To Raise an Army
Nine months spent in the dirt and mountains, partnering with a loose confederation of Afghan security forces against their cousins, neighbors, and friends. This was my formative experience in 2011; deploying to a war where complacency was king. Many Afghans couldn’t be bothered to patrol and get blown up by hidden enemies while there were Americans to continue patrolling in their stead. And Americans weren’t keen on stumbling across an IED clearing an empty village when the United States was preparing to abandon the country altogether. It was a puzzling experience which I’m still trying to work through. And I suspect I’m not alone.
Hindsight
There are countless missteps which budding historians can easily identify in retrospect. A failure to understand the politics before ousting the Taliban in 2001, ignoring Afghanistan in favor of invading Iraq in 2003, unprecedented turnover in political and military leadership slots; the list goes on. But rather than beat these collective horses to death, I wish to highlight an under-discussed (and thus continuing) failure: the training of foreign military forces. Look no further than Iraq or Syria and see that ‘lessons learned’ remains a suggestion rather than a commandment.
Why Did Foreign Training Fail?
The most basic question remains unanswered: what does it take to raise and train a proficient military force? American drill sergeants would answer with an exhaustive list of physical, mental, and ethical competencies. They would also tell you that they break incoming privates into a rough mold of proficiency, but ultimately the NCOs at the receiving units must sharpen them into effective soldiers. This continuing developmental process is taken for the granted in the American system (ridiculing the Structured Self-Development courses and safety briefings tends to take precedence), and largely ignored when training foreign soldiers.
The most basic question remains unanswered: what does it take to raise and train a proficient military force?
Soldiers and policemen alike in the worst years of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were trained to be bodies that could patrol and die. In the low-intensity wars of attrition, bodies and unit strength percentages mattered. Higher-tiered priorities like ensuring unit integrity and developing officers and NCOs were afterthoughts. As a result, there was a wild deviation between units. I experienced this firsthand: our first company of ANA soldiers had a tough, respected CO. Drug abuse, skipping patrols, and falling asleep on guard duty were met swiftly with corporal punishment. The follow-on replacements were led by an obese, lazy man. He never left the wire, and rarely managed his company. His unit rarely showed up for patrols, and when they did the few volunteers were stoned out of their minds. Lack of leadership cripples units at the company level, but the problem lies much deeper.
The American military boasts a storied history dating back generations. Service-members from the very beginning are impressed with the weight and sacrifice of those who wore the uniform before them. There is a powerful sense of national pride, honor, and duty in the modern all-volunteer force. Service-members also happen to be fairly well-compensated between housing allowances, education benefits, and salaries. None of these aspects are present in the militaries we’ve tried to cobble together in recent years. We attempted to raise and train unified militaries in diverse, fractured societies. Pay was meager and infrequent, corruption was rampant, and the only unifying thread was American patronage, which is hardly a solid foundation for a national military in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Higher-tiered priorities like ensuring unit integrity and developing officers and NCOs were afterthoughts. As a result, there was a wild deviation between units.
Conclusion
So when I reflect and write I find myself rehashing the same thoughts. News of the fall of Ramadi in Iraq or Kunduz in Afghanistan is met with disbelief and disdain. Pundits ask ‘how can these militaries fail, with all of the equipment we gave them?’ A better question is why we think a sturdy fighting force can be created with a few weeks of training and high-tech equipment. If, as history would suggest, we continue to revert to training and equipping foreign military forces to supplement our deployments, we should start to answer this question in depth.
