How Peyton Manning (sort of) Runs the Zone Read
According to early naysayers, one of the biggest problems with the “spread” approach is the difficulty of manufacturing a run game out of the gun with a stationary quarterback. While a lot of college coaches like Urban Meyer made their living using the quarterback to outnumber the defense in the run game, guys like Peyton Manning aren’t blessed with that same skill set.
Manning’s offense doesn’t operate exclusively out of the gun, but it doesn’t do him or the Broncos a lot of good to be overly predictable when they do line up that way. Just as importantly, even when you have equal numbers in the box to run the football, how do you slow the defenders down, and create some kind of hesitation? We’ve covered constraint plays from the Denver offense in the past, but what about this specific situation?
The short answer is that the offense needs to be able to simultaneously threaten to both sides of the formation after the snap, so that the defense isn’t sure where the ball could end up. The most obvious play that fits that description is the zone read play, with the quarterback and tailback “mesh” in the backfield helping to create a lot of uncertainty about who has the football, but that’s not a great idea when your quarterback is Peyton Manning.
So how do you threaten the defense with the football inside the tackle box and in the weak side alley at the same time, especially if the quarterback isn’t a mobile guy?
Simple, you put someone else in position to carry the football out on the edge, and in this case, that person is Wes Welker.
The Play
The offense lines up in a 2×2 set with the back Knowshon Moreno lined up to the “open” side of the formation.
While the corners to both sides have given the receivers a bit of a cushion, the mirrored depth of both the corners and safeties to both sides of the defense are lined up in a 2-deep shell, which means that both corners will have to come down and play the flat aggressively, especially against a play like this.
There are a couple of important reasons why Welker and Thomas have been brought in so tight to the formation.
First of all, speed is key here. Adam Gase and the Denver coaching staff are very cognizant of the distance of the throw, since obviously the shorter the distance between he and Manning, the quicker the ball gets to its intended target.
As we talked about a couple of weeks ago, bringing the receivers in tight to the formation has its advantages, and in this case the goal is to bring the defenders, especially the corner playing over the top of Welker, even closer to the offensive line to make the left tackle’s job even easier.
Also, as the objective is to get the football into the alley between the hash mark and the numbers, all Welker has to do is catch the football and turn up the field to take advantage of the convoy of blockers which has been set up for him. The tight alignment of Welker is just a simple way to make his assignment that much easier.
Finally, with three eligible receivers (Welker, Thomas, Moreno) aligned so close together, almost in a “bunch” look, Denver is hoping to induce a reaction from the defense designed to defend against the bunch, one that usually involves having the corner to that side drop and take away the vertical route, and as a result opening up space for the play to Welker.
As we’re about to see, however, it doesn’t quite work out that way.
Even though this play gets the football out to Welker on the “edge” of the formation, it’s still designed to force the defense to account for the alley between the hash marks and the numbers, similar to the way a mobile quarterback would pull the football on the zone read play and look to get vertical and turn up the field in that same area.
Manning takes the snap, carries out a token play fake with Moreno, and immediately looks for Welker running the smoke route to the left side.
Demaryius Thomas, lined up on the line of scrimmage inside of Welker, works to seal off the nickel corner to the inside and away from the play.
At the same time, the corner to the bottom of screen recognizes the play and immediately heads downhill, attacking the outside shoulder of Welker to keep the appropriate amount of leverage on the play so that if he misses the tackle, he still forces Welker back to the bulk of the defense.
Unfortunately for Denver, Baltimore is too quick and the corner brings down Welker before the play has a chance to get going. The Broncos are counting on the football to get there and the blocks to be set up before the corner has the chance to make a play, but that’s not what happens in this case.
Now we go to the end zone view to check out the defensive alignment.
In this six-man front, the ends on both sides are lined up wide to contain any kind of run and keep the football between the tackles so that the defense can force the play to one of the guys in the middle, particularly the two linebackers.
As was mentioned in the intro, Denver wants to make it tougher for the defense to blindly chase down any kind of shotgun run from behind by adding a constraint to the offense, giving them a legitimate threat away from the backfield flow.
Manning takes the snap, extending the football to Moreno just long enough to sell the run play.
It’s worth noting that because of who Denver has at quarterback, this play is also vital to keeping the backside defensive end at bay on run plays from the gun. While technically the ends to either side of the formation are assigned to play “contain” on any run plays from the gun, the lack of a running quarterback threat away from the handoff allows the unblocked backside defensive end to cheat a bit in his assignment by coming a lot tighter off the block of the offensive tackle to his side.
Simply put, if he has nothing to worry about other than the running back, he doesn’t have to play as disciplined on his assignment, and the defense can afford to play a little bit more unsound by getting another player to the football.
This is why it’s important to have plays like this in the game plan, because even if Manning isn’t a threat to take off around the edge with the ball, the unblocked end should still come straight up the field, if for no other reason than to attempt to take away the passing lane to Welker.
On this play, the man playing the defensive end position to that side is #55 Terrell Suggs, and he isn’t able to get upfield quick enough to take away the pass.
The playfake also accomplishes another objective, it holds the linebackers in place while the left tackle, left guard, and center get out to the alley in an attempt to plow the road for Welker. In fact, it’s the left tackle’s job to kick out the corner who ends up making the play, but because of the speed in Baltimore’s secondary, Welker doesn’t have much time to get going before he’s got a defender all over him.
Conclusion
As I’ve said time and time again, on this site and other places, I’m not interested in breaking down only the “big” plays that make the highlights on SportsCenter, or the plays that work flawlessly. The strategy and the reasoning behind the plays that coaches call, even if they are unsuccessful or go for a minimal gain, are just as interesting to me, since they give such a great look into the way coaches are thinking and what adjustments they are forced to make over the course of a game.
The thinking behind the play is sound, and even though Denver was stopped short in this instance, it’s little wrinkles like this that make the offensive line’s job that much easier when it comes time to run the football out of the gun.
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