Blink and you’ll miss it: Chinese Navy, from modernization to expansion
Observers of Chinese military activities over the last few months might have noticed a heightened pitch of news reporting regarding Chinese Naval activity and developments, whether it is a 40 ship exercise in the South China Sea, or the revelation of a railgun installed aboard an old LST ship making it likely the world’s first seaborne railgun platform. Reports of new potential locations for overseas Chinese bases and stations have proliferated as well.
These stories have inspired a range of reactions ranging from anxiety of the imminent hostility that the Chinese Navy’s newfound capabilities may lead it to pursue, to dismissal of those same newfound capabilities as fragile paper tigers or merely Potemkin public spectacles.
Now that we are approaching the tail end of the 2010’s it might be a good time to reflect on the Chinese Navy’s development over the course of the last decade, where it is likely to go in the next decade, and what that means for the world’s naval balance of power and the geopolitical repercussions of that.
The last decade of Chinese Navy procurement could best be described as “modernization”. That word is chosen carefully, because “modernization” and “expansion” have two very different connotations.
“Modernization” implies the replacement of old or obsolete equipment and facilities for more modern or up to date equivalents, i.e. a change in quality, but it does not necessarily mean the total quantity of equipment and facilities has increased.
“Expansion” on the other hand, implies an increase in total quantity or amount of the equipment and facilities available. This may be with or without a concurrent “modernization” of those same equipment and facilities.
From the end of the Cold War to the present day, the Chinese Navy’s procurement of new vessels and simultaneous retirement of older obsolete vessels can best be characterized as mostly modernization, coupled with a marginal expansion of total fleet numbers as well. (Past write ups on this website have documented the surface combatant component of their procurement over the last decade and a half.)
In terms of changes of net capability, “modernization” and “expansion” also have different effects.
“Modernization” needs to consider the difference in capability or “quality” between the old equipment and the new equipment. Thus, if we were to hold the number of the equipment constant, a simple expression can be derived:
Net change of capability via modernization = (Post modernization quality)— (Pre modernization quality)
“Expansion” considers the difference in capability between the number or quantity in the pre-expansion quantity with the post-expansion quantity, so assuming we hold the capability of the equipment constant, a simple expression would be:
Net change of capability via expansion = (Post expansion quantity) — (Pre expansion quantity)
However, in the real world, the modernization and expansion often occurs hand in hand, so a more comprehensive expression would be:
Net change in capability from expansion and modernization = (Post expansion quantity x Post modernization quality) — (Pre expansion quantity x Pre modernization quality)
Obviously, it is very easy to assess the change in quantity of equipment during an expansion, but can be difficult to objectively assess the change in quality of equipment during a modernization, meaning the above expression is mostly for illustrative purposes.
That said, sometimes the changes in quality are very obvious, for example, a hypothetical four ship squadron of refitted 051 destroyers that is replaced by a four ship squadron of 052D destroyers allows even non-naval experts to roughly gauge how much more capable the new 052D squadron will be compared to the older 051 squadron, despite both having the same number of ships.
Now that the definitions of “modernization” and “expansion” are understood, the Chinese Navy’s modernization over the last decade or more can be viewed in context. The 26 054A class frigates that replaced older 053H pattern frigates and the 6 052C and (conservative estimate) 6 052D class destroyers that have replaced older 051 pattern destroyers offered substantial, almost quantum leaps in quality in the domains of armament, sensors, networking, and endurance. This does not include other modern (but less capable than 052C/D) destroyers like the 051C, 052B, 051B and Sovremenny classes which also substantially outgun the ancient 051 family.
The induction of 60–80 022 classfast attack craft and the current ongoing of induction and construction of 40+ 056 class corvettes offered a similar increase in quality by replacing older 037 gunboats and subchasers as well as partly taking on the role of older 053H frigates.
There have also been some new ship types that the Chinese Navy has inducted which could be defined as an “expansion” rather than a “modernization”. Aircraft carrier CV-16 Liaoning, and the currently four ship strong 071 class of LPDs are both ship types that the Chinese Navy previously had no equivalent of. The nearest equivalent of the 071 LPD being the various 072 variant LSTs, however the difference in form between a 23,000 ton LPD with a 5,000–7,000 ton LST is obvious to many.
The bulk of these recent new ships, in particular the 052C/052D destroyers, the 054A frigates, the 071 LPDs, the 022 FACs, the 056 corvettes, began entering service in the mid 2000s, to today in 2018. However, even this 10–15 years can be broken down into two eras of construction.
The first two 052Cs were launched in 2003 and commissioned in 2005, with the first of the subsequent four 052Cs (and 052Ds that succeeded them) being launched in 2010 and commissioned in 2013.
The first 071 LPD was launched in 2006 and commissioned in 2007, with the second and third 071 LPD only being launched in 2010 and commissioned in 2011, and 2011 and 2012 respectively, with the fourth 071 LPD launched in 2015 and commissioned in 2016.
On the other hand, the lead 054A ship was launched in 2006, commissioned in 2008, and between then and now launches and commissionings have never faced a gap greater than two years. 056 launch and commissioning have been even more impressive, with the lead ship launched in 2012, commissioned in 2013, and with 39 056s currently in service and an additional 7 currently being fitted out/launched as of early 2018.
Therefore, the Chinese Navy’s surface combatant modernization that we see today largely occurred from 2005, however, that can be said to have been conducted in two phases. One phase, from 2005 to about 2008, involved the commissioning of a small number of newly modern vessels in small numbers, 052C, 071, and in a way, the 054A.
The following phase, from about 2010 to today, can be described as an increased production rate of 071 LPDs (with five vessels launched between 2010, 2011, 2015, 2017 and 2018), as well as continued production and commissioning of 054A frigates averaging 2–3 ships per year. But it was the resurrection of destroyer production that is most significant, with an average of 2.25 new destroyers launched per year from 2010 (four 052Cs, thirteen 052Ds, one 055, to date). That is to say, between the 30th October 2010, and to today the 11th April 2018, eighteen destroyers have been launched (of which one is a 13,000 ton “large destroyer”/cruiser) and at least ten commissioned.
Putting it another way, today there are at least 12 aegis type destroyers of the combined 052C and 052D types commissioned in the Navy’s order of battle. Prior to 31st January 2013, the Chinese Navy only had the pair of two original 052Cs commissioned. So between 31st January 2013 and 11th April 2018 (a span of slightly over 5 years), at least 10 new aegis type destroyers were commissioned, an average of 2 per year. Viewed as a percentage increase, 12 aegis type destroyers versus 2 represents a 500% increase in the quantity of aegis type destroyers in service.
Of course, all of these new destroyers, frigates, corvettes and FACs introduced into service coincided with the retirement of many older and much less capable equivalents, meaning the net capability, quality and tonnage of the Chinese Navy increased even though the total number of commissioned surface combatants may not have increased as much.
However, beginning in 2018, and arguably beginning in 2017, a new phase of Chinese naval shipbuilding seems imminent, as the production of certain ship types continue, and as others wind down and new types gather pace.
Destroyers
052D production is expected to continue. In previous years, it was suggested that 18 ships would be ordered, but recently new rumours have come to light suggesting that has been increased to 26. Currently, there are 13 052Ds in the water (at least 6 commissioned, with the rest in various stages of sea trials and fitting out).
052Ds are being built at two shipyards, Jiangnan and Dalian, and taking a conservative nationwide total of 2 launched per year (considering 13 were launched between 2012 and 2017, but of those 13 ships, Dalian only launched its first 052D in 2015), it would take about five years from 2018/19 to complete the construction and launch of 26 052Ds with a few years on top of that for all 26 to enter service.
Conceivably, the full order of 26 052Ds could be commissioned by 2025.
Large destroyers
This site has tracked the 055 quite closely, from when it was still a land based testbed in a field in Wuhan, to when it was about to be launched last year.
The 13,000 tons, 112 VLS equipped large destroyer or cruiser is being built at Jiangnan and Dalian, the same two shipyards building 052Ds. Currently, the lead 055 ship is being fitted out in preparation for sea trials at Jiangnan with the second ship under construction with launch likely to be imminent within the next few months.
Dalian are also in the late stages of simultaneous construction of two 055s in a single large drydock with launch likely late this year.
Modules for the fifth and sixth 055 hulls have also been identified at both Jiangnan and Dalian, and rumours of 055 construction suggest that the “first batch” of 055s ordered will be at least 8 ships. The total number of 055s that the Navy will require cannot yet be determined, in part because it will likely be succeeded by an improved 055A class in the medium term that among other things, may include an integrated electric propulsion system that may enable new systems such as railguns and directed energy weapons.
Never the less, it is reasonable to expect that the six current positively identified 055s will likely be in the water by 2020, with the last of these six commissioned likely a few years after that by the early 2020s.
Whether the final number of the 055 family (i.e. including a notional 055A class) will be somewhere between 8–12 ships, or something more like 20–24 ships is a question with strategic consequences. But going by past and projected build rates, if the Chinese Navy does seek 20–24 055 ships, such a number may well have entered service by the late 2020s, with 8–12 ships potentially entering service before 2025.
Frigates
054A production will almost certainly be capped at 30 units, with the last and final ship likely to be launched sometime this year in 2018.
This is expected to be followed by a successor class, the 054B, which is expected to feature a substantial number of improvements including integrated electric propulsion (IEPS), a much improved sensor suite with an integrated mast, as well as more comprehensive signature reduction, a more capable ASW suite further improving on the 054A’s already comprehensive ASW capabilities, while maintaining only a marginal increase in displacement.
It’s thought that the first 054Bs should be in the early stages of fabrication, and this class should be built at two shipyards, Huangpu and Hudong, the same two shipyards that built the 054A class. The lead ship may be launched within two years.
More importantly, present rumours place the order (or requirement) of 054Bs at “under 24”. Going by 054A launch rates of 3 ships per year, and assuming the lead ship is launched before 2020, it may take up to 2027 for that number to be realized.
Corvettes
056 construction, or more accurately, 056A construction (as all 056s launched recently seem to be the improved ASW variant featuring a remarkable towed sonar and variable depth sonar), appears to have slowed down a little from its early heyday in 2012–2016, where an average of 8 ships were launched per year, to only 3 ships launched in 2017 with seemingly a similar number appearing likely for 2018.
Original estimates for 056 requirements ran up to 60 ships, and with 39–40 ships currently in service and another 6 in various stages of fitting out and sea trials, a reduced launch rate of about 3 ships means it will take only a handful of years until a 60 strong force of 056/As are met. Needless to say, rapid production of 056s do not seem to be as great of a priority for the Navy anymore.
As for FACs, obviously no 022s are under construction since the last unit was launched many years ago, and it is unlikely the Navy will acquire further ships of this type going forwards.
Carriers
CV-16, aircraft carrier Liaoning was commissioned in 2012 after an active fitting out period of about 2 years. The as yet unnamed second carrier (and first domestic carrier) will likely be designated CV-17, and was launched almost exactly a year ago from Dalian, and has undergone fitting out since then, with most recent pictures suggesting it will begin sea trials within months or even weeks. Going by CV-16’s timetable as a guide, it is likely CV-17 will be commissioned sometime in late 2019 or early 2020.
The third carrier is expected to be a CATOBAR carrier, likely featuring electromagnetic catapults. It will be larger than CV-16 and CV-17 but smaller than the Nimitz or Ford classes, likely having a full displacement of under 80,000 tons.
Despite some recent articles, it is likely that this third carrier (let’s call it CV-18) has only begun fabrication of modules recently at Jiangnan shipyard, therefore it will only likely be launched two or three years down the track by 2020 or 2021, with commissioning perhaps by 2025.
After CV-18, things become more murky, as we do not know if the Navy will commission Dalian to build a fourth aircraft carrier while CV-18 is being fitted out or still being worked on, or if they will wait a few years until CV-18 begins sea trials or even enters service. We also do not know if the fourth aircraft carrier will be conventionally powered i.e. CV-19, or nuclear powered i.e. CVN-19.
Amphibious assault ships
071 production up to this point has been a 6 ship run, all produced at Hudong shipyard, with the most recent ship launched in January 2018. It is not known if additional 071s will be procured, but it most certainly canot be ruled out. The last of the currently observed 6 ship run will likely enter service by late 2019 or early 2020, meaning the Chinese Navy will have a 6 strong LPD force at the beginning of the 2020s.
075 production is a much more interesting affair. Contrary to some online reports, the designation of the Chinese Navy’s LHD is not 081, but rather 075 (081 is the designation of a class of small minesweepers).
The 075 class is thought to displace 37,000 tons full, which would make it smaller than the US Navy’s Wasp and America classes, but larger than virtually every other non-USN LHD in the world. Currently, two ships are thought to have been ordered with both having begun fabrication and construction work at Hudong as well. It is likely that photographic evidence of the lead ship’s construction will emerge by 2019, with launch possible a year or so after, and both ships will almost certainly enter service before 2025. A requirement for four 075 LHDs has been floated but the total number beyond the initial pair is unknown. Going by 071 production, it is possible that it may take a while until further 075s are ordered. Or it might not take long at all. Thus is the joy of PLAN watching.
However, the Chinese Navy is not just made up of surface combat ships. Replenishment ships, submarines, surveillance aircraft, combat aircraft, helicopters all make up important components of their combat capability, but these are unfortunately more difficult to assess.
Replenishment ships
The big news story in the replenishment ship domain is the 901 class. This ship class displaces between 45,000–50,000 tons at full, with a speed of 25 knots to be able to keep up with carrier strike groups, with the only other analogue in the world being the US Navy’s Supply class. No other Navy in the world operates a similar class of ship of this size and speed.
The first 901 ship was launched in 2015 and commissioned in 2017 at Guangzhou, with the second launched sometime in 2017. Further production of 901 ships will likely depend on procurement of additional carriers.
The 23,000 ton 903/A class is smaller and slower than the 901, of which 8 are currently in service (the most recent pair launched in June 2015 and commissioned on the same day in July 2016), with a 9th thought to be under construction at present.
The Chinese Navy’s blue water capable replenishment fleet is respectable for the frequency of blue water operations they conduct, made up of 12 ships (one 901, two 903s, six 903As, one single 908, and two 905s). With one more 901 fitting out and one 903A under construction, by 2020 this fleet may increase to a total of 14 ships if the older 905s are not retired. Going beyond that, construction of additional 901s or 903As or even a new replenishment ship class altogether cannot be predicted.
It is also worth noting that the production and commissioning of six 903As occurred within a 3 year period from 2013 to 2016, an average of two per year, suggesting production and commissioning of this type can be rapidly increased if required.
Submarines
Submarines, both conventionally powered and nuclear, are difficult to gauge in terms of quantity.
The total fleet of conventional submarines are made up by about a dozen 039 “Song” class boats, a dozen Russian “Kilo” class boats, and over a dozen of 039A/B “Yuan” class boats. The current production rate of the 039B boats is difficult to ascertain, however it is known that they will be succeeded in production by an improved 039C class sometime in the future.
The future of the nuclear submarine fleet is even harder to predict, not only because of the traditional tight security surrounding Chinese nuclear submarines in future, but also because the Chinese Navy may or may not be on the cusp of finally producing a class of nuclear submarine at a level competitive with modern contemporaries.
The current Chinese SSN force is thought to be made up of 3–4 09IIIA (or 09IIIB) boats produced sometime between 2012 and 2017, 2 09III boats produced in the very early 2000s, and a handful of improved 09I boats.
The current Chinese SSBN force is thought to be made up of 4–5 09IV class boats.
Much has been made in the English language defence media of the limited capabilities and noise levels of Chinese nuclear submarines, especially the earlier 09I and 09III classes.
The 09V and 09VI classes have been expected to emerge for many years now, however it has yet to show up. Some recent rumours do however suggest that breakthroughs in nuclear propulsion and noise reduction have been made, as well as the possibility of a new large nuclear submarine production facility.
It is impossible to properly speculate what the eventual capabilities of the 09V SSN and 09VI SSBN will be. However, if investments have been made into a large scale production facility capable of much greater production rates, that would parallel the Chinese Navy’s destroyer development that led to the 052C/D classes, where various non-competitive destroyer classes were developed and inducted in limited numbers for industry development and expertise and to increase naval capability, before finally having the advancement to develop a destroyer class they considered competitive and which met their requirements that was worthy of mass production.
If mass production of an SSN and SSBN type has at last been reached, then that would have some interesting consequences indeed.
Surveillance aircraft
Chinese land based surveillance includes a respectable number of Y-8 and Y-9 based ELINT aircraft, as well as 6 KJ-200 AEW&C, and likely at least 4 KJ-500 AEW&C.
Carrierborne AEW&C will be fulfilled by the KJ-600 that will likely make its maiden flight within a year or two, adopting a similar proven aerodynamic configuration to the E-2 family.
Very important to the Chinese Navy’s ASW and near seas maritime surveillance capability, is the Y-8Q or KQ-200 ASW MPA aircraft. Currently it is likely that 8 such aircraft are in service, however it is not known what the annual production rate of KQ-200s are. Based on satellite photos of the production facility at Shaanxi, a minimum of 4 aircraft per year appears reasonable, however we do not know if this is the maximum or minimum number that can be produced per year. As this aircraft is produced on the same line as other Y-9 airframes (including the Y-9 transport, the KQ-500 AEW&C, and the various Y-9 special mission planes), slots for each type may vary year by year.
Nevertheless, the Chinese Navy likely has a large requirement for this aircraft type to have a large fixed wing ASW platform, and an annual production rate of four KQ-200s per year would make some 20–24 aircraft in service by the beginning of the 2020s.
Combat aviation
Chinese Naval land based combat aviation will not be considered here, only carrier based combat aviation.
In this case, that means the J-15. Currently it appears there are some 24 airframes produced and in service, of which one or two have been lost. 24 airframes are sufficient for the airwing of CV-16 Liaoning as a seed carrier/training carrier role, but insufficient for a fully armed Liaoning in a combat role and definitely insufficient for both CV-16 and CV-17 in combat roles.
Going forwards, it is not yet known how many more J-15s will be produced. Earlier predictions of a catapult compatible J-15 variant being mass produced are also now in doubt as it seems the Chinese Navy is interested in moving on faster to a 5th generation fighter.
The carrier borne 5th generation fighter is thought to be between a variant of the FC-31, and a variant of J-20. Demonstrators or even fully fledged prototypes of both carrier variants may be under construction, to fly within the next year or so. But needless to say, the shape of the combat airwing of China’s burgeoning carrier fleet is very much shrouded in mystery at this stage.
Helicopters
Naval helicopters are very much important for ASW work and transport/utility work. A number of Ka-28s and Z-9 variants conduct the bulk of this ASW work, however both types are either getting a little obsolete, or too small to be optimal.
A Z-8/18 derived ASW helicopter has been adopted aboard Liaoning as an ASW helicopter, and its size means a large sensor and weapons payload can be carried with good endurance and range, however it is likely to big to be carried aboard anything other than a carrier or LHD. It is not even known if 055s will be able to carry a Z-8 as an ASW helicopter.
Optimally, a naval Z-20 variant would make the best ASW helicopter for surface combatants, as a naval Z-20 will likely have similar payload and endurance metrics to a MH-60 variant that the US Navy fields as its current primary ASW helicopter. A folded Z-20 should also be able to fit within the hangars of all Chinese surface combatants that can accommodate a Z-9 or Ka-28. However, both the Z-8/18 and Z-20 are in early stages of production and a limited production rate is likely in the future, especially as the Army/Ground Forces will likely demand a large share of their production.
The Navy also suffers from a lack of modern air assault/transport helicopters, which would be important for the 071 LPDs and upcoming 075 LHDs. Currently the 071s rely on a small number of ageing Z-8 variants, often seen in a pale blue colour scheme. Naval variants of both the modern Z-8/18 and Z-20 for the air assault role would fill this role well, but again suffer from the same limited production rates.
Don’t blink
This piece has illustrated the way in which the Chinese Navy has modernized its surface fleet through a large scale procurement program from the mid to early 2000s, to the present day.
However, going forwards into the early 2020s, the Chinese Navy will likely experience a phase of both modernization and expansion, where the total number of ships of each type will exceed previous numbers. Therefore, the rapid production rate of destroyers, frigates, amphibious assault ships, and corvettes demonstrated in the 2010 to present period is especially relevant, as that provides a threshold for the kind of production rate that the Chinese shipbuilding industry can manage.
For the purposes of naval observers that are not primarily focused on the Chinese Navy, the effect is one where the equivalent of an entire new fleet appears to have been magicked out of thin air within a few years.
Future concrete production numbers for all ship types (especially the 055s, the amphibious assault ships, and carriers, not to mention submarines) are not available, and current rumoured production schedules will always be at the mercy of economic downturns, unforeseen conflict, and even possibly natural disaster.
However, if the course is stayed (which, on the domestic economic front at least, is looking substantially more stable compared to 2016 when I last wrote a similar post), then by the early 2020s it is likely that the Chinese Navy’s commissioned surface combat ships (i.e. not including ships in construction, being fitted out or in sea trial) will look something like this:
- ~8 055 large destroyers
- 20–24 052D destroyers
- 6 052C destroyers
- 11 older non-aegis type destroyers (2 052B, 2 051C, 1 051B, 2 052, 4 Sovremenny; all 051s retired)
- 30 054A frigates
- 2-4 054B frigates
- 2 054 frigates
- ~12 late model upgraded 053H/3 frigates
- ~60 056/A corvettes
- 2 STOBAR carriers (CV-16 and CV-17)
- 6 071 LPDs
- 1–2 075 LHDs
- 2 dozen or more 072 family LSTs
At the end of the day, numbers are important because numbers dictate the frequency of deployments during peacetime that can be made, the simultaneous number of deployments that can be made, and the size of deployments that can be made in different theaters. In wartime, the numbers directly correlate to the absolute amount of available vessels and firepower at a nation’s disposal.
For the purposes of illustration, the Chinese Navy’s aegis type destroyers projected above (052C, 052D, 055) will be greater in number than the entire ROC (Taiwan) Navy’s current frigate+destroyer force (composed of 4 Kidd class destroyers and 24 frigates). For another comparison, the projected number of 052Ds alone would be roughly equal to the Royal Navy’s requirement for its entire surface escort force for destroyers and frigates (6 Type 45 destroyers, and 13 frigates to be made up of varying numbers of Type 23, 26 and 31e depending on timescale).
Of course, as always, numbers and hardware alone do not directly translate capability, as training, maturity of systems integration, tactical and operational proficiency are major confounding factors. However, it can be expected that as the size and complexity of the Chinese Navy grows, the scale of exercises and the complexity of training will proceed along with it.
Overall, a persistent theme for this long time PLA watcher has been that the Chinese Navy’s modernization in the last decade has been described by most commentators and news media in vague terms. But the actual numerical scale of this expansion is often left untouched, and near term projections are either left barren or more often than not, underestimated.
This piece has hopefully demonstrated the kind of rapid production and commissioning rate that the Chinese Navy is capable of and what that means for its near term fleet. The frequency of deployments and the size of the deployments are of particular consequence.
That in turn hopefully has created some thoughts regarding what that means in terms of geopolitical changes, both regionally (such as in the South China Sea theater), or globally (in terms of Chinese ability to deploy task forces into the Indian Ocean).
Finally, this will likely be the last post I make on this blog, as I will not be renewing the hosting for this domain when it expires later this year. This is partly because I want to put more focus on my real life studies which are very much not related to military or geopolitical affairs. That said my posts on this website have been pretty intermittent over the last few years.
I will however still be active on the various forums and sites (including Reddit) that I currently frequent. I just can’t be bothered writing up big original pieces anymore.
