Analyzing the Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Afghanistan through the Lens of Social Construction Theory
By Cory Hudgins and Danielle Parker
The events of September 11, 2001, are seared into the fabric of the United States of America as it operates today. One way this is evident is the 20-year war in Afghanistan that has just barely come to an end. In October 2001, President George W. Bush stated:
I gave Taliban leaders a series of clear and specific demands: Close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; and return all foreign nationals[…] None of these demands were met. And now the Taliban will pay a price.
Troops entered Afghanistan to find Osama bin Laden and eradicate al-Qaeda. Short-term mission after short-term mission abounded. According to a report issued by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, this short-term thinking led to the most significant failures of the mission. We fought not one 20 year war, but twenty 1-year wars. The report credited this short-termism to “overwhelming pressure from Congress and agency leadership” to demonstrate quick results. This implies that, at times, the politics and optics of the policies were given more weight than the effects of the policies themselves. The conflict repeatedly took on new aims, such as defeating the Taliban and bringing stability to Afghanistan
From 2008 to 2011, the war with the Taliban was effectively at a stalemate. Then, in the Spring of 2011, U.S. forces located and eliminated Osama bin Laden. Though military operations, military assistance programs, and stability operations continued, the U.S. slowly decreased the number of troops deployed to Afghanistan.
Finally, ten years later, in the summer of 2021, the U.S. withdrew the remaining members of the military. At the time, it was believed that the government of Afghanistan would be able to stand on its own, but that was not the case. At a rate no one predicted, the Taliban took district by district with ease until they assumed full control of Afghanistan. Afghan civilians began requesting visas to come to the United States in droves. Since 2014 as many as 34,000 visas have been submitted to the State Department. Those numbers drastically increased over the summer with the expansion of Taliban control.
“Policies create politics” — this quote from Ted Lowi is the most succinct takeaway from Social Construction and Policy Design Theory (hereafter “Social Construction Theory” for short). The timeline on U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is yet another example of the truth this statement holds. In this paper, we address what Social Construction Theory is and how it can serve as a lens for analyzing the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. We show that the U.S. and the Taliban created consequences for specific target groups that will inform many future policies in signing the Doha Agreement by looking at the social constructions created from a shared understanding that the war in Afghanistan needed to end. These constructions laid the foundation for the framework that would become the U.S. withdrawal. These target populations are:
- The United States government and citizens.
- The Taliban.
- The government of Afghanistan.
- The citizens of Afghanistan.
After explaining the role of each group, we examine the extent to which the feed-forward effects following the policy fit that initial projection. Looking at these consequences suggest policy lessons for the future.
Social Construction and Policy Design Theory
The concept of politics being socially constructed was recognized by policy scholars decades ago. Some figures we will be quoting in this assessment include Anne Schneider, Helen Ingram, and Ted Lowi. Social influences become the primary driver for policy design instead of the objective seriousness of an issue. Social forces also drive what effects a policy will have. Target populations of the policy are affected based on their socially constructed perception: the ideas, messages, stereotypes, and perceptions assigned to specific groups. In a sense, the “good guys” will be given “advantages,” and the “bad guys” will be given appropriate “hurdles.”
Each of these groups is determined based on the policy maker’s perspective, based on the amount of power and the positive or negative connotation associated with these target populations, as shown in Figure A.
The way these target groups are socially constructed is crucial. They have developed through years and even decades of societal messaging. Both direct and implied messages, circulating through the media, are absorbed by every person on earth. An individual’s perception of the world is constructed from these messages. When putting policies into place, policymakers take advantage of these established constructs to decide who can and cannot withstand potential consequences in the policy. Policy targets will receive benefits and burdens in respect to how they fall within the following quadrants. “Symbolic” benefits and burdens are also issued to help the policymakers save face. A symbolic benefit would be some version of a participation trophy. A symbolic burden is an empty box; you can make it look like you’re carrying something heavy when, really, there isn’t much work.
Advantaged: Groups with a lot of power that are perceived positively, and as such, will receive benefits and few burdens in the policy.
Contenders: Groups with a lot of power that are perceived negatively and receive benefits and symbolic burdens in the policy.
Dependents: Groups with little power that are perceived positively and receive burdens and symbolic benefits in the policy.-Deviants: Groups with little power that are perceived negatively and receive burdens of the policy and no benefits.
Feed-forward effects are what happen after an initial policy. The distribution of benefits and burdens among target populations inform how they see themselves, how they interact with policymakers, and what policies continue to be implemented. As an example, those that are Advantaged see their power and positive association reflected in policy and stay involved in politics to maintain that position. Due to their favored status, policymakers seek out Advantaged groups to support future policies. This attention makes Advantaged groups feel good about themselves, which also promotes involvement in policymaking. It is a self-perpetuating cycle of policy, effects, and new policies. This cycle is true for each target population, though as perception and power decrease, their involvement and favorability do too. Deviants see that they have little power and negative associations, which leads to minimal political involvement due to societal perceptions. Their choices are intentionally limited in policy to keep them in this group. When policies aren’t designed to help them, they will be disengaged and distrustful of government/ policymakers.
Applying Social Construction Theory to the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan
On February 29, 2020, an agreement was reached between the United States government and the Taliban, dubbed the “Doha Agreement.” A condition of the deal was complete U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan by May 1, 2021 (a date later extended by six months by the Biden administration). Thus, a policy was decided and with it the benefits and burdens of each target population. The Doha Agreement cemented perceptions and points of view that brought about target groups in the withdrawal. Certain groups were carved out to receive benefits and burdens based on their status in society, as perceived by the policy decision-makers in this case: the United States government and the Taliban.
According to Schneider and Ingram, target populations are:
…chosen not just for their instrumental ability to serve policy purposes and not just because of their political power, but also because of the value-laden, emotional, and powerful positive and negative social constructions with which they are associated.
As such, the U.S. became advantaged from creating a U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan, provided military assistance, along with the signing of the Doha agreement. The Taliban became contenders by signing the Doha agreement and their subsequent advancement through Afghanistan due to the withdrawal of all U.S. forces. The Afghan government became the deviants from political infighting, which left them out of Doha negotiations, the collapse of their military; and the president fleeing Afghanistan. The Afghan people became the dependents as the U.S. withdrawal led to the spread of the Taliban and the collapse of their government.
As we elaborate on each of these target populations, it is essential to specify that their assignment (per Social Construction Theory) began when signing the Doha agreement. The withdrawal is somewhat ongoing and has been widely reported on; only pertinent information is discussed here, not to be conflated with media portrayal.
The United States: Citizens, including those in government and the military
The United States government and the Taliban enacted the policies from the Doha agreement. This inherent power placed them at the top of the social construction. While these entities have a negative perception of one another, the U.S. held a steady amount of power while the Taliban received an increase from this agreement. That stark difference is why the Taliban became the Contenders and the U.S. the Advantaged.
According to President Biden, the reason for following through with the deal (made under former President Trump) was that “our job in Afghanistan was done”. The only vital national interest held by Afghanistan was “to make sure it can never be used again to launch an attack on our homeland,” and that objective has been long since fulfilled. The only alternative would have been to send in thousands of more troops and escalate the war, which had effectively been stalemated for years.
At the turn of the century, many Americans couldn’t locate Afghanistan on a map; after 9/11, a majority knew its exact location. From Oct 2001 to Aug 2021, an estimated 800,000 service members were deployed to Afghanistan and 2,352 died during the conflict. At the peak of the conflict, there were 97,000 U.S. members and 41,000 NATO troops deployed to Afghanistan. Following the death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, the U.S. began to slowly downgrade its forces. In February 2020 only 12,900 U.S. members, 8,000 NATO troops, and 10,000 contractors were deployed to Afghanistan.
In a joint speech from the Department of Defense: “Eight-hundred-thousand of us in uniform served in Afghanistan over the last 20 years. Our nation spent over $1 trillion, and most importantly, 2,461 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines gave the last full measure of devotion, while 20,691 were wounded, and untold thousands of others suffer from the invisible wounds of war as we close this chapter in our nation’s history, and all of those casualties are alongside our allies and partners, and we should never forget that 60,000 Afghan National Security Forces gave their lives in the conduct of this war.”
This is where the benefit to the U.S. lies: the return of all troops deployed in Afghanistan, the prevention of any further troops being sent in, and no more families affected by a deployed loved one. Benefits also lie in a reduced cost to the U.S. military and taxpayers. At the implementation of the Doha Agreement, few burdens were identified for U.S. citizens and its government/military. An exit was always the goal and it was being achieved. This fell right in the line of being advantaged in Social Construction Theory.
Feed-forward effects, however, tell a different story. Public response to this policy at the time of the Doha agreement was largely negative, with many saying there were not enough checks in place for the Taliban. Multiple generals warned issues could occur if the U.S. continued with its plan to withdraw all forces. Neighboring countries concluded the Afghanistan situation would be disastrous if the U.S. was to withdraw. The most considerable fallout from this policy has been the civil society especially those who helped the U.S. military was forced to brave a harrowing journey for evacuation, with many being left behind altogether. Local American citizens were trying to find ways to assist in the withdrawal of these Afghan civilians. Multiple states and governors, including Governor Cox of Utah, told the federal government that their states will house Afghan refugees. On top of state assistance with the evacuation, American citizens compiled their resources to help those stranded in Afghanistan.
As we know from Ted Lowi, politics influenced this policy before it was ever put into place, and politics remains in the aftermath. The future policy is already being informed as protocols are formed to vet and re-home the 80,000 Afghans that were able to flee the country. Attitudes towards refugees will be on full display. This resettlement will become a precedent for any future scenario that is similar. As time goes on and Americans process how the 20-year intervention came to an end, there will be opinions stronger than ever about our military’s involvement overseas. The public opinion of prolonged military entanglement will hold weight on future policies being considered.
The Taliban
The Taliban built up a negative portrayal of Afghanistan through a decade of brutal control. Historically, the U.S. would have considered the Taliban a deviant target population. However, the Taliban-not Afghanistan’s government-was consulted/included in its final agreement to end the war. The Taliban became firm contenders; they received the benefit of a seat at the table, the growing influence, and the exit of the U.S. military. With the signing of the Doha agreement, the Taliban were expected to meet certain conditions: to begin talks with the Afghan government, to not fire at/attack the U.S. during withdrawal, and to not allow terror groups to fly in their controlled territory. The Taliban only fulfilled one condition of not attacking U.S. forces. This violation of the Doha Agreement could have resulted in the cancelation of the Agreement, and yet the Taliban’s actions were met largely without retribution. This demonstrates the “symbolic” burdens of a contender.
During the first ten years of the Afghan war, the Taliban had strong support from the populace. According to a survey from The Asian Foundation, the Taliban had 50% support from Afghan civilians, primarily Pashtuns. In 2019 the same survey was given and only 13.4% supported the Taliban. The majority of Afghans who responded to the survey said it was important to protect women’s rights, an area they felt the Taliban was lacking in.
The Taliban began to exercise their political power with their ability to take over Afghanistan slowly. Then when the U.S. fully withdrew, the Taliban filled the power void that was left. The Taliban was able to take over Afghanistan in a manner of weeks compared to the estimated months projected by senior military leaders. Leading up to the collapse of the Afghanistan government, the entire world saw the Taliban descend upon villages, towns, cities, and military installations with little to no resistance. The president of Afghanistan left the country stating, “countless patriots would be martyred, and the city of Kabul would be destroyed” if he had stayed behind.
For the Taliban, the feed-forward effect of the Doha Agreement was controlled. In a matter of weeks, they increased their tempo and completed their takeover of Afghanistan. The Taliban began to implement policies that put constraints on Afghan civilians, such as not allowing girls and women to return to some schools or workplaces. With a Taliban government, multiple international governments have expressed concerns about a return to the old Taliban ways. Future international policies will place limits on aid and other power for the Taliban if certain humanitarian standards are not met.
The Afghanistan government: The military, street-level bureaucrats, and elected officials
The Doha Agreement constructed the Afghan government as deviants. While the U.S. and Afghan militaries were allies, the Afghanistan government was left out of the Doha negotiations due to political infighting. This defined the social construction of these players. The Agreement required a political pact between the Taliban and the Afghan government, but the Afghanistan government was not willing to meet some of the demands of the Taliban and vice versa. The negotiations between these two never materialized and the Taliban increased their attacks on Afghanistan’s military.
Somewhat backed into a corner, with the signing of the Agreement, the government of Afghanistan’s strength was beginning to deteriorate. A date was set when all U.S. and NATO assistance to Afghanistan would cease. At this point, we begin to see the political power shift from the government of Afghanistan to the Taliban. We see them change status from Contenders to Deviants, with no political power or goodwill.
According to Social Construction Theory, deviants tend to receive no policy benefits and many burdens. With the downgrade and subsequent withdrawal of U.S. forces, the Afghan government inherited all of its responsibilities. Over the last 20 years of war, U.S. forces trained and equipped the Afghan military. However, the Afghan government collapsed at the hands of the Taliban as the U.S. began its final exit. It can be argued that the Afghan government was not ready to defend their country without the U.S. military. The Afghan government received all the benefits of modern technology, training, and military collaboration- but was unable to operate without U.S. support.
The feed-forward effect of this collapse was abandonment. The President, Ashraf Ghani, fled the country when the Taliban took Kabul. The military members deserted so that they wouldn’t be punished, or worse, for their past lives. This left the Taliban with billions of dollars of advanced U.S. military equipment: Humvees, Trucks, Weapons, and Helicopters. The U.S. military claims that all sensitive electronics were stripped from any equipment that was left behind. Even so, the Taliban is winning the public relations game of assuming control of the country. They have been using social media to make it known they are in possession of everything that once belonged to the governments of the United States of America and Afghanistan. This is a policy lesson to keep a close eye on because the Taliban has become a case that will be studied in winning credibility in the age of social media.
The Afghan people
An estimated 47,000 Afghanistan civilians have been killed since the beginning of the war in 2001. 2021 was an exceptionally dangerous year for the Afghan people; there was a 47% increase in casualties compared to 2020. As the Taliban transitions into power, many foreign governments believe they would implement policies and practices that were in place pre-9/11. Citizens of Afghanistan themselves feared this. With no humanitarian conditions put in place in the Doha Agreement, the Afghan people were socially constructed as dependents: entirely at the mercy of whoever was in charge at any moment.
According to Social Construction Theory, dependents tend to receive policy burdens and symbolic benefits. The “benefit” of peace and a long war ending was technically true- if it weren’t for the war the Taliban were about to wage on Afghan daily life, like girls in school and women excelling in the workplace. The withdrawal of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and the subsequent take over by the Taliban left thousands of Afghan civilians in desperate need to leave. Afghan civilians were in fear of their livelihoods under a Taliban government. U.S. forces executed the largest non-combatant evacuation operation over a two-week period from Hamid Karzai International Airport.
The biggest question on the minds of policymakers, veterans, and even civilians, was the manner of exit for civilians that assisted U.S. forces during the war. Many people demanded that the U.S. government evacuate these Afghans before they were executed at the hands of the Taliban.
It was claimed that we were “absolutely not going to see people airlifted off the roof of the U.S. embassy”, and yet the evacuation became an extravaganza on a similar par. Veterans were running private operations from across the world to get their former squads evacuated because they felt the military on the ground had their hands tied. According to former senior U.S. officials that spent their careers in Afghanistan, this breakdown of communication and wrong predictions will be studied for generations.
The feed-forward effect of so many people seeking refuge has been addressed here and here, and will be an interesting component to future policy in the United States, ranging from welfare to immigration.
Conclusion
Using Social Construction Theory as the lens, one can see how populations are merely political constructs. Target groups are created by policymakers to receive the benefits and burdens associated with their decisions. The alignment of political power created target groups: the United States, the Taliban, the Afghan government, and the Afghan citizen; at the signing of the Doha Agreement. What followed were the consequences of said policy going into effect.
In analyzing the feed-forward effects of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the lasting impacts seem clear: the United States will be reckoning with what became a catastrophe for a long time. Taking in refugees will also have a lasting effect on policy and the makeup of the country itself. The Taliban will be reckoning with such a marked increase in power. All eyes are on if their rule will mimic that of their past. But the changes in political power brought forth by the Doha Agreement were most disastrous for those individuals who had relied on the governments of the U.S. and Afghanistan for protection. Some are still being evacuated when possible- their fate is the most questionable, as the government of Afghanistan no longer exists.
