FC Bayern and the art of creating positional superiorities

Tolga Yardimci
Positional Play
Published in
5 min readAug 10, 2022

FC Bayern Munich got off to a flying start to 22/23 season with their brand new 4-2-2-2, scoring 11 goals in 2 games. The way they created positional superiorities with both physical pace and speed of thought in the attacking 3rd between lines, inter lines, and out of lines is very impressive and I believe it is worth to be further discussed.

4–2–2–2 structure when Bayern in possession.

After the DFB Super Cup game, RB Leipzig coach, Domenico Tedesco, summarized everything for us: “Bayern deserved their win, especially for the 1st half. They played to their strengths. They have lightning fast players in all positions. The arrows come from everywhere — left, right, left half space, right half space. This is mad, absolutely mad!”

Against RB Leipzig’s compact 5-2-2-1 standing at mid-block, they usually looked for superiorities inter and out of lines. They achieved this through first keeping their attacking midfielders at a position to force opponent wing backs to be an intermediate player between attacking midfielders and full backs, attracting the wing back with full back, and then moving the attacking midfielder to force opponent center back to be an intermediate player between striker and attacking midfielder. Then, they force the center back to make a decision to pin on one player, and find the empty pocket by playing third man over seriously long distances. It is not easy to do this at all, but they have individual and collective quality to successfully use this strategy.

In the example below, we see Muller’s position is forcing Henrichs to stay between Pavard and him.

Once Pavard attracts Henrichs and sees his jump, he sends the ball to Lucas. While Muller moves behind Henrichs to force Halstenberg to stay between Gnabry and him.

Lucas sees Halstenberg decides on staying at Gnabry and finds Muller on an open channel out of Leipzig’s defensive line for an easy and advantageous progression.

At another example, Pavard similarly attracts Henrichs.

This time Halstenberg decides to stay at Muller, and Upamecano reads it well to find Gnabry between the lines.

Their second strategy to create positional superiority is to play a 3-man front line. If both opponent wing backs are high, then 3 players from the attacking 4 pin the center-backs, while the fourth player waits the opportunity to find the space between the line.

In this example, the threat started by finding Muller between the lines ends with Mane’s goal.

Against Frankfurt, who use a similar variation of 5–2–2–1 structure with RB Leipzig, they started the game with two goals, after which Frankfurt couldn’t stay compact against Bayern in the first half. The wing backs jumped too easy, the distance between defensive line and midfielders increased too much. Oliver Glasner also admitted it after the game, saying: “It was a fully deserved win for Bayern. We lost our heads after the two quick goals we conceded. Bayern took full advantage of the space we gave them. We were simply overwhelmed by their pace.”

As Bayern recognized the excessive length of Frankfurt defense, they used the 3-man front line again and again to usually find Musiala between the lines who can carry the ball towards the opponent goal quickly.

If anybody from the defensive line leaves the player he was pinned and jumps to Musiala, this will result in even worse situations for Frankfurt, because Bayern is exceptional not only in creating space but also finding the empty man in the space.

As we all know, Muller is really good at reading the game. When a wing back loses control, probably because of the frustration, and jumps too high, he can directly detect the opportunity.

Here he starts showing his teammates the space due to Kostic’s jump very early on and asking to switch the play.

Bayern uses Mane dropping and moves the ball to the space. This danger also ends with Musiala’s goal.

Needless to say, Bayern has significant qualitative and socio-effective advantages against their opponents. They have the most expensive squad of Bundesliga by far. If we want to line-up the best 11 of the league, we will probably count 8–9 players from them. This individual quality obviously gives them a strong qualitative advantage. In addition, except Mane, all players have been playing together for a while, the settled squad and good atmosphere with strong leaders help them to create strong socio-affective superiority against their opponents. The best example of this is the fourth goal against RB Leipzig, where the build-up and progression happen so quick and fluid to deliver the ball from Neuer to back of the net of Gulacsi’s goal.

It has been really interesting to watch Bayern implementing some elements of positional play with a 4–2–2–2 structure, which is believed to be doomed by people obsessed with positional play. Them implementing these ideas with an incredible speed on the pitch makes their game more relentless and entertaining. As we will see them playing against different structures and models, we will learn more about Nagelsmann’s playbook and I am really looking forward to it.

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