Over the weekend, the Washington Post had an account of the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concerning the fate of the United States’ mission in Afghanistan in the coming years. Typically NIE’s reflect the consensus opinion of 16 intelligence agencies, so they are significant documents for policy makers and those of us on the sidelines.
The authors seem to only have access to sources familiar with the report as opposed to directly reading the document. This is unfortunate, as it adds a layer of mystery to the arguments contained in the NIE. One cannot help but speculate that politics in the Beltway may be pushing different derivations of the report’s findings into the public sphere. In fact, this seems to be the case as one reads the entire article. But this speculation would only be an assumption that politicians and career bureaucrats are untrustworthy and we should be suspicious when a great many of them want to speak anonymously to journalists (we have good reason for that suspicion).
I would like to point out the thin strands of actual NIE reporting that I can find in this story, and then provide some commentary based on my experience in Afghanistan as well as what I have heard from friends or read from reputable reporters. Then I will point out the apparent spin doctoring as the techniques in use will likely continue to be used in 2014.
My prediction for Afghanistan is largely in agreement with the few, brief paraphrases of the NIE to be found in this article. The narrative from Kabul is likely to be very similar to the assessment and spin found in this article for the next few years. The reality on the ground will progress in accordance with the way Afghanistan has always progressed — local power brokers interacting based on their capabilities and interests relative to other power brokers with limited influence from Kabul.
The strands of the report include:
This NIE “predicts that the Taliban and other power brokers will become increasingly influential as the United States winds down its longest war in history”
This point seems rather uncontroversial to me. I don’t even think you would need any access to classified information to make this assessment. Afghanistan, especially in more rural areas, has always been beyond the influence of Kabul. Local power brokers (tribal elders, warlords, etc.) have always been the supreme authority in their areas of influence. Twelve years of ISAF effort would not alter that fact.
It is true that internecine conflict has meant that tribal elders are no longer as powerful as they once were. Radical mullahs (not just Taliban mullahs) have gained influence since the Soviet invasion. The country is now more fractious as a result of the decades of conflict than prior. How this could mean a stronger and more influential Kabul in the long run is beyond me.
“The report predicts that Afghanistan would likely descend into chaos quickly if Washington and Kabul don’t sign a security pact that would keep an international military contingent there beyond 2014 — a precondition for the delivery of billions of dollars in aid that the United States and its allies have pledged to spend in Afghanistan over the coming years.”
This is also an uncontroversial assessment and has as much to do with financing and support services — areas where the Afghan government and national security forces are weakest — as it does with foreign combat power and advisors. Anyone who has read about the collapse of the Afghan “national” government after the Soviet Army withdrew knows that a lack of financing meant as much as the absence of foreign combat power.
“But the analysts anticipate that the central government in Kabul is all but certain to become increasingly irrelevant as it loses ‘purchase’ over parts of the country, the official said.”
This point goes hand in hand with the previous comments, with decades — really centuries — of recent history in Afghanistan. These assessments do not state that Mullah Omar will ride the streets of Kabul backwards on a donkey in triumph by late 2014. What these assessments state is that propping up a government in Kabul with the notion that it is the capital of a modern national state has always been and will always be a losing effort until long after we are all dead. This does not mean that Kabul and other urban centers in Afghanistan cannot be made relatively secure and prosperous (these would be expensive projects to undertake but they are possible).
The development of national institutions takes decades if not centuries. It cannot be deployed out of a proverbial box based on a Power Point CONOP in the matter of months or years — especially when there are numerous firefights plaguing the population.
The spin… and why it’s just spin:
We are going to see a lot of the same arguments as reports verify this NIE in 2017 (or as soon as 2014 without the BSA or a re-worked version of it). Some of these arguments make me quite upset.
“Some officials have taken umbrage at the underlying pessimism in the report, arguing that it does not adequately reflect how strong Afghanistan’s security forces have become.”
It’s been a few months since I have read anything really comprehensive on the capabilities of the Afghan national security forces. As far as I am aware, these elements remain of varying quality with numerous versions of national and local police. We do not know if this NIE addressed the ability of Afghan security forces to establish a national presence in the most vulnerable provinces and districts. But, we have seen press reports of deals made between Afghan national forces and local militants to avoid fighting. This has happened repeatedly in the Pech and also possibly in Sangin, after the withdrawal of U.S. military. This was happening in 2010 and 2011 during the troop surge when I was there.
“One American official … said there are too many uncertainties to make an educated prediction on how the conflict will unfold between now and 2017, chief among them the outcome of next year’s presidential election.”
Here we have one of the least intellectually honest responses to the NIE — a document intended to be predictive based on the consensus opinion of analysts looking at the problem. This unnamed official states there are too many variables to make a prediction and so we shouldn’t look at these issues with any concern, I guess. If you feel this warrants a response (or that the reporters should have included this quote without attribution or elaboration) please stop reading my posts.
A slightly more defensible response comes from another unnamed official — sort of.
“’I think what we’re going to see is a recalibration of political power, territory and that kind of thing,’ said one U.S. official who felt the assessment was unfairly negative. ‘It’s not going to be an inevitable rise of the Taliban.’”
This quote reflects essentially, as far as we can tell, close to the same sentiment as the NIE’s assessment that local power brokers will gain influence while the power of Kabul will wane after 2014. Mullah Omar and the Taliban of 2001 did not have full control of Afghanistan before we intervened (again) in the wars plaguing the country and I doubt this NIE states that he will come to dominate the entire country after 2014. The Taliban is not a monolithic insurgency operating with clear command and control from Quetta. There are factions with varying degrees of loyalty to the original leaders of the movement. There are factions who clearly are rivals for influence with the Taliban of 2001.
The Taliban movement of 2001, radical militant and criminal factions operating in the country and in neighboring areas, the Afghan national government’s security forces, and ISAF have public relations problems with the Afghan population in many areas of the country. Local power brokers will be looking to make security pacts with whoever is in the area that they can work with. ISAF and the government in Kabul will rarely be the only party involved in these agreements after 2014.
Near the end of the article, the writers have a discursion concerning the recommendations former General Petraeus had when he took over at CIA. This paragraph is revealing in many ways and is worthy of further reporting, either by a journalist today or a historian tomorrow. While the Intelligence Community’s NIEs have been historically pessimistic on Afghanistan, ISAF commanders have added addendums that highlight their contradictory opinions (except for this NIE, tellingly).
“The issue came to a head when Gen. David E. Petraeus left command of the international coalition in Kabul to take the helm of the CIA in 2011. He instructed analysts at the agency, which plays the dominant role in shaping NIEs, to consult more closely with commanders on the ground as they put together future war zone intelligence estimates. The directive was seen by some as an affront to the agency’s mandate to provide policymakers with independent, fact-based analysis.”
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