEA shows that the anticipated supply of key critical minerals in the year 2030 will be well below the demand set by the net zero by 2050 target³⁰.

A rapid energy transition requires rapid access to massive amounts of critical minerals. The ~20 year lead time for new mining projects and high financial risk are extraordinary challenges for such access. Facts on the ground tell us that the global society is very unlikely to meet the critical minerals challenge associated with net zero by 2050.

The Land Resource Challenge

Solar and wind power plants require far more land than natural gas and coal power plants³¹. A utility-scale solar power plant requires over a hundred times more land to produce the same amount of lifetime electricity as a natural gas plant. An onshore wind farm requires over a thousand times more land.

While rooftop solar and offshore wind do not require land, these technologies are far more expensive in most regions. Accordingly, utility-scale solar and onshore wind technologies have been given a much larger role in the net zero proposals.

A gigantic increase in solar and wind power is being proposed. For example, the IEA net zero proposal calls for the electricity from solar and wind power to increase by a factor of fifteen by the year 2050. This equates to solar and wind power generating two times more electricity than that generated by all the sources combined today. For reference, solar and wind power contribute to less than 15% of the electricity generated today³².

Clearly, a massive amount of land will be required considering that utility-scale solar and onshore wind power are expected to be major components of the total solar and wind power deployments.

The challenge is not that there is not enough land. The challenge is about the practical access to the required land at the desired locations.

The solar and wind projects often need to be sited close to the population centers for economic and other practical reasons. Many people are opposed to having such projects close to where they live. This is already having a major impact. Globally, there is an increasing level of such “not in my backyard (NIMBY)” attitude. Energy projects are increasingly seeing pushbacks from the local population. This is of major concern because the energy transition has large land requirements. New renewables projects and new mines will require vast areas of land. The pushbacks from the local population will make it extremely difficult to get timely access to the required land.

A recent Columbia Law school study of the situation in the United States is revealing³³. Renewable energy projects have faced significant opposition in 45 states. Over two hundred local laws and policies have been issued in 35 states to restrict renewable energy projects.

The NIMBY problem has been on the rise globally. This problem impacts all projects, not just low carbon energy projects. But the challenge is extraordinary for the low carbon energy transition because of its massive land requirements.

Very few renewable projects have been deployed compared to what is proposed in the future. Even so, the opposition for the projects has been significant. Several times higher deployment is being proposed over the next three decades. This will markedly increase the severity of this challenge. There is no evidence to suggest that the global energy projects will have access to the required land in a timely manner.

The Skilled Workforce Challenge

The requirement of a very large skilled workforce also presents an extraordinary challenge. Tens of millions of skilled workers will be required for the shift to low carbon energy³⁴. A shortage of workers is already being observed at the current levels of deployment. A recent report by IEA has captured some of these issues³⁵. Europe and United States have a shortage of plumbers, pipefitters, electricians, heating technicians and construction workers. China is struggling to fill positions in its factories³⁶. Such shortages are already restricting the pace of the shift. This challenge will rapidly increase because of the stress from the rapid deployment speeds that are being proposed. China’s ministry of education has predicted a huge talent gap by the year 2025. It has predicted a talent gap of over 9 million people in power equipment, over 1 million in clean vehicles and more than a quarter of a million in offshore equipment.

The following quote in a recent article from the consulting firm McKinsey and Company is relevant³⁷. “McKinsey estimates that the global installed capacity of solar and onshore and offshore wind projects will have quadrupled from 2021 to 2030. This huge surge in new wind and solar installations will be almost impossible to staff with qualified development and construction employees as well as operations and maintenance workers.”

There is no easy and quick fix to this problem. Training a massive workforce with special skills is challenging and takes time. According to reports by IEA and Linkedin, the shortage of skilled workers in the clean energy area has been rising since the past several years. Clearly, the desired improvement is not occurring.

To make matters worse, the deployment of clean energy technologies will need to greatly ramp up over the next several years. Such a rapid ramp up will not be possible if there is a shortage of skilled workers, which is likely to be the case.

The Technology Gap Challenge

The proposed energy transition has a technology availability problem. According to a recent update from IEA³⁸, technologies required to reduce 35% of the CO₂­ in a net zero world are still not available on the open market³⁹. These technologies are still in the prototype or demonstration stages. They will be required to address key applications such as steel and cement production, ships, aircraft, and long duration energy storage.

This is an extraordinary problem because such technologies have far more challenges to overcome as compared to technologies such as solar and wind power, heat pumps, and electric cars. That is why they are still in the demonstration or prototype stages. I will call these difficult technologies hereafter.

The difficult technologies will need to be available for wide scale deployment in ten to fifteen years to be consistent with the net zero by 2050 proposals. To be available on a wide scale, a new technology must satisfy two crucial conditions. The new technology must be available at a comparable cost to the incumbent. And, it must provide a similar convenience to the user.

What does history tell us about the time required for a new energy technology to move from a demonstration stage to a significant market share?

The 2023 IEA Technology Perspectives report provides this information⁴⁰. For wind power, it took over 30 years. For solar power, it took over 50 years. And it took 30 years for lithium-ion battery. Many of the difficult technologies have only been in the demonstration stages for a decade or less.

How much time will be required for the difficult technologies to be widely used globally?

No one can accurately predict the time required for major innovations. But we can guess based on historical data. The easier technologies such as solar and wind power took between 30 to 60 years to reach a significant market share. Therefore, the difficult technologies are likely to take a few to several decades to reach a major share of the market. This timeframe is not consistent with the proposed rapid energy transition.

The Energy Security Challenge

For global energy security, it is important that a few countries do not control the access to energy. Poor policies, conflicts, civil turmoil, or natural disasters in these countries could lead to major disruptions in energy supply.

Currently, the global energy supply depends mainly on the access to fossil fuels. Fossil fuel technologies require a large amount of fuel, i.e., they are fuel intensive. On the other hand, low carbon technologies require large amounts of materials, i.e., they are materials intensive.

Globally, each country will have to deploy massive amounts of low carbon energy technologies every year. This will be a continuous process as replacements will be required every two decades or so.

The implications are obvious. As the energy transition progresses the global energy supply will increasingly depend on the access to the materials required for low carbon technologies.

Low carbon technologies require massive amounts of critical minerals. So, a geographically diverse access to critical minerals is crucial for global energy security. Unfortunately, critical minerals have a poor diversity compared to fossil fuels. The top producing country has more than half of the share of the extraction of rare earths, cobalt, lithium, and platinum (Figure 2)⁴¹𝄒⁴².

Figure 2. The global share of the top producing country for key critical minerals. Data Source⁴³: IEA

The critical minerals require a processing step following their extraction. The processing of critical minerals is even less diverse⁴³. China has a dominant share in all aspects. It has a very large share in either the extraction or processing of many critical minerals. Chinese companies have also made major investments in countries–such as Australia, Chile, Congo, and Indonesia–that produce critical minerals.

China also dominates the mass manufacturing of low carbon technologies⁴³. China’s domination of the entire supply chain is because of its unique conditions such as a) access to a cheap and large workforce, b) the powerful influence of an autocratic government, c) first mover advantage, and, d) access to mineral resources.

Such dominance of China is alarming. Other nations are very unlikely to diminish China’s domination in the foreseeable future. This situation is a major concern for the global energy security.

The geographical diversity of the entire low carbon energy supply chain will need to diversify substantially to address this problem. To be consistent with the proposed rapid transition, this must be achieved in a decade or so. Recall, China’s domination in this space is because of several unique conditions. There is no evidence to indicate that the diversification can be achieved in a reasonable timeframe. This is yet another extraordinary challenge which the global society does not have a good answer for.

The International Cooperation Challenge

A high level of international cooperation is crucial for a rapid energy transition. IEA estimates that a low level of international cooperation can delay the transition by four decades⁴⁴.

This an extraordinary challenge because each country has its own challenges, politics and agenda. The conflicting interests and priorities of the countries make it very challenging to maintain a high level of co-operation. This is especially difficult for countries that have a very different governing structure such as a democracy vs. an autocracy.

The challenges related to high international co-operation are clear from the global conflicts,⁴⁵ trade wars⁴⁶ and unequal access to covid vaccines across the globe. For example, there was inadequate co-operation about covid vaccines even though tens of millions of lives were at stake⁴⁷𝄒⁴⁸. By the end of the year 2023, 80% of the population in high income countries had been vaccinated. The corresponding share in low-income countries was only 33%. This is very revealing. The international co-operation was low despite the obvious and acute importance.

There is no evidence to suggest that a high-level of global cooperation is possible in the required timeframe.

The Investment Gap Challenge

The upfront investment costs or the cost of the physical assets that will be required to shift to low carbon energy are massive. The global cost is estimated to be over a hundred trillion dollars⁴⁹𝄒⁵⁰.

This means that massive investments in low carbon energy will be required over the next few decades in all countries across the globe.

The analyses from different groups show that the current investments are trillions of dollars lower than the required investments for a rapid transition⁵¹𝄒⁵². So, the investments in low carbon energy will need to increase drastically. But a rapid access to massive investments will be very challenging. Crucial issues such as addressing poverty, health care, senior care are all underfunded as well.

This will be especially difficult for developing countries. United Nations has recently provided data about the magnitude of this problem⁵³. Developing nations face an investment gap of 2.2 trillion dollars annually for the energy transition. Addressing such a massive gap quickly will be extremely challenging.

The situation is even more tricky. Typical cost estimates are based on the physical assets required for the energy transition. They exclude several other costs⁵⁴. Examples of excluded costs are a) retraining of the workforce, b) compensation for stranded assets, c) loss of value pools in parts of the economy, and d) redundancy in energy systems that would be required to avoid supply volatility during the transition.

The excluded costs are expected to be huge considering that a very large workforce will need to be retrained, vast number of assets will be stranded, and substantial redundancy in energy systems will be required. Thus, the investment gap is much larger than what is typically estimated.

Clearly, the massive investment gap is a major obstacle to a rapid energy transition.

Final Remarks

A rapid energy transition has many extraordinary challenges. There is no evidence to suggest that the global society will be able to meet all of these challenges. The evidence points to the contrary.

Facts on the ground tell us that several miracles will be required to meet the aspirational targets. Yet, several influential entities believe that a rapid transition is not that difficult. They believe so because they either ignore the challenges or irrationally assume that the global society will somehow overcome the challenges. The wide reach of such influencers has caused a lot of confusion, anxiety, and hatred in the public. Many now believe that a rapid energy transition is straight forward but for the greedy forces that are not allowing it to happen.

The reality is that a rapid energy transition has many extraordinary challenges. These challenges cannot be wished (assumed) away as is often done in academic papers or ambitious net zero proposals⁴⁹. Aspirational targets that do not give due respect to these extraordinary challenges will guarantee a poor outcome. Key issues-such as timely access to critical minerals, land, investments and skilled workforce, wide availability of difficult technologies, global politics, and energy security-must be carefully considered.

There is significant confusion about our past achievements. Our society has made major advances in information technology, medicine, electronics, satellites, and space travel over the past few decades. But these advances required trivial resources compared to the proposed low carbon transition. The proposed transition involves a complete overhaul of the global energy system. This basically means a complete overhaul of how we do things today. The scope and complexity of the proposed transition is extraordinary because it very rapidly requires an unprecedented level of physical resources and global cooperation. The global society has never undertaken a task of such scope and complexity. Not even remotely close!

The energy transition poses several unprecedented challeneges. So, a robust proposal must include a rational discussion about how all the challenges will be addressed. This is the only route to efficiently address climate change. I will discuss one possible path in one of my upcoming articles.

References & Notes

[1] United Nations. Climate action. Causes and effects of climate change. https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/causes-effects-climate-change#

[2] IEA: United Net zero by 2050. https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050

[3] IRENA: World transitions outlook: 1.5oC pathway. https://irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/World-Energy-Transitions-Outlook

[4] United Nations. Climate action. For a livable planet: Net-zero commitments must be backed by credible actions. https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/net-zero-coalition#

[5] U.S. EIA: Primary energy. Note, this data is based on a fossil fuel equivalence (or substitution) method for renewable energy. So, this is a reasonable apples-to-apples comparsion. https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/total-energy/total-energy-consumption?

[6] International Energy Agency Report, 2021. Net zero by 2050: A roadmap for the energy sector. https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050

[7] International Renewable Energy Agency. World Energy transitions outlook: 1.5oC pathway. https://www.irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/World-Energy-Transitions-Outlook

[8] Our World in Data. Global direct primary consumption. Historical data from the site is available only in this format. Note: The basic conclusion does not change when considering the heat loss associated with fossil fuel power and other energy applications. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-primary-energy?country=~OWID_WRL

[9] This informtion considers the thermodynamic inefficiencies of fossil fuels and related technologies.

[10] Our World in Data. Global direct primary consumption. Historical data from the site is available only in this format. For the 2050 energy use, I consider the total final consumption from the IEA report (Updated Net zero by 2050: see next reference) which accounts for the heat loss associated fossil fuel power and other energy applications. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-primary-energy?country=~OWID_WRL

[11] IEA Updated 2023 report: Net zero by 2050. https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-roadmap-a-global-pathway-to-keep-the-15-0c-goal-in-reach

[12] International Energy Agency Report, 2021. Net zero by 2050: A roadmap for the energy sector. https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050

[13] IEA Report. Energy Technology Perspectives 2023. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2023#

[14] U.S. EIA data. Primary energy. Note, this data is based on a fossil fuel equivalence (or substitution) method for renewable energy. So, this is a reasonable apples-to-apples comparsion. https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/total-energy/total-energy-consumption?

[15] The final energy consumption (or useful energy) estimated for the year 2050 by IEA and IRENA for their net zero pathways is still quite high despite the converion to a low carbon energy system that has far higher thermodynamic efficiencies (little to no no heat loss). This is because the population, economy and thereby the global energy consumption is expected to grow markedly over the next three decades.

[16] IEA Report. Net zero by 2050. A roadmap for the energy sector. Page 119. https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050

[17] IEA Report. Energy Technology Perspectives 2023. Page 283. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2023#

[18] Data Brief. A global inventory of electricity infrastructures from 1980 to 2017. Volume 38. Page 107351. Year 2021. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8441158/pdf/main.pdf

[19] U.S. EIA data. Electricity data. https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/electricity/electricity-generation

[20] The data for current levels is from the year 2022 (i.e., the most recent available data). IEA data. Tracking clean energy progress 2023. https://www.iea.org/reports/tracking-clean-energy-progress-2023

[21] IEA Updated 2023 report: Net zero by 2050. https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-roadmap-a-global-pathway-to-keep-the-15-0c-goal-in-reach

[22] IEA data. Global hydrogen review 2022. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-hydrogen-review-2022/executive-summary

[23] IEA Report, 2021. The role of critical minerals on clean energy transitions. https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions

[24] IEA provides data based on capacity (per MW). But the capacity factor or availability of wind and solar power to generate electricity is lower than natural gas and coal power. Also, the life of solar and wind power is lower than natural gas and coal power. So, a solar or wind power plant with the same capacity as a fossil fuel power plant produces much lower electricity over the life. A more relevant approach is to compare the materials required per unit electricity produced by the power plants over the lifetime. I have converted the IEA data from materials required per capacity to materials required per unit electricity generated over the lifetime. I have used average data from IEA reports for the capacity factors and lifetimes. I have used the average of natural gas and coal power to represent fossil fuel power. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/average-annual-capacity-factors-by-technology-2018https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2023

[25] USGS Lithium data. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2023/mcs2023-lithium.pdf

[26] USGS Nickel data. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2023/mcs2023-nickel.pdf

[27] USGS Cobalt data. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2023/mcs2023-cobalt.pdf

[28] IEA Report. Energy Technology Perspectives 2023. Pages 86,87,90,96. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2023#

[29] IEA Report. Energy Technology Perspectives 2023. Page 62. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2023#

[30] IEA Report. Critical minerals review 2023. https://www.iea.org/reports/critical-minerals-market-review-2023

[31] Oakridge National Laboratory Report. Environmental quality and U.S. power sector. Air quality, water quality, land use and environmental justice. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/Environment%20Baseline%20Vol.%202--Environmental%20Quality%20and%20the%20U.S.%20Power%20Sector--Air%20Quality%2C%20Water%20Quality%2C%20Land%20Use%2C%20and%20Environmental%20Justice.pdf

[32] U.S. EIA Data. International. Electricity. https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/electricity/electricity-generation?

[33] Sabin Center for Climate Law Report. Opposition to renewable energy facilities in United States. May 2023 edition. https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sabin_climate_change/200/

[34] IEA Report. Energy Technology Perspectives 2023. Pages 71–75. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2023#

[35] IEA Report. Energy Technology Perspectives 2023. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2023#

[36] IEA Report. Energy Technology Perspectives 2023. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2023#

[37] McKinsey & company. Renewable energy development in a net-zero world. Overcoming talent gaps. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/electric-power-and-natural-gas/our-insights/renewable-energy-development-in-a-net-zero-world-overcoming-talent-gaps

[38] IEA Updated 2023 report: Net zero by 2050. https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-roadmap-a-global-pathway-to-keep-the-15-0c-goal-in-reach IEA Commentary. https://www.iea.org/commentaries/reaching-net-zero-emissions-demands-faster-innovation-but-weve-already-come-a-long-way

[39] Also, many of the commercially available low carbon technologies are not yet competitive. The market uptake of these technologies has mostly been driven by massive subsidies.

[40] IEA Report. Energy Technology Perspectives 2023. Page 50. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2023#

[41] IEA Report, 2021. The role of critical minerals on clean energy transitions. https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions

[42] IEA Report. Energy Technology Perspectives 2023. Pages 86,87,90,96. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2023#

[43] IEA Report. Energy Technology Perspectives 2023. Pages 86,87,90,96. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2023#

[44] IEA report (2022). Accelerating sector transitions through stronger international collaborations. https://www.iea.org/reports/breakthrough-agenda-report-2022

[45] Global conflict tracker. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker

[46] Carnegie endowment for international peace. The China-US trade war has become a cold war. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/16/u.s.-china-trade-war-has-become-cold-war-pub-85352

[47] United Nations. Covid vaccines. Widening inequality and millions vulnerable. https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100192

[48] Our World in data. Coronavirus vaccinations. https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations

[49] IEA Updated 2023 report: Net zero by 2050. https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-roadmap-a-global-pathway-to-keep-the-15-0c-goal-in-reach IEA commentary. https://www.iea.org/commentaries/reaching-net-zero-emissions-demands-faster-innovation-but-weve-already-come-a-long-way

[50] International Renewable Energy Agency. World Energy transitions outlook: 1.5oC pathway. https://www.irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/World-Energy-Transitions-Outlook

[51] Climate policy initiative. How big is the net zero financing gap. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/How-big-is-the-Net-Zero-financing-gap-2023.pdf

[52] Boston Consulting group. Bridging the $18 trillion gap in net zero capital. https://www.bcg.com/publications/2023/bridging-the-vast-gap-in-net-zero-capital

[53] United Nations Conference on trade and Development. Investing in the energy transition: countries need more balanced policies.

[54] McKinsey & Company Special Report, January 2022. The net zero transition. What it would cost? What it could bring? https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/the-economic-transformation-what-would-change-in-the-net-zero-transition