How I was able to reveal page admin of almost any page on Facebook

Sudip Shah
PenTester Nepal
Published in
5 min readDec 20, 2021

Hello there , I am Sudip Shah from Pokhara, Nepal(a 19 yo independent security researcher). I found a bug on Facebook for Android where I was able to leak any page admin’s personal account id through IDOR.

It’s been a long time since I wrote an article about my resolved reports due to some internal problems. Today, I am going to write about a high impact vulnerability on Facebook which I found after lots of tries.

Background: I was very devastated and frustrated by the thought that I tried but was not able to find some cool bugs like you see on Twitter or anywhere. Seeing them made me realize that I should learn more about stuff. The logical bugs of Facebook which most people always try at their first attempts were never my first attempts. From the beginning, I always tried to find some high impact bugs on a technical basis but I always ended up finding logical bugs more. Logical and technical both bugs are nice actually, no arguments on that. It was fine actually as I was able to pay my bills due to them. But I wanted more, I wanted to get myself involved on the technical side more. So after 2 years of trying to find on the technical side of Facebook and after lots of duplicates and informative, I finally managed to find an IDOR vulnerability on Facebook’s Android app .

Why did I choose Facebook android? I was frustrated with trying on the Facebook web, checking all those responses and requests, trying to find something hidden. So I tried intercepting on the Facebook Android app.
I managed to find a strange behaviour while checking the request and responses of my HTTP history were while viewing the live video of any page, I was getting the admin’s real id in the response stated in the “broadcaster_id” parameter.

The Bug:

While intercepting and navigating to the other page’s live video section in FB android, I found a vulnerable endpoint in the doc_id=4449530781773796 , where when the page_id in the request is changed to any page then the page admin is disclosed in the response in the broadcaster_id parameter.

Impact:
It leads to page admin disclosure which is a privacy issue to the page. The impact is high because the page’s admin information is meant to be kept private and not shown to the public.

Repro Steps:

1. Send a Post request to graph.facebook.com/graphql with doc_id=4449530781773796
2. Edit the page_id in the request to any page.
3.In the response, we can disclose the admin easily by seeing the broadcaster_id=

Here is the poc : https://youtu.be/bskV-Nr64rE

This bug could’ve affected most of the pages on Facebook because most of the pages have live video features nowadays.To perform the exploit on a mass scale ,a script would be created to automate and change the value of the page_id in the request and capture the broadcaster_id from the response and save it in a file .
Or ,
We can use the Intruder option of Burpsuite and select the page_id and insert the list of page_id’s in the payloads and run it . Then we could get the admin info in the response and save it in a text file for targeting .

2nd Scenario:

I found one more scenario of the issue where the exact live_video_id can be provided in the request and then the admin will be disclosed in the response through IDOR vulnerability .
The Upper case used directly any page_id but this case uses the exact live_video_id . In this case, the vulnerable doc_id is doc_id=5048752835141848 where the video_id can be changed to any live video’s id then the admin of the page will be disclosed in the response in the broadcaster_id parameter.

Here are the steps :
1. Page conducts a live video
2. Attacker intercepts FB4A and then searches for doc_id=5048752835141848
3. Change the video id to the required page’s live video id
4. We can see the admin of the page being disclosed in the broadcaster_id= parameter in the response.

idor2

The second case got duplicated of the first issue because they both had the same root cause.

Timeline:

Initial report sent: October 5, 2021
The second scenario sent: October 6, 2021
Triaged: October 7, 2021

Fixed: October 21, 2021

Rewarded: 4500$ Bounty rewarded on November 5, 2021

my highest on a single report till now (4500$) xD

I was so happy as I received the bounty notification because it was my highest of all time on a single report. I will try more and learn more to find more high impact bugs in the upcoming days.

Thank you for taking the time to read my article. Have a great day!

Coverage:

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