Strong Partisans are on the Rise in the US
Nearly 70 years of survey data show that fewer folks identify with a political party today than in the past. But those who do are more likely to identify as a “strong” partisan than before.
Many people who follow American politics know about the so-called “rise of political independents.” In the early 1990s, people were about as likely to identify with one of the two major parties as they were to identify as “independent.” Today, as of Gallup’s March 2023 measurements, nearly half (49%) of American adults identify as such.
But, as I’ve written about before (alongside many, many others): most “independents”, when pressed, tend to admit to consistently leaning towards one party over another. This lean isn’t simply marginal. The preferences of these folks tend to be far closer to the average position of the party they lean towards versus the positions of the other party. “True” independents (people who do not admit to any particular leaning) tend to only comprise about 5–15% of the US adult population at any given point in time.
There is another group on the rise in the United States though. It’s a rise that doesn’t garner a lot of press coverage but is also quite consequential. The US is experiencing a rise in Strong Partisans. From the 1970s through 2000, Strong Partisans comprised between 25–30% of American adults. From 2000 through 2020, though, they’ve ballooned to just shy of 45%. In fact, in 2020, there were about 1.5 times more strong partisans than leaners and true independents combined.
I know, I know. It may not seem like an interesting insight at first glance. A lot has been written about polarization and the rising degree of partisan hostility in the US. But the research on these topics tend to show that people tend to more strongly dislike the “other” rather than feel more warmly towards their own. So when you consider that, plus the fact that leaners are on the rise, it’s actually rather curious. We’re seeing fewer self-avowed partisans in America, but those who are partisans are more likely to identify as strong partisans than in the past.
Measuring Partisan Strength
Here’s how political scientists and survey researchers tend to measure partisan strength and identity. It usually takes place over three questions, of which respondents will typically see only two.
- The first question asks them if they identify as a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or Something Else. If they say Independent or Something Else they move onto question 2. Those who pick Democrat or Republican will skip to question 3.
- The second question asks those who didn’t identify with a major party whether they tend to lean towards one party or the other. They will be given a third option to assert that they truly do not favor one over the other. The first group are identified as leaners and the second are identified as “true” independents. They’ll skip over question 3 from here.
- The third question asks those who initially identified as either a Democrat or Republican whether they see themselves as a “strong” Democrat/Republican or a “not very strong” Democrat/Republican. These groups are seen as Strong/Weak partisans, respectively.
The outcome, as typically used, is a 7 point scale ordered from: Strong Democrat; Weak Democrat; Lean Democrat; Independent; Lean Republican; Weak Republican; Strong Republican. But you can also use the results from the three questions to group people into four camps: Independents, Leaners, Weak Partisans, and Strong Partisans.
Insights from 70 Years of Survey Data
The American National Election Study (ANES) has been surveying Americans’ partisan preferences since 1952 with their latest release coming in 2020. This means we have data on respondents’ partisan self-identification for 31 elections[1] spanning nearly 70 years. We can use these data to plot out the relative size of each of the four groups (Independents, Leaners, Weak/Strong Partisans) over time.
This is what I’ve done with the chart below. Here’s how to read it: Each of the four groups is given an area in the chart, designated by color. These areas reflect their relative proportion in the US adult population, measured by the different waves of the ANES. Moving from left to right on the chart is akin to moving forward in time; the way that the group changes in size as one moves from left to right denotes how that group’s relative size has changed. If a color takes up a narrower amount of space on the left than it does on the right, then it has grown over time. If it takes up less space on the right than it does on the left, the group has shrunk.
First, in-line with the headlines, the number of leaners is indeed higher than at other points over the last few decades. It was at a low of about 15% in the 50s and 60s before reaching a peak of almost 30% in the 00s; it hovers at about 22% in 2020. The number of weak partisans has steadily eroded from its high of 43% of the population in 1966 down to a low of 22% in 2020. Strong partisans were initially high in the 50s and 60s before dipping to their lowest point in the 1970s at around 22%. In 2020 though, the number of strong partisans was at 44%.
Is it just the Internet?
Folks reading this who happen know about the evolution of the ANES’ sampling strategy (you’d be surprised at how large of a group this is in quantitative political science) may have a possible rejoinder here. In 2012, the ANES pivoted towards including respondents who reported-in over the internet. In survey research, the mode by which you collect your responses can matter a great deal. It may be that these online respondents are more likely to indicate that they are strong partisans. This could make the appearance of any “rise” a mirage; a mere artifact of sample selection.
This is why I reran the analyses among only those who responded via face-to-face interviewing (which was video chat in 2020 due to Covid) or over the phone. The results were substantively the same: A relatively stable set of folks identifying as strong partisans until a spike in the 2010s. Excluding those who participated online, the percent of strong partisans in 2012 was 33% and 45% in 2020. Weak partisans held relatively steady in this time period from 23% to 22%. The rise of strong partisans is likely not just a methodological quirk.
Generational Replacement?
My first thought in seeing the flow, ebb, and then massive flow again of strong partisanship was that this was a phenomenon spurred by generational replacement. Perhaps respondents were more inclined towards strong partisanship in the 50s and 60s, passed on, and were replaced by generations of folks less inclined towards strong partisanship. These folks, in turn, are starting to pass away in the 21st century, leaving generations who were stronger in their partisanship.
To investigate this, I broke out the following generations: Pre-Silent (born prior to 1900), Silent (1901–1927), Greatest (1928–1945), Boomers (1946–1964), Gen X (1965–1981), and Millennials (1982–1996). (There weren’t enough respondents in the data to robustly do Gen Z). Each facet below looks at the evolution of partisan strength in the US by generation. As before, the X axis shows time, the change in size from left to right denotes the change in relatively proportion. (This time though, it is within that particular generation).
There do appear to be some generational differences. The Pre-Silent generation appear to be the most strongly inclined towards strong partisanship as a rule. The constriction of strong partisanship in the 70s may partially be a function of generational replacement as all ensuing generations around at the time (Silent, Boomers, Gen X) were far more likely to be either a weak partisan or a leaner at the time.
It appears that two factors may be occurring here. The first may be a life-cycle effect. It appears that all generations, even those that didn’t survive into being sampled in 2020 (or, at the very least, had reached the point in age where they started getting “top-coded” into the next generation) started exhibiting a decrease in weak partisanship as they get older. For some generations (Boomers, Gen Z, and Millennials) this conversion appears to take room away from weak partisans and leaners. For others though (Pre-Silent, Silent, Greatest), the number of leaners has stayed more or less the same.But it also does appear from the Silent, Greatest, and Boomer generations though that the 50s-70s tended to feature little-to-no erosion in the relative prominence of weak partisans; and all identifiable generations are experiencing a surge in strong-partisanship from the 2010s forward.
That is to say, it’s possible that some of this is being driven by generational effects. But it is likely not the full story.
Rise of the Strong Partisans
Though fewer people in the United States are willingly identifying with a political party thanks to the rise of leaners, those who do identify with a party are far more likely to identify strongly. This effect does not appear to be driven by a change in how data are collected nor is it likely that it can be entirely explained by generational change.
What’s behind this rise in strong party identification. It’s likely not an increase in warm-fuzzies about the parties themselves; as I mentioned earlier, that’s about flat over time. However (and a big thanks to Sierra Davis Thomander and Karl Zipple for helping clarify my thinking on this here), it’s likely that this reflects increased partisan sorting in the US. Over time, a variety of different important social cleavages have more clearly aligned with one party over another. It’s likely that part of the increase in partisan strength comes from there being less ambivalence in which way people feel socially inculcated to identify. Warmth likely reflects the strength of people’s attachment to the party as a salient identity in and of itself rather than confidence/strength in their placement in a partisan box defined by sociohistorical factors beyond their individual control.
It is important to note that these data are snapshots around election season. Partisan identities are more activated in those contexts so it may be that other data, when an election isn’t going on, might find different proportions. It could be that we’re only at a point where strong partisans outnumber others when we’re in the midst of a campaign. (Though that may be small solace since Trump and Biden have both announced their Presidential campaign).
It’s also important to note that the rise of strong partisans may not necessarily harbor any ill omens for American democracy. The more dangerous parts of partisanship isn’t necessarily found in being for your own group but in being against the other. Even then, such affective polarization may very well be the appropriate response when the issues being contested aren’t languid, wonkish disputes over technocratic policy specifics but over huge issues such as “who does and does not belong in the public square and what foundational ideas are and are not worthy of state endorsement or repression.”
But it is important, when thinking about parties and party identity in America, that we don’t mistakenly believe that leaning “independents” are the only relevant group to the discussion. Strong partisans are also on the rise.
[1] Presidential and Congressional from 1952–2004 and then just Presidential from 2008 onwards. At least in the cumulative dataset that I’m using.
Peter Licari is a social data scientist specializing in American political behavior. He received his PhD in American Politics and Political Methodology from the University of Florida. The views expressed here are his own. He can also be found on YouTube and on Twitter(@PRLPoliSci). What little spare time remains is dedicated to long-distance running, binging games and media with his wonderful wife, Stephanie, playing with his daughter, Rosalina, walking his dog, Dude, and holding oddly productive one-sided conversations with his cat, Asia.
This is version 1.0.0 of this analysis. This post’s changelog is maintained on Github.
I believe all work benefits from readers’ constructive feedback as well as the writer’s own revisiting and reflection. But not all work fits the mold of academic publication. To that end, for the sake of transparency, I have decided to visibly index what point my non-academic projects are at once they go live in a format where others will (hopefully) come into contact with it. Minor revisions (such as grammar or minor image formatting issues) lead to an increase in the third digit. Major revisions inspired by my own revisiting and minor revisions inspired by the suggestion of readers leads to an increase in the second digit. Major revisions driven by the suggestion of readers or by future reflection and revisiting the project leads to the an increase in the first digit. After 6 months of no updates, a version should be considered “final.” The original version was published 4/28/2023. The current version was published 4/28/2023.
