How Kant’s Notion of Practical Rationality Identifies Reason With Universalisability
A brief overview
The universalisability test is a test of the sufficiency of the reasons for an action or choice that are encompassed in our maxims. Universalisation, according to Kant, is an act of the will and inherently implies that all human beings are recognised as ends in themselves and should be treated as such in all morally relevant situations. These stipulations constitute the Kantian meaning of the concept of universalisability and explain its crucial role in morality.
The reason why someone should be able to universalise their proposed maxim is that universalisability articulates a basic moral fact, namely, that the agent recognises all fellow human beings as equal moral subjects and is disposed to act based on this recognition in all specific instances. Kantian universalisation is from the outset a dynamic disposition of the will, which acknowledges the end-in-itself status of all moral individuals and of morality in general. Yovel describes how this universally oriented recognition means the individual’s particular will performs an act of self-universalisation by adopting a universal standpoint as their own personal standpoint, thereby constituting themselves as moral. Consequently, what gives universalisability moral value and makes it a moral guide is its implicit recognition.
Aspiring to universality involves both inner processes and the way in which the maxim in question should shape the external world. Being rational here also means being autonomous and self-willing, i.e. striving for rationality as end in itself. The will assumes its own universal structure and projects it on the external world, including in terms of social and cultural customs, moral awareness, and political and religious institutions.
So, on the one hand, practical rationality is self-directed because its ultimate goal is to realise itself in all such activities. However, in order to do so, it must also be an outward-facing activity, always directed at something else, e.g. an action, an intention or a custom. These two characteristics are not contradictory though because reason’s outwardly self-projecting takes place for reason’s own sake. Rationality must realise itself in social and cultural areas like science, politics or religion by lending them its own structure. Yovel posits that this is the only way in which human rationality is able to realise its own end, which makes Kant’s concept of reason inherently teleological.
Kant’s first formulation of the Categorical Imperative (known as the Formula of Universal Law) stipulated:
‘Act only according to the maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’.
Kant considered this to mean that we should act as though our maxim were, by our will, to become a universal law of nature. Further, Kant posited that it ought to be tested whether we could will the universalisation of such maxims. In doing so, the moral agent should be characterised as asking what kind of world they would create led by practical reason.
However, the problems that arises is how we can determine whether or not a maxim can be willed to be a law of nature. As Kant equates the will with practical reason and the assumption that everyone must therefore arrive at the same conclusion when considering different possible moral choices, we can rule out personal preference or individual desires when it comes to universalising rational choices for what we will to be universalised must be without contradiction.
It also follows that, despite its intentions, the universalisability test function of the Categorical Imperative cannot be construed as an infallible algorithm which merely delivers an answer in response to a question posed. Further, universalisation in Kant concerns the substance of morality and not procedure only. As the moral interest involves universally oriented recognition as a constitutive element, it requires self-universalisation as articulated in Kant’s first formulation of the Categorical Imperative, while simultaneously endowing it with moral significance.
Finally, even Kant himself acknowledged that willing for maxims to be universalised gives rise to contradictions, both in conception and in the will. Specifically, these are teleological contradictions (i.e. the maxim is inconsistent with the notion that any action has a natural purpose for which it must be the one best suited), logical contradictions (i.e. a logical impossibility in the universalisation of the maxim in that if it were universalised, the action it proposes would be inconceivable), and practical contradictions (i.e. the notion that the maxim would be self-defeating if universalised as it would become ineffective for the intended purpose if everyone performed the same action).
Sources:Johnson, R. & Adam C. (2019). Kant’s Moral Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Korsgaard, C. M. (1985). Kant’s formula of universal law. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66(1–2), 24–47. Williams, G. (2017). Kant’s Account of Reason, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Yovel, Y. (1998). Kant’s Practical Reason as Will: Interest, Recognition, Judgment, and Choice. The Review of Metaphysics, 52(2), 267–294.
