Making the Most Out of Dialogue
Darynell Rodríguez Torres
Executive Director, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)
In 1972, the Nixon administration initiated a process of engagement with China amid a context of rising hostilities. President Nixon’s visit to China and his meeting with Mao Zedong became a landmark in Sino-American relations, as it started a process of de-escalation of hostilities between two countries that saw each other as main foes. The expression ‘Only Nixon could go to China’ has been used since then as a metaphor of the hard line politician who could take bold actions to drastically undertake a policy change that would encounter a strong opposition if done by someone else.
Forty-seven years later, it seems we have a similar scenario, which brings an opportunity to end one of the last conflicts of the Cold War. The Trump administration has the opportunity to undertake a historical policy change towards the DPRK, starting a process of normalization, which could lead to supporting a transformation process in the Korean peninsula. In the long run, this engagement strategy could prompt a gradual process of denuclearization by providing mutual security assurances and eliminating the perception of mutual threat.
When looking at the current situation in the Korean peninsula, most analysts agree on a fundamental premise: there is no military solution to the conflict. The stakes are too high and the human costs would be unimaginable. If this premise is accepted, there are basically two other options to consider: maintain the status quo or move forward towards normalizing relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), on one hand, and the United States and the DPRK on the other (Kearney, 2017).
Maintaining the status quo would imply a high risk, in a very volatile region characterized by mistrust, limited communication channels and the feeling of being constantly under threat. This would build on the already fertile ground for miscalculations, mutual provocations and military escalation.
This leaves de-escalation of hostilities and the eventual normalization of relations as the most desirable, if not really the only option. As mentioned by the American academic John Delury, ‘the unpalatable truth is that there is really only one serious path out of the quagmire: normalization of relations between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.’ (Delury, 2018). Of course this normalization process would also have to include relations between the DPRK and ROK as well as Japan.
Begin by ending the war
Any serious effort to walk towards normalization of relations should consider one fundamental step: the need to reach a peace treaty that finally puts an end to the Korean War. This will be a significant step in acknowledging the concerns of the DPRK on one hand, and provide mutual reassurance about the security of all the parties involved in the conflict.
While for the population of the US, being technically in a state of war with the DPRK may not have many implications in their day to day life, the situation for the people in the Korean peninsula is very different. Those who have been able to visit the DPRK can immediately experience how the feeling of being under threat marks the day to day of North Koreans. The war there is not dormant; it is not an abstraction or a technicality; it feels very real and present in people’s lives.
As any state who feels under threat, the DPRK’s priority is to ensure its own security and guarantee its survival. The classic realist paradigm of international relations defines the national interest in terms of power, and power is defined in terms of a country’s military capacity to protect itself. North Korea’s defence policy follows this logic. As stated by the foreign affairs analyst Fareed Zakaria, ‘the North Korean regime has tried to buy insurance. And in the realm of international affairs, the best insurance is having a nuclear capacity’ (Zakaria, 2017). From the perspective of North Korea, rather than offsetting the military balance in the region, what its nuclear weapons programme does is to level the playing field.
Acknowledging the security concerns of the DPRK and discussing different options to provide reassurance about its security would be a more effective policy than 20 more years of sanctions. Putting a formal end to the Korean War could be that factor that prompts a virtuous cycle to build confidence and bring lasting change in the region.
As stated in 2017 by members of the Korean National Peace Committee: ‘Once a legal guarantee for peaceful co-existence between the DPRK and the U.S. is provided by the conclusion of a peace agreement, not only can DPRK-U.S. relations, but also issues of DPRK-Japan and the north and the south Korea relations be resolved’ (Korean National Peace Committee, 2017). Having talks about how to put a formal end to the Korean War should be one of the first steps to walk towards normalization of relations, reduce tensions and pave the way for future talks about a nuclear free zone in the Korean peninsula.
Enhancing citizens´ diplomacy to safeguard steps towards peace
After the suspension of the Six Party Talks in 2009 official spaces for dialogue were virtually inexistent. This lack of dialogue channels can be considered as one of the elements that explain the exacerbation of tensions, the cycle of provocations and the military escalation in the region.
While most official channels of communication were closed, civil society organizations stepped up to fill this gap by convening track II dialogues and developing activities to enhance people to people interaction across the two Koreas. Under the current context, civil society organizations need to continue with their efforts and support the official process that is underway.
As in any other process of this nature, the situation in the Korean peninsula often feels like a roller coaster. When it seems a decisive step is about to be taken, it is then followed by a setback. We need to be aware that the process of re-building trust and confidence to break the cycle of tensions and military escalations will be long and bumpy. Once again, civil society initiatives can be an important instrument to ensure sustained dialogue despite these difficulties.
Since 2015, the Northeast Asian network of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, GPPAC, has been leading a track II dialogue, the Ulaanbaatar Process. This initiative came out of the realization that platforms for dialogue in the region were urgently needed. The Ulaanbaatar Process emerged then as such a platform for dialogue, seeking to engage civil society participants from all the countries involved in the Six Party Talks. These dialogues are hosted in Mongolia and seek to strengthen the role of civil society as a complement to official diplomatic efforts.
The objectives declared by the participants in this process are:
- To strengthen the role of civil society in the context of building peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
- To complement and contribute recommendations to official processes, including the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue for Northeast Asian Security initiated by the Mongolian government.
- To support the development of an institutionalized regional mechanism supporting dialogue and reconciliation in Northeast Asia.
- To contribute to overall confidence building measures within the Northeast Asia region.
The meetings of the Ulaanbaatar Process have been a useful space to exchange knowledge and have constructive discussions on issues of concern for the entire region. These include the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia, the need to advance towards a permanent peace treaty and the role of civil society actors across the region to contribute to achieve these goals.
The experience of the Ulaanbaatar Process highlights the need for developing platforms that facilitate dialogue and regional engagement. Ensuring the sustainability of these initiatives, however, is always a challenge. While there is a recognition of the efforts of civil society, these activities require funding and donors often seem skeptical about their concrete results.
The Ulaanbaatar Process was conceived as long-term initiative to facilitate and sustain dialogue. It aims at complementing and stimulating official processes with the understanding that there is a need to make dialogue a habit in the region and that expecting ‘quick gains’ on very complex issues is not realistic. Since it was first launched, significant outcomes have emerged in terms of facilitating regular engagement, gaining a better understanding of the issues by looking at them from different perspectives and developing a joint problem solving approach among the participants.
The time seems ripe for the Ulaanbaatar Process to move into a new stage. Participants in the dialogue need to strategize together how they can contribute to support the diplomatic breakthroughs that have taken place in the last years and prevent that the setbacks in the process bring us back to positions of isolation and lack of engagement. Bringing the conclusion of six years of dialogue into key decision makers and being more public about the discussions and recommendations made by dialogue participants, could be some of the next steps in this dialogue process for the coming years.
As any mediator would say, despite the ups and downs, the progress and set backs of a particular process, the important thing is to always be there. Civil society initiatives have always been there, especially when no other spaces for dialogue were open. A process of de-escalating tensions and transitioning into a peace regime in the region will need of civil society initiatives at various levels to make it successful. Enabling the current civil society led processes to continue their work and stimulating new initiatives is critical.
Conclusion
Engagement and dialogue, not isolation, sanctions and military threats, should be the corner stones to normalize relations in the region, prevent an arms race and eventually advance towards the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in Northeast Asia. Putting a formal end to the Korean War would be a very significant step in de-escalating tensions and providing mutual security assurances that would enable a process of normalization in the region.
Opening channels for interaction and exchanges at different levels will be critical in building confidence and changing mutual perceptions. This includes the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, the effective engagement of the DPRK in different multilateral forums (both global and regional), the development of opportunities to foster people to people interaction and the integration of the DPRK in the global economy. Measures of this type would not only contribute to de-escalating tensions and preventing a military clash which could turn into a nuclear catastrophe; they could also stimulate some changes inside the DPRK which arguably are already underway.
Moving in this direction will require drastic changes in the foreign policy of the countries involved in the conflict. But there are precedents that show that those shifts are possible and can lead to dramatic breakthroughs. These diplomatic efforts should be accompanied by civil society initiatives, which already have proven useful in keeping some channels of communication open and creating useful people-to-people exchanges. Only through a combination of decisive political action, diplomatic efforts and citizen’s engagement, the current state of mutual mistrust and antagonistic narratives can change and the last standing conflict of the Cold War can finally be overcome.
References
Delury, J. (2018) ‘Normalize the Hermit Kingdom’. In Foreign Policy, January 2018.
Kearney, C. (2017) Strengthening Understanding Through Dialogue. A Peacebuilding Approach to the Korean Peninsula Conflict, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Siem Reap, Cambodia.
Korean National Peace Committee, (2017) ‘The Northeast Asian Context and the Ongoing War on the Korean Peninsula’. In Reflections on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia. Uragsh-Orgil company, Ulaanbaatar 2017, pp. 104–117.
Zakaria, F. (2017) “We think North Korea is crazy. What if we’re wrong?”, The Washington Post, accessed on 23 April, 2018.
Darynell Rodriguez Torres is the Executive Director of the GPPAC Foundation. Darynell has over twenty years of experience in the areas of international affairs and peace and conflict studies; working at the interface of politics and international public policy. He has a deep knowledge of conflict prevention and peacebuilding issues and extensive contacts with external stakeholders including civil society organisations, government representatives and high-level officials at the United Nations system and regional multilateral organisations. Previous to his appointment in GPPAC he worked as adviser of the President of the Colombian Senate, in the Secretary General’s office of the Secretariat for Ibero-American Cooperation and as a political risk analyst and public policy consultant for European public affairs firms. Darynell’s academic background includes a BA in Political Science and International Studies from West Virginia University, a Masters in Applied Political Studies by FIIAPP, a specialist degree in Communications and Political Management from the Complutense University of Madrid and a Masters in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Sciences.
