Peace in Colombia under Galtung and Buzan framework
In October 2016 Peace Negotiations in Colombia, between the Government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), concluded after 5 years of meetings in La Habana, Cuba. However, the referendum voting, which was intended to legitimize the peace agreements with the popular consent, failed to do so as the majority of the Colombian population voted against the agreements. This situation opened up doubts over the conditions of peace included in the text of the agreements and its consequences. Also, it was not clear if the scenario of the post-conflict in Colombia would be that of total peace.
The circumstances mentioned can be analyzed at the light of two of the most influenced and cited academic researches on peace and conflict. The contributions of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) and Johan Galtung (1996) offer the perfect academic theory to advance in a deep analysis of the circumstances of peace and violence in the post-conflict scenario in Colombia. Both these academic references complement in the sense that they widen the concepts of peace, violence and security, offering a broader argumentative and theoretical ground for the studies of conflict. Given that violence is not just direct but it is supported by structural and cultural violence, the answer to violence should not be just military and political, but other security approaches tender a more effective response. Security in an economic, societal, political and environmental sense diminishes structural and cultural violence. By decreasing structural and cultural violence conflict transformation will offer a scenario with less direct violence.
That being said, it is important and interesting to analyze the post-conflict scenario in Colombia by the impact and effectiveness of the peace agreement through the contributions of such authors. The following essay will respond to the question of: what are the security impacts of the peace agreement signed in Colombia between the Government and the FARC? The security implications of such agreement depend of the conditions of violence that mutated through the conflict period in Colombia, thus the points agreed on have to solve in some way the structural and cultural violence present in the causes of the armed struggle. At the same time, there has to be a wider understanding on security to offer peace in the rural regions of Colombia, given that there are still presence of armed actors that affect the post-conflict scenario.
Colombian Conflict Diagnosis
Conflict in Colombia is one of the oldest armed struggles of the world and also one of the most complex. Direct violence threats are highly institutionalized through the discourse of securitization and promoted from every sector of security. Also, peace carries new security threats and security institutions are working on identifying them to legitimize budget expenditure. One of the biggest threats are FARC dissent groups that continues its illegal activity searching for revenues through their participation in illegal economies such as coca production, illegal extraction of gold, illegal extraction of wood, cattle robbery, among others. As stated, these dissent groups do not have any political claims and are just economic driven. There is also important to state that Colombian geography is very accidental and varied posing more difficulty to the governmental institutions to make presence in remote regions of the country.
There are many ways to approach the Colombian conflict, however in this essay I will use a time-based approach in order to offer a simple historical presentation of a long and highly complex conflict. One of the most important efforts agreed in the Peace Negotiations between the government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) were to institute a verified and complete historical trajectory of the armed conflict. The government established a group of highly renamed academicals to conform the Group of Historical Memory to accomplish such task. The Group of Historical Memory proposes four different periods that represent changes in the dynamics of the use of violence, the intensity of the conflict and the configuration of the armed actors. The first period, from 1958 to 1982, indicates the transition from the political violence to the subversive violence. This transition is a consequence of the rejection of the amnesty offered by General Rojas Pinilla to the liberal guerrillas in the southern regions of Colombia leaded by the future commander of the FARC, Manuel Marulanda. After the Colombian Army attack to this guerrilla they celebrate their first conference in 1965 with 100 fighters. Two years after, in the Second Conference this sublevated guerrilla group takes the name of FARC (Grupo de Memoria Historica, 2013). This period is characterized by the inability of the Colombian government to control the subversive advance and the emergence of other guerrillas groups such as the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN).
The rise of these armed groups responded to clear interactions of direct, structural and cultural violence. Thus, violence in this period is a reaction to a complex form of violence directed by the lack of capacity of the Colombian State to offer peace scenarios to its population. FARC had social claims that were not responded by the Local Governments of rural regions of the country. The absence of a political alternative to left-wing political inclinations led to the conformation of groups outside the political structure of the government. These groups armed themselves to defend their ideals and people from other armed groups representing conservative parties. Also, the economical and societal situation in peripheral communities gave the structural support to such groups.
The second proposed period is between the years 1982 and 1996 and it distinguish itself for the political projection, the territorial expansion and the military growth of the guerrillas groups. Also, the far-right paramilitary groups appeared in this period. There was an international view of a delicate crisis and the partial collapse of the Colombian Government, given the eruption and propagation of the drug problem in the global political-security agenda (Ibid.). Given the incursion of the guerrilla groups in more complex means of illegal financing as the drug trafficking, blackmail massive and selective kidnapping, it was evident the combat ability increase of the FARC. This was founded in the large accumulation of resources and was expressed in the adoption of a new strategy of enlargement of their territorial control and in the number of fighters (Echandía, 2012).
The period from 1996 to 2005 is characterized by the worsening of the war in Colombia. Between those years occurred the simultaneous expansions of the guerrillas and the paramilitary groups, the crisis and rebuilding of the Government in the middle of the armed conflict and the political radicalization of the public opinion through a military solution of the conflict (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2013). The beginning of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), a paramilitary-armed force that grouped different self-defense and criminal organizations marks a change in the dynamics of the conflict and in the intensity of the violence. During this period academics distinguish the violence peak during the entire armed conflict. The offensive attitude of the paramilitary groups leaded to cases of indiscriminate violence against civilian population with the goal of disputing territorial claim with the guerrilla groups. Also, there were cases of violence against civilians as form of punishment for the previous support to guerrilla groups.
From 1998, president Pastrana commenced a strengthening policy aimed to improve of the tactics and technic capabilities of the Armed Forces with direct impact on the insurgents groups. The period between 2005 and 2013 presented a government-lead military offensive of the state, which reached its highest point of efficiency against the insurgency. Guerrilla groups were weakened at the point to force a tactic and geographical reorganization. Also, the AUC demobilized through a peace agreement with the Government. However, this supposed the beginning of Criminal Bands composed with formed AUC fighters. Both, the strengthening of the Colombian Armed Forces and the offensive of the AUC forced a geographical relocation of the guerrillas in the borders, which offered them survival opportunities through hiding and favored the construction of illegal economies structures that implied a continuation of the armed confrontation through different strategies (Cabrera, 2012).
Through these periods there were four attempts to establish a peace agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government. All of them failed, in part because they did not have into account the structural problems affecting the continuity of violence. Even if the political claims of such organization were each time more diffuse because the prevalence of the economic objectives, there were not a social approach to the necessities of rural communities or to the opposition political groups in the democratic structure of the government. After all of the failed peace negotiations processes the direct violence was the only solution to the guerrilla problem. Discursive violence and poverty were not approached until the peace negotiations of the Habana. The history of violence and the failed peace attempts of the past conditioned the peace negotiations that started in 2011; many of these conditions predispose the parties in their attitudes and goals. The most cited example is the extermination of the Union Patriotica, a political movement created by the FARC to participate in the democratic arena, in the ninetieths. Dialogue, was then, limited in the trust for the probable repetition of such violence acts.
Peace Elements of the New Agreement
Taking for proven the complexity and heterogeneity of the Colombian conflict comes the need to open the possibility to assure peace trough peaceful means. The negotiations started in the middle of the ongoing armed conflict with small contacts between a small government delegation and the secretariat of the FARC. As it was indicated before, during the both presidential periods of Alvaro Uribe (2002–2006 and 2008–2010) the FARC suffered their most important military defeats. Their fronts withdrew to the borders of the south and west of Colombia. Their military capability was reduced to small terrorist tactics in rural areas and towns. The political decision of president Santos (2010–2014 and 2014–2018) was to open a small channel of communication to indicate in the possibility of a new peace negotiation process. Many academics believe that if that decision were not taken, the conflict will entered an extermination phase of the last militants and leaders of the FARC. This would signified a bloody period with many civilian casualties and economic costs to the country.
However, it was clear that the superiority of the government in the military field would not rest difficulty to the dialogues of the Habana. Colombian conflict can be classified as a complex conflict given the heterogeneity of the actors and the goals, which have been mutating during the large periods of the armed struggle. Also, it is a fully articulated conflict for there exist the conditions and elements of the conflict triangle (Galtung, 1996). As there are attitudes and assumptions that suppose aggressiveness between the parties, the behavior is destructive and there is a contradiction of goals. Nevertheless, the transformation of the conflict was not carried according to the suggestion of Galtung (ibid.) as the approach between the parties was developing during the armed fight between the Army and the FARC. Thus, there was not such thing as a reduction of the conflict, or reduction of the behavior. One can think of a change of attitudes and a creation of a new behavior, which complicates even more the categorization of the conflict. This situation stayed the same during the four periods of the conversations, until the decision of bilateral cease of fire at the beginning of the year 2016.
On the other hand, the peace negotiations of La Habana started in the right direction of attending a structural cause of the violence. The negotiations began with a previous stipulated agenda that would help the focus on the main problems that were the core sustentation of the armed conflict for the parties. Those are: the end of the conflict with the FARC (elimination of the direct violence between the actors), justice for the victims (as a therapy for no repetition in the future), solution to the narcotics drugs problem (as one of the legitimizers of the direct violence), better opportunities to the rural area (for it is the starting and core argument of the armed struggle since the sixtieths), democratic opportunities and participation (to transform the conflict without the elimination of the contrary) (Final Agreement, August 24, 2016).
Even though Colombian armed conflict is sui generis, as all the conflicts, most of the elements of the peace agreements were taken from the peace experiences of Ireland and South Africa. Nevertheless, the final product given to the Colombian population to legitimize in a referendum was a very specific agreement. As was later advised, the referendum disapproved the text of the peace agreement because it had not in count the position and proposals of many Colombian political parties and societal organizations. It was one of the biggest mistakes of such process that, even though, it was a complex conflict, only two actors were taken into account to participate in the dialogue. After saying this, it is clear that the transformation was according a dialogical approach that may not referred a practical action after the agreement (Galtung, 1996).
According to Galtung (ibid.) the dialogical conflict transformation must pursue an effort on overcoming the past to construct a new future, creating new opportunities were the B-axis is less, as well as the direct violence. The author focus on the necessity and implications of moving from past to the future, resting importance to data and history on peace making, but not in legal instances. However, the cores of the peace agreement in Colombia are the victims, their history and reparation. The creation of a mechanism of truth, justice and reparation was needed as an engine of many other mechanisms like the transitional justice commission (Final Agreement, 2016). Thus, the Commission of clarification of truth, coexistence and no repetition is the common ground to create a peace scenario. However, this may create more violence as it is intended to distribute culpabilities among the actors.
As conclusion of this chapter it is evident that despite the new peace agreement have elements that intent to establish a wider agenda to diminish structural generators of violence and the change in attitudes and behaviors, there may be elements that contribute to a new generation of violence. The conflict transformation is a fact as one of the principal actors of the armed struggle agreed on abandoning the direct violence and behavior against society and the government. However, the new scenarios are not pacific at all. The prevalence of the past in the implementation of the agreement may lead to the perpetuation of the basis of the conflict and the start of new direct violence. Also, the introduction of the FARC to democratic institutions is not a guarantee of the building of a future together. Institutions like the parliament are not cooperative at all. They have block apparatus and schemes to oppose other actors, deepening the cultural and structural violence. Just to name an example, filibusterism may be use to block the democratic process of the Colombian government, complicating the solution of public problems with communal interest.
However, discursively the introduction and implementation of the peace agreement that change the behavior of an armed actor makes Colombia a more developed country. Even if the state institutions don’t have a real presence in the rural areas of the country, the interest of the international community would help to improve the conditions of those in need. As a consequence of such rhetorical change, non-governmental international organization may have an interest in participating in the building of a post conflict scenario through a more holistic approach. The absence of armed groups in large proportion of the territory favors the access and work of such organizations and the government to assist such communities and to have some impact in the contribution to peace.
Security Approaches to new Threats
As peace is the absence of violence and security is the condition of peace this two terms must be perfectly coordinated for a maximization of the impacts expected in the post conflict. Nevertheless, security conditions are not yet guarantee in most of the regions in Colombia. From common robbery to complex Transnational Organized Crime affect the stability of the Colombian democracy and the living and property of its citizens. Also, new forms of threats have emerged in recent years, which widen the field of threats perceived in the different levels of analysis.
As stated by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) security matters are subjects of political interest. Matters that affect the survival of the units are discursively constructed by different actors. Through the securitization process such matter becomes one that must be approached with more urgent policies and actions. However, the pressure of different legitimizers of violence can favor the prevalence and creation of threats to maintain global military expenditure. Such is the situation of Colombia in the post conflict, however as I will show in the present chapter, such threats are real and well grounded. Also, attained to the studies of the authors, the new threats affect not only the Colombia population and institutions but are characterize to have transnational consequences.
Colombian conflict created the conditions for the continuation of many armed groups based on the appropriation of means illegal financing. More that 50 years of conflict structured the country with the elements necessaries to produce and export illegal narcotic drugs and many other forms of illegal economies that affect the different sectors of security. These preconditions promote the continuation of an armed struggle for the control of such means of illegal financing. However, also the security institutions and social organizations, directed by the Colombian government, had widen and share their experience to offer a wider approach to end violence scenarios in the rural areas of the country. Following, I will address some of the many new threats identified by the different sectors and the process of securitization in the security agenda for the post conflict.
Colombia is one of the countries with higher military expenditure as a proportion of the total public expenses. One of the strongest considerations made by the civil society for the post conflict was that given that one of the most important actors of the conflict was going to renounce the armed way there was no need to support such a big proportion of he public funds to the war. Therefor, more resources were going to feed the societal needs of the population, such as education and health. However, the change of the conditions of the conflict changed the perception of threats, but they didn’t diminished. This was argued given (1) the existence of other armed groups besides the FARC, (2) the origination of new armed groups and (3) the perception of new threats and widens of the objectives of the security institutions.
Following the inter-sector linkage and analysis suggested by the authors (ibid.) the Colombian post-conflict shows a perfect example to apply such analysis. The new doctrine of the Colombian Armed Forces, doctrine DAMASCUS, establish the widening of the mission of the different security institutions to offer a more effective approach to previous existence threats and new threats and assure the peace consolidation in the country. This change in the doctrine was promoted by the interest of the Colombian Ministry of Defense to enter NATO, for they applied NATO principles in such doctrine. Environmental, economic and societal security is the core of such doctrine that started to be implemented since the beginning of the year 2017.
Just to offer an example that show the change of doctrine based in the widen of the objectives of the security institutions, the inter-agency efforts and the securitization process of a threat I will explain the illegal exploitation of gold deposit in the western borders of Colombia. In this region the Front 57 of the FARC made presence for more than 20 years controlling the illegal exportation of gold to Central America. After the peace agreements this Front was disintegrated and it is starting to make the transition to the civilian life. However, the existence of such economical activity determined the societal and economic factors of the region. Right now there are new armed groups coming from the northern region of Colombia to maintain the illegal gold extraction in the border. The unregulated and disproportional uses of such activities have a large negative impact on the environment affecting communities in Colombia and Panama. The illegal exploitation causes the disappearing and poison of rivers for the use of mercury in the artisanal process of extraction. Finally, the poisoned fishes may end up in the table of a fisherman’s family. The societal securities is threaten by this activities given that their identities are conditioned by the destruction of the environment separating the community to their ancient cultural uses. There is, also, an economical dependence to an illegal activity that threatens the stability of the region in the post conflict.
This matter was securitized by the new doctrine DAMASCUS of the Armed Forces of Colombia given a coercive response to the sectors security problems. The new doctrine created a battalion in charge of identifying and destroying the illegal deposits of gold in the national territory. However, this battalion was integrated by different governmental agencies to offer a wider security approach to the environmental, economical and societal problem provoked by the illegal extraction of gold. First of all, the securitization process led to manage the illegal gold problem to be managed as the former FARC fronts were managed. This means the bombing of the camps and the military intervention afterwards. The change in the political interpretation of such groups was promoted to maintain the military efforts on different enemies. Also, non-governmental organizations of national and international levels intervene after the military actions to help develop the communities and the environmental maintenance of the regions.
However, the contributions of the authors (ibid.) serve to analyze the Colombian post conflict scenario through the lens of the new definition of the security complex. As it was stated that the armed organizations are often concentrated in the borders of Colombia as an strategy to survive their illegal action affects at least the communities of two countries. Also, the inter sector linkage of the new threats perceived by the units of securitization in the post conflict change the already established security coordination and cooperation between units. This is, then, a major complexity to the security scenario in the post conflict. The interdependence of the security relations among actors in the regional and national levels darkens the peace expectations of the future. This, given the political enmity in the region that doesn’t take into account the structural problems endured by the communities.
Conclusion
In conclusion, even though a peace agreement was signed between the two actors that had the most influence in the Colombian conflict, there is not such thing as a pacific scenario in the future of the country. The considerations provided by Galtung (1996) and Buzan et al. (1998) confirm that the elements of violence are still present in the Colombian context. There are implications that affect the structural and cultural violence and may have a repercussion in the reborn of the direct violence among the actors in the future. The scenarios of interactions provided to reduce the violence may not have the outcomes expected and may be use to block the contrary making violence to prevail.
Also, the security conditions are not guaranteed given the complexity of the new threats perceived by the units. Threats that affect at the same time different sectors are still present. The securitization process favored the widening of the security approach that might help diminish the presence of armed groups in border areas of Colombia in the short future. However, the security complex theory signals that given the interdependence of the security matters among units, the illegal action of armed groups and dissent can affect communities in the post conflict in Colombia and its neighbors.
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