Why Are There No Democracies in the Middle East?
The Arab Spring brought about a new hope of democratisation and an increase in political freedom for people living in the Middle East. Yet despite this optimism, many countries in the region either suppressed the uprisings, transitioned to a new authoritarian regime, or are still facing ongoing civil wars.
One example of the types of states that weathered the Arab Spring most successfully is the oil-rich Gulf Monarchies. This raises the question of why, despite numerous attempts, has democracy failed to either emerge or survive in the Middle East.
The most prominent theory on the progression of economic and political development is Modernisation Theory. This argues that each country will go through certain stages of development from a feudal system, to industrialisation, and will then become a modern liberal democracy with various stages in between.
Modernisation Theory believes that democracy is secreted out of dictatorship by economic development.
The second theory on democratisation articulates that it is not democratic emergence but democratic survival that causes the correlation between GDP per capita and democracy.
Adam Przeworski argued that one can “Expect to observe democracies to appear randomly with regards to levels of development, but die in the poorer countries and survive in the wealthier ones. Thus, history gradually accumulates wealthy democracies, since every time a dictatorship happens to die in an affluent country, democracy is there to stay.”
Traditional theories have increasingly come under more intense scrutiny as this contrast continues. One possibility is a reverse causality of democracy and economic growth, arguing that by committing to privileges such as property rights and political representation, individuals feel safer in investing capital in a country where returns cannot be arbitrarily taken away leading to economic growth.
Some historians have observed that the exit option of merchants in feudal Europe led to the creation of democratic institutions as a means to keep the tax revenue of merchants who would otherwise leave for a country where their rights are more protected.
Although these theories have different means the end is the same in that democracy and economic wealth correlate. This offers little when analysing the Middle East, as within both theories the region’s strong economic development but poor political development makes states in the region anomalies within these lines of thought.
Why then do so many Middle Eastern states sit outside of the correlation between economic and democratic development? One of the reasons behind this is known as the “resource curse”.
In economic terms, this usually refers to the observation that countries with an abundance of natural resources tend to perform worse than those without such resources. In terms of political development, it also tries to explain the link between access to these natural resources, and less democracy.
One way that natural resources undermine democratic development is that they provide revenue without the need to bargain with the merchant class. Unlike the merchants in Europe, who fostered the economic growth from the 16th century onwards, natural resources are fixed assets and have no exit option.
The lack of bargaining power undermines the ability of citizens to negotiate for better democratic representation. For example, if a businessman in the 18th century was not offered sufficient protections from the ability of a tyrannical government to take his wealth, or the right to participate in decision making through democracy, he could simply leave and move to another country.
Oil is also somewhat unique within the resource curse theory. Unlike other natural resources which require a degree of cooperation with the merchant class such as coffee or cotton, oil is much easier for the state to extract and sell itself without any degree of accommodation between the regime and merchants.
The finance raised from oil also enables regimes in the Middle East to “coup-proof” themselves. The first part of coup-proofing revolves around the suppression of groups that could be deemed a threat to the regime’s survival, such as the military. One of the ways this is accomplished is by creating a paramilitary force separate from the main army that can protect the regime from the military and creates an increased risk for anyone, military or civilian, to attempt to overthrow the regime. Oil revenues also fund secret police and other security forces that can deal with any troublemakers before they gain a wider audience.
The ability to prevent democratisation with oil revenues is not just repressive. The capital inflows also enable regimes to “buy-off” the population by spreading the benefits of expenditure, enabled by the abundance of oil. This can be seen in infrastructure, healthcare, and education throughout the oil-rich countries in the region. At it’s simplest by improving people’s lives they are less likely to wish to see the downfall of the regime that has, in their lifetime, made them considerably better off.
Another way that Persian Gulf monarchies survive is by giving powerful positions to family members who would otherwise have a vested interest in toppling the regime to take power themselves. For example, the most vulnerable time of an autocratic regime is during succession. In Gulf Monarchies the family members will band together rather than competing for power and risking their positions. Unlike military dictatorships, the line of succession is also secure, eliminating any questions or conflicts over who will be the next leader.
This creates a cost-benefit analysis of why certain regimes in the region are so enduring. Opposition to the autocratic regimes increases as the benefits of supporting the regime decline and the risk of opposing the regime decreases. The repression ability and economic benefits that oil revenues bring supports this and explains why the cost-benefit analysis would encourage both the citizens and the elites to maintain support for existing autocratic regimes in the Middle East.
The power culture is also different in Monarchies compared to other autocratic regimes. For example, the military, anti-imperialist and secular regimes are more divided with clearer “insiders” and “outsiders” giving a stronger sense of winners and losers.
This has the effect of increasing the stakes of control and impact greatly upon the cost-benefit analysis mentioned previously. As a result, military regimes see a much greater amount of unrest than monarchies.
One of the most controversial theories on why democracies don’t exist in the Middle East is that the culture of the region and Islam are both detrimental to the development of democracy.
Even within this theory, academics are divided. Some believe that Islam is naturally hierarchical making people more open to authoritarianism whilst others believe it is Arab culture, not Islam that explains this. Although for both of these points there is certainly a correlation, both theories struggle to stand up to more intense scrutiny.
For example, the Catholic Church during the enlightenment, was often supportive of the absolute monarchies of Europe so to say that this then fosters an un-democratic culture would be incorrect. The majority of Islamic countries with the exception of a few, tend to be quite poor, this would also explain why democracies are unable to endure in these nations. Finally, the only countries that sit as anomalies in the correlation between economic development and democracy, are all extremely rich in oil, which as discussed earlier would explain why they maintain stable, autocratic regimes.
Saudi Arabia stands out as being one of the clear anomalies. Economically, Saudi Arabia is a well-developed country with a GDP per capita of over $50,000 according to the CIA world factbook. The IMF has also praised Saudi Arabia’s economic reforms, observing the increase in non-oil fiscal revenues and an increase in fiscal transparency though oil revenues still account for over 80% of their income. In contrast to their flourishing economy, democratic development remains lacking. Dissidents against the autocratic Monarchy are persecuted, the media is censored and women are yet to receive many of the basic rights that men in the society have.
The most effective way that the Saudi regime keeps hold of power is through a series of anti-revolutionary measures. The Saudi security forces are effectively split to act as a counter-balance to each other and are recruited from tribes that are supportive of the Monarchy.
Saudi Arabia also operates both a public uniformed police force and a secret police force that act effectively against any dissidents.
During the Arab spring, these forces were used to quickly clamp down on any protests as security forces closed off places that could be used for assembly and ensured that dissidents received severe penalties.
It is hard to imagine that Saudi Arabia would be able to afford their upkeep were it not for their vast oil revenues. This can be compared to Yemen, which has a GDP per capita of $2,500. In contrast, the authoritarian regime in Yemen was unable to hold back the unrest during the Arab Spring forcing Ali Abdullah Saleh from power with the civil war still ongoing.
The regime in Saudi Arabia has also taken steps to prevent the rise of dissent in the country with considerable spending and redistribution enabled by the abundance of natural resources and the fiscal revenue this provides for Saudi Arabia. In order to make the population more subservient and passive with respect to the authoritarian nature of the Saudi Monarchy, cradle-to-grave welfare, education, healthcare, employment support, and the supply of drinking water in a country that is predominantly desert, has helped to bolster support from the population.
Oil exports have also enabled Saudi Arabia to avoid international scrutiny for their human rights abuses. The recent killing of Jamal Khashoggi, a journalist critical of the regime who had been living in exile, emphasises this. Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the country where the murder took place, have differing views on the events surrounding his death with a UN report that the killing was “an extrajudicial killing for which the state of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is responsible”.
The West has often been willing to turn a blind eye to the oppressive regime in Saudi Arabia. Part of this is also down to the huge weapons exports that countries such as the USA and the UK have in the country.
Another example of this is in comparing Bahrain and Libya. Bahrain at the time had significant oil exports to the West. The result, when both were facing a humanitarian crisis during the Arab Spring with both regimes cracking down brutally on the uprisings, rebels in Libya were supplied weapons and given direct military support whilst a blind-eye was turned to Bahrain.
During the Arab Spring, the Saudi regime was also able to use cultural factors to their advantage. In 2011, members of the clergy denounced the pro-democracy movements in Saudi Arabia as “un-Islamic”, warning that the movement threatened the unity of the community. In part, this is down to the huge spending on religious projects done by the Al-Saud monarchy of Saudi Arabia. The regime often uses its own interpretation of Shari’a law to justify their authoritarian tendencies and religious leaders in the country will regularly promote this.
It is also important to note that it is predominantly the Gulf Monarchies that prove to be exceptions to the correlation between economic and political development. For example, whilst polls in Egypt have shown that the population is more receptive of authoritarian regimes providing they provide stability. This does not necessarily advocate the theory that cultural factors underpin their failed transition to democracy. Having a GDP per capita of around $12,500 is a more likely explanation. Similarly, the vast majority of Islamic Countries tend to be on the lower end of the economic spectrum. The exceptionalism lies more in the oil-rich countries around the Persian Gulf.
As to why there are no democracies in the Middle East, the failure of democracy in the region is not unique. For the majority, the lack of economic development has underpinned the failure of democratic regimes as it has done across the globe. Whilst this is not to say that poor countries cannot be democratic, the link is too stark to ignore. But why are the richer countries in the region not democratic? The answer is both simple and extremely complex. Oil. This valuable resource has provided the means to adopt a successful “carrot or stick” approach towards their population and gives other powers a vested interest in maintaining stability in the region. Whilst this does not wholly disprove other theories such as that of Islamic culture being fundamentally undemocratic, it certainly provides a much more robust explanation.
Thank you for reading, we hope you come away from this with a better understanding of the dynamics of the region. If you enjoyed, feel free to check out our other informative articles.
