Derek Shrum
Practice of History, Fall 2018
3 min readNov 8, 2018

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How Domestic Concerns Affected German Foreign Policy

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Foreign policy is not thought to be as important as concerns closer to ones self which is understandable. But you can easily overlook the changes in the world that foreign policy shapes everyday. Every war, every trade deal, every friendship with an other country has the possibility to change, and will change without clear commitment. This was the situation Germany was in late 1800’s and early 1900’s as their foreign policy changed quickly as a result of their lack of commitment due to the demands of their citizens. Without learning from history we are doomed to repeat the mistakes of Germany, relying too much on a strong military will leave you friendless and surrounded.

Shown above are those most responsible for the foreign policy decisions made by Germany. From the strong and uniting leadership of Otto von Bismarck, to the divisive and aggressive attitudes of Kaiser Wilhelm.[1]It was his decision to provoke Britain in the naval arms race that was part of the reason for World War One. He wished to be seen as a strong and powerful monarch for his people due to his physical disabilities.[2] Germany being a young country also wished to be taken seriously through military might, which led to confrontations such as the military maneuvers in the Philippines with the United States.

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The German colonies scattered across the world were seen as a measure of their power, but also a safety valve.[3] Germany had many problems with people leaving due to repression of freedom. Instead of being used to grow the economic power of other countries, they wished for these outcasts to be used for the betterment of Germany through the colonies which had looser rules and less direct control over peoples lives.

With most of the publications being in the hands of the government, it made sense that those could see through the propaganda would want to leave.[4] Those that believed the news saw their country as being stronger than all others making sure conflict was sought after. This led the government to continue to up the ante in foreign matters to impress the people leading to a slippery slope of dangerous relationships with the world.

Seeking war also made sense to populace since the German Empire itself was formed after the three unification wars set in motion by Bismarck.[5]Being forged in the fire of war as a nation made aggression seem popular among the civilians, and among the leadership gave the mark of a strong leader.

The aggression in foreign relations that was shown by Germany was not a natural result, but rather it was learned and forced upon them by their populace. It was either continue with their run of success in war and aggression that they have had since unification or risk all of it falling apart by showing weakness.

[1]Rohl, John. “Germany Without Bismarck”. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967.

[2]Schult, Volker. “The Philippines and the Kaiser’s “World Politics”.” Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society 33, no. 1/2 (2005): 1–31. http://www.jstor.org/stable/29792566.

[3]Smith, Woodruff. “The Journal of Modern History,” 4:641–62. 46. The University of Chicago Press, n.d. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1877789.

[4]Mommsen, Wolfgang. “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Wilhelmian Germany, 1897–1914.” Central European History 24, no. 4 (1991): 381–401.

[5] Rodes, John. “Germany: A History.” In Germany: A History, 379–453. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964

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