Questions on Democracy: Defining and Redefining an Ancient Word

Last time, we asked the question: what kind of government does the US government claim to be? How does it portray itself mythologically?

We learned that the US government sees itself as a representative democracy. According to the materials the US government provides us on the topic,¹ we learned that a representative democracy is different from a direct democracy in that, rather than each citizen appearing to cast their vote in person, we elect representatives who make decisions for us.

We already know that not everybody agrees with this claim. But before we start to analyze its veracity, I want to rewind a little bit and look at the definition of a democracy.

What Makes a Government “Democratic”?

Whenever we try to define a concept, there are numerous different angles from which we can approach the task. We can go for a linguistic definition of the word; we can look at how the originators of the idea conceptualized it; we can examine popular current ways of thinking about the idea; we can take a behaviorist approach, looking at how the concept seems to function in practice; and so on. In my opinion, the more approaches you use in combination, the more insight you will ultimately gain.

Many people trace the origins of democratic ideals back to the ancient Greek civilization. I would argue that the concept of democracy probably does not begin with the Greeks — that is, there were other social organizations prior to the Greeks that, it could be argued, functioned democratically. Unquestionably, however, the linguistics of democracy can be traced back to Greece. Let’s turn to a professor of classics and political science, Josiah Ober, for a definition of the etymology of the word:

According to Dr. Ober, “democracy” comes from the Greek words “demo” (people) + “kratos” (power or capacity). It refers to the capacity of a group of people to accomplish things together.

In practice, the term “democracy” usually refers specifically to a type of governance process — a process in which “the people” exercise “power” or “capacity” to rule.

That’s a good starting point, but what does it really mean?

One of the problems with linguistics is that, the more you focus on the definitions of words, the more their certainty starts to crumble before you like sand. Words are shy, photosensitive creatures: when subjected to scrutiny, they tend to fragment and scatter into the shadows. For example, who counts as “the people”? Into what domains do their “powers” extend? How much power should they be allowed to exercise within those domains? What are the inner and outer limits of what counts as a “democracy”?

Even in ancient Greece, where the term was invented, this question had no single answer. Aristotle, in his Politics, defines a variety of potential democratic “styles”, ranging from a relatively democratic oligarchy to something approaching a more pure and direct democracy. Kurt A. Raaflaub estimates that the adult male citizenry of Athens — who constituted the Athenian “demos” — numbered only between 10–20% of the total population; such a state would differ greatly from most practical modern instances of a “democracy”. Nevertheless, he writes:

“We are simply not in a position to deny that the Athenians had a democracy, even if we believe that it does not fit our concept of democracy. After all, they invented the word […] [Thucydides] and the “Old Oligarch” (see note 6) use the word frequently; other late fifth-century authors clearly allude to it (Sealey 1974; Farrar 1988).” (1)

He makes a good point. The linguistic term “democracy” is, to some extent, inseparable from the historic context of its etymology, although it has clearly acquired some new meanings over time. The ghost of the original term “democracy” and its classical Athenian definition will always float around its living reincarnations (at least until we create a new word for it). But would a classical Athens, transposed onto the modern world, still count as a democratic institution? How would we define a modern “demos”, if we had the chance to do so from scratch?

Let’s pretend we suddenly find ourselves in charge of setting up our own democratic government. We know now that, by definition, a democracy is a government of the people. But which people? Does that include everyone who lives within our borders? *Should* it include everyone? There are nearly infinite lines along which we could choose to include or exclude people that we see as more or less fit to make decisions. Here is a list of some of the questions would-be democratic governments have historically encountered:

Do all races and genders get the right to participate?
Do people of all religions, ideologies, or political affiliations have the right to vote?
What about people of different physical ability levels, or people with mental illness?
Can poor people make decisions?
Do you have to be a legal citizen, or born in the country, to be involved in policy development?
Can citizens living abroad for long periods of time continue to participate?
Is decision-making limited by age, or education level?
Do prisoners, criminals, captives, or slaves have the right to vote?
Can you lose your participatory privilege once you have earned it?

And so on. I’m sure you could add your own questions to expand this list.

You might find yourself, before even considering these questions, saying, “In our democracy, everyone should have the right to participate! We want to be fair and equal!” And indeed, many of these questions would seem, to most of our modern ears, to have obvious answers. Of course we should let all races and genders vote! Of course we should let people vote, regardless of religious affiliation! Most of us would probably also believe poor people, or people with varying ability levels or education, should have the right to participate as well. But other questions would be much more controversial: for example, the question about immigrant participation or the question about prisoners. And a great many people would probably flat-out oppose the idea of four year-olds voting on nationwide issues.²

So it seems we already have some potential exclusionary criteria. If you believed any of the above groups of people should be excluded from our theoretical democracy, or if you had thought up some exclusionary criteria of your own, the question would then be: why? What are your reasons for excluding the groups of people you did?

According to Richard S. Katz of Johns Hopkins University, voter exclusion criteria fall into three main categories: restrictions “based on community membership and having a personal stake in the election, those based on competence, and those based on autonomy”. (2) Chances are, your logic falls into one of these categories. Governments and populations tend not to want people to vote if they are part of a community whose opinions are disliked, if they believe such people are not autonomous and so cannot form opinions of their own, or if they believe such people are not capable of making good decisions.

If you believe any one of these categories provides good reason for denying someone political participation, you will probably come up with some groups of people that you believe should not vote in our democracy — as did the 63 countries analyzed in a study by Blais, et al. (3) Almost all the countries studied denied mentally disabled persons the right to vote (category 3 or 2), while a majority of them also denied prisoners the right to vote (category 3 or 2), and most required voters to be citizens (category 1). Every single country included in the study had instituted a minimum voting age — and of these countries, only Brazil allowed anyone as young as 16 to vote.

Once we make some decisions about who “counts” as the “demos”, we encounter our next issue: how much participatory power, or “kratos” should each member of the demos have? Should the “government” be a decision-making body comprised of every eligible citizen, who must be present in one form or another to give their input? Or should there be a centralized and permanent government apart from the citizenry, that shares power with the people (or carries power with a greater weight)? Should some types of voting citizens have more inherent decision-making power than others? If so, why or why not?

Functional Democracy in Classical Athens

Let’s look at classical Athens, which is usually touted as one of the closest historical examples of a “direct democracy” — a government where the decision-making power lies directly in the hands of a citizen “demos”. What kind of governing power did the citizens of classical Athens really employ?

Scholars disagree. For one thing, Athens was not uniform or static; it went through many iterations of law. For another thing, sources are often incomplete and contradictory, and documents on Athenian political history were frequently written long after the events they describe; as such, they may be colored by narrative bias, and riddled with inaccuracies.

Keeping this in mind, I turn to Dr. Melissa Schwartzberg, Silver Professor of Politics at NYU. She collaborated with Ted-Ed to create a succinct, rough sketch on how government functioned in classical, fifth-century, “democratic” Athens:

According to Schwartzberg, the “Ecclesia”, or citizen assembly, could be attended by any Athenian citizen or member of the “demos”. This assembly could propose laws, give public speeches, or bring forth a public lawsuit. Scholars estimate that around 6,000 people could reasonably congregate on a hill, called the “Pnyx” (from a word meaning “squeeze tight together”), in the shadow of the Acropolis, to form the citizen assembly. (4) Votes were taken by raise of hand, with the exception of ostracisms,³ which were counted by casting physical votes instead. According to Josiah Ober, the assembly would meet 40 times a year. In a paper he wrote for the “Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics” collaboration, he argues:

“The system as a whole promoted the development of substantial agreement across a diverse population of citizens on core values, while encouraging debate on particulars. It sustained decision-making practices that enabled effective policy formation and timely implementation.”

He attributes that to “the inter-mixing of men from different villages, and different geographic regions, along with strong social incentives (useful contacts, public honors: Ober 2008, chapter 4)” which “served to break down insular, local strong-tie networks.” (5)

We’re going to come back to that later.

But despite the fact that this Athens is called a “direct democracy”, the Athenians also had some representative councils to help with governance. Many of these people were chosen for office by lottery, while some of them were aristocratic.

The Council of 500, or the “Boule”, for example, was in charge of setting agendas and evaluating law proposals. Meanwhile, a collection of jurors and magistrates held court. These offices were filled by lottery, while generals were aristocratically elected.

Compared to most of the representative democracies we know today, this system seems to give a lot of “kratos” to the citizenry. But the point of this article is not necessarily to hold classical Athenian democracy up as the true definition of a democratic government. The point is rather to pose the following questions: what kinds of state structures can we claim under the mantle of democracy? How do we decide if a government is “democratic” or not? And hopefully, once we consider these questions, we can then ask: are some forms of “democracy” more desirable than others? Are some more prone to abuse and inequality? Are there new ways of thinking about democracy that we haven’t thought of yet? And could technology allow us to experiment with new forms of democratic theory?

Aristotle’s Politics: Democracy or Oligarchy?

Where democratic theory is concerned, Aristotle occupied an interesting vantage point. Using both local legends and primary sources, he could look back at the evolution of Athenian democracy, as it moved like an insect through a series of life cycle stages. This evolution still lay fresh in recent collective social memory. So it’s no surprise that, in his Politics, he describes four major styles of democratic government.⁴ These range from more or less representative, to more or less direct, and include, roughly summarized:

1) democracies in which there is a property qualification for participation;
2–3) democracies in which other citizens can participate, but may or may not have the time or the means, to varying extents; and
4) democracies in which all citizens — including the poor — participate in government processes.

Moreover, he goes on to describe different ways in which citizen participation can intersect with representative councils, bestowing more or less “kratos” on the assembly:

“That all things should be decided by all is characteristic of democracy; this is the sort of equality which the people desire. But there are various ways in which all may share in the government; they may deliberate, not all in one body, but by turns, as in the constitution of Telecles the Milesian. There are other constitutions in which the boards of magistrates meet and deliberate, but come into office by turns, and are elected out of the tribes and the very smallest divisions of the state, until every one has obtained office in his turn. The citizens, on the other hand, are assembled only for the purposes of legislation, and to consult about the constitution, and to hear the edicts of the magistrates. In another variety of democracy the citizen form one assembly, but meet only to elect magistrates, to pass laws, to advise about war and peace, and to make scrutinies. Other matters are referred severally to special magistrates, who are elected by vote or by lot out of all the citizens. Or again, the citizens meet about election to offices and about scrutinies, and deliberate concerning war or alliances while other matters are administered by the magistrates, who, as far as is possible, are elected by vote. I am speaking of those magistracies in which special knowledge is required. A fourth form of democracy is when all the citizens meet to deliberate about everything, and the magistrates decide nothing, but only make the preliminary inquiries; and that is the way in which the last and worst form of democracy, corresponding, as we maintain, to the close family oligarchy and to tyranny, is at present administered.”

Why does Aristotle argue that “all things should be decided by all”, while simultaneously claiming that the present Athenian democracy — which allows “all citizens” to “meet to deliberate about everything” — is “the last and worst form”?

Aristotle recognized that the concept of equality was important, and that democracy could help to bring a greater sense of equality among citizens. He wrote that “the equality which the friends of democracy seek to establish for the multitude is not only just but likewise expedient among equals”, and that “democracy is the most tolerable of the three [perversions of government]”.⁵ However, at the same time, he believed that democracy and tyranny were “nearly akin, for the extreme form of democracy is tyranny”. He was skeptical of a pure democracy, believing that the masses would overpower the few, and seemed to prefer a more moderate kind of constitutional government.

On the other hand, he acknowledges that the more representative side of the democratic spectrum could blur the boundaries between democracy and oligarchy. He writes:

“For polity or constitutional government may be described generally as a fusion of oligarchy and democracy; but the term is usually applied to those forms of government which incline towards democracy, and the term aristocracy to those which incline towards oligarchy, because birth and education are commonly the accompaniments of wealth […] There is a true union of oligarchy and democracy when the same state may be termed either a democracy or an oligarchy; those who use both names evidently feel that the fusion is complete.”

Are democracies doomed to succumb, ultimately, to either oligarchy or a tyranny of the majority? In the next couple of articles, we’ll examine some arguments for and against direct democracy, both in modern and ancient times, and ask some questions. Did classical Greek democracy function more democratically than modern American representative democracy? Were the two forms of government that different? Would direct democracy be feasible — or desirable — today? What are the implications for citizen participation in a Greek-style democracy, versus the implications in an American-style one? And perhaps the most interesting question of all: can we see Aristotle’s observations take form in modern American democracy? That is, has representative democracy in America begun to blur into an oligarchy?

Perhaps it seems, to some, a bit anachronistic, to look back at Greek democracies and how they functioned. Many of us read Aristotle in college philosophy classes; the specifics of ancient Athenian democracy, you might say, are mere argumentative birdseed for dusty academics. Why should we spend time trawling through ancient treatises when it seems like American democracy has bigger issues to deal with?

But sometimes, reflection gives us inspiration for the future. Looking back at the past helps ground us in the now, to give us footing for our next moves. If we forget too much, we lose perspective, and with it our ability to be creative. And if we are to tackle some of the biggest problems we face as a society today, we are going to want every creative edge we can possibly get.

Perhaps it is time to rethink our current systems, and make some changes. And maybe — just maybe — a detour into history can help us brainstorm possibilities.

Notes

1. We chose to use US.gov to look for materials in answer to our question, on the grounds that this is one of the most easily accessible sources for your average inquiring mind. This is where we would expect many people to look first when searching for information about the US government from the horse’s mouth.
2. Originally, I assumed that almost everybody would oppose the right of children to vote. But according to polls on Debate.com, most people actually supported the idea of children voting. While I don’t know what their methods are, and so can’t speak to the bias of the survey, there were also several Reddit threads, and even articles in major newspapers, making the case for children’s right to vote. This surprised me, I must admit. There was, of course, a lot of opposition to the idea as well. Most of the opposition centered around the idea of children being immature, their brains not being fully developed, or simple political bias: Democrats argued that Republicans have more children, which would be unfavorable to them; others argued that people with lower education levels have more children, believing this would engender more voting ignorance. Many of the arguments in favor of children voting centered around American principles of equality and democracy. Some people believed it was hypocritical to teach children the value of democracy while denying them a right to participate in it. Others expressed the idea that age does not necessarily equate to maturity, and that children can easily be as mature as, if not more mature than, adults. A third group of people advocated lowering the voting age, but only by a couple years.
3. “Ostracism” refers to the Athenian practice of expelling citizens for periods of ten years. This was usually done to those perceived to be a threat to the political order.
4. At first, Aristotle names five different types of democracy as follows: “Of forms of democracy first comes that which is said to be based strictly on equality. In such a democracy the law says that it is just for the poor to have no more advantage than the rich; and that neither should be masters, but both equal. For if liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost. And since the people are the majority, and the opinion of the majority is decisive, such a government must necessarily be a democracy. Here then is one sort of democracy. There is another, in which the magistrates are elected according to a certain property qualification, but a low one; he who has the required amount of property has a share in the government, but he who loses his property loses his rights. Another kind is that in which all the citizens who are under no disqualification share in the government, but still the law is supreme. In another, everybody, if he be only a citizen, is admitted to the government, but the law is supreme as before. A fifth form of democracy, in other respects the same, is that in which, not the law, but the multitude, have the supreme power, and supersede the law by their decrees.” (6) But just a few paragraphs later, he describes only four. Mortimer Chambers analyzes this discrepancy in a paper entitled “Aristotle’s ‘Forms of Democracy’”. He explores the idea that Aristotle’s first form of democracy, a complete equality between rich and poor, was only an abstraction, and therefore was subsequently dropped — that Aristotle wanted to focus on the analysis of democracy in practice. He also suggests that Aristotle’s four forms of democracy were based on known iterations of Athenian democracy under different reformers. (7)
5. Aristotle names three types of governments: monarchy, aristocracy, and constitutional government. Each has its own corrupt form, or “perversion”: tyranny corresponds to monarchy, oligarchy to aristocracy, and democracy to constitutional government.

Sources

1. Raaflaub, Kurt A., Ober, Josiah, Wallace, Robert, Cartledge, Paul and Farrar, Cynthia, 2007. Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece. University of California Press: Berkeley.
2. Katz, Richard S., 1997. Democracy and Elections; cited in Blais, André, Massicotte, Louis and Yoshinaka, Antoine, 2001. “Deciding who has the right to vote: a comparative analysis of election laws”. Electoral Studies 20:41–62.
3. Blais, André, Massicotte, Louis and Yoshinaka, Antoine, 2001. “Deciding who has the right to vote: a comparative analysis of election laws”. Electoral Studies 20:41–62.
4. Cartledge, Paul, 2016. Democracy: A Life. Oxford University Press: New York.
5. Ober, Josiah, 2007. “What the Ancient Greeks Can Tell Us About Democracy”. Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics. Version 1.0. Retrieved from https://www.princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/ober/090703.pdf
6. Aristotle. Politics. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. Available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.html
7. Chambers, Mortimer, 1961. “Aristotle’s ‘Forms of Democracy’”. Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association. 92: 20–36.