The Nuclear Status of the DPRK and the New Regional Order
Anastasia O. Barannikova
Ph.D, Research Fellow, ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University
The officially declared goal of the United States and others in the continuing dialogue with the DPRK is its verifiable nuclear disarmament; the goal of the latter is to obtain the no less verifiable security guarantees from the US. However, no country concerned has a clear concept of both denuclearization and normalization or the ways in which these goals can be achieved. The lack of flexibility shows a divergence between the official and real goals of the countries in the dialogue. Indeed, signing an agreement with the US cannot be a major goal of the DPRK as agreements between any states have short lifespans and can be easily sacrificed for the national interests of the stronger country. As for the nuclear disarmament of the DPRK, the consequences of this for regional security would be much more serious than those of the development of the country’s nuclear weapons.
DPRK’s Motivating Factors and Strategic Goals
There are many approaches to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Officially, the US promotes the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) of the Korean Peninsula but limited to its Northern part1. DPRK insists on CVID of the whole Korean Peninsula, which would inevitably require the removal of the US nuclear umbrella for ROK2. There are also other approaches proposed by experts of different countries: “Managing deterrence”3, Hecker’s roadmap4, CRID model5 etc. Each of the considered approaches has both strengths and weaknesses, but they have a common drawback: Only the DPRK is considered the subject of denuclearization. This contradicts the very concept of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It should be noted that none of the approaches takes into account the factors motivating the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons and its strategic goals.
First, the possession of nuclear weapons is considered by the DPRK as a security guarantee. It was the threat to its security, which once pushed the DPRK to develop nuclear weapons many years ago. In the course of the Korean War, the US leadership was seriously considering the option of a nuclear strike on North Korea6. The United States conducted a series of training atomic bombings of North Korea involving B-29s and created “Operation Plan 8–53” providing for the use of “large numbers of nuclear weapons” against China, Manchuria and the DPRK7. These plans have never been implemented but they pushed the DPRK to developing its national nuclear program for the purposes of national security. The threats to the DPRK have since changed but nuclear weapons have become an integral element of the DPRK’s security system. Military and nuclear doctrines of the DPRK (which are not publicized but can be inferred based on official statements) rely on nuclear weapons as the main deterrent of external threats. Nuclear disarmament would automatically deprive the DPRK of this deterrent and reduce its ability to respond to large-scale enemy aggression, even with the use of conventional weapons. As a result, the country would become weak and vulnerable with its security endangered.
For many years the international community and Northeast Asian states did their best to deprive the DPRK of other forms of security. The DPRK could not rely on allies, military and technical cooperation or adequate security guarantees; no country shared military technologies and weapons which could form the defense system of the DPRK; economic sanctions led to budget shortages and a huge gap in military technology between the DPRK and its potential enemies.
Security is not the only factor that motivates the DPRK to develop its own nuclear potential. Political considerations are no less important. Its nuclear arsenal has become an integral part of the domestic policy of the country and a symbol of its prestige. The nuclear status of the DPRK was enshrined in its constitution in 2012 and plays an important role in internal propaganda. Moreover, the nation’s nuclear potential justifies the hardships and low standard of living its people have suffered for many years. At the same time the ability of the country to develop these weapons like “major powers” have done and its new status as the “nuclear power of the East” engenders national pride. The abandonment of nuclear weapons in such circumstances would undoubtedly have serious consequences both for security as well as the image of North Korea’s leadership. Furthermore, it would question the future of the regime as the nuclear weapon defends it both from external and internal threats. The only way to disarm the DPRK is through global denuclearization (of course, this would have to be initiated by the largest nuclear weapons) or the development of an even more powerful weapon.
Having now successfully completed the development of its nuclear weapons and having become a de facto nuclear state, the DPRK’S status is not just a matter of security and prestige. The DPRK’S nuclear status can help the country to achieve certain foreign policy goals as well. Reunification is undoubtedly one of them. However, reunification through the absorption of one system by another is impossible and technically unfeasible and its shortcomings are well understood both in South and North Korea8. North Korea has its own vision of reunification — unchanged for decades: One nation — two systems9. It promises not unification in the full sense but rather the coexistence and cooperation of two independent countries. It has the potential to promote integration processes and to lead to establishing a political system on the Peninsula that Koreans find attractive.
One important consideration remains; that the Korean Peninsula be neutral in its foreign policy. This was first pointed out by Kim Il Sung when he proposed the idea of a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo. It is also suggested that Kim Jong Un, while studying in Switzerland, became interested in the historical experience of that country as a neutral state. If Korea had had such a status in the previous century, the Korean War and subsequent division of the Peninsula could have been avoided. Even now, both Korean states are actively involved in the rivalry between the US and the People’s Republic of China. As the status of the DPRK has changed, its chances of finding its place in the sun have increased. However, to achieve this goal, the DPRK needs its nuclear potential, which has already proven itself to be an efficient tool for foreign policy. Korea has historically been a “strategic plaything” in the confrontation of “great powers”. Thanks to its nuclear weapons, North Korea now has the opportunity to become a “strategic player”.
Even the most flexible approaches to denuclearization or US-DPRK normalization do not consider the abovementioned strategic goals. They provide compensation for the removal of North Korean nuclear weapons as a means of security only. But what about the other functions of this weapon? If it has become a symbol of North Korea’s prestige and an integral part of its ideology, disarmament could very well destabilize the regime. If a nuclear deterrent has been created in order to achieve geopolitical goals, it is clear that North Korea can give it up only after having achieved these goals.
Nuclear Status of the DPRK and Other States’ Interests
Recent events show that the countries involved in dialogues on the issue of security on the Korean Peninsula intentionally repeat the mistakes of the six-party talks. It is unlikely that the US leadership was not aware of the position of the DPRK on the issue of denuclearization. The refusal of the DPRK to make unilateral concessions without any reliable guarantees was also not surprising. This approach could perhaps have been justified in the 2000s when the DPRK did not have nuclear weapons, struggled under serious economic problems and could conceivably make concessions. Now, however, using these old approaches simply seems strange. There are two possible explanations for the continued use of these inefficient tactics. First, the major powers in question are ignoring the shifting balance of power in Northeast Asia and still consider the world to be uni- or bi-polar. Second, the large powers are fully aware of this shift but are trying to postpone the inevitable and maintain the status quo; with one very important oversight — The North Korean regime and its de facto nuclear status are integral parts of the status quo. If this is the case, it means that denuclearization cannot be the real goal of the big powers.
The North Korean nuclear program caused the destabilization of the security system in Northeast Asia in the initial stage of its development. However, the initiation of a military nuclear program by the DPRK could not have been a surprise for the big powers as those states actively contributed to creating the current nuclear potential of the DPRK. Legally recognized nuclear powers shared their technologies in the early stages of North Korea’s nuclear program, allowed later leakages of those technologies, and failed to give security guarantees when the country was ready to agree on disarmament. The instability caused by the DPRK’s nuclear weapons has being maintained artificially by regional actors for many years. However, constant instability could be considered as a new kind of stability with the nuclear weapons of the DPRK as a stabilizer. In June 2018, a similar opinion was voiced by American experts in articles entitled “Why the United States Needs North Korea to Stay Nuclear? ”10 and “North Korea Is a Nuclear Power. Get Used to It”11 among others. The leadership of the United States, most likely, has already “got used” to the nuclear status of the DPRK. However, it maintains instability around it in the interest of its own geopolitical gains. The fact that American experts have started talking about it openly may indicate a shift in US foreign policy strategy and the changing role of the DPRK. However, ongoing contradictions and disagreements within the government of US will continue to influence its official stance.
The DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons in fact serves the geopolitical interests of the United States and other countries, including Russia and China. Both countries view stable North Korea as more important than denuclearized one12. Indeed, nuclear weapons guarantee the security of the current North Korean regime. They prevent any attempts of violent regime change by external forces and grant North Korean leadership opportunities to develop the country independently. The security of the regime, in turn, guarantees stability near PRC-DPRK and RF-DPRK borders. A stable regime in the DPRK not only guarantees the absence of refugee flows, which are typical zones of armed conflicts and civil wars. This also prevents US troops from being deployed on the territory of the DPRK. As for the United States, the nuclear status of the DPRK serves US interests simply because a nuclear North Korea will not fall under the total influence of neighboring countries. It will remain a relatively independent state, currently serving a role of buffer, and subsequently capable of deterring others. Despite the official rhetoric, United States has demonstrated their real attitude to denuclearization this year. First, the US withdrew from the deal with Iran thus negating any deals and agreements of such kind; and second, it made no concessions and took no steps towards the DPRK. This has made North Koreans believe that the US has pushed them to stop bilateral dialogue and continue their nuclear activities.
In recent years, the nuclear program of the DPRK has been used as a reason for the militarization of all the countries of the Northeast Asian region including Russia and China. The progress of North Korea in the nuclear and missile development sphere in recent years has had a significant impact on the balance of powers in the region: Along with strengthening the position of the DPRK itself, it has served as a pretext for an arms race involving all the countries of the region. United States have used these tensions as justifications for deploying missile defence systems in ROK, useless against the DPRK but capable of deterring Chinese missiles13. Russia and China are advancing their own strategic forces and missile defense systems and strengthening troops in the Far East14. Japan, under the pretext of protection against a “North Korean threat”, has modernized its fleet, which now exceeds the needs of self-defense15. It is now considering the deployment of US missile defense systems on its own territory. ROK launched new KSS-III missile submarine last year. The specifics of the submarine (long endurance and capability of launching submarine-launched ballistic missiles) made observers suspect Seoul in laying the foundations for deploying sea-based nuclear deterrence16. The arms race has spread beyond Northeast Asia, involving Pakistan, India, Iran, and Israel. Since this arms race has not yet finished, the countries involved would clearly not be interested in the removal of the pretext for it, or in any change of the status quo.
The DPRK’s nuclear weapons have become an integral part of the modern Northeast Asian security environment. Integration processes on the Korean Peninsula started independently of (or against) the will of the “great powers”. The growth of China has weakened the US’ position in Northeast Asia and now one can’t speak about American dominance in the region. Moreover, one can’t speak about any country’s dominance. Despite the fact that China is allegedly trying to take the place of the United States, the processes in the region are more complicated than those of a bipolar and even multipolar world. We can speak about emerging “centers of power”17 in the world and Korean Peninsula is one of them. Yes, there may still be cold war-type thinking in the region; but without military blocs. China, Russia and the DPRK are independent military powers. It has become possible because all of them are nuclear countries. If China and the DPRK had not started nuclear programs they could very well have become satellites of the USSR and would have suffered from its collapse even more severely. The cold war would never have ended in that case. Thanks to the nuclear status of these countries, there is no military alliance opposed to the U.S.-Japan-ROK triangle. We have politically and militarily independent countries instead.
Denuclearization would inevitably lead to drastic changes and, in fact, would cause another change of regional order. The countries of the region that have not yet recovered from the recent changes will obviously not be ready for new ones. Therefore, it is in the interest of all participants in the current dialogue process around the DPRK to slow down inevitable change. We can expect that denuclearization talks will be just talks, buying time for North Korea, the US, and China to adjust to new realities in Northeast Asia.
1 Michael R. Pompeo, “Remarks with Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha at a Press Availability”, U.S Department of State, accessed August 8, 2019. https://www.state.gov/remarks-with-republic-of-korea-foreign-minister-kang-kyung-wha-at-a-press-availability/
2 Korean News, “Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula is DPRK’s Invariable Stand”, accessed August 8, 2019. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201309/news29/20130929-06ee.html.
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Anastasia Barannikova is a research fellow at ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University (Vladivostok) and Advisor for the Korea National Heritage Protection Foundation (Pyongyang). Her research interests include (but not limited by) regional (Northeast Asia) security and nuclear non-proliferation; Korean Peninsula, DPRK foreign and domestic policies, DPRK nuclear and missile program, nuclear posture. Barannikova is the author of more than 100 publications in scientific journals, newspapers and blogs, including articles in Russian, English, Chinese, Korean, Mongolian and Japanese languages. She is also a speaker /presenter / security expert at the number of international conferences held in China, DPRK, Japan, Mongolia, ROK, and Russia.
Barannikova has a background in Linguistics, Intercultural Communication, International Relations from the Far Eastern Federal University (1999-2004), National, Information, Military Security from the Russian Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation (2004-2006), and History & Political Sciences from ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University (2010-2013) and numerous workshops and trainings (including “Elements of atomic and nuclear physics”, National Research Nuclear University MEPhI; International School on Global Security-2016, PIR Center and Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, fellowship at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (USA) in 2019, etc.). She holds a Ph.D in History from ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University.
