The Death of American Foreign Policy
What is the latest debate or talking point you have heard regarding Russia’s aggressive war in Ukraine, or the Islamic State’s challenge to the post World War One settlement of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse? These events represent significant challenges to the international system yet the answers are often familiar, if decidedly not refreshing in familiarity.
Europe, an economic and political union struggling to keep Greek banks open, is relying upon negotiations that cannot possibly be considered as good faith. These negotiations are bolstered, as it were, by the threat of sanctions — which criminal regimes often circumvent creating new problems. Perhaps the leaders of Europe are attempting to buy time, however, with no long term strategy apparent it is uncertain what they will obtain in exchange for the expense. The costs are likely to mount while criminal groups within Russia become increasingly powerful and unpredictable.
The Obama administration has admitted their strategy for Iraq and Syria is, at best, a work in progress. The current idea, the same one aged two years at this point, calls for a gradual increase in the training of vetted partisans in an increasingly sectarian civil war. The training mission of the Iraqi army during the US occupation produced practically no positive results at least by 2014. There are many reasons for this, which the president seemed to reference recently. Much like the previous administration, there is a gradually emerging realization that dearly held policy choices were mistaken or at the very least overly optimistic.
The punditry has advanced a number of lazy options in response. A renewed US occupation — or really imperialism, with great images of ancient ruins (no irony here) — is on one end of the spectrum while on the other we have the popular admixture of special operations forces, drones, trainers well ensconced in their bases (how will they monitor what their cohorts are doing… maybe more drones). Everyone smartly professes that there are no good options, that this will take a long time to settle, that regional powers need to become more involved (I guess like Yemen), and that it is all ultimately up to Baghdad. Baghdad, at least with the previous two prime ministers, seems content to push the sectarian conflict to its logical conclusion.
Alarmingly, this feeds right into both the radical Shiite leaders in Baghdad (and Teheran) and the Islamic State. Our foreign policy punditry has tackled the Islamic State as well. Are they a “state”? We shouldn’t call them that. Their strategy is poorly conceived, say some. Their ideology is internally inconsistent, assert others. I have looked over a great deal of material and find both conclusions to be, well, overly optimistic.
As we clearly do not have the stomach for interventionism, the learned pundits have other stale options available in the buffet table of foreign affairs advocacy, such as Containment! The latest advocate for this is Stephen Walt. The international system, according to Walt, will respond in a (neoliberalist dream) equilibrium to the radical emergent-state with a 13th Century worldview. I suppose this equilibrium is on the cusp of emerging in Europe to counter Putin as well.
The underlying assumptions in international relations are stale — or worse. Problematic Neoliberal assumptions coexist alongside an intellectually exhausted Realism that does not understand the gritty world it purports to explain. Sanctions punish regime elites, sure, but they also lead to a criminalization of the regime and economy. Economic development and investment can be a component of foreign policy. But, as with sanctions it must be watched closely lest unscrupulous regimes gain more clout. Force has always had a place in international relations. But, the plan as it appears on paper is not likely to reflect the reality that you encounter. What madness drove the United States to invade Iraq in 2003? Was it national interests or something else? What about Putin’s invasion of Ukraine?
The preferred American way of war has been counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency, at least in practice, has been a traumatic waste of resources. There have been short term gains in some areas, but long term progress remains elusive. We did not almost win in Anbar. We created a new faction of militants and local power-brokers who were content to jump through our western hoops and we were happy to call them the next Sons of Liberty so long as they killed Al Qaeda operatives. That was not winning, unless that was the entire objective of the Iraq occupation at any point in time.
It was not a bad deal, but it was hardly an ideal situation upon our exit from Iraq. If it was counterinsurgency, it was year one work. The difficult process of political reintegration was yet to begin when we were sent packing. Anybody can train up a group to fight for power and money, Putin has been doing that in Ukraine for more than a year now. The irony is missed by most.
The second wasteful component of American counterinsurgency is the free flow of funds for building capacity. This is where neoliberalism runs wild. If only we could create infrastructure and jobs, then we would settle all the terrible political, economic, social and even religious squabbles. The reality is instead a resource bonanza for some with new or further aggrieved populations seeking ways to upend the societal bargains of who gets what. And they usually assume force is the best way to do it.
Stunned by the failings in Iraq and Afghanistan, and sensitive to the grief of our own losses, American politicians have attempted to concoct new forms of warfare that even Donald Rumsfeld would have found incredible. In Libya we avoided the prolonged occupation, but not the factionalism and regional instability.
Perhaps the reason the foreign policy debate in America has become stale, with op-eds calling for the same measures that op-eds called for months or weeks ago, is that we all realize at some level that it has been one failure after another. As we get ready for another polarizing round of elections, we need to hit pause on the foreign policy publishing machine and come up with some new assumptions for how the world operates and how the United States can function within those limitations.
