In mid-September this year Markus Soeder, leader of the Christian Social Union and head of the state of Bavaria, caused a minor stir in the German NatSec-community by suggesting Germany should procure a helicopter carrier for its Navy. Specifically, in an interview with German tabloid “Bild” he stated: “The Navy needs more operational ships. That also includes, in my opinion, a helicopter carrier. That way we can, from the soon to be navigable Northern Ocean into the South China Sea (!) fulfil our treaty obligations.” Leaving aside here what treaty Soeder has in mind when it comes to send naval ships near Chinese shores, he picked up a thread that was previously started by then Christian Democrat leader Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, when the now Minister for Defence suggested back in March that Germany should, eventually, with France commit to building a “European aircraft carrier”. That idea was widely ridiculed by observers, though it may have simply been a throwaway thought underlining Kramp-Karrenbauer’s wider ideas on European integration in the same interview. German dreams of carriers in one form or another go back further than that though. Of course Graf Zeppelin usually features in such accounts as the famously ambitious but never actually operational Kriegsmarine-example heading into World War 2. More recently — well, A LOT more recently — though, back in 2003, another German state prime minister, Roland Koch, also conjured up the idea of a German aircraft carrier when he attended the launch of Sachsen-class frigate Hessen. So in political terms the idea keeps floating around, however dubiously.
But what about operational requirements? To put it very short, there is no capability or real requirement, at present, for the German Navy to operate a dedicated helicopter carrier. In extremis the term means a vessel such as Japanese Izumo or the American — well — ”America”-class, specifically the first two ships of the type. Both examples have in common that they are dedicated carriers for V/STOL-aviation, both helicopters and aircraft such as F-35B. Notably despite being considered amphibious ships they do not feature well-decks to disembark vehicles onto shore. Beyond such clear-cut carriers exist what is commonly termed LHD or LHA, amphibious assault carriers which operate both a large number of helicopters and move armored vehicles that either swim out on their own or are carried by landing boats to initiate a beach assault. Several countries across the globe operate such vessels and the number keeps growing, most recently China launched its first such design.
Typical for all these ships is that they really are mostly a platform for the actual capability they carry, via helicopters, landing boats and troops they can move and support. All these things cost a lot of money to buy and operate. Despite rising budgets it’s very hard to see how Bundeswehr could afford such a procurement, seeing as the service struggles even now to get major projects, such as a new heavy transport helicopter, new frigates and the controversial Tornado fast jet-replacement on the road.
So now that we have the terminology covered for what sort of ships Germany probably cannot, in the near future, buy and operate, what would be the sensible way forward? Just focus on what the Navy is currently about to buy, ie frigates, submarines, corvettes, some new auxiliaries, and call it a day? Well, not quite. There just happens to be a requirement that floated around for now nearly three decades and could actually be a useful asset to a German navy facing more responsibilities and persistent operational tempo both within NATO and representing national foreign policy. Various terms were used by German defence officials over the years to describe this project, starting with “command ship”, then “multi purpose ship” and much later, when Anglicisms became fashionable, the Joint Support Ship or JSS. Derisively also dubbed “Arche Naumann” or Naumann’s Ark, after the then head of Bundeswehr General Naumann, who pitched the idea first in 1995, the term envisaged a ship of roughly 20,000 tons, capable of supporting up to eight helicopters, 700 troops, an on-board hospital and roll on/roll off-capability to move military vehicles. During the 1990s and early 2000s, with it’s for Bundeswehr very temperamental but generally not constructive security debate and declining budgets this proposal never developed serious traction.
But times are changing now, European NATO-members, notably of course Berlin, are expected to directly shoulder a larger share in security contributions and the Deutsche Marine consequently faces its first serious effort at expansion in order to support both treaty obligations and more expeditionary or “out of area”-deployments. The service recognizes this also on the amphibious and sealift front by joining in what so far appears to be a very constructive cooperation with the Royal Netherlands Navy. This endeavour centres, since 2016, on the use of the Dutch “Multi Function Support Ship” (one could even say, its say a Joint Support Vessel) HNLMS Karel Doorman. The Karel Doorman is an interesting concept, roughly 28,000 tons large, it features a landing deck for vehicle transfers onto the boats it carries, aviation facilities for six medium helicopters, a vehicle deck, but most interestingly also two Replenishment At Sea (RAS)-arms that allow her to supply other ships with fuel, dry cargo and ammunition. As such the ship ticks a lot of boxes on the requirement list for Germany, having the flexibility to perform as a transport, supply ship or assist in disaster relief or evacuation operations. The rotary aviation element would also be helpful without breaking the bank like a pure helicopter carrier would. Furthermore, given cooperation with the Netherlands, the German Navy is currently in an excellent position to familiarise itself with the day to day operation of such a platform and avoids getting thrown into the deep end receiving a capability it has absolutely no experience with.
Therefore and in conclusion, if German politicians are serious about defence and do not just want to get headline attention in newspapers, this would be by far the most sensible way forward. It would still present a veritable challenge, given the usual problems of gold-plating requirements and industrial lobbying over workshare, but a German version of “Karel Doorman” would at least be eminently achievable and provide a valuable contribution both to national defence and international partners for security cooperation.
