How San Francisco Exploits Man Coverage To Set Up The Run
Colin Kaepernick seemingly came out of nowhere in 2012. After taking over for an injured Alex Smith in Week 10, the second year quarterback managed to take his team all the way to the Super Bowl before they fell short to Baltimore in the “Har-Bowl” that February.
Since Kaepernick took the job of signal caller, San Francisco’s offense has added an extra dimension. With Greg Roman calling the shots at offensive coordinator, the 49er offense was always fun to watch.
Today we’re going to talk about the quarterback run game, breaking down a single play and looking closer into the details that go into the play design.
We’ve talked several times about the advantages of bringing your receivers in close to the tackle box, as well as other creative ideas from the San Francisco playbook. In this article we’ll talk more about that, but also how sometimes, offenses can exploit man coverage to open up running lanes, especially for the quarterback.
The Play
After throwing an incomplete pass on 1st and 10 at the Seattle 16 yard line, the 49ers need to get back on schedule to set up 3rd and manageable. 2nd and long can be tricky, but having the ball this close to the end zone takes at least a little bit of pressure off of Jim Harbaugh and offensive coordinator Greg Roman.
As you can see from the wide angle below, the defense is pretty spread out.
There are two special alignments we should take notice of on this play. First of all, to the right side of the offensive line, the defensive line is deployed in a peculiar alignment, with the defensive tackle and defensive end lined up extra wide in a pass rush set.
Meanwhile, at the top of the picture, the pair of San Francisco skill players #81 Anquan Boldin and #21 Frank Gore are aligned in a “stacked” look, compressed to just a couple of yards away from the left tackle.
More important than the way the offensive players are lined up on the left, however, is how the defense lines up in response.
The Will linebacker #50 KJ Wright lines head up over Frank Gore, ready to press him in anticipation of a vertical release, so it’s Wright’s job to make it as difficult as possible for Gore to release off the line of scrimmage.
The reason is that in this set, Gore is likely to be clearing a path for Boldin, though from the perspective of Richard Sherman lined up a few yards behind Wright, it’s not clear whether Boldin is going to be running some kind of in-breaking shallow crossing route, or pivoting back out to the flat.
Thus, you have the cushion that Sherman has given himself.
In general, whenever defensive backs are in doubt, they give themselves a cushion, and this play is no exception.
Coming back around full circle, Kaepernick is aware of this philosophy, and the look Seattle is giving him to the two-receiver side is one he undoubtedly practiced against and prepared for during the week leading up to this game. He’s got a responsibility to observe how the defense lines up to the stacked look and adjust the assignments of one or both of them as necessary.
Since the Will appears to be locked up on Gore, and likewise for Sherman on Boldin, Kaepernick adjusts their assignment to make sure that the free safety Earl Thomas is taken care of as well. With both defenders to that side playing man coverage, San Francisco can run them both into the middle of the field in Thomas’s direction, hopefully either delaying him or taking him completely out of the play.
As we see after the snap in the picture below, Kaepernick drops back for a count just long enough to time up the pull of the guard and set up the run play.
The defensive end Cliff Avril shoots up the field, perhaps expecting more resistance than he gets, maybe anticipating the tackle to fire out in pass pro. Regardless, he completely overshoots Kaepernick’s depth in the backfield, and almost immediately takes himself out of the play.
As the play really gets going, notice the way both receivers take their men with them, leaving the left side of the field completely wide open for the cutback that naturally develops. As they head toward the deep middle to take Earl Thomas out of the play, the leave lots of green grass to Kaepernick’s left, and he’s happy to oblige.
Kaepernick is eventually chased down from behind, but how exactly did the giant hole in the defense develop in the first place?
Let’s go to the end zone view for a better look at the run
After identifying the leverage KJ Wright and Richard Sherman are playing with to the two-receiver side, Kaepernick makes the call at the line of scrimmage that we talked about earlier.
The call is repeated by the offensive line.
At the snap, Kaepernick begins to feign a dropback, and the left guard begins to pull.
It’s important to point out that the design of this play is telling Kaepernick to head to his right, but because of the reaction of the defense, particularly the nose and the Sam, he’s very smart to cutback to the left.
Some coaches would call this a QB power play, others would call it a “long trap,” but the difference is entirely academic. The line is blocking down and the pulling guard is supposed to work to create a crease to the right side.
The 49ers, like all other great offenses, have put their own spin on a classic play, and in this case it works beautifully.
Regardless, let’s talk about what happens next up front, and how Kaepernick responds.
With six gaps in the tackle box to defend and only five defenders, Seattle will need the guys up front to play extra aggressive once they begin to detect where the play is going. As a result, once the nose #69 Clinton McDonald feels the center block down on his left side, and he sees the left guard cross his face to pull around, he works to beat the center across his face and cut off the path of the guard to shut down the play before it begins.
This is in anticipation of the power run scheme that San Francisco makes a living off of, and McDonald is only doing what he’s coached to do, but as we’ve seen before, even the best defensive schemes have weaknesses, and good offensive coaches always have an answer up their sleeve.
As the play progresses, the right guard climbs to where Bobby Wagner is sitting, as part of the play design to create a crease in the defense to the strong side of the formation.
However once Wagner sees the giant hole start to develop on the backside of the play and Kaepernick go for the cutback lane, he evades the block of the guard #75 Mike Person. Because of his lack of leverage, the only way Person could’ve kept him away from the play was by grabbing onto his jersey and hoping the officials didn’t notice.
Once Wagner heads in pursuit of Kaepernick, it’s simply a race to see if Kap can turn the corner and get up the sideline and past the goal line before Wagner chases him down from behind.
This time, the defender is able to chase the quarterback down from behind, but not before Kaepernick picks up nine yards to set up third and one at the five yard line.
Conclusion
Let’s reflect again on what makes this play so successful:
First of all, Kaepernick’s superb understanding of the play, before and after the snap allows him to put the offense in the best possible scenario for success.
The stacked alignment of the receivers to the left side forced the defense to make it very obvious how they were going to defend it. Once the defense declared their intentions, all Kaepernick had to do was point his guys in the right direction. Since the defense was playing man across the board, San Francisco killed two birds with one stone by getting the edge defenders to vacate the area where the cutback lane developed, as well as putting an obstacle between the quarterback on the run and the free safety in the middle of the field tasked with being the last line of defense between the offense and the end zone.
While Kaepernick’s statistics have not always been stellar, there’s no doubt that having a mobile guy standing back there in the shotgun adds a whole new dimension to an offense, especially when he’s such a natural runner and can exploit the seams and creases given to him by the defense.
When you take an already dangerous and mobile quarterback, and put him in situations where it’s easy to diagnose what the defense intends to do, it’s almost like cheating.
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