What Happens if Russia Wins?
With the Russo-Ukrainian War quickly approaching two years, we have yet to see a breakthrough on either side. Since the initial conquests made by Russia when they were on the outskirts of Kiev and Kharkiv, they have pulled back to the South and Eastern regions of Ukraine after Ukraine successfully counterattacked those positions. Ukraine tried to follow up this success with another counter-offensive in 2023, but it was unsuccessful as there were only minimal changes to the front. With American reluctance growing about delivering more aid to Ukraine, we are seeing articles saying that if aid is not delivered then Ukraine will fall to Russia. While I will not comment on whether this statement is true or not, such a statement leads us to another question. What happens if Russia conquers Ukraine?
Again, I am not predicting Russia is going to conquer the whole of Ukraine or when this may occur. But rather, what consequences does a Russian victory have in Europe in geopolitical terms? To answer this question, we will focus solely on the geopolitical aspects of politics in Europe. We will ignore the moral implications of a Russian victory as foreign policy dictated by morality is dangerous to those who espouse such sentimentality and those who suffer the consequences of such high-minded ignorance (Guglielmello 2023). Instead, we will focus on the interests of Russia if they are successful in their endeavor. Or if we want to ask the question in another manner, what motives do Western actors have in order to prevent Russia from accomplishing its objective?
In the West, we hear two fundamental reasons why we must support Ukraine. The first reason is that if a totalitarian government can invade its neighbor, this shows weakness among the Western Powers, especially America, and it would embolden other dictators to invade other countries. The proponents of this argument would usually point out the policy of appeasement or isolationism during the interwar period. This rhetoric is more likely than not political pandering. Ukraine was firmly in Russia’s sphere of influence as late as 2014 and had no firm security guarantees from the West up to and including when Russia invaded in 2022. In fact, before Russia invaded Ukraine, the President of the United States said the following. “I think what you’re going to see is that Russia will be held accountable if it invades. And it depends on what it does. It’s one thing if it’s a minor incursion and then we end up having a fight about what to do and not do” (Khalid 2022). Do we believe that autocratic governments would view the West or America as weak when we do not take action to protect a country that is not within our interests and has no security guarantee? Likely not.
However, there is a second argument used to support Ukraine. That by supporting Ukraine, it would prevent a war between NATO and Russia which could eventually turn into a nuclear war. While this does sound hyperbolic and some who use this argument do so without evidence, some geopolitical analysts do make an argument based on geography and realism that could lead to this conclusion. Analysts such as Peter Zeihan, whom I very much respect, have made the argument that due to the geography of Russia, a war between Russia and the West is inevitable if Russia is able to conquer Ukraine. To give Peter Zeihan additional credit, he did predict Russia invading Ukraine within the 2022 timeframe due to the demographic decline of Russia. So, why do some analysts believe that war is inevitable if Russia defeats Ukraine?
The Russian economic sphere is both poor and cold. As such, much of the Russian infrastructure is based on rail lines instead of road networks. The issue with railroads is that they lack maneuverability compared to road networks. This means if an enemy were to invade Russia, Russia would not have the capability to expel the enemy except through a war of attrition. In this war of attrition, the Russians could usually count on their ally, the Russian winter, to turn the tide in their favor. We can see historical examples such as the Great Northern War, Napoleon’s invasion, and WWII to see how enemies could invade deeply within Russia and then lose due to unfavorable weather conditions. But using other examples, we could see how the ability of enemies could either conquer Russia, such as the Mongolians in their conquests, or how a war of attrition could lead to the downfall of the Russian system, such as WWI. So while a war of attrition could be successful for the Russians, it is not the best strategy considering the number of casualties the Russians experience during these wars when they win or the negative consequences of losing this type of war. How does Russia prevent enemies from invading?
Geography. If Russia could forward position their troops between geographic barriers, then the invaders’ only chance of succeeding would be to invade positions that harbor many Russian troops. Since the geographic barriers would be inaccessible for large-scale invasions, this strategy plugs any holes the attackers may use to invade Russia. The invaders would find a wall of mountains, deserts, or the full force of Russian might. Since there would only be a limited number of access points, a rail system could be constructed so troops in these geographic locations could be supplied. This has been the Russian strategy for centuries for defense and was only successfully constructed when the Soviet Union won World War II. But since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian state has been working hard to either get these access points back or to have friendly nations control these access points. While there are nine access points of concern, we will only focus on the four westernmost points. These are Crimea, Bessarabian Gap, Polish Gap, and the Baltic Sea.
Three of these points make Ukraine essential for Russia. But according to those who worry about a prospective Nuclear War, only one of these regions would not be the cause of this war. This region would be Crimea. Crimea not only gives Russia access to the Black Sea but it gives Russia a warm-water port that it always desires. Such importance is given to Crimea that it was annexed in 2014. Crimea is also the only region that is fully within Ukraine and such greater escalation from this region is not likely. However, the other access points may impact other nations, such as Moldova, Romania, and Poland. The geographic feature that is central to the Russian strategy is the Carpathian Mountains.
The Carpathian Mountain chain is found in Eastern Europe (see map below). It borders or runs through Czechia, Slovakia, Poland, Ukraine, and Romania with the most westernmost and southernmost parts of the chain being in Austria and Serbia respectively. For our purposes, we will focus on the Polish, Ukrainian, Moldovan, and Romanian relations to this mountain chain. In the North, the Carpathian Mountains border Poland and the North European Plain. This Plain was the bane of Russia’s existence in the 20th century as the Germans were able to use their army to invade Russia twice. While this Plain does not provide any logistical obstacle on its own, reaching the Carpathians Mountains would give the Russians a significant defensive advantage. Using the mountains as the obstacle, armies in the Polish Gap could only move east or west. So plugging the eastern part of this Polish Gap prevents armies from reaching deep into Belarus or Ukraine. If armies were to reach this point, they would not be blocked or limited in geography so they would be able to move in any direction. Similarly, the Carpathian Mountains make it difficult to invade from the Balkans. The only access point is through Bessarabia where armies could invade from either the south or north. The countries in the Bessarabian Gap are Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine.
So, to those who argue that if Ukraine falls would eventually lead to a Russo-NATO War, their argument is as follows. If Ukraine falls, Russia still would not have successfully plugged the two gaps of concern in Poland and Bessarabia. In order for them to feel safe in their defensive posture, they will need to invade Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. While the invasion of Moldova would be unfortunate, it would have no material impact on the West. On the other hand, both Poland and Romania are NATO members. Therefore, this invasion from Russia would bring the rest of the NATO members into war. Since NATO is significantly stronger than Russia, which is even more highlighted after the Russian inadequacy in Ukraine, Russia’s only ability to defend itself or win this war would be to use nuclear weapons. Therefore, if Russia is stopped in Ukraine, then any future war with NATO will be avoided. However, we find this argument fatally flawed.
While we agree with the logic of Russia feeling that it needs to expand due to geography and thus why it invaded Ukraine, we do not agree with the logic that Russia would need to invade Poland or Romania to satisfy its defensive needs. While we are under no illusion to realize that if Russia feels that it needs to invade these lands to be safe, then it would invade; based on history we feel that such an invasion from Russia is not needed per the Russian perspective. As stated before, every defensive gap the Russians needed to feel secure was secured during the end of World War II. By the end of the war, the Russians were the hegemonic power of Eastern Europe. They could shape the eastern half of the continent in whatever manner they would like and controlled every country in the region, except for Yugoslavia (and later Albania), Greece, and Turkey. In fact, not only did they have the ability to shape the land to their wishes but they did shape the land to their wishes. They arranged the borders of Poland where the Polish lost nearly lost about 178,000 square kilometers (or 69,000 square miles) of land in the East to the Soviet Union and the modern state of Moldova was taken from Romania and incorporated into the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union rearranged its borders to ensure its safety and the Russian state of today is trying to get back to this level of safety, then the Russian state does not need either Romania or Poland under its direct control today. Yes, both Romania and Poland were puppet states of the Soviet Union therefore it made the Soviet Union even safer. But it would be unconscionable to think the Soviet Union would not alter its border to include vital strategic, defensible positions in its own borders and leave them in a foreign state at a time when they were more than happy to alter its border for its own strategic interests. The Soviet Union would have easily altered the border even further if it meant greater security for the Soviet Union, especially when it had a ruler, such as Stalin, who did not care about moral values and cared even less for the people he ruled. We find it credible that all the defensive positions that Russia would care about in 2023 would be either identical or nearly identical to those who constructed the map of the Soviet Union in the 1940s. In this case, neither Poland nor Romania would be targeted by Russia when the stakes could lead to a nuclear war and the benefits are not nearly as large. With that being said, Moldova would likely be a target for Russia; but Moldova is not in NATO and is not materially important to the West. This however is just the first reason why we oppose the view that if Russia wins the Russo-Ukraine War, it will lead to war with the West.
The second reason is that regardless of whether Ukraine is in the Western or Russian sphere of influence, NATO already has control of one of the access points. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Kaliningrad were the four regions within the Soviet Union that are situated on the fourth access point mentioned above, the Baltic Sea. Out of these four regions, only Kaliningrad is under Russian control as it is still part of the Russian state. The three other regions are independent, sovereign nations that are members of both NATO and the European Union. If Russia is so determined to get back to the level of security it had during the Soviet Union that it is willing to invade Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania, then war between NATO and Russia is inevitable. So all the proponents who use the argument that Ukraine must be supported to prevent a war between NATO and Russia will have to explain that either the results of the Russo-Ukrainian War will not prevent this war or why we should not focus on all of our aid on our NATO allies in the Baltic.
However, we do not believe that war between NATO and Russia over the Baltic is either imminent or likely to happen. As stated before, if Russia was going to war with NATO, they would lose and prove Bismarck correct as a “preventative war is like committing suicide out of fear of death”. While the Russians may be angry that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are out of their sphere and this situation cannot be changed, it is far better for the Russians to live without this access point than the alternative where they tried to fight to get these lands back. In a similar vein, if a country getting into NATO prevents Russia from acting within its interests, it must act within its interests before a country gets into NATO. Outside of Ukraine, the best example is Georgia. In April 2008, the members of NATO agreed that “Georgia would become a NATO member”. In August 2008, Georgia would go on and lose a war with Russia. It has been 15 years since and Georgia is still not a member of NATO. Since then, 6 countries have joined the alliance. For Finland, joining NATO took less than a year. With Ukraine getting closer to the West and Russia’s fear of Ukraine joining NATO, along with geographic considerations, this prompted Russia to invade Ukraine. While Russia has only itself to blame for the invasion, it does so with its interests at heart (Guglielmello 2023).
Not only does Russia act within its own interests, but it acts either immediately or quickly to secure those interests. As mentioned before, Russia acted within four months to secure its interests in Georgia. Russia invaded and annexed Crimea during Ukraine’s protest and eventual removal of their pro-Russian president. They later supported separatists in Eastern Ukraine within the same year. In both Ukraine and Georgia, when Russian interests were threatened, actions were taken immediately in order to protect those interests. If Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were so essential for the Russian geopolitical strategy, what are they waiting for? They could have acted in the last 18 years to get any or all of these countries back under the sphere of influence. They border each country and could use Belarus as a springboard as well. Either they are waiting to see if NATO dissolves or they wrote these states off unless circumstances change in their favor. In both situations, Russia’s strategy is to patiently wait; the exact opposite of their strategy in Georgia and Ukraine. Due to this, we have the confidence to say not only is war not inevitable between NATO and Russia in the Baltic, but it is unlikely to happen in the short term due to these countries’ alliance with NATO.
If Russia were to win the war tomorrow, in a month, in a year, or a decade from now, we should not expect a conflict between NATO and Russia to be inevitable. Either the conflict is already inevitable due to the Baltic States or the resolution of the Russo-Ukrainian War will not lead to a further conflict between the two geopolitical powers. If it is the latter, then every additional escalation of aid and support from the West to Ukraine risks further escalation between nuclear powers. Based on the evidence, the former situation is unlikely to happen. While Russia’s interests are based on geography, their actions are better explained in a different framework. In less than a decade after Ukraine ousted a legitimately elected president in order to be closer to the West, Russia seized Crimea, supported rebels in the Donbas, and then led an outright invasion of Ukraine. This was similar to Russia’s actions involving Georgia after NATO signaled its interest in the nation. While Russia acts within its interests, it does so without the direct confrontation of NATO. This was one of the principal reasons why Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine, to prevent NATO from expanding into Ukraine. While geography does explain Russia’s actions and foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, there is a reason that better explains Russia’s strategy. Preventing NATO from expanding into these geographic vital regions. While Russia could not prevent NATO from adding the Baltic nations to their rank, Russia will pursue its best alternative; prevent any other post-Soviet nation from joining NATO.
Considering the importance the Russians put on Ukraine, the lack of importance Ukraine has for America and the West, and how every substantial increase of aid for Ukraine raises tensions between nuclear powers; it is likelier that NATO’s support for Ukraine increases a chance of a global war between NATO and Russia rather than a Russian victory in Ukraine. While we are sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause, this is not enough to warrant support from the West. Since we find that America has no real geopolitical interests in Ukraine, aid given to Ukraine should be at a minimum and given only if does not increase the risk of a confrontation between NATO and Russia.
