The Party and The State

The Islamic State is a dangerous mix of religious fanaticism and state-building state-terror. And it is on the offensive.

Many analysts and policymakers remain flummoxed by the Islamic State. Is the group the most puritanical, radical, and violent terrorist-insurgent group on the planet? Or is there a leadership cadre of cynical Baathists using foreign fighters as cannon fodder?

The reality is a much more menacing combination of the two: militant Salafism has taken hold of territory the size of a state and is on the offensive. The leadership element of this group knows how to govern by fear and terror. They governed that way when they worked for Saddam.

The current options on the proverbial policy table are all problematic. Supporting proxies cedes control to unreliable regional powers who will likely make the conflict worse. Placing foreign boots on the ground will result in a prolonged counterinsurgency, with less hope for success than even last decade. Containment risks ceding large swaths of territory to an apocalyptic insurgency.

While the insurgency in Iraq had always been fractious, the Islamic State’s recent history points toward consolidation, an aspect even very cogent analysts sometimes miss. This consolidation is fueled by the increasingly sectarian conflict in the region and the brutal state-terror practices of the group’s Baathist leadership. Moreover, the insurgency in Iraq has been influenced by numerous dynamics within the country, beginning well before the invasion in 2003. Decades of conflict and sanctions gradually weakened the regime of Saddam Hussein. The regime increasingly emphasized religion as a tool of foreign and domestic policy. In order to circumvent sanctions, the regime enabled an expansive smuggling network, creating new economic and political centers of gravity.

The insurgency against western militaries alongside the expansion of Shiite and Iranian influence in the country deepened the sectarian nature of the conflict. Strategic mistakes left Sunni communities embittered while also providing opportunities for new partnerships in violence to develop. Salafist insurgents, weakened over the last decade, have reemerged at a time when their ideology is attractive to disgruntled Sunnis. A more complete and historically grounded assessment of this insurgency is vital to understanding the challenges facing Iraq. The tendency towards fractious insurgent groups is coming to an end and a genuine albeit brutal state-building effort is underway. Misinterpreting the composition and intent of the Islamic State’s leadership risks continued policy paralysis at the expense of the stability of the entire region.

The brutally authoritarian regime of Saddam Hussein ruled over a predominantly Shiite population, with other minority ethnic groups. Expansion and consolidation of this Sunni-Arab regime required extensive political, social, and economic manipulation of the diverse Iraqi society. This effort was further complicated by a lengthy war with Iran, the invasion of and then expulsion from Kuwait, and sanctions that ostracized the regime from much of the international community. The regime’s response to these challenges was to attempt to harness internal and external forces which could be of benefit to the government. In this pursuit, the regime supported militant Islamists, curried favor with the broadening political Islamist community in the Muslim world, appropriated smuggling networks for revenue generation, and rewarded loyal supporters of the regime at the expense of other communities.

But, as the regime confronted increasingly complex challenges with dwindling resources, new power bases and sources of influence developed. In many ways, the regime was merely buying time while the internal cohesion of the Baath party and government degraded. Focusing on the secular ideology of the party at its most powerful ignores the long decline in central authority in the country. The overthrow of the regime, disbanding of the Baath party, emergence of anarchy in the initial occupation, and development of new power groups further exacerbated the scope and depth of the society’s fracturing. The withdrawal of international forces and the consolidation of a Shiite dominated central government has resulted in an increasingly sectarian conflict. Older members of the regime, who were closer in age to Saddam, have tended to maintain more nationalistic rhetoric even as the conflict deepened in 2014 and 2015. The leadership cadre of the Islamic State, on the other hand, seems to be from a younger generation that was potentially influenced by more sectarian ideology found in Iraq in the 1990s and after the Iran-Iraq war.

The Regime and The Radicals

Like other regimes in the region, Saddam’s Iraq courted militant Islamists to serve as proxies against rivals. During the Iran-Iraq war, members of Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood were trained by an element of the Iraqi army to fight against the Hafez al Assad regime in Syria, an ally of Iran (Lia, p. 40–41, 46; Cruickshank & Ali, p. 3; Helfont, p. 355). Saddam’s regime also supported the families of dead Palestinian insurgents so as to increase his standing with those opposed to Israel (Byman, p. 44). Samuel Helfont has noted that regime records indicate no sympathy on the part of Saddam for Islamist causes, but rather the regime used Islamist movements to achieve domestic and foreign objectives (p. 352–353).

The leader of the Baath party viewed religiously motivated actors with suspicion but also acknowledged that common objectives justified cooperation on some occasions (Helfont, p. 354–355). Baath support of Islamist groups and movements would help to mitigate any religious opposition within the country and serve as a platform for foreign influence (Helfont, p. 356–357). The Iran-Iraq war served also as a catalyst to develop espionage networks in the southern Shiite holy cities in the country. Islamic educational institutions worked as a means to build international networks of support (Helfont, p. 358, 363). Before the United States led invasions in 1991 and 2003, Saddam pressed sympathizers to rally in support of the dictator (Helfont, p. 359, 365). Several years after the first US invasion, Saddam’s regime launched a campaign directed at highlighting the Islamic faith. The dictator supposedly had a Qur’an written using his own blood.

Journalists who were in Iraq immediately prior to the US invasion in 2003 noted the presence of religiously motivated foreign fighters who had been recruited by the regime for suicide missions (Anderson, n.p.). At the time, Baathists typically expressed that this was a tactically expedient alliance between religious fanatics and the regime (Anderson, n.p.). Following the invasion, a targeted campaign of assassinations began to take place directed at Baathists. Looting, as has been widely reported, also began to take place. When Bremer ostracized former Baath party leaders from government, US military officers reported that looting seemed to become more organized and that sabotage campaigns were more evident (Anderson, n.p.). The first signs of the insurgency had appeared.

A prominent member of Saddam’s regime, Izzat Ibrahim al Douri, had developed his own patronage network within the military during and after the Iran-Iraq war. During that war, Douri began to recruit fellow officers into the Sufi Naqshbandi order. After the regime fell and Saddam was executed, Douri transitioned his patronage network into an insurgent network called Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order (JRTN as transliterated in Arabic) (Knights 2011, p. 1–2). This patronage turned insurgent network, centered on a regime powerbroker, demonstrates a vital aspect of the Baathist strategy for power preservation both before and after the US invasion in 2003. Saddam’s regime consistently sought to garner support from networks that could serve mutual objectives with the state.

Those networks, as will be discussed in greater detail below, could range from religious lodges like the Naqshbandi order to criminal smuggling networks. As the country descended into chaos, these networks remained active and were used to expand the insurgency. Baathists remained involved in these networks, but for some the ideological explanations for violence turned more radical and religious over time.

While Helfont focuses largely on Saddam’s interpretations of the regime’s cooperation with Islamists, Myriam Benraad’s research has shown that Iraqis nonetheless were influenced by the regime’s increasingly religious overtones (Benraad 2010). After the defeat at the hands of the Americans in 1991 and the subsequent economic troubles caused by sanctions, a return to more puritanical interpretations of religion became increasingly popular (Benraad 2010, p. 6–7). The regime may have used religion in a cynical fashion, but this nonetheless meant that many Iraqis and fellow Baathists were increasingly exposed to more radical religious messages. In the late 1980s, in the ethnically mixed town of Tal Afar, Sunni imams with a Wahhabist leaning were placed in the mosques of that city (Patriquin, p. 20).

Regime Mechanisms for Control Feeds Insurgency

Despite the government’s harsh, authoritarian methods, this was not the policy choice of a strong and cohesive regime. In actuality, the regime was attempting to undermine potential opponents and leverage additional forms of social and political control. At about the same time as radical imams were employed in Tal Afar, Saddam’s regime also shifted the state’s ideology to coopt powerful tribal networks for state advantage. Previously, the regime had viewed tribal affiliations as contrary to the ideology of the Baath party. In exchange for supporting the regime, Saddam condoned illicit activities such as smuggling and provided tribal forces with land and weapons (Benraad 2011, p. 22). After the Gulf War, regime power waned and these tribal factions became significant economic players due to their lucrative smuggling businesses. By the late 1990s, the regime was using Sunni tribal militias to guard key routes in the country’s interior. The cost to the regime for the use of this partisan security force was increased autonomy for the tribes in the west (Williams, p. 25–26). A closer look at the regime’s efforts to control the population of Tal Afar and appropriate the smuggling networks in the western part of the country will demonstrate how new centers of power were emerging before the collapse of the regime and that those power groups still contend for control to this day.

While serving in Tal Afar in 2006, Captain Travis Patriquin worked on an article concerning the role former Baathists played in the insurgency. He took a historical perspective on the role the Baath party played in the social and political life of the city, using that information to build his argument that former regime adherents were still exercising significant control in the region. Prior to the fall of the regime, the Baath party maintained extensive espionage networks and practiced authoritarian state-terror to keep populations subdued (Patriquin p. 17; Devlin, p. 1407). Another form of population control involved recruiting and rewarding segments of the population into the military. The Turkoman of Tal Afar were particularly targeted, with Baath party loyalists rewarded for their service. Turkoman military veterans were given new homes in Tal Afar with modern plumbing and other utility services. Their co-ethnic neighbors continued to live in a more decrepit part of the city.

The veterans’ community overlooked the vital highway connecting the city to the border and Mosul (Patriquin, p. 18). Patriquin argues that this was an intentional effort by the Saddam regime to ensure control of an ethnic minority group in a strategically important part of the country. Those who supported the regime lived in relative comfort while members of their tribe who did not serve in the military lived in the city’s bad neighborhood (Patriquin, p. 20). As mentioned earlier, alongside this settlement process, extremist interpretations of Sunni Islam were prevalent in Tal Afar mosques — an additional effort to overcome the ethnic divide between the regime and the town’s inhabitants through the use of religion. The Turkoman population was effectively split between Shiite and Sunni in the town as well. Several prominent members of the Islamic State have been Turkoman Baathists with at least one from Tal Afar. The Islamic State military commander for Iraq, Abu Muslim al Turkmani, was from Tal Afar. His counterpart in Syria may also have been Turkoman from Mosul with longstanding ties to Al Qaeda (Barrett, p. 28).

Patriquin authored his paper at a time when the emphasis of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations was on foreign fighters. He emphatically noted that there must have been a facilitation network in Tal Afar bringing these fighters into the region and instructing them where to attack for maximum effect (Patriquin, p. 21–22). His local sources informed him that prominent individuals in the town were facilitating these militant migrations in 2003 and 2004, and ordering the militants to commit terrorist attacks and targeted assassinations (Patriquin, p. 22). Baathists in Tal Afar also had ties across the border in Syria from before the invasion and could easily facilitate the movement of foreign fighters across the region they knew quite well (Patriquin, p. 21). While the preclusion of former Baathists from roles in government created animosity toward the government in Baghdad, a failure on the part of the occupiers to work with local powerbrokers also inflamed tensions (Patriquin, p. 23). As the Saddam regime maneuvered around increasing challenges, local elites had gained more autonomy, often through illicit enterprises condoned by the regime. Largely ostracized by the new national government and ignored by the occupiers, the old elites used their criminal acumen to lethal effect.

Mosul is another prominent city during the history of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. Like Tal Afar, the city’s population was multiethnic and the Baath party had a strong base of support there (Hamilton, p. 4). The city was also prominent for the movement of funds and foreign fighters into the country during the US occupation (Hamilton, p. 3, 18). As the American counterinsurgency effort intensified in Al Anbar Province, insurgents moved into Mosul (Hamilton, p. 9). Since mid-2014, the city has been under the rule of the Islamic State. Various supposedly nationalist insurgent factions have attempted to form in the city but have been repressed by the Islamic State. Douri’s JRTN initially applauded the Islamic State but turned critical of the group when harsh restrictions were imposed on Iraqi Christians (Adnan and Reese, p. 15–16). It is likely that in Tal Afar and Mosul, as well as in any city with strong regime ties and smuggling networks, Baathists and Salafists began to work together early in the insurgency. Over time, that collaboration has intensified for some and now a militant Salafist insurgency has appropriated the state-terror expertise of the Baathist regime.

Smuggling has been a part of economic life in Iraq since the end of the Ottoman Empire, when divided communities sought to avoid European imposed duties (Herbert, p. 71; Williams, p. 9). After the invasion of Kuwait, sanctions isolated Iraq and jeopardized the regime’s access to oil revenue, weapons, and luxury goods (Herbert, p. 73; Williams, p. 9). This resulted in the surprising thaw between Syrian and Iraqi Baathists, longtime rivals of one another, through the mutually beneficial business of oil smuggling (Herbert, p. 73; Williams, p. 14). The precursor ingredients for insurgency, terror, organized crime, and deep sectarian animosities were all present in Iraqi society prior to the US led invasion and occupation. Authoritarianism, corruption, and illicit networks working against sanctions created a complex set of challenges that were eroding the regime prior to the occupation (Williams, p. 13, 16, 23).

Illicit activities appealed to regime officials as the central government could afford less and less wealth distribution to the country’s periphery. The same smuggling routes that were used to direct resources out of the country were used to bring foreign fighters into the smoldering insurgency (Williams, p. 26). While authoritarianism had previously been conducive to corruption, the state was in fact criminalized through the illicit mitigation of sanctions (Williams, p. 31). Those who lived in border regions, who had personal and business connections with residents in neighboring states, were uniquely positioned to take advantage of these new illicit opportunities.

Profitable, interpersonal networks linked regime hands in Syria and Iraq, and those networks were still in effect even when the regime in Baghdad fell (Williams, p. 32–34). When the military was disbanded “400,000 specialists in violence” were thrown upon an already criminalized economy — the only economy remaining in the country (Williams, p. 46). Syrian intelligence saw the insurgency in Iraq as an opportunity to undermine the United States in the region and deflect militant Sunni Islam away from the regime in Damascus (Gordon & Morgan, n.p.; Ali, p. 2). Al Qaeda in Iraq saw the smugglers as the necessary conduit to move fighters and weapons (Gordon & Morgan, n.p.). The combination of Baathism and Salafism began to fuse along the smuggling routes through Iraq and Syria.

Terrorism Meets State-Terror

David Siddhartha Patel argues that analysts error when they fixate on the supposed secular ideology of Baathism versus the hardline Salafist ideology of the Islamic State. While our understanding of the group is limited, files found in mid-2014 indicate the group is Iraqi lead and most of the leadership has ties to the Baath party (Patel, p. 3). The organization may contain up to 1,000 former technocrats, intelligence, and military personnel (Lister, p. 21). The Baathists that serve in the Islamic State tend to be younger than the leaders of other insurgent organizations, such as Izzat Ibrahim al Douri, who fought the occupation and the current government in Baghdad (Patel, p. 3). Douri, whose vital signs are a matter of contention, would be in his 70s today. Younger Baathists would potentially have served in the military in a more direct role against Iran in the 1980s and the Americans in the 1990s and 2000s. There have been published anecdotes that with Saddam’s faith campaign in the 1990s, some Baathists began to abstain from alcohol and follow Salafist clerics (Sly, n.p.).

Saddam also mobilized the Fedayeen, a paramilitary wing staffed by religiously devout followers, prior to the American invasion last decade. This group purged potential opponents of the regime before the invasion. Summary executions and disappearances are hallmarks of the Islamic State’s governance strategy today. Potential rivals are assassinated or forced to flee (Barrett, p. 20–21). Sixty prominent former Baathists were disappeared from Mosul when the group took over in 2014 (Adnan & Reese, p. 16). The Islamic State’s use of state-terror mimics the Baathist model in other ways as well. Documents obtained by Der Spiegel show a former Baath strategist, Haji Bakr, outlining an “Islamic intelligence state” — a vast network of recruitment and infiltration (Reuter, n.p.).

The Islamic State’s predecessor, Al Qaeda in Iraq, had shifted over time from a foreign fighter organization to an Iraqi populated one (Benraad 2010 p. 4–7; Lister p. 9). Battlefield success against the foreign fighters of the Al Qaeda network in Iraq provided an opportunity for Iraqis and in particular Baathists to assume leadership positions within the insurgent movement (Reuter, n.p.). The Islamic State has altered its composition in Iraq and Syria as well. Foreign fighters are focused in Syria where they have little connection to the population and can be moved quickly to engagements. Locally based insurgents tend to be less mobile and more bound by their own communities (Reuter, n.p.; al Tamimi, n.p.). The Islamic State operations in Iraq, especially in the 2014 to 2015 timeframe, indicate a likelihood of closer ties to the Sunni communities to the west and north of Baghdad. The group has been able to infiltrate key cities in these regions, with a military like focus on supply routes and resource acquisition. The group demonstrates military, espionage, and smuggling expertise earned over years of operations in the region (Sly, n.p.; Barrett, p. 36–38).

Under the leadership of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, former Baathists became more prominent in the organization and drew upon regime networks to bring their contacts into the group (Sly, n.p.; Lister, p. 18–19). Baghdadi likely interacted with Baathists perhaps as an insurgent and almost certainly while a prisoner in Camp Bucca (Barrett, p. 19, 31; Chulov, n.p.). Large American military prison camps presented insurgents with an opportunity to expand their networks (Chulov, n.p.). Prison amnesties at the end of last decade and the Islamic States assaults on prisons in the “Breaking Walls” campaign in 2012 lead to increased numbers of former Baathists and insurgents available for work (Barrett, p. 9; Lister p. 11). Militants now fighting with the Islamic State may have been part of the Baath party, Al Qaeda, the Sahwa movement, or other groups at various times (Sly, n.p.). Under Zarqawi, Al Qaeda in Iraq was hesitant to work too closely with the Baathists. Over time, however, elements of the insurgency have intermingled and radical sectarianism has increasingly come to dominate the conflicts in the country. Salafism, never truly foreign to Iraq in the Saddam era, has become more prominent as the conflict intensified. With a Baathist inspired internal intelligence organization taking hold within the Islamic State, it is unlikely many will take the risk of attempting to defect from the group.

Part of the confusion among analysts with regard to the Baathist role in the current insurgency also may stem from the blurring of networks as fortunes shifted over the years. Insurgent leaders would encourage their fighters to join other networks during times of weakness, so as to keep some pressure on their opponents (Ali, p. 3). Interpersonal networks, rivalries, and shifting opportunities created a “complex mesh of affiliations” at times (Knights 2008, p. 3). Douri’s network, JRTN, sponsored attacks or provided facilitators and training for other groups to increase the overall operational tempo of the insurgency (Knights 2011, p. 2–4). A litany of groups and umbrella organizations have emerged over the years in Iraq. There have been significant ruptures within groups populated by former Baathists as well. (Adnan & Reese, p. 13–25). Several groups seemed relatively dormant until the Sunni protest movement of 2012 and 2013. While these groups differ ideologically from the Islamic State, the brutal repression the Islamic State has implemented against rivals and opponents should not be discounted either (Adnan & Reese, p. 24). The reemergence of these groups and the ensuing dominance of the Islamic State in part of the country are a result of decisions made in Baghdad by the Shiite dominated central government.

Sahwa was about Opportunity, This is Sectarian

As the US withdrew and transferred control to Iraq, former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki consolidated power at the expense of the Sahwa movement and moderate Sunnis (Lister, p. 10; Adnan & Reese, p. 10). The Sahwa movement represented the work of ambitious and largely self-interested sheikhs seeking to gain control of territory from Al Qaeda and the insurgency by becoming patrons of the US military (Patel, p. 4, Benraad 2011, n.p.). The need for funding drove Al Qaeda in Iraq to finance its campaign through illicit enterprises such as smuggling (Benraad 2010, p. 6). At least some in the Sahwa movement were likely motivated purely by self-interest and sought only to undermine Al Qaeda’s role in smuggling. Several individuals and tribes that worked with the Americans were suspected of being longtime smugglers (Benraad 2011, n.p.). Any potential for ideological affinity with the central government was further undermined when Maliki shut down Sahwa tribal councils and instituted new councils directly under his patronage (Benraad 2011, n.p.). Maliki refused to integrate Sahwa militias into the security services. By 2010, the Islamic State in Iraq, as the group was known at the time, actively recruited Sahwa fighters into its ranks (Lister, p. 10).

The actions of the Shiite dominated central government fit into the Sunni rejectionist narrative advocated by the Salafist insurgents (Benraad 2010, p. 7). Whether intentionally or not, the United States benefited from the decentralized and fractious nature of the region when implementing the Sahwa program. The centralization program Maliki undertook at the end of the US occupation inflamed the autonomous inclinations of this rural area (Benraad 2011, n.p.). Saddam had granted autonomy to these groups so long as they supported his regime. Now, the Shiite dominated regime was asserting its prerogatives. Younger members of the movement seem to have been particularly prone to Salafist recruiting efforts (Benraad 2011, n.p.). Those who did not join the insurgent group were targeted for assassination along with other Sunni moderates (Benraad 2010, p. 5–6; Benraad 2011, n.p.). Former Sahwa fighters could be linked to terrorist attacks targeting Shiite civilians by early 2011 (Benraad 2011, n.p.). While the decline of the Sahwa movement at the hands of Maliki is important, it is insufficient to explain the reemergence of insurgency in the Sunni heartland of Iraq. Moreover, the deeply sectarian nature of the conflict that benefits the militant Salafist insurgents the most also developed only over time.

Revolution in Syria provided the Islamic State with another battlefield to exploit (Lister, p. 12). But, it was not until the central government of Iraq lost legitimacy with the Sunni street that the full potential of the Islamic State would be realized. In 2012 Sunni areas began to push for increased federalism and autonomy. Iraqi troops were accompanied by Shiite militias to stymy the demonstrations. Politicized arrests of Sunni leaders further inflamed the situation. Sunnis began to encamp in protest of the Shiite dominated government. In late April 2013, one such encampment was the scene of a massacre perpetrated by special operations forces from Baghdad. Widespread and sustained violence, however, did not materialize after this incident. Dubious security arrangements between Sunni leaders and the central government produced more doubt in the Sunni street. Demonstrations persisted throughout 2013 with occasional clashes. In late 2013, the protest movement heated up in Ramadi. (Sowell, n.p.). Maliki dispatched troops to break up the protest in that city claiming that it was run by Al Qaeda. Clashes ensued while the rhetoric from some Sunnis intensified toward armed sectarian resistance. When Iraqi security forces eventually withdrew, the Islamic State was left to fill the power vacuum in the province (Sowell, n.p.; Adnan & Reese, p. 12). In fact, the Islamic State had endured setbacks in Syria and was shifting its operational focus from the west to the east of that country around the time of these protests across the border in Iraq (al Ubaydi, et. al., p. 21). The Islamic State had a cadre of highly mobile fighters ready to press into Iraq. The offensive of 2014 launched from Syria had been initially envisioned by former Baathist Haji Bakr (Reuter, n.p.; al Ubaydi, et. al. p. 43).

As Fanar Haddad argues, it would be incorrect to interpret Iraq as an unsectarian country during the Saddam regime merely because the Baath party advocated secularism and Pan-Arabism. Sectarianism was ever present in how the regime controlled the population and the determination of which groups received political, social, and economic power. Sectarianism has increasingly emerged as the ideology underpinning the expanding Sunni insurgency as it looks to define itself against a Shiite dominated central government. As the post occupation political crisis has deepened, Sunnis have increasingly adopted religious markings and slogans for their political coalitions and neighborhoods. Previously, it was the marginalized Shiite who used such iconography to unite their political projects. These ideological markings demonstrate a process of identity creation that has developed alongside Sunni political and economic grievances (Haddad, n.p.). Increasingly sectarian rhetoric has been conducive to Salafist organizations like Al Qaeda and the current manifestation of its Iraqi wing now calling itself the Islamic State. Salafist militants also provided a cohort of dedicated fighters for this cause (Haddad, n.p.). The Islamic State melds the recruitment and motivation potential of global Salafist militancy with the lengthy experience of rule by state-terror of its Baathist leadership. Over the years, that leadership has almost certainly radicalized as well.

Sectarianism and Salafism have flourished in Iraq and the region after the US withdrawal and the rise of a Shiite dominated central government in Baghdad. Baathists have risen to prominence in the Islamic State and are using their expertise in state-terror to dramatic effect in state-building. The process towards this dire scenario has been a lengthy one. Sanctions and warfare forced the Saddam regime to try new tools to maintain control. The regime emphasized religion, sought to harness tribal factions, divided population centers, and employed smugglers to circumvent sanctions. After the occupation, the insurgency against western militaries used radical foreign fighters, largely facilitated by regime networks. Conflict and shifting interpersonal networks led Iraqis to take over the most militant of insurgent groups, formerly allied to Al Qaeda. More recently, mistakes on the part of the central government have caused the Sunnis to call for open rebellion.

The most prominent Salafist insurgent group, now calling itself the Islamic State, has seized upon this opportunity. Generational differences have also become apparent as older Baath party members are having less success than relatively younger ones. Perhaps most worrying though is the success Salafists have had with the youngest of fighters in Iraq. But, it must be remembered that the Islamization of the Baath party began at the nadir of Saddam’s government after the first Gulf War. That period led the regime to shift its party ideology and attempt to appropriate new methods of maintaining control. Stressed by war, those political, social, and economic networks that rose to prominence during Saddam’s decline remain in place and have pulled the region to the brink of a terrible sectarian conflict. Understanding the history of these networks and the dynamics that have fueled this conflict are essential. With radical and brutal practitioners of state-terror at the group’s highest levels, the Islamic State will not fracture under its own ideology. The conflagration in the Middle East today has been developing over decades and is increasingly more radical, more uncontrollable, and more dangerous.

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