Civic space is a cornerstone of citizen participation: Q&A with authors of new OECD report

The OECD published its first-of-its-kind flagship comparative report on civic space, The Protection and Promotion of Civic Space: Strengthening Alignment with International Standards and Guidance (highlights report), which offers a baseline of data from 33 OECD Members and 19 non-Members and a nuanced overview of the different dimensions of civic space. Over 200 participants joined our launch event (recording here) on 16 December 2022. The event provided an opportunity for participants to submit questions to panelists, the most insightful of which we explore in more detail below.

Civic space is a cornerstone of open and democratic societies and a prerequisite for good governance. It is understood as a set of legal, policy, institutional and practical conditions necessary for people to organise, participate and freely express themselves. A robust civic space is linked to higher levels of citizen engagement, stronger transparency and accountability, and empowered citizens and civil society.

What is the unique selling point of this report? Can you elaborate on how it complements similar annual reports from organisations like CIVICUS and V-Dem?

The OECD report complements analysis from other organisations on civic space in four unique ways:

1. A government perspective. Unlike the vast majority of reports from other sources, the OECD civic space report is underpinned by data from 52 governments. These countries voluntarily opted into this process and the information received was validated by the OECD to ensure accuracy and consistency across the data set.

2. An emphasis on laws, policies, institutions, and practices that support the protection and promotion of civic space. The report focuses on concrete actions taken by countries, that can be monitored, while highlighting areas where standards and practices can be improved or are out of sync with international norms. In contrast, most other analyses of civic space are perceptions-based e.g., perceptions of an enabling environment for civil society, democracy, press freedom, and freedom of expression, to name a few.

3. A global perspective with a focus on OECD Members. While the report is based on data from a total of 52 countries, there is a significant focus on the 33 OECD Members that took part in the OECD survey. The 10 high-level recommendations and related key measures in each chapter were drafted with a particular focus on the challenges and needs of OECD Members. The report also draws attention to their role as major donors in development co-operation, calling for a coherent policy approach to civic space protection, both domestically and abroad. Geographically speaking, most participating countries are based in Europe (23 countries) and Latin America and the Caribbean (13), with a number of responses coming from other geographical regions, namely in Asia and the Pacific (6), Africa (3), the Middle East (3), Central Asia (2) and North America (2).

4. Wide-ranging approach to the protection of civic space, including a positive narrative on steps that governments are taking. The OECD approach to civic space is broad. It recognises the multitude of factors that can influence the ability of civil society and ordinary people to become involved in policy making. We believe there is great value in applying this wide lens in order to fully understand the often interlinked factors — e.g. people who are routinely discriminated against not being willing to exercise their right to freedom of expression or being unable to access information — that influence participation in public life.

Within OECD countries, our research shows that there are challenges but also positive developments that can be built upon (see some of them on page 32: Good country practices to protect and promote civic space). Many other analyses adopt a global approach — in other words, are based on an analysis of a much larger number of countries, including those with more extensive challenges related to civic space — and therefore often yield more negative overall findings. It is our hope that a focus on what is working well may serve to inspire other countries and change the narrative to one that recognises champions, progress and positive trends, in addition to restrictions and contested areas.

What is the contribution of a new international initiative to promote civic space for CSOs given the growing range of challenges and restrictions they currently face?

Relevant legal frameworks that underpin vibrant civic spaces (such as freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly) in addition to the right to privacy, non-discrimination, access to information and press freedom, are already well established in international legal frameworks as well as national constitutions and legislation. In addition to our report, there is significant and detailed guidance available on implementation of these laws, including from:

• The UN system (e.g. General Comment 34 on Freedom of Expression, General Comment 37 on the Rights of Peaceful Assembly, UN guidance on states’ duty to protect human rights defenders)
• Special Rapporteurs (e.g. on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association, the Right to Privacy)
• Council of Europe (e.g. Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the need to strengthen the protection and promotion of civil society space in Europe).

However, while laws that help to protect civic space are often well established in OECD Members, they may be out of date in some countries, not in line with international standards and/or lacking in implementation.

There is a role to play for new international efforts in this area, such as the OECD’s Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy initiative that helps to refocus countries’ attention on civic space, coupled with the need to focus on implementation of fundamental democratic rights.

The Civic Space report examines a host of challenges that are gaining in importance, including:

• Protecting CSOs and activists from strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) (p. 226).
• Limits on access to information, especially in emergency contexts (p. 138).
• Taking measures to protect ordinary people and journalists from online hate (p. 175).
• Protection for women from misogynistic hate speech (p. 181).
• Reversing negative trends in OECD countries related to press freedom (p.160).
• Disruptive new digital technologies, such as artificial intelligence, posing new risks to data protection, privacy, and non-discrimination (p. 185).
• Rising concerns about state surveillance of civil society (p. 56).

One of our core conclusions is to ensure ongoing monitoring of civic space protection using disaggregated data to understand emerging challenges and gaps. Only by firmly understanding the landscape, can solutions be found.

As illustrated in some cases in this report, sometimes democratic measures can be used to limit civic space. How do you understand the dilemma that initiatives that can have a detrimental impact on civic space can be established by democratic means?

Democratically elected governments supporting and implementing policies or practices that limit civic space is indeed a reality in some countries. It’s important to emphasise that there are legitimate reasons to do so in certain contexts. For example, at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic most countries instituted emergency measures that were broadly welcomed by populations and many of these affected civic freedoms (p. 57). Ensuring that any such measures are limited in duration, approved by parliament, overseen by independent institutions, and that such measures are subject to judicial review is key. Similarly, it is crucial to ensure individuals can seek remedies for any rights violations.

At the same time, there is also a tension because these measures can undermine or erode fundamental rights. The system of checks and balances in our democracies, including independent judiciaries, strong parliaments, an unhampered press and oversight mechanisms remain crucial buffers against these effects, providing actors in each branch of government with powers to reign in other branches. The report highlights the role of effective and adequately resourced publicly funded independent oversight institutions in protecting civic freedoms (p. 74).

One particular area where we see civic space being eroded at the global level is policy making related to national security and counter-terrorism. Internationally endorsed recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) require states to enact a wide range of legal measures and observe due diligence obligations in order to prevent terrorist financing through the global banking system (p. 249), for example. Research indicates that the over-zealous implementation of these standards by governments and banks, has led to significant challenges for the CSO sector, which the FATF recognises.

There are three key measures that countries can consider taking to counter such restrictions on civic space:

• Assessing the impact of national policies and measures related to national security and counter-terrorism, including money laundering, on civil society and implementing a risk-based approach in assessments of the sector.
• Systematically engaging in dialogue with civil society actors when designing national security and counter-terrorism policies and measures, to reduce the risk of security measures having a disproportionate impact on civic space or leading to unintended consequences for CSOs (see good practices, p. 234).
• Ensuring that national laws and practices enable CSOs to seek, receive and utilise financial, material and human resources, whether domestic, foreign or international, for the pursuit of legitimate and lawful activities.

What place does so-called ‘uncivil society’ have in this space? For instance, in some countries, civil society is quite polarised and organisations with exclusionary beliefs that could be a threat to democracy work with governments.

In this report, CSO is understood in the broadest sense. It covers a wide range of non-market and non-state organisations in which people can organise themselves to pursue shared interests. The term includes trade unions, charities, consumer groups, associations, non-governmental organisations, foundations, and other groups.

The OECD recognises the diverse, positive roles that CSOs play in society, including as service developers and providers, campaigners, builders of social movements, government watchdogs, rights advocates, information providers, and active participants in governance processes. It recognises that governments and policy makers are accountable to a broad range of stakeholders, including civil society, who bring unique expertise, knowledge and contributions to policy discussions and decision making. It acknowledges that participation in public affairs is a right.

However, the notion that a civil society automatically supports healthy democracies is misplaced. Some civil society groups are driven by a desire to deepen and protect democracy, while others can undermine some of its basic tenets. Countries have legitimate limitations in place to address this, including addressing individuals or groups that present threats to public order. Furthermore, CSOs may not always be distinct from the state (e.g. as in the case of Government Organised Non-Governmental Organisations or GONGOs); and different interests (e.g. political party agendas, politicians, private interests) may also infiltrate and co-opt civil society. Actors that espouse political, religious and economic interests that override and undermine the public interest — however that is defined — are also present in many contexts. As a result, developing policy guidance in this area is inherently complex.

The report addresses some of these issues from the standpoint of transparency and a more comprehensive piece on this is forthcoming.

How do you monitor and gather information from states with an unstable government? When you gather data and evidence of human rights violations, how do you know they are accurate?

All government data presented in the OECD report has been validated by the OECD. Our approach to commenting on violations or restriction is to first seek out data from reliable, well-established partners and sources and second triangulate findings — using different datasets — wherever necessary.

For example, when we discuss killings of journalists in 2021 (p. 158), we note that different organisations use different methodologies to count these deaths and provide figures from a range of organisations: UNESCO (55 killings); the Committee to Protect Journalists (45); Reporters Without Borders (31); and the International Federation of Journalists (45). In other words, while the details and methodologies may differ, when taken together, these different sources provide a broad overview of related challenges.

This article was written by Claire McEvoy, Marie Whelan, and Deniz Devrim from the Open Government, Civic Space and Public Communications Unit at the OECD.

Contact us to receive updates from the OECD Observatory of Civic Space: civicspace@OECD.org

Read the report.

Click here to (re)watch the launch.

Click here to see the Highlights document in English (French and Spanish forthcoming).

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