Not Your Grandma’s Pakistan Army
Why is the Pakistani military not taking over?
WITH THE TWIN protest sit-ins led by Imran Khan and Tahir-ul-Qadri camped out at Islamabad’s Constitution Avenue, a fresh look at the political role of the Pakistani military is in order.
The Constitution of Pakistan stipulates no political role for the armed forces; represented at the federal cabinet by Defence Minister, they are part of the executive branch of the government. All the three services chiefs are appointed by the civilian President of Pakistan on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, who is the chief executive of the country.
History, however, paints a different picture. The country has been under direct military rule for almost half of its life. What is more, even under civilian rule, defence and foreign policy have been viewed as falling within the exclusive domain of the military.
With this background in mind, it is understandable that there would be whispers of military’s complicity when Khan’s PTI (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf) and Qadri’s PAT (Pakistan Awami Tehreek) started their eerily synchronised ‘long marches’ from Lahore on 14 August 2014, arriving in Islamabad two days later. Also owing to this background is the fact that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government is jittery.
The inflammatory rhetoric used by the leadership of the two protesting parties further fuels this kind of whispering, as does the fact that the protest leaders have been undaunted by low turnouts and the complete absence of any broader political support whatsoever; twelve days after their marches kicked off, Khan and Qadri are staying put, holding the the nation hostage.
On top of everything else has been a vicious communications campaign aimed at denting the government, hurting the civilian-military relations, and provoking the military into intervening. Spearheaded by an influential television channel, the campaign is fronted by a discredited anchor and relies on dubious whistle-blowers to spreads falsehoods.
No concerned about long-term issues like the channel’s own credibility or survival, the campaign employs propaganda techniques to create immediate shock and awe. Like a well-staffed pry-ops campaign it increasingly appears to be, it has demonstrated capability to expand its scope at the spur of the moment, attacking persons and institutions deemed opposed to its aims.
So why has the military not taken over the reins of power already? To put it bluntly, it is not the Pakistan military of the yesteryears.
LET US CONSIDER for a moment how Pakistan shook off General Pervez Musharraf, the military chief who ousted Nawaz Sharif in 1999 and who clung to power in one form or the other until 2008.
One of the ills of politics is that there is too much jockeying for credit. Depending upon who you ask the above question, the answer can be any of (1) the lawyers’ movement, (2) Asif Zardari’s PPP (Pakistan People’s Party), (3) Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League — Nawaz); and probably a few more.
And yet the truth of the matter is that the decisive push came from the military itself.
First, the military refused to engineer the 2008 election to his liking, paving the way for a clear victory for the PPP and a near total rout of Musharraf’s pet PML-Q (Pakistan Muslim League — Quaid-e-Azam).
Then, the military nudged him into doffing his uniform, his ‘second skin’, after he had flatly refused to do so in the face of all kinds of domestic and international prodding.
Soon afterwards, on the initiative of Zardari, the political class decided to push him out of the presidency. The campaign to put political pressure on Musharraf was orchestrated rather well, with resolutions calling for his ouster passing elected houses across Pakistan. But was he about to give in to that pressure? Not at all.
A look back at history shows Musharraf was at that point weighing options —not excluding dissolution of the Parliament — to cling on. He agreed to resign only after the military — with General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani at its head as the Chief of the Army Staff — ever so gently nudged him in that direction.
There is little doubt, then, that the Pakistani military played a key role in returning Pakistan to democratic rule.
BUT WHY WOULD the Pakistani military help usher in democratic rule? After all, Musharraf’s reform agenda was far from finished. The politicians taking over the reins of power from Musharraf were no less unruly, inept, or corrupt as a lot than the ones Musharraf ousted in 1999. In fact, the political landscape Musharraf left in his wake was identical to a T to the one he had inherited.
The answer is not easy to find because Pakistani generals are an insular lot. They keep to themselves and almost never betray their thoughts. Going by the conduct of the two Army Chiefs since Musharraf, however, we may surmise that they are convinced, once and for all, that civilian rule, however imperfect, serves Pakistan’s supreme national interest.
Firstly, they have seen first-hand how the military’s involvement in politics hurts the military itself and its public perception. At the very least, politicking generals — and by extension their non-politicking colleagues — lose the hallowed status of selfless soldiers and open themselves up to political muckraking.
Secondly, they must be convinced by now that military-led political reform is a red herring. The Musharraf experience — how he failed to cleanse the system and instead came round to working with the same set of people he intended to expel from the political space — certainly would lead to that conclusion.
If we were to assign credit for Pakistan’s return to democracy to one individual, it would be General Kayani — assuming of course the foregoing narrative of the country’s return to civilian rule is valid. His watchword throughout the six years he spent as the Chief of Army staff was ‘national power’.
Kayani held forth on national power in speeches at Kakul, during media outings, at public events, with visiting delegations — everywhere he went, including at meetings with formation commanders.
In July 2011, delivering his keynote address at the Army’s National Seminar on De-Radicalization’ in Swat, he declared the Army derived its strength from the people of Pakistan and was answerable to the people and their representatives. And he added:
“In modern times, no single organ of the state is configured to mount a wholesome response to the challenges confronting national security. All instruments of state and society have a role to play,”
That Kayani sustained emphasis on national power and institutional division of labour throughout his two terms as the man at the helm is a clear indication that it represented institutional consensus rather than personal preference.
It is quite likely, then, that the Pakistani military under General Kayani facilitated the switch back to civilian rule because it was sold on the idea that the military’s involvement in politics creates more problems than it solves — that Pakistan’s supreme national interest lies in civilian rule.
IF THE MILITARY did indeed help usher in democratic rule, then, we can rely on it to guard it in the face of all adversity rather than trample it. It certainly helps that the current top brass of the military is thoroughly schooled in the precepts of national power.
Also helpful is the fact that they have a perspective on the lapses of the Musharraf years. They know from experience that leading an army is a full-time job, not something to be juggled along with domestic politicking and international diplomatic manoeuvring.
A final factor working against a military takeover at the moment would be the character of General Raheel Sharif, the current Chief of the Army Staff. From all accounts, he is an unalloyed soldier, more akin to General Kayani than the likes of Musharraf and Zia-ul-Haq. He is unlikely to allow anything to distract him from his core mission.
General Sharif comes from a storied family of professional soldiers. He is a younger brother of Major Shabbir Sharif who laid down his life defending the nation in the 1971 war with India and was posthumously awarded Nishan-e-Haider, Pakistan’s highest military gallantry award; and a nephew of Major Raja Aziz Bhatti, another recipient of Nishan-e-Haider from the 1965 war with India.
With this kind of background, General Sharif is likely to be concerned with preserving the family honour rather than gambling it away in any adventurism.
All in all, it is fairly safe to say the Pakistani military is not interested in disrupting the civilian rule, notwithstanding the winks and gestures from some actors of the current political imbroglio.
Image credits: Both images used are ISPR (Inter-Services Public Relations) handout photos
