Fundamentalism and the Prisoner’s Dilemma

THE current rise of fundamentalism can be explained using the classic Game Theory scenario known as the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”. For those not familiar with Game Theory, let me start by giving you a very simplified example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma applying a real historical case of exacerbated fundamental behavior: the example of Catholics versus Protestants. In this example, there are two ways in which each group can behave: either it cooperates to try to agree on a new set of beliefs (not without having to make some concessions to its rival), or it fights its opponent for fundamental supremacy. This game has basically four possible outcomes: a) Both decide to cooperate, or b) both decide to fight each other, or c) Catholics cooperate while Protestants do not or d) vice versa. This is a typical case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma where, unfortunately, the only stable equilibrium (or Nash equilibrium as it is known) is for both to fight each other again and again. Let me illustrate why this is the case.

Let us start by assuming that Catholics want to cooperate. If they do, the best response for the Protestants is to try to take advantage of their rivals soft stance and try to impose their own fundamental worldview — as the payout of not cooperating while the other is trying to cooperate is larger than the payout of both cooperating. Now let us assume that Catholics do not want to cooperate; the best response for the Protestants in this case is also not to cooperate, as the payout of trying to cooperate when the other one is not cooperating is lower than the payout of just fighting back. If I were to describe the game from the perspective of the Catholics, the best responses will be exactly the same as above. As such, the only equilibrium we are left with is for both not to cooperate. But the fascinating feature of a Prisoner’s Dilemma like this one is that both parties could actually be better off if somehow they managed to cooperate. The problem is that cooperation, although preferable than all out war, is not a sustainable equilibrium: as soon as one starts cooperating, the incentives for the other to deviate from cooperation and exploit the potential gains are just too tempting.

So if the only stable equilibrium is for an ongoing battle of worldviews, how did we manage to escape the Catholic/Protestant blood bath as we evidently did? Well, the simple answer is that we created a parallel strategy to avoid playing the game to begin with. Realizing that the “Catholic vs. Protestant” game was not going to lead to a social optimum, liberal philosophers (following the ideas of John Locke) introduced the then revolutionary concept of Toleration. Toleration is neither cooperation nor battle, it is premeditated mutual respect. Toleration is then not a strategy in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game I have just described; it is a strategy to avoid playing the game altogether. The key for toleration to work lies in removing the possibility of playing the confrontation/cooperation game, and the way this was achieved in practice was by privatizing our beliefs and by extracting them from public discourse. Once our Catholic or Protestant beliefs became private, there was no more game to be played: no one cooperated but no one fought either: we just mutually ignored (tolerated) one another.

As I have argued in previous posts, the problem with Toleration is that in an era of complete interconnectedness, the clear separation of the public and the private has become impracticable. The rise of the Internet has reignited our Prisoner’s Dilemma. In today’s world we are back at playing the confrontation vs. cooperation game of years past — and we all know where that is leading. To make matters worse, this time around the game is more complex than the good old Catholics vs. Protestants version, and on top of that, the game is here to stay as radical interconnectivity is probably irreversible. Insisting in Toleration as an escape valve will not work either because the possibility of carving out a private area in these interlinked days is not realistic. The real question then is how do we manage to create a plural society that actually cooperates and avoids the pitiful yet seemingly inevitable equilibrium of rising fundamentalism? Answering this question is, I am convinced, the most pressing task of our generation.

That cooperation is a better outcome than escalating fundamentalism is evident, yet, as the Prisoner’s Dilemma example showed, it is neither the natural nor a stable equilibrium. In order to make cooperation a plausible solution we are going to need to do more; new ideas are required and bold changes in the way we understand and organize ourselves will need to be introduced. I have already advanced some suggestions and outlined probable changes in previous posts, but the task is ongoing. Understanding what we are up against is, for now, a good start. Yet the truth is that, for the time being, we are back at being prisoners of our own beliefs.