The AT-AT: a fully functioning Forward Operating Battle-station
A modest proposal for defense appropriations
Defense appropriations conjures many complex topics. The costs are staggering, with the F-35 program costing more than some countries’ GDP. For the most troubled programs, the costs are often excessively higher than what was projected and the capabilities of the new platform more limited than initially conceived or even the platform that is to be replaced.
I know nothing of defense appropriations. I don’t know the process, how to write a proposal, how to format a budget projection. I do have a little experience with Excel and Power Point. Based on the success of other appropriation efforts, I feel like I have sufficient real world knowledge to propose a new weapons platform.
It’s fashionable in defense platforms to incorporate everything a committee can possibly conceive into the platform. So, in that spirit, I will propose that the AT AT designed and fielded by the United States should not only be a weapons platform but also an important ISR platform as well.
The AT AT can contain UAVs/UASs, often called “drones” in popular media. A launcher and recovery system (a net) can easily be stored in the large “torso” of the vehicle. Analysts and UAV pilots can also be seated in the “torso” and provide real-time collection and assessment. The vehicle would be armored and have offensive capabilities. It would also have excellent line-of-site for radio communications to dismounted units and smaller vehicles. The AT AT would be more than a replacement for the main battle tank, it would be a mobile Tactical Operations Center. In fact, an AT AT or several AT ATs could conceivably replace the cumbersome building of a Forward Operating Base. If it could also refuel and rearm rotary wing aircraft, the vehicle’s capabilities would be truly extensive.
There has already been a lively debate on Twitter this morning. I will address some of the most pressing concerns. First, in the cinematic version of the AT AT there was a serious vulnerability to tripwires.
This is actually not much of a concern for several reasons. First, the AT AT would only trip if it continued moving over encumbered terrain. This was an operator error in the motion picture. No matter how well we design our massive, four legged, weapons platforms we will still need trained and experienced operators to make decisions in a complex and adaptive environment.
There is another reason why this vulnerability can and should be mitigated, and it was expressed by Oldguard12 and ChiTownCopper. In fact, the mitigation technique is already drilled into our combat arms officers: combined arms support.
Combined arms of dismounted infantry troops storming around the AT AT, communicating with the command element, and supported by smaller and more maneuverable vehicles, like the AT ST, will overcome the challenges of terrain and the enemy. When we add ISR and rotary aircraft to the AT AT platform, we have a fully functioning Forward Operating Battlestation.
