Philosophy & Theory: Great ideas in 1000 words
John Rawls’s Theory of Justice
‘Great ideas in 1000 words’ is a series in which I briefly share my understanding of influential and important theories and concepts from the world of philosophy and beyond. This time: John Rawls’s theory of justice. Last edit: 02/09/2024.
John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness is effectively a thought-experiment in the tradition of contract theory by which Rawls seeks to establish the principles of justice that would devise the basic structure of a well-ordered society if free persons — represented by rational parties — were to chose so in an original position that is characterised by fairness and equality.
An essential feature of the original position is, famously, the veil of ignorance, which deprives the parties in the original position of all essential knowledge about the people they represent. As Rawls asserts, occupying “a particular social position is not a good reason for us to accept, or to expect others to accept, a conception of justice that favors those in this position” (Rawls 1985, 237). The veil, now, prevents particular social positions or particular features of one’s identity to influence the bargaining process in the original position. In Rawls’s own words:
“Among the essential features of this situation [the original position] is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.” (Rawls 1971, 12; my emphasis).
Only by depriving the parties of all specific knowledge about the people they represent, we can ensure the agreement that they enter to be the outcome of a fair bargaining process. The agreement is not chosen on the basis of a ‘particular condition’ that a party seeks to improve in favour of those it represents. Rather, it is chosen on the basis of a general assumption about what people, generally, regardless of who they actually are, in a situation in which they could end up as ‘anyone’, might choose as principles of justice.
According to Rawls, the parties in the original position would now select two general principles of justice. The first principle guarantees the equality of basic rights and duties, that is, basic liberties for all (BLP) (Rawls 1971, 14, 302; Rawls 1985, 227). The second principle holds “that social and economic inequalities […] are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society” (Rawls 1971 14f; see also Rawls 1985, 227).
The second principle is, thereby, twofold: the principle of fair equality of opportunity (FEOP) is sought to compensate for being born in a disadvantaged social situation by guaranteeing that “offices and positions [are] open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls 1985, 227), while the difference principle (DP) holds that social inequalities are only permissible if they advantage the worst off members of society (ibid.). In summary:
The First Principle: equal basic liberties are guaranteed for all members of society (BLP).
The Second Principle: social and economic inequalities between members of society are permissible under only two conditions:
a: all members of society can rely on conditions of fair equality of opportunity when applying to offices and positions (FEOP).
b: social and economic inequalities advantage the worst off members in society (DP).
These two principles now stand in a lexical order to one another; they are not interchangeable. For Rawls, basic rights and liberties are never to be compromised, under no circumstances. For instance, it would simply be irrational to apply the DP to the BLP, as unequal rights would not advantage those who have less rights. Thus, the first principle is lexically prior to the second principle (Rawls 1971, 43; 302f). However, this is not the only lexicality apparent in Rawls’s principles. Within the second principle, the FEOP is also lexically prior to the DP. Rawls maintains that
“[…] it may be possible to improve everyone’s situation by assigning certain powers and benefits to positions despite the fact that certain groups are excluded from them. […] But the principle of open positions forbids this. It expresses the conviction that if some places were not open on a basis fair to all, those kept out would be right in feeling unjustly treated even though they benefited from the greater efforts of those who were allowed to hold them […]” (ibid., 84; see also 302f).
Simply put, public positions not being open for all, even if for the greater benefit of the worst off, would be a significant injustice of their basic liberties, among which self-realization is an important one. And “For Rawls, justice demands fair opportunity for self-realization” (Kelly 2017, 83). The principles of justice as fairness thus are, in short and lexically correct order: BL -> (FEO -> DP).
One last thing to note here is that Rawls presupposes strict compliance with these principles (Rawls 1971, 145, 245). That is, in a well-ordered society regulated by these principles of justice it is assumed that people strictly comply with them. This condition is what makes a society ‘nearly just’ and also stabilizes it, for it is in everybody’s interest to comply with the Rawlsian principles of justice (Shelby 2023, 211f).
It is in that sense, then, that Rawls’s theory is an ideal theory of justice, that is, a theory “that explains and justifies the principles that would regulate the basic structure of a perfectly just society.” (Shelby 2013, 148). Rawls’s theory is not a theory that directly devises principles for correcting existing injustice in a not-so-just society, for that would be the realm of non-ideal theory. However, it can be an ideal guideline for non-ideal theorising nonetheless.
References
Rawls, John (1971): A Theory of Justice, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Rawls, John (1985): ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 14, №3, pp. 223–251, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Shelby, Tommy (2004): ‘Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations’, in: Fordham Law Review, Vol. 72, pp. 1679–1714, Fordham Law School, New York City.
Shelby, Tommy (2013): ‘Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills’, in: Critical Philosophy of Race, Vol. 1, №2, pp. 145–162, Penn State University Press, University Park.
Shelby, Tommy (2023): ‘Race, Reparations, and Justice as Fairness’, in: Rawls’s A Theory of Justice at 50, edited by Paul Weithman, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Disclaimer: This article ought not to be referenced in any publication for it is not peer-reviewed and is only meant to illustrate my understanding of the ideas discussed herein. Interpretations might vary, and this article is no exception. Furthermore, I do not claim to have a correct understanding of the ideas discussed herein for I am not (yet) a qualified lecturer at a university. I simply want to offer my own interpretation to the world. As time goes on, I might get a better understanding of the ideas discussed herein, or change aspects of my interpretation, or add aspects that are currently missing — in such a case I will update this article to account for that. So look out for the date of the last edit in comparison with the publication date.
