Dramatic Changes on the Korean Peninsula and Challenges since 2018
Park Jung Eun
Secretary General, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
A surprise summit meeting between the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States was held in Panmunjeom, the symbol of a divided Korean Peninsula, on June 30, 2019. It was 4 months since the DPRK — U.S. Summit in Hanoi in February 2019, which failed to reach any agreement. As people had held such high expectations of the Hanoi summit, its breakdown shocked the world. Since then, the talks between the DPRK and the U.S. had been in deadlock. Despite the comprehensive Singapore Agreement which announced the new relationship between the DPRK and the U.S., peace in the Korean Peninsula and complete denuclearization, it seemed that the two countries were focused not on negotiating based on give-and-take, but only on ‘denuclearization first.’ The U.S. was full of distrust — it did not expect the DPRK to really denuclearize, and therefore, the discussions on the establishment of a new relationship between the DPRK and the U.S. and a peace agreement disappeared.
What was promising, though, was that the heads of the two countries continued to show their intention to continue with negotiation, and that the Moon Administration effectively played its role of intermediary by suggesting and achieving the summit meeting in Panmunjeom. The trialogue at Panmunjeom was a scene that would go down in history, and the heads of the DPRK and the U.S. agreed to continue working-level negotiations. Some critics asserted that the trialogue was nothing but one of President Trump’s presidential election campaign events. However, politics and diplomacy are all about navigating through the narrow gates of negotiation and bringing people to the table. It is still uncertain whether the two countries will be able to overcome their differences at future working-level negotiations. However, it is still better to resume negotiations while holding onto their positions than to do nothing at all. The DPRK and the U.S. must break down the wall of distrust between them, honor the agreement made in Singapore and start negotiating to materialize the steps and promises described in that Singapore Agreement. The role of civil society is to persuade the international community, including the DPRK and the U.S., to support and make progress in the peace process.
No-deal in Hanoi: One Meeting Cannot Solve All Problems
The Hanoi summit clearly showed how difficult it is to solve the conflict in which the Korean Peninsula is engulfed: it is the last place in the world where the Cold War continues to exist. It is not easy for two countries that have remained enemies for more than 70 years to suddenly engage in negotiations with complete trust in each other. Even DPRK Chairman Kim’s repeated expression of his will to denuclearize would not reduce the distrust of the international community, including the U.S. — that is the reality. The nuclear conflict in the Korean Peninsula grew out of hostile relations; the DPRK vs. the U.S. and the ROK vs. the DPRK. Thus, it is neither practical nor appropriate to demand that the DPRK accept full-blown denuclearization at once. The history of the nuclear issue that has persisted for more than 20 years proves that the ‘denuclearize North Korea first’ policy has failed to bring an end to the conflict in the Korean Peninsula. Rather, it has given the DRPK time to multiply its nuclear capacity. The two countries must engage in phased and simultaneous implementation of the Singapore Agreement at the minimum level, after aligning their demands and expectations. If the two countries can build mutual trust over the course of this process, they may make a greater leap forward.
The Parties Must Engage in Phased Implementation of the Singapore Agreement
At the first summit meeting between the DPRK and the U.S. that took place in Singapore on June 12th 2018, President Trump and Chairman Kim agreed to: establish a new relationship between the two countries; build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula; and work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Also, President Trump committed to providing security guarantees to the DPRK, and Chairman Kim reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, after the summit, no promise was honored and the agreement remained just that; an agreement. After the no-deal outcome in Hanoi, only the discussion on ‘denuclearization first’ prevailed. This is why the trialogue at the Panmunjeom was especially meaningful, because it gave a reason for the negotiations to resume.
It is a good thing that the atmosphere in the U.S. has changed after the trialogue at the Panmunjeom: from ‘denuclearization first’ to acknowledgement of a phased approach. According to the U.S website Axios, Stephen Biegun, the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea, said off-the-record immediately after the trialogue at Panmunjeom that although the U.S. would not lift the sanctions, it might be willing to make concessions such as providing humanitarian support and restoring diplomatic relations, if the DPRK were to freeze its nuclear program.1 Such ‘give-and-take’ would also be possible if the talks were headed toward denuclearization.
We need to identify a way to carry out all other elements, aside from denuclearization, of the comprehensive agreement made in Singapore, while maintaining the denuclearization process. It became obvious that the two countries held different views on the denuclearization process during the Hanoi summit. The DPRK should put its nuclear facilities other than Youngbyeon, where the state’s plutonium is processed and which emcompasses 50~80% of the DPRK’s nuclear program, on the agenda and the U.S. should also put on the agenda corresponding actions, such as sanction relief, establishment of diplomatic relations between the DPRK and the U.S., and a declaration of the end of war. By doing so, the DPRK can eliminate skepticism about its will to denuclearize, and the U.S. can demonstrate its credibility with regard to actually implementing the agreement. At the same time, the two countries will be able to maintain momentum in the denuclearization process.
Sanctions Against the DPRK that Prohibit Humanitarian Aid Must Be Lifted
Many U.N. resolutions concerning sanctions against the DPRK state that they are just a means to an end, rather than an end in themselves. The resolutions emphasize peaceful, diplomatic and political arrangements in addition to sanctions, because of this reason. The resolutions emphasize that the sanctions against the DPRK shall not aggravate the life of North Koreans or negatively affect humanitarian aid activities, because humanitarian aid holds universal value for humanity that must not be stopped under any circumstances.
Reports2 by the U.N. and other international organizations show that humanitarian aid to the DPRK is urgently necessary. However, the sanctions by the U.N. and the independent sanctions imposed by the U.S. which were reinforced after the first DPRK — U.S. summit ought neither to harm the lives of the DPRK people nor to hamper humanitarian activities for them. Nevertheless, it is fortunate that the UN 1718 committee granted 14 exemptions3 including medical aid, food, and facility and welfare support for the first six months of 2019. However, the U.S.-led sanctions against the DPRK are preventing North Korea from receiving humanitarian aid. Inter-Korean exchange and cooperation are indispensable catalysts for peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula. This is despite the fact that the heads of the ROK and the DPRK had met and declared that the two countries would stop all hostile acts and create a permanent peace regime. This year, no Korean civil organization dedicated to providing support to North Koreans was allowed to visit the DPRK or carry out its activities. Also, all inter-Korean cooperation projects promoted by local governments of the ROK, including the Seoul Metropolitan Government, were suspended. Even the Mount Kumgang tourism region and the Kaesong Industrial Complex project that had been suspended irrespective of the U.N. sanctions against the DPRK remain suspended.
Inter-Korean cooperation for humanitarian purposes not only provides help to the vulnerable in the DPRK, but also eases military confrontations and tensions between the two Koreas and helps them recover their sense of community. Inter-Korean humanitarian cooperation can also promote a virtuous cycle of peace, supporting the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. If the international community provides humanitarian aid to the DPRK, it will be regarded as a sophisticated diplomatic act that demonstrates respect for the DPRK and binds it as a member of international society. Sanctions against the DPRK that aggravate humanitarian suffering in North Korea and prevent the two Koreas from solving humanitarian issues and strengthening cooperation and exchange must be relaxed as soon as possible.
Denuclearization as a ‘Process of Peace’
Korean civil society has been emphasizing that the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula is a part of an unstable ceasefire system. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is an issue that cannot be separated from the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and the restoration of the DPRK — U.S. relationship. This is evidenced by the fact that the DPRK began to develop nuclear weapons during the period of military confrontation and the arms race that persisted in the Korean Peninsula for many decades. Thus, demanding ‘denuclearization first’ as a non-negotiable condition for negotiations is unilateral and unrealistic. It is also clear that peace on the Korean Peninsula cannot be achieved only by denuclearization. This is why Korean civil society emphasizes that denuclearization has to be part of a process of building peace and be implemented together with efforts to build a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. This includes the execution of a peace treaty or the establishment of diplomatic relations between the DPRK and the U.S.
Also, in order to completely denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, the denuclearization of North Korea alone is not enough. Complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula cannot be achieved by ‘complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization’ of the DPRK only. All nuclear threats that may exist within and outside of the Korean Peninsula must be removed to completely denuclearize it. The possibility of the DPRK, as well as the ROK, using nuclear weapons must be ruled out. ROK, the U.S. and Japan rely on an extended deterrence strategy, which includes the transportation and placement, as well as research & development of nuclear weapons. Denunciation of the extended deterrence strategy must be one of the approaches towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Korean Peninsula without any nuclear threats could transform Northeast Asia into a nuclear-weapon-free-zone. This in turn, can make a significant contribution towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free-world.
The Precarious ROK-Japan Relationship and the Abe Administration’s Dangerous Bet
A few days after the surprise trialogue at Panmunjeom, the Abe administration of Japan announced restrictions on exports to ROK. This is Japan’s economic retaliation against the ROK, due to a political and diplomatic issue. The Abe administration is dissatisfied with the Moon administration’s refusal of the 2015 agreement on wartime sexual enslavement of Korean women and the Korean Supreme Court ruling on compensation for Korean forced labor victims. The ROK and Japan have gone through strained relations often in the past, due to historical issues, and lately, Korea-bashing voices have become louder in Japan.4 However, there had never been any problem bad enough to break the long economic and civil relationships between the two countries. This seems to have changed. The Abe administration has even accused the ROK — without any evidence — of exporting strategic goods to the DPRK. It is hard to believe that Japan is retaliating against the ROK simply because of disagreements concerning historical affairs. Both the ROK and Japan believe in free trade and democracy and had been cooperating in many areas, including politics, the economy and the military. By making such accusations and retaliatory threats, Japan is testing the decades-long relationship between the two countries.
The Abe administration is threatening economic retaliation because of historical affairs. This behavior can be interpreted in many ways. Ultra-right-wing conservative forces in the ROK and the current ruling power in Japan have long shared a common interest. These forces were in power in the ROK for a long time in both the aspect of political power as well as in the dictatorship and development history of the ROK. Tensions rose temporarily when the South Korean public criticized the lack of resolution of historical tensions. However, the basic cooperative relationship between the two countries remained intact. The Abe administration uses hostility towards the DPRK as the basis of maintaining its power and wishes to maintain the status quo of a divided Korea over the alternative of a rapid transformation to a peaceful inter-Korean relationship.
The Abe administration is also trying to convert Japan into a country that can engage in the war, by amending Japan’s pacifist constitution. It continues to deny the fact that Japan invaded other countries and continues to seek ways to convert Japan into a strong militaristic nation. Meanwhile, the democratic and dynamic civil society of ROK, that has resisted dictatorships and replaced people in power, is driving change in politics and diplomacy. Currently, the Moon Administration in the ROK is supported by its civil society.
Both the Abe and Park Geunhye administrations announced that the one billion Yen (USD 8.8m) received from Japan in 2015 as compensation for wartime sexual enslavement of Korean women marked ‘the final and irreversible’ agreement between both countries on this matter. This was despite the fact that civil society of the ROK strongly opposed such an agreement. However, in November 2016, the Park administration entered into a further agreement, the Korea-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Japanese corporations had forced Korean people into labor during its colonial period. The Supreme Court of Korea ruled that those Japanese corporations must offer compensation for their exploitation of Korean labor. The Abe administration is making an issue out of this Korean Supreme Court ruling and its execution. Meanwhile, it has become clear that the Supreme Court of Korea had made the political decision to intentionally delay its ruling on forced labor during the Park administration. This behavior of the Supreme Court of Korea has been pointed out as evidence of the lack of its independence. Aside from the matter of historical affairs, there is a large difference in the way the two countries perceive the issues surrounding North Korea, the path of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the integration of the two Koreas. The gap between interests pursued by Korean and Japanese governments has never been wider.
The Abe administration implemented retaliatory actions so senseless that any advanced nation would never think of attempting them. This behavior demonstrates that the extreme right-wing conservative forces of Japan are able to threaten the ROK’s economy and security. The dominant opinion in South Korea is that the recent behavior of Japan shows how deeply the Korean economy has relied on Japan, and that the ROK must take this opportunity to quickly change its industrial structure. However, South Koreans must realize that this is not just an economic problem. The Abe administration is pushing for amendments of the peace constitution of Japan and a revival of militarism. This does not just concern only Japan. This is a threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. We must note that we had underestimated the negative role the Abe administration has been playing with regard to the peace process in the Korean Peninsula.
There is No Choice but to Achieve Peace through Peaceful Means
Under no circumstances should we replicate the past: military tensions and threats of nuclear war must not be repeated. South Korea’s government and civil society have made achieving peace through peaceful methods and solving problems through dialogue and negotiation possible and have confirmed that such possibilities can be turned into reality. In 2018, the two Koreas stopped all hostile acts, and the Korean Peninsula welcomed the most peaceful period since the ceasefire. However, this opportunity to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula is threatened by the interests of other countries. The support from and cooperation of the international community is urgently required. This is why South Korean civil society has urged a ceaseless peace process for the Korean Peninsula and continues to strive for the delivery of its voice to the international community, including the U.N., and the executive branch of the U.S.
The Korea-Japan relationship must be rehabilitated into a relationship where the two countries respect and cooperate with each other. The two countries must not incite chauvinism aimed at each other. South Korean civil society must actively exchange opinions with more members of Japanese civil society. That will help us turn the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia into peaceful regions without nuclear threats.
1 Jonathan Swan, Erica Pandey, ‘Trump’s negotiator signals flexibility in North Korea talks’, Axios, July 3, 2019. https://www.axios.com/trump-negotiator-steve-biegun-signals-flexibility-in-north-korea-talks-0b1f9a53-2599-49ac-b236-0fa819d175f8.html
2 UN Security Council resolution 2397(2017), Implementation Assistance Notice №7 : Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
3 United Nations Security Council, United Nations, accessed August 8, 2019. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/humanitarian-exemption-requests
4 The Korea Times, “Hate speech against Korean still active in Japan”, March 24, 2019. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/03/120_265876.html
Ms. PARK Jungeun is Secretary General of People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD). She joined PSPD, a key advocacy NGOs in the Republic of Korea, in 2000 and worked at the organisation’s Peace and Disarmament Center for 15 years dealing with denuclearization and military alliance issues. She is a member of the Policy Advisory Committee of the Ministry of National Defense and chairperson of the steering committee of the Civil Peace Forum, a network of peace organizations in the ROK.
