Hong Kong is Gone. What Happens If We Lose Taiwan?
The Hong Kong national security law demonstrates the PRC’s willingness to take draconian measures to reunify China. Are increasing tensions in the strait an indicator that Taiwan is next? We’re joined today by Dr. Namrata Goswami, an independent scholar on International Relations and subject matter expert with the Futures Laboratory. She’s working on a new book focused on China’s grand strategy and territorial ambitions, and joins us to discuss the state of China’s relations with Taiwan.
Namrata, welcome! Let’s get started — can you give me a brief overview of the new book on Chinese strategy you’re working on, and when do you expect it to be published?
Thank you. It’s great to be back, and I think that this topic is both timely and relevant. China’s relationship with Taiwan is a part of the book that I’m working on, but the broader focus of my writing is on China’s grand strategy, political culture, and notions of territoriality.
Within the book, one of the key themes I’m trying to explore are the different streams of Chinese grand strategic thinking, such as Han Feizi, Sun Tzu, and the Warring States period. I’m also attempting to show how ancient thinking on strategy and political culture influences China’s contemporary leadership and affects its relationships in the modern world.
For instance, I’m working on chapters of the book on Hu Jintao’s teachings, which was focused on scientific development, Deng Xiaoping and China’s opening up to the world, as well as Jiang Zemin and the Three Represents, and of course Xi Jinping’s ambitious dream for China in the 21st century.
My book is still in the early stages of development. In terms of the publication date, I’m hoping to turn in a manuscript by November of 2021, which will take about six months for peer review, and depending on peer review and revision suggestions, I’m hoping it will finally come out by the summer of 2022.
Let’s talk about the One-China Principle, which asserts that there’s only one sovereign state of China. Under the 1992 Consensus, both the communist People’s Republic of China and the Taiwanese Republic of China agree on policy — but they completely disagree on which government is legitimate. What can you tell me about the policy?
The One-China Principle comes from an informal discussion between the Straits Exchange Foundation representing Taiwan and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, which was their Chinese counterpart. This discussion led to a verbal agreement on the idea of “One-China”, but there’s no written record of the 1992 Consensus to codify it.
So in terms of the One-China principle, the communist Chinese version of it maintains that the only legitimate government is the People’s Republic of China, which makes the Taiwanese government an illegitimate, semi-autonomous government. So in essence, they believe that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, which is ruled by the People’s Republic of China.
Now the Taiwanese version of the One-China principle also believes that there is a single Chinese nation which includes both Taiwan and mainland China, but they believe that the Republic of China is the state with ruling sovereignty — which is the complete opposite of what the communists believe. The one thing both groups agree on is that there’s a single Chinese nation, but what they can’t agree on is who is the legitimate government in charge of it.
I think it’s important to mention that when we talk about the China Principle and the US-China policy, it does not mean that the United States has agreed to support China’s One-China principle, which is that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States position acknowledges that China has this perspective, but also acknowledges that Taiwan has a different perspective — and the US takes this position to maintain diplomatic relations with China.
The Washington Post has written that China “considers Taiwan a breakaway state” that must be reunified with the mainland government, and Bloomberg says that Xi Jinping wants to “cement” his legacy by regaining the lost territory. Are these news stories accurate in their description of China’s intentions to reclaim Taiwan?
Absolutely. The reunification of Taiwan has been a goal of the communist party of China since the establishment of Taiwan as a separate self-governing republic back in 1949. Taiwan is only one part of a grand strategy for Chinese reunification that includes Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau, several disputed territories with India and Bhutan, as well as the South and East China Sea Islands.
The push for reunification has become stronger under President Xi Jinping, because of his goal to rejuvenate the Chinese nation — and by that, he means reunification with Taiwan and the other territories as well.
China has been pressuring governments and corporations to not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state for some time as well. Would it be accurate to say that they’ve been setting the stage to reclaim Taiwan in the future, or are they simply reaffirming a policy that comes out of the 1992 Consensus?
I think they are creating legitimate grounds for reunification with Taiwan. If you look at their diplomatic relations, one of the required conditions to start diplomatic relations with China is that you have to either recognize Taiwan as part of China or else say nothing about what Taiwan’s status is. If you recognized Taiwan as an independent nation, then China will refuse to have diplomatic relations with you.
Here’s an example: when Taiwan was first established under Chiang Kai-shek, who fought against the communist party, the United States agreed to secure and come to the defense of Taiwan. Between 1956 and 1979, the US and Taiwan had a mutual defense treaty that obligated America to come to the defense of Taiwan. However, when Jimmy Carter established diplomatic relations in 1979, China insisted that the treaty with Taiwan be negated.
Today, the US has the Taiwan Relations Act, but it doesn’t obligate the US to defend Taiwan, unlike the US-Japan Security Alliance does. As you can see, China has levered its diplomatic capabilities to ensure that Taiwan does not gain international legitimacy — and the United Nations does not recognize Taiwan as a separate state, either.
Communist China is the representative of the Chinese nation in the UN Security Council, which took the seat of the Republic of China, further creating diplomatic and international legitimacy to allow the reunification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland and the Chinese nation.
In October, China threatened to attack Taiwan, which comes on the heels of rising tensions in the South China Sea and aggressive military drills during a recent American diplomatic visit to Taiwan. Can you tell me a bit about the escalation that we’re seeing, and what it could mean?
Back in January, President Xi Jinping gave a speech to mark the 40th anniversary of a statement China made to Taiwan back in 1979. He reiterated what China’s Taiwan policy is, and said, “Chinese don’t fight Chinese”, along with discussing his hopes for a peaceful reunification — but he did not commit to not using force as a last resort.
So, force is always on the table for China, and the increase in aggression from China is President Xi’s way of warning the United States not to establish an official relationship with Taiwan. Currently, the US does not have a consulate in Taiwan, and instead functions through an informal body called the American Center in Taiwan. We have a relationship, and even sales of weapons systems like the F-16, but it’s not a formal diplomatic relationship.
So, back in September, U.S. Undersecretary for Economic Affairs Keith Krach visited Taiwan for the funeral services of President Lee, which came only a month after a visit by Human Services Secretary Alex Azar. China responded that these seem like official meetings, which means Taiwan might be trying to become independent, and they were sending a signal that they wouldn’t tolerate diplomatic meetings between the US and Taiwan.
You’ve said that China wants peaceful reunification, but given Taiwan’s reluctance in this area, is there a likelihood that China may invade Taiwan to reclaim it — and if so, what timetable might exist for that?
President Xi has outlined a desire to reunify peacefully with Taiwan, but using force is not ruled out. Back in 2013, he said “these issues cannot be passed on from generation to generation”, which means he’s hoping for reunification within his lifetime — and he’s currently 67 years old.
So, in terms of a timeline, if Taiwan makes moves for independence such as the Taiwanese cross-Strait relations referendum back in 2004, I won’t rule out the potential for China attempting to take over Taiwan by force. You can see that strategy in President Xi’s focus on Naval and Air Force modernization because I think he realizes that if you want to take over Taiwan, you need to invest in those capabilities.
Unless the situation escalates through something like Taiwan independence, I would say that we should be carefully watching this a decade from now in 2030, and then probably in another decade after that, if things do not change.
Taiwan’s been around since 1949 and they have a lot of international relationships. If China escalates to the point of using force, do you think the United States would be involved in helping protect Taiwan?
I would say that Taiwan is very important in terms of US credibility in the region, so if an escalation of conflict countries does occur, countries like Japan, Vietnam, and India will be watching the US response closely.
Keep in mind that the US has been of the factors why China has not escalated the conflict in Taiwan in the past. Taiwan is self-governing because the United States offered a guarantee back in 1949 — unlike Tibet, which did not have a US guarantee, and was occupied in 1950. In that context, I think the United States will have to do something in response if Taiwan is invaded by China.
In addition to maintaining US credibility, Taiwan has significant strategic importance. Its location offers strategic insights into events in the South and East China Seas, and it’s also valuable as an unsinkable aircraft career. So, if China did take over Taiwan, it puts China’s long-range DF-21C missile in range to target Guam, which is a US-base. There are many strategic implications to be aware of if the US fails to assist Taiwan, but keep in mind there is no treaty obligation for the United States to come to their defense.
What happens if China is successful in taking Taiwan? The United States has over $100 billion a year in trade with the Republic of China and over $630 billion a year in trade with the communist People’s Republic of China. Would we continue trading with both countries, and what would happen if we lost trade with one or the other of them due to hostilities or an embargo?
If that scenario comes to fruition and China takes over Taiwan, I think it probably will follow the trajectory of Hong Kong and continue to remain economically vibrant. Back in 1997, when the United Kingdom returned Hong Kong to China, it also had an incredibly vibrant economy, and China worked to ensure that it remained vibrant after the transition.
In the case of Taiwan, the difference is that it’s likely there will be some disruption in the supply chain because Taiwan is truly self-governing in terms of how it conducts its business. A rapid move from a capitalist system to China’s brand of communism would have an impact on the global supply chain.
I think we can learn a lot here by looking at the COVID pandemic. We’ve experienced the disruption of supply chains combined with trade sanctions, but the world’s dependency on China for vital supplies like ventilators and N95 masks countries forced us to accommodate this difference in China’s supply chain.
I think a similar kind of scenario may be the case in Taiwan, and if a scenario comes to fruition where China takes Taiwan, I think that global companies will be forced will be able to adapt to the new reality, and it will lead to some short term supply chain disruptions as they adjust.
Can you elaborate a bit on technology supply chain security? Taiwan’s TMSC supplies 48% of the global chip market, and Foxconn is the world’s #1 electronics manufacturing service. You’ve mentioned possible short-term disruption, and I’m wondering how much this might disrupt our technology supply chain for semiconductors, technology manufacturing, assembly here in the United States if this is lost?
As I’ve said, it would disrupt supply chains in the short term, but I think countries will diversify and adapt. The only example we can look to is Hong Kong, which doesn’t have what Taiwan is offering to the world in terms of electronics and manufacturing but does have similarities in other sectors.
What China did with Hong Kong, especially after the 2008 financial crisis, is that instead of keeping it a key stock exchange for Western markets, they diversified and replicated it in cities like Shanghai, Beijing, and Shenzhen as major stock exchanges for Western engagement with China. Similarly, I think we would see a replication of Taiwan’s model in cities like Shenzhen, which are already emerging as global manufacturing hubs.
Here’s an example: Foxconn is headquartered in Taiwan, but its major manufacturing factory is in Shenzhen. The company chooses to do the assembly in mainland China to diversify its supply chain. Foxconn’s CEO said that if they lose Apple as a customer because of trade sanctions, they’ll still have phone manufacturers in China like Huawei & Xiaomi to fall back on.
So, we could expect to see a limited disruption of the supply chain, but I think China is taking that disruption into account because they realize it’s part of the impact from taking over Taiwan. I believe they’ll plan for that with a scenario as we see in Hong Kong.
Back in June, China passed the Hong Kong national security law, which has been described as “draconian” legislation and being “the end of Hong Kong”. What are some of the lessons we can learn from Hong Kong that may apply to Taiwan, especially in terms of China’s approach to reunification and the associated risk of disruption that comes it?
I think Hong Kong also teaches us an important lesson about taking China’s articulation of escalating the conflict with Taiwan seriously — because Hong Kong’s loss of autonomy last year from the national security law shows us that President Xi does not care about international reputation. There was a lot of shaming when China passed the legislation in the National People’s Congress, but they went ahead with it anyway. That may set a precedent for Taiwan.
Another dangerous precedent being set is China’s reinterpretation of the One-China principle in how it relates to Taiwan. Essentially, China is attempting to apply the “one country, two systems” model to Taiwan that they developed with Hong Kong & Macau — which were both autonomous zones within communist China, not self-governed republics.
However, China is now applying that interpretation of the One-China principle to Taiwan, which is why President Tsai decided not to agree to the 1992 Consensus. That’s because doing so would implicitly support the re-interpretation of the One-China principle into one country, two systems. China has very strategically changed the parameters they use to deal with Taiwan.
Has China’s success in reunifying Hong Kong emboldened them in terms of Taiwan, and do you think that if they can reclaim or reunify with Taiwan, do you think that might further embolden them in terms of other territorial acquisitions?
Great question, and it’s one of the key questions in my upcoming book as well. Hong Kong has major two implications in terms of China’s behavior with other disputed territories. The first is that China has slowly eroded Hong Kong’s independent judiciary, free press, and the rights of its people. So if we use Hong Kong as an example of what might happen with Taiwan, it doesn’t inspire much confidence if China claims that reintegration will respect or preserve Taiwan’s freedoms over time.
The other implication of China’s behavior comes from how they’ve changed their adherence to territorial agreements. An example of this is the median line in the Taiwan Strait, which China has recently crossed with warplanes & submarines. The median line is an unofficial boundary which both Taiwan and China unofficially acknowledge as the international boundary, and aren’t supposed to cross it because that is a threatening act.
China crossed the median line when the US diplomat was in Taiwan, but when they were asked why they did it, they denied the existence of a median line on the grounds that Taiwan is a part of China. In other words, since China supposedly has sovereignty over Taiwan, China has not done anything illegal.
China has articulated a very similar argument concerning the Bhutan border dispute over territory in Doklam. In this case, when Bhutan pointed out that China had signed agreements not to change the status quo, China said that Doklam was never included because it’s part of their territory. However, in this particular case, China had agreed on paper, unlike the 1992 Consensus, where there was no written document.
Similar behavior is seen in the South China Sea, where China agreed to a set of principles, and when they behave differently and are questioned, their ministry of foreign affairs once again claims these areas are Chinese territory. When they were talking about these issues, they agreed that there was a dispute and agreed to discuss it, but later claimed there was never a dispute.
So, in terms of Taiwan, China first agreed that there is a One-China principle, with different interpretations. They’ve agreed that Taiwan and China would have diplomatic relations based on the 1992 Consensus, but when issues become strategic, they redefine China in terms of the one country, two systems model — which is China’s unilateral definition of the conflict, and can have very long-term consequences.
One final factor that may embolden China is the support they’ve established on the UN Human Rights Council. In the case of Hong Kong, about 53 countries supported China’s national security law, where only 27 countries dissented. However, while China did have a majority, most of the countries that agreed were African countries, along with China’s partners in the Belt and Road Initiative, such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Saudi Arabia.
Let me close by asking what comes next in this tense situation. Next year is the first of two Chinese centenary years in 2021 & 2049, and I’m wondering if may be adding pressure within China that’s driving some of this escalating international tension. Do you think that’s a factor, and can you offer any predictions on what to expect in the next few years?
The China we’re dealing with today is not the China we dealt with in 1949. Today’s China is globally integrated, and they’ve built very strong influence mechanisms around the globe, which severely limits Taiwan’s ability to maneuver politically. Countries that want diplomatic relations with China cannot have official relations with Taiwan, which includes the United States.
Now, in terms of timelines, in 2021 China will be celebrating the one-hundredth anniversary of the birth of the communist party. It’s easy to envision President Xi giving a celebratory speech focused on the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which will stress the fact that Taiwan should feel grateful and historically accept China as the only nation, and become a part of China.
Now, what Xi has promised in his Taiwan policy is that Taiwan will a semi-autonomous status very similar to Tibet, which includes property rights and their existing system of taxation. I believe that in 2021, he’ll try to create a narrative sending a message to Taiwan that rejoining China is a good thing.
Unfortunately, I think he realizes is that his actions in Hong Kong and his aggressive militarization of the Taiwan Strait has made Taiwanese more fearful, and Taiwan’s democratic progressive party has not agreed to give their consent to the 1992 Consensus, which means that they are getting even more independent in their thinking than before.
Even the Kuomintang, which was very supportive of a China-Taiwan diplomatic relationship has now been forced to say that they are not in support of the 1992 Consensus because of China’s strategic blunder in changing the meaning of the 1992 Consensus. So now, if the Kuomintang gives support to China, the Taiwanese will see them as disloyal.
So, as I said before, I think the year we need to watch is 2030, as well as the hundred year centennial of the People’s Republic of China, which is coming up in 2049. By then, China will aspire to peacefully reunify Taiwan into Chinese society through a combination of diplomatic & economic relationships, creating dissent within Taiwan, and long-term military buildup. I do believe that China is willing to play the long game with Taiwan, but they’re preparing to move quickly if the opportunity presents itself.
Remember, President Xi talks about wanting peaceful reunification, but from a strategic perspective, he’s working to modernize their Navy and Air Force, developing missile capabilities to target US aircraft carriers, building space-based weapon systems, and more. This indicates that China is not just focused on an area denial strategy, but they’re also seriously considering an offensive strategy against Taiwan.
About Our Guest
Dr. Namrata Goswami is an independent strategic analyst, author and consultant on Great Power Politics, Space Policy, Alternate Futures, and Frameworks of Conflict Negotiation and Resolution. After earning a Ph.D. in international relations, she served for nearly a decade as Research Fellow at India’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) sponsored think tank, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, working on ethnic conflicts in India’s Northeast, counter-terrorism and China-India border conflict. Her research and expertise generated opportunities for collaborations abroad, and she accepted visiting fellowships at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway; the La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia; and the University of Heidelberg, Germany.
In 2012, she was selected to serve as a Jennings-Randolph Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington D.C. where she studied India-China border issues, and was awarded a Fulbright-Nehru Senior Fellowship that same year. Shortly after establishing her own strategy and policy consultancy in 2016 after relocating to the U.S., she won the prestigious MINERVA grant awarded by the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense (OSD) to study great power competition in the grey zone of outer space. In 2017, she was awarded a contract with Joint Special Forces University (JSOU) to write a monograph on ISIS in Asia, in which one of her field of study was Indonesia.
With expertise in international relations, ethnic conflicts, counter insurgency, wargaming, scenario building, and conflict resolution, she has been asked to consult for audiences across the globe, from academia to policy-makers. She was the first representative from South Asia chosen to participate in the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies NATO Partnership for Peace Consortium (PfPC) ‘Emerging Security Challenges Working Group.’ She also received the Executive Leadership Certificate sponsored by the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, National Defense University (NDU), and the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). Currently, she is working on a book project on “Ethnic Conflicts” with Oxford University Press, and another one on ‘Great Power Ambitions in Outer-Space” to be published by Lexington Press, an imprint of Rowman and Littlefield.
