Stepping Outside the Shadow of War
…this post is not about the application of Clausewitzian strategy in the modern world, instead it is about addressing how American thinkers must view problems and solutions outside of a militarized framework.
The Greater Middle East today is rife with conflict, many are manifestations of the centuries-old Sunni-Shia divide, and yet that would be an oversimplification. So much of it is, at its core, socio-economic in its origins. For the better part of the last century these states have been ruled by various dictators of all kinds of ideologies: socialist, Islamist, Arab nationalist, or just plain greed. In the last several years new actors have risen to challenge the status quo in demand for greater representation and ultimately setting the stage for the conflicts we have today — from Tunisia to Iran, from Turkey to Bahrain. Many called it the Arab Spring. It proved strong enough to have toppled strongmen like Mubarak. Still, other strongmen like Assad were less hesitant to do what it takes to remain in power. In the years since 2011, what began as a popular movement became an opportunity for groups like Al-Qaeda, who quickly seized upon the brutality of the Syrian civil war. Today we not only have Al-Qaeda, we have something worse: the Islamic State.
The past year has seen a cornucopia of articles on the 4W-H (who, what, where, why, and how) about the Islamic State and just as many articles on the 4W-H to defeat them. Let us be honest and say that the American adventure in Iraq has much to blame in creating the conditions that facilitated their rise. We must move beyond that point not for the sake of diminishing our fault nor for the sake of cleaning up our mess, but to help create a better Middle East. To do so, policymakers and Americans in general must change how we view the situation on the ground. To begin, we must shift away from viewing the problems and solutions in strictly military terms.
America’s Militarization of Problem Solving
Americans have become consumed by war and national security anxieties, which in turn have provided us with the memories, models, and metaphors that shaped broad areas of national life.
Last November I published a post titled “Daeshbags: Refugees, ISIS, and Winning the War on Terror;” where I advocated opening our arms to several thousand refugees fleeing the violence. In doing so, we would be winning the war of ideas against ISIS. I still advocate it and as a US policy position, it’s a good start. Since then, a handful of articles began to appear which tackle ISIS on more military terms:
To be fair, this is community of military thinkers but we must try to think outside of our own boots.
Yet if we are to truly accept the teachings of Clausewitz, we have to accept the fact that military strategy is also as important as achieving economic, social, and political goals (An upcoming post). However, this post is not about the application of Clausewitzian strategy in the modern world, instead it is about addressing how American thinkers must view problems and solutions outside of a militarized framework. This a phenomenon that dates back to the 1930s and the New Deal, when American political leaders began tackling domestic issues with a war footing. How else can a society of individualists collectively mobilize manpower, resources, or resolve except under the shadow of war? The central thesis of Michael Sherry’s work, In the Shadow of War is that Americans have become consumed by war and national security anxieties, which in turn have provided us with the memories, models, and metaphors that shaped broad areas of national life.
Even my aforementioned post falls victim to this phenomenon: “the war of ideas.”
In the present, we see strategic thinkers attempting to frame a broad range of actions, including non-military actions, into purely military frameworks: the Gray Zones. Or as mentioned earlier, exclude all non-military actions and focus solely on what we’re comfortable with: Clausewitz.
Part of why we tend to do this is the fact that we are good at war in its simplest of terms, but it won’t be enough to address the problems that begin once the killing stops. And this is where victory really matters.
A non-military analysis of the problem
Without the institutions of the state, more Iraqis fell back on their religious and tribal identity for security.
War and conflict certainly are part of the problems in the Greater Middle East. History tells us conflict, does not occur in a vacuum. It is the product often of economic insecurity and its objectives are more often than not economic. In the former Yugoslavia, ethnic tensions arose more from elites attempting to concentrate wealth within their respective nationalities, once they knew it was all crashing down, rather than historical religious animosities. Post-Saddam Iraq also experienced a similar socio-economic breakdown. Since the foundation of the Iraq military had become an institution where Iraqis could find social mobility, pride, and above all: patronage. If the state and nation relied so much on a single institution, what would take its place after its dissolution?
The abolition of the Iraqi Army proved a disastrous decision and one that led directly to the foundation of the Islamic State — born in the void — when the single largest national institution had ceased to exist. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers and officers with their weapons and no jobs — no income — were left to their own devices and it was shortly thereafter the Sunni Insurgency began. Without the institutions of the state, more Iraqis fell back on their religious and tribal identity for security. American resolve and a change in strategy did beat the insurgency but the fragile state of Iraqi politics and society left the country vulnerable. By 2011 with Arab Spring in full bloom across the region, the backlash from Middle Eastern regimes were brutal and none more so than in Syria. The carnage had unleashed a new civil war in the region and a new opportunity for Iraq’s old insurgents to capitalize on: disenfranchised Sunnis in Iraq and Syria.
One could try fault the administration for the prolongation of the Syrian Civil War, or the rise of IS and their blitz across the desert into neighboring Iraq; but they should view the situation beyond simple military terms. For example, in 2012 when President Obama had to respond to Assad’s use of chemical weapons there was a 70% opposition from the public and overwhelming Republican opposition. Also, a decade of American intervention made the presence of troops unacceptable to regional allies or brought with it an air of distrust with potential partners.
At the moment, pullback and containment are the right choices. They do not appear to be much of a strategy since we have to influence our regional partners, not simply command them. After more than a decade of unilateralism containment through multilateralism looks slow and wishy-washy, nothing Clausewitz would have approved of. The current strategy of multilateral containment and slow strangulation is working as we have seen in the liberation of Ramadi and Sinjar. This is not the strategy we want, but it’s the strategy we need if we are to do things right. Nevertheless, the dangers of too many players on the field came to the fore when Turkey shot down a Russian SU-24. This should remind us of the fragile character of anti-ISIS cooperation and why containment through regional partners is a much preferred option.
Looking Beyond the Islamic State
For US to achieve long-term stability in the region will require a multi-faceted and interdependent approach that will demand bold leadership and political capital to find a careful balance between state and non-state actors. The American dream to make Iraq a poster-boy for democracy failed miserably because of the route taken to achieve regime change. In many ways, de-Ba’athifaction and a complete restructuring of the state left out many potential transitional partners and created the aforementioned vacuum in society and state. Instead, by using American and European economic soft-power rather than threats of ‘regime change’ the goal should be to influence autocratic regimes into transitioning into a more representative system. For example, the US government could incentivize American corporations to invest capital in chosen state. Understanding that the region is prone to instability, the US government could through tax-breaks, offset the risks shouldered by these corporations. The payoff for the regimes would be increased investment, jobs, and a stronger middle-class; however, participating states must agree to a roadmap to democracy. Democracy must fostered, not imposed.
America must bring in non-state actors regardless of ideology — Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, and others — into the fold. Although many hawks will claim they are mere proxies of our adversaries, this ignores the fact that relationships with proxies work both ways. Proxies have historically played their sponsors often by simply advertising mutual interests but also by manipulation through “flattery, pledging solidarity, feigning indifference, threatening defection, or even raising the specter of their own collapse and the disastrous results that might flow from it.” By reducing them to mere proxies is that we risk losing out on opportunities to build a lasting peace. By reaching out to proxies the US can capitalize on the differences between them and their sponsors.
The point is not to win militarily nor to win politically. It is to be a part of multilateral effort to that brings an unprecedented level of stability and democracy to the region. This will not take a single presidential term and it must be part of political commitment that will perhaps take a generation if it is to be done right.
7 January 2016
Point of Decision’s anniversary contest challenged writers to evaluate the current state of western (particularly US) policies in the Greater Middle East. Identify what has been successful, what problems remain, and potential solutions.
Honduran-born, Carlo enlisted in the Marines shortly after becoming an American citizen and credits his decision to having read Making the Corps, by Tom Ricks. Carlo deployed in the opening days of OIF as Marine and twice as a US Army Soldier. After 7 1/2 years of service, he left to pursue a degree in History at Concordia University in Montreal and graduated in 2015. You can follow him on Twitter @cvalle0625
